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DESPATCHES,

CORRESPONDENCE, AND MEMORANDA

OF

FIELD MARSHAL

ARTHUR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.

EDITED BY HIS SON,

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.

[*IN CONTINUATION OF THE FORMER SERIES.*]

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DESPATCHES,

CORRESPONDENCE, AND MEMORANDA,

OF

F. M. THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

TO LORD FITZROY SOMERSET. MEMORANDUM ON SPAIN. [277.]

Jan., 1823.

It is important to make the Spaniards feel, First, that they cannot get rid of their King without exciting the hatred, indignation, and enmity of all Europe; and that all concerned in his deposition or murder will undoubtedly suffer for it. Secondly, that a king being necessary for the government of their country, and a part of their system as established by themselves, it follows as a matter of equal necessity that the powers and prerogatives assigned to the King in the system should be such as to enable him to perform his duties; and such as in reason a king ought to be satisfied with.

If the situation of the King is not what it ought to be, if he has not the power to protect himself and those employed under him in the performance of their duty in the service of the public, and if the King has not reason to be satisfied that the power allotted to him by the law is sufficient, the country will never be in a state of tranquillity, be the system of government what it may.

There will be perpetual successive insurrections in one part of the country or the other; the King and his government will be a never ceasing object of jealousy and distrust, and sooner or later the catastrophe will happen which all good men deprecate. But not only is internal tranquillity impossible as long as this system lasts, but it renders foreign war and invasion certain. The family connexion between his Catholic Majesty and the King of France, the interest which the latter naturally feels for the welfare of the former, which the desire to re-establish the French influence in Spain will constantly induce him to manifest, will occasion a perpetual irritation between the two countries, as long as the situation of the King in Spain is not what it ought to be, which it may be expected will sooner

or later occasion war, and the successful invasion of the weaker country. Thus, then, those Spaniards who really desire the peace and welfare of their country must look to an alteration of their constitution which shall have for its object to give the King the power of executing his office.

I confess that I don't see any objection to this alteration, either in the antecedent conduct of the King, or in the apprehension that his Catholic Majesty will abuse the power thus confided to him. The King will feel the advantages of the position in which he will find himself, and will have no motive for wishing to overthrow the system established, particularly if the alteration is made in concert with him; and, moreover, the spirit of the people and the exertions of those individuals who have prevented the existing system from being overthrown will preserve that to be established, even though the King should be desirous of overthrowing it by the abuse of the power entrusted to him. This will be the case particularly if the proposed alterations of the system are concerted with the King. Indeed, no other mode of making these alterations can have the desired effect; as, if they are not made in concert with the King, H. C. M. will not cordially carry into execution the system proposed, and both king and people being dissatisfied, there will still be the same causes for internal disturbance and for external war as exist at present. The concert with the King on the alterations to be made must be a real one; and the King must be satisfied that the constitution as altered will secure the foundations of his power over the executive government, and will give him the means of protecting himself, and his servants. Neither do I see any reason for deferring to make these alterations in the recent transactions of foreign Powers. Those transactions are all defensive. France by her Army of Observation professes to be on the defensive, and that she will not pass her frontier excepting on the occurrence of certain cases.

The alteration of the constitution on the principles proposed would render those cases so improbable as that the continuance of the Army of Observation would be a useless expense, and there is no doubt that it would be withdrawn.

Then another advantage which would result from this alteration in aid of internal tranquillity is that France would most probably immediately adopt some efficient measure to prevent the assembly of the Royalists within the French frontier. All Spaniards

who pass the frontier might be ordered to reside at such a distance from the frontier as to render their intrigues or their operations within the Spanish frontier nearly impossible, and thus the asylum given in France to persons of this description would not be inconsistent with the peace and tranquillity of Spain.

But this is not all; the Spaniards must see that all the sources of the prosperity of their country are nearly destroyed, and that the very foundations of social order and government are in a state of risk. There is no trade, no private or public revenue, the national property cannot be sold, the interest of the national debt cannot be paid, nor can the army, or any of the public servants or establishments; and no more money can be borrowed.

I happen to know that the principal monied people in Europe will not lend their money to Spain till they shall see a system prevail in that country which will afford some hope of the re-establishment and permanence of peace and good order.

If all this be true, if it be true besides that the best chance that Spain has of coming to some arrangement with her revolted colonies, is to be found in some settlement of her internal dissensions and distractions, it is impossible that any reasonable Spaniard can doubt that the time is come at which a great effort should be made to effect those alterations which the common sense of mankind points out to be necessary.

WELLINGTON.

To General Alava. [278.]

MI QUERIDO ALAVA, Londres, Janvier, 1823.

J'ai reçu votre lettre, et je vous remercie beaucoup de la gazette que vous avez ordonnée qu'on m'envoie. Je désire connaître les détails de votre position en Espagne un peu mieux qu'ils ne me sont connus par les gazettes anglaises et françaises.

J'ai vu avec grand plaisir que vous aviez le désir que votre ministère eût été très modérée dans sa conduite et dans ses réponses aux communications faites par les ministres de France et les trois Cours continentales.

J'avais bien conseillé cette modération dans les conversations que j'avais eues à Paris avec les amis du gouvernement Espagnol, et j'aurais désiré qu'elle eût continuée jusqu'au départ des ministres des trois Cours de Madrid, malgré les provocations des notes écrites pour faire la demande des passeports.

Mais dans toutes questions de cette espèce, surtout quand elles regardent vous autres Espagnols, il m'a toujours paru qu'il valait mieux tenter de trouver un remède pour un mal imminent que de discuter la manière par laquelle il est arrivé.

Il me paraît que le ministre de France va être retiré de Madrid en conséquence des réponses données aux ministres des trois autres Cours. Nous en avons même des indices, et vous pouvez vous assurer que la guerre ne tardera pas longtemps à suivre.

Je ne vous écris pas pour vous flatter; et je vous dis la vérité avec la même franchise avec laquelle nous discutions jadis. Vous êtes tout à fait en faveur des réformes, et il faut compter que vous n'avez rien qui soit capable à résister à la force qui va être employée contre vous.

Vous trouverez que je ne me trompe pas ordinairement en calculs de cette espèce; et soyez sûr que ce que je vous dis est la vérité.

La France n'a pas une armée comme celle de Buonaparte ni comme d'autres que nous avons vu faire la guerre contre lui. Mais on se trompe si on croit que l'armée française ne fera pas son devoir en Espagne, et qu'elle n'est pas assez forte ni en état de battre tout ce qu'on peut mettre en campagne contre elle, et de vaincre toute résistance.

Quelle honte! d'être obligé de se soumettre dans les temps actuels, après avoir résisté à Buonaparte!!

L'Espagne, j'espère, n'en sera pas subjuguée; et il faut croire que les résultats politiques ne seront tels que le désirent ceux que souhaitent et fomentent cette guerre. Mais quels que soient les résultats, il m'est clair qu'au moment où cette guerre commencera, le terme de la tranquillité, du bonheur, et de l'indépendance de l'Espagne est fini pour nos jours.

Je suis assez certain du fait quand je vous donne l'assurance qu'en France on désire la paix autant que vous autres en Espagne devez la désirer. Ils la désirent non parcequ'ils craignent leur armée, non parcequ'ils doutent des succès militaires, non parcequ'ils ne sont pas sensibles aux avantages à la dynastie régnante de tels succès, mais parcequ'ils ne peuvent prévoir ni la fin ni les résultats de la guerre, avec exception seulement d'une longue et énorme dépense.

Je vous demande donc si la saine raison n'exige pas que tout ce que vous êtes de modérés en Espagne se coalisent pour effec-

tuer cette réforme dans votre systême qui puisse mettre votre pays dans le cas de concilier sa voisine puissante et menaçante ou de la résister. Je ne veux pas ici répéter les raisonnemens à ce sujet que vous aurez vus de ma part adressés à d'autres ; mais soyez persuadé qu'une telle réforme fondée sur le principe que j'ai déjà indiqué est le seul et le vrai remède à tous vos maux et à tous vos dangers.

Il paraît que vous croyez que l'Angleterre ne peut pas voir l'Espagne envahie par la France sans s'en mêler, et vous vous fondez sur ce que j'ai pu dire aux officiers de l'armée à Tarbes qui ont voulu s'opposer aux mesures du Roi en 1814.

Observez que nous étions en France, et que la paix n'était pas signée ; et qu'il s'agissait ni plus ni moins que d'une mutinerie et une guerre civile.

Je n'étais pas alors, non plus qu'à présent, le gouvernement Britannique ni son organe. Si je l'eusse été, vous pouviez à peine fonder votre attente de notre appui sur une telle assurance. Je tâchais, comme général, de persuader à ces officiers de ne pas s'embarquer dans une guerre civile ; et entre autre conséquence, je leur montrais que leur pays probablement continuerait à être l'arène où se battraient la France et l'Angleterre. C'était une hypothèse tout à fait à propos au moment ; mais il ne s'ensuit pas qu'à tout moment, et sans connaissance de cause, l'Angleterre doit faire la guerre à la France quand celle-ci la fait à l'Espagne, ou prendre part à ses dissensions civiles.

Mais en tout cas il est impossible que vous ne regardiez pas comme un malheur pour votre pays le renouvellement des scènes où nous avons passé ensemble. Une guerre civile et étrangère dans son pays n'est pas à désirer, même quand on peut en espérer des succès par le secours étranger ; et je vous supplie, au lieu d'y penser, de regarder fixement ce qu'exigent le bonheur et la tranquillité de votre pays, dans son intérieur aussi bien que dans l'extérieur, et de songer aux moyens de l'accomplir ; ces moyens vous pouvez vous assurer que vous trouverez seulement dans le courage et la détermination des hommes modérés comme vous-même.

Croyez moi, &c.

WELLINGTON.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Stanhope Street, 2nd Jan., 1823.

I have looked at the despatches which have been sent to Sir William A'Court, and find that there are two which relate to the subject on which we were speaking. The first (which is that which you saw at Paris) does not confine the proposition distinctly to the exportation of arms and ammunition, and distinctly refers to the Foreign Enlistment Bill. The second refers only to the exportation of arms, stating that he (Mr. Canning) has heard that the Spanish government had entered into contracts here for arms, and that arms and ammunition could not be allowed to be exported to them, unless they consented that we should also allow them to be exported to Spanish America, as well as to all other countries. But both this despatch (which, however, does not mention the Foreign Enlistment Bill) and the first propose a "*repeal*" of the prohibition, which looks as if Mr. Canning thought that the exportation of arms and ammunition could not be allowed, except by a repeal of part at least of the Enlistment Bill. Now the fact is, that arms and ammunition may be allowed to be exported under license to any place whatever, whatever may be the construction of the Bill in question; but I entertain the greatest doubt whether there is anything in that Bill which renders a license to export arms and ammunition necessary. That Bill prohibited, among other things, the fitting out armed vessels to aid in military operations against any foreign Power without his Majesty's license; and in another clause authorizes the seizure of the arms and ammunition, &c., found on board *such* vessel. But that clause did not authorize the seizure of arms and ammunition on board of an *unarmed* merchant vessel. It must, therefore, be under some other Act no way relating to Spain, which renders a license necessary for the simple exportation of arms. As, however, under any construction it will not be necessary to repeal the Foreign Enlistment Bill, or any part of it, to be enabled to allow the exportation of arms, I think that the proposition made to Spain is reasonable and even desirable. It is,—"We apprise you that we cannot allow you to purchase arms of us unless you will allow us to sell them also to your revolted colonies, and to all other Powers. We now refuse licenses (by your desire) to export to your colonies, and, on the principle of strict neutrality, we must refuse them to you. Release us from one prohibition, and we will withdraw the other." It will certainly be desirable if our manufacturers can be allowed to export arms everywhere. The only thing, therefore, that we have to guard against, as it appears to me, is, lest under a misapprehension of the operation of the Enlistment Bill Mr. Canning should propose to repeal it, or any part of it, for the accomplishment of that which can be done, without any reference to Parliament whatever.

I hope I have not seen this in too sanguine a light, and that I shall have the satisfaction of hearing that your apprehensions have been removed for the present.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Count Toreno to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, le 6me Janvier, 1823.

J'ai déjà commencé à recevoir des réponses aux communications que j'ai faites à mes amis, et je tâcherai de vous en faire part par leur ordre.

La première qui se présente, c'est celle de demander à l'Angleterre une médiation pour arranger les affaires du jour, c'est-à-dire, celles de l'Espagne en Europe, conjointement avec celle de l'Amérique. Cette communication n'a pas été mal accueillie ; le ministère ne l'a pas repoussée, et tout le parti modéré des Cortès la recevrait avec empressement, si en même tems que le ministre Anglais à Madrid annoncerait confidentiellement les bonnes dispositions de son gouvernement pour adopter cette médiation, il promettait aussi de sa part qu'il s'opposerait à toute intervention armée contre l'Espagne des autres puissances du continent, pourvu que le gouvernement Espagnol se conduisit avec modération, ne fermant pas les portes non plus aux arrangements définitifs avec l'Amérique et aux modifications constitutionnelles que dans l'intérêt de l'Espagne elle-même devraient se faire. Le parti exalté suivra l'impulsion du Ministère, et *celle dont je vous ai parlé.*

La seconde communication en ordre, c'est celle, Monsieur le Duc, de votre voyage à Madrid. Mes amis croient qu'il serait fort convenable, mais qu'il faudrait le préparer d'avance. Ils pensent, et dans mon opinion ils pensent fort bien, que votre personne ne doit être mise en aucun compromis moral, avant d'avoir toutes les probabilités du succès. C'est là l'intérêt de l'Angleterre, c'est aussi celui de l'Espagne. C'est pourquoi il faudrait d'abord établir de certaines bases préliminaires, du moins confidentiellement et de manière que les Ministres et la majorité des députés fussent persuadés de l'utilité et du noble objet de votre voyage. Vous seriez alors reçu en triomphe et d'une manière digne de vous. Un des bons moyens de communication est celui de Lord FitzRoy Somerset avec le Général Alava ; celui-ci est l'intermède entre le parti modéré des Cortès et les exaltés. Sa franchise militaire et ses précédents le mettent dans une bonne position, et des lettres écrites par Lord FitzRoy Somerset qu'il puisse montrer, produiront un excellent effet, et prépareront les esprits, surtout quand on verra qu'il ne s'agit que des intérêts bien entendus de l'Espagne qui doivent être aussi ceux de l'Europe. Cette remarque sur l'utilité de cette correspondance ne vient pas de moi ; on me la fait de Madrid ; c'est pour cela qu'elle est d'un grand poids.

Quant à la réforme constitutionnelle, il faut la préparer de longue main. C'est la manière la plus sûre et la plus solide de la faire. Les obstacles les plus forts qui se présentent, ce sont ceux qui dépendent de la Constitution elle-même ; j'ai eu l'honneur de vous en parler dans la note que je vous ai remise ici. D'une part si l'on se conduit inconstitutionnellement dans cette réforme, les liens sociaux si relâchés dans les changemens politiques pourraient l'être tout-à-fait, et les hommes turbulens y trouver un prétexte pour exciter des troubles. Mais d'une autre aussi, si on laissait s'écouler le tems de huit ans en ne commençant à les compter que depuis 1820, la ruine de l'Espagne et de son Amérique pourrait se consommer, ou leur bonheur se trouver très compromise. Dans cette embarras je trouve un moyen qui pourrait nous conduire à un heureux dénouement. Ce serait de travailler

afin que ces Cortès déclarassent que les huit ans s'étaient écoulés, chose qui n'est pas contraire au texte de la Constitution, et qu'on préparât les esprits pour faire de bonnes élections le mois de Décembre prochain, dont les députés ratifieraient cette décision des Cortès de cette année-ci, et exécuteraient les réformes. Il est vrai qu'il faut qu'un an s'écoule avant que les modifications aient lieu; mais en attendant on donne un gage de plus à l'Europe, on peut faire un armistice avec l'Amérique, et préparer des traités de commerce, et faire d'autres choses trop importantes pour pouvoir être improvisées. D'ailleurs les intérêts sont si grands de tous les côtés, qu'il est convenable d'aller avec un peu de lenteur, si l'on peut éviter par là une catastrophe; une guerre entre la France et l'Espagne est une affaire très chanceuse, et au milieu de l'esprit novateur et inquiet de l'Europe entière, surtout *de la France*, les chances pèsent plus en faveur de l'Espagne, que du gouvernement de cette dernière nation.

Il est fâcheux que dans ce moment de crise l'affaire des prises de Porto Rico, &c., se soit présentée, et d'une manière menaçante au gouvernement Espagnol. J'espère que tout s'arrangera amicalement, et que tout cédera aux intérêts d'une nature plus élevée qui existe maintenant.

Nous attendons avec impatience la réponse de Madrid à la note du gouvernement Français. Je me flatte que vos conseils et vos insinuations n'auront pas été oubliés. Il est à regretter que ce gouvernement-ci ait parlé du principe qu'il croit vicieux (celui de la force) dans la révolution d'Espagne. Ce n'était plus le tems de rappeler ces choses-là. Il avait reconnu ces changemens en 1820 sans faire une telle observation; et vraiment ce n'était pas au gouvernement actuel de France à reprocher à celui de l'Espagne l'origine *de la force.*

J'ai tout lieu de croire, Monsieur le Duc, que vous continuerez vos bons offices par rapport à l'Espagne; elle a été témoin de votre gloire et de vos grands exploits militaires; plût à Dieu qu'elle le soit aussi de celle que le sort peut-être vous destine d'être son pacificateur.

Agréez, Monsieur le Duc, l'hommage sincère de mon estime et de ma haute considération.

LE COMTE DE TORENO.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Lord FitzRoy Somerset.

MY LORD, Foreign Office, 6th Jan., 1823.

In returning to your Lordship the Memorandum, which the Duke of Wellington has put into your hands,* of the points upon which it may be advantageous to the King's service, that your Lordship should communicate verbally his Grace's sentiments to such of the persons now taking a leading part in the affairs of Spain as may be likely to be influenced by a communication of this confidential nature, I have very little to add to the contents of the Memorandum, and that little relates rather to the mode of your acting upon it than to the substance of the paper itself.

Important as the aid which your Lordship will bring to Sir William A'Court must be, you will, I am sure, be aware of the absolute necessity of

* See page 1.

not appearing to be invested with any separate *mission*, which might detract in the eyes of the Spanish ministers from that gentleman's official or personal authority. Your Lordship will be so good as to consult Sir William A'Court's wishes and opinions as to the occasions on which, and as to the persons with whom, you should enter upon the topics entrusted to your discretion; and you will report to him your several conversations, not disguising from the individuals with whom those conversations are held that you are to do so.

At the same time, however, that you will be thus careful to mark your relation to his Majesty's established minister, it will be essential to avoid creating the impression that the suggestions which your Lordship has to offer on the part of the Duke of Wellington as the friend and well-wisher of Spain are only in another shape *demands* on the part of your government.

A voluntary compliance with the suggestions of the Duke of Wellington will enable us to mediate for Spain with France with an effect infinitely more powerful. But we do not, like France, demand anything of this sort as the price of our forbearance to break with Spain.

What *is* necessary to enable us to mediate for Spain with honour is the redress of the grievances which we have against Spain. But that matter is in Sir William A'Court's hands, and is I hope in a train of settlement.

With respect to the length of your stay at Madrid, I have only to refer you to your own and Sir William A'Court's joint discretion. I shall hope to hear from your Lordship soon after your arrival, and as often as there is a safe opportunity of writing.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GEORGE CANNING.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Coombe Wood, 7th Jan., 1823.

The King has agreed to the whole of the arrangement which I submitted to him in the most kind and cordial manner. He came into the proposal of calling Vansittart to the House of Lords without the least difficulty, and said everything that could be most gratifying to Vansittart upon the occasion. He left the question of Cabinet for Huskisson to my *discretion*, but repeated his objection to the existing members. Canning and I have agreed that for the present Huskisson ought not to press it, and that he may have an assurance that the point shall be conceded either upon the first vacancy, or, if no vacancy shall occur, when he has held the office of President of the Board of Trade for a twelvemonth. To this he has assented, though not with as good a grace as I should have desired for his credit. It is still desirable that the secret should be kept till the election arrangements can be settled. I intend to send out cards for a Cabinet dinner on Wednesday, the 22nd, which will bring us all together a fortnight before the meeting.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

General Alava to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MI QUERIDO SEÑOR DUQUE, Madrid, el 8 de Enero de 1823.

Ya habrá recibido Vuestra Excelencia los periódicos del "Espectador" desde el 1° de este, que por orden suya me encargó Lord FitzRoy dirigiese al oficio de la Ordenanza.

Por fin llegáron las notas de las tres potencias, sobre cuyo contenido omito hacer reflexiones; y sobre todo sobre el language de la de Rusia. Es menester convénir que San Miguel ha debido necesitar de suma prudencia, y de dominio sobre sí, al oirse tratar de rebelde y de perjuro, como todos sus compañeros del éjercito de la Isla; y si el Autócrata crée que el *knout* es un excelente remedio para corregir á sus vasallos, se engaña miserablemente en pensar que puede aplicarse igualmente á los Españoles. Sin embargo créo firmemente que al tratarse mañana este asunto en sesion publica se conducirá el Congreso con toda la circunspeccion Española.

A la Francia se le ha contestado en terminos muy moderados y dignos; sin establecer princípios, pero sí declarando la decision de repeler la fuerza con la fuerza, si llegáse á atacarnos. En cuanto á los socorros que ofrece á nuestro gobierno, se le contesta con suma urbanidad, agradeciéndolos, pero sin admitirlos; y asegurándola que el mejor socorro y auxilio que puede darnos es el de dejarnos tranquílos, retirar un ejército que alimenta las esperanzas de los facciosos, y abstenerse de dar á estos la proteccion que aquel gobierno les dispensa publicamente en su pais con escandalo general, y en desprecio de todos los tratados.

Nuestros negocios con ese pays se despacharon ayer favorablemente en sesion secreta par unanimidad. Pero si la guerra se declarase ¿podrán los Ingleses permanecer neutrales? No lo creo, y ruego á vuestra Excelencia que traiga á su memoria lo que en 1814 dijo V. E. á los oficiales Españoles en Tarves quando llegó la noticia de los sucesos de Madrid, y la de que el Rey habia hechado á tierra la constitucion.—Vuestra Excelencia dijo "Que á toda costa debia evitarse la guerra civil, por que si esta se encendía, la Francia tomaria parte en ella, y en tal caso no podria dejar la Inglaterra de tomar la suya." Estas palabras, que tengo bien presentes, son tan exactas, que para mi es imposible la neutralidad Inglesa si los Franceses toman una parte activa en nuestras disensiones. Nosotros no provocaremos la guerra, porque ni nos conviene, ni estamos para ser agresores; pero si rechazaremos toda agresion de su parte; y vuestra Excelencia sabe demasiado el odio que se profesa á los Franceses por nuestro pueblo para no conocer que á los dós meses de entrar estos en España se volverán contra ellos los mismos facciosos que vengan á sostener.

Ofrézcame Vuestra Excelencia á los pies de mi Señora la Duquesa; tenga la bondad de ofrecer mi memoria á la familia de Lord Maryborough, con mis recuerdos á Lord FitzRoy; y crea V. E. que es su mejor amigo y el mas agradecido

M. R. DE ALAVA.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 8th Jan., 1823.

Your letter of yesterday has arrived in very good time.

I have adopted all your suggestions, and I hope shall have removed all your objections. You shall have an amended edition to-morrow. I send the draft to the King to-night, and shall deliver the note to M. Marcellus, and dispatch my Spanish messenger as soon as I receive the King's sanction.

Ever most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

Lord Liverpool has probably told you that I at length succeeded in persuading Huskisson to postpone. The King deserved that he should not be pressed by the grace with which he consented to leave the decision in Liverpool's hands.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 11th Jan., 1823.

I was not able to keep my promise the day before yesterday, nor to redeem it yesterday; because the King did not return the draft, which I sent for his approbation on Wednesday, till this morning; and then only upon my communicating through my new Under Secretary to his friend at Brighton the importance of having it back. Three days have been lost thus in despatching my messenger to Madrid, which is unlucky. But I fear the delay has originated in indisposition.

I now send you a copy of the note, in which I hope you will find nothing objectionable.

I hope it places us on the best ground, not only with Spain and with France, but with the continental Allies. I have tried the effect of it (that is of the substance and tenour of it) as it stands, both upon Lieven and Esterhazy; and pointed out the *Frenchifying* the question of peace or war, as the best way of avoiding collision with the three great powers; and they have professed themselves to be not only satisfied, but infinitely *relieved* by what I have told them.

I send you an extract of a letter from Sir Charles Stuart, announcing to me the effect produced by my private letter (which I showed you) upon Chateaubriand. You are to observe that I said nothing to Stuart about it.

I received at the same time a message from Chateaubriand through Marcellus; expressing his gratitude for the letter; which he said had not only delighted him, and so forth, but had materially strengthened his position with the King; and begging me to continue to write to him; promising at the same time, "*d'agir dans mon sens*," to the utmost of his ability.

The promise must be tried by experience; but I have thought it best not to let Chateaubriand's good disposition cool; and therefore I have written to him to-day, a letter of which I enclose a copy (to be returned to me).

I ought to tell you, in order to explain parts of it, that a letter from him had crossed mine, which appealed to my anti-revolutionary sentiments, and

breathed anything but the spirit of peace. His professions through Marcellus are subsequent to that letter.

I have sent a copy of Toreno's letter, which you were so good as to send me this morning, to Sir William A'Court under the strictest confidence.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[279.] *To Count Toreno.*

MONSIEUR LE COMTE, Wherstead, 13me Janvier, 1823.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 6me, et je prends la première occasion pour y répondre. Je vous prie d'observer que ma réponse est toute officieuse; que je ne remplis aucune charge qui me met dans le cas de ne pouvoir vous rien dire de la part du gouvernement; et que me trouvant à la campagne où je n'ai pas même l'occasion de pouvoir consulter les opinions des autres, je ne peux que vous communiquer les miennes.

Vous pouvez vous assurer que l'opinion du gouvernement Britannique sera toujours opposée à toute intervention armée dans les affaires de l'Espagne, à moins que l'Espagne ne la provoque par sa conduite.

Mais il lui serait impossible de promettre de s'opposer à une telle intervention dans aucun cas, et surtout sans connaître exactement les antécédents; et encore moins avec l'objet de pouvoir persuader l'Espagne à demander la médiation de S.M.B. D'ailleurs une telle promesse ne consisterait nullement avec le caractère de médiateur que le gouvernement de S.M. désire prendre; et je m'assure que vos amis en Espagne verront qu'ils peuvent se servir du gouvernement de S.M.B. plus utilement pour leur cause dans le rôle de médiateur qu'en tout autre, et que la promesse préalable qu'ils désirent avoir, ne consiste pas avec l'impartialité qu'un médiateur doit observer.

Vous aurez su que Lord FitzRoy Somerset a été envoyé à Madrid. Sa mission est fondée sur l'intention de faire des communications verbales, en aide de celles qui auront déjà été faites par le Chevalier A'Court. Il verra le Général Alava, avec lequel il aura probablement des communications confidentielles qui lui feront connaître ce qu'on pense ici sur la position des choses.

Vous connaissez mieux vos affaires que moi, et les difficultés qui doivent résulter de tout effort pour améliorer la Constitution. Cependant je dois vous avertir que le temps se passe, les

malheurs augmentent et se compliquent, et vous n'avez de remède que dans la réforme de la Constitution.

Vous avez une guerre civile, et vous êtes menacé d'une guerre étrangère, dont la conséquence immanquable sera une invasion, qui doit nécessairement aggraver les maux de la guerre civile, dont elle prendra les formes, et sera suivie de toutes les conséquences désastreuses. Vous perdez vos domaines d'outremer, et vous n'avez aucune ressource pour pouvoir faire face à cette complication de maux. Vous n'avez ni revenu public ni particulier; et le crédit de l'Espagne n'existe plus, car je sais de ma connaissance personnelle que les capitalistes de l'Europe ne veulent plus vous prêter de l'argent tant que vos affaires se trouvent dans la position où elles sont.

Vous dites qu'une guerre en Espagne est une affaire chanceuse pour les autres. Mais quel bien vous fera la ruine d'une autre, et surtout de la dynastie royale en France?

A tous ces maux de l'Espagne il y a un remède, le changement d'un système de gouvernement dont tout le monde avoue les défauts, et son inaptitude pour gouverner l'Espagne; et il faut observer que cette opinion est fondée non sur des théories, non sur la malveillance, non sur des vues d'intérêt personnel, et qu'elle n'est pas l'opinion d'une petite minorité, mais qu'elle est générale et presque universelle, et celle de ceux qui ont été les meilleurs amis de la Constitution et même de ses auteurs.

Malgré qu'un changement soit clairement l'intérêt de l'Espagne, je serais le dernier à vous en conseiller un qui aurait l'apparence d'être dicté par qui que ce soit, et surtout par les puissances étrangères. Mais avant de recevoir cette lettre vous aurez vu jusqu'à quel point elles y sont intervenues; et malgré que je n'approuve pas leur démarche, que j'ai tant fait pour les en dissuader, il y a au moins ceci à en dire, que le coup, si c'en est un, est donné, que l'Espagne est libre à faire ce qu'elle veut, et que les relations de la France avec ces puissances en égard de l'Espagne sont pûrement défensives.

Ainsi donc la politique ne fournit aucun motif pour ne pas faire la réforme que la raison et le bon sens exigent impérieusement; et je ne peux pas comprendre comment il est possible que tous les honnêtes gens ne se liguent pas ensemble pour pouvoir porter, sans perte de temps, une réforme si nécessaire pour les intérêts et le bonheur de chacun, et pour l'existence même du pays comme corps social.

Pour ce qui regarde les questions des prises de Porto Rico, &c., vous pouvez vous assurer que les circonstances où elles se trouvaient, et le nombre et l'aggravation des plaintes, y ont forcément attiré l'attention du gouvernement de S.M., et que s'il n'y avait pas donné son attention, et que si l'on n'eut pas écouté les plaintes en Espagne, il aurait été impossible pour le gouvernement de S.M. de rien faire qui aurait pu vous être de quelque utilité.

Cette lettre vous prouvera, Monsieur le Comte, l'intérêt que je voue toujours au sort de l'Espagne ; un intérêt que les circonstances si intéressantes de ma vie passée et la reconnaissance me feront sentir toujours.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[280.] *To Lord* ———.

MY DEAR LORD, Wherstead, 14th Jan., 1823.

I have received your Lordship's letter of the 7th instant, and, having referred to my correspondence and to that of your Lordship with the Secretary of the Commander-in-Chief, I must say that I can do no more to prevail upon his Royal Highness to promote you than I have done already.

Your Lordship knows well that it is quite impossible for me to recommend any individual officer to be promoted by brevet. There are hundreds who deserve such promotion; and unless the Commander-in-Chief will give me permission to recommend a list, common justice requires that I should refrain from recommending any. Your Lordship stands recommended by me as other officers do; but it is quite impossible for me to press your individual claim without giving you a preference to others which you could not wish for and I could not grant.

Ever, my dear Lord,

yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

The Hon. Frederick Lamb to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Paris, 16th Jan., 1823.

Within these few days there has arisen here a very general notion that the French army in the south is not to be depended upon. For some time back there have been articles in the papers stating the reform and sending away of non-commissioned officers and soldiers without stating their offence. Now the names of officers said to be well disposed are quoted as having written that a system of carbonari is organized in most of the regiments. Of course I can form no opinion upon the real value of those reports, but they gain ground here, and perhaps tend to their own fulfilment. The reasoners recollect that the Spanish revolution was produced by the army assembled in the Isle of Leon for an expedition to which it was averse, and the inference will of course be presented to the French army. Talleyrand, talking of those reports, said to me yesterday, "Il faut les croire, car les ministres le disent eux-mêmes." I asked him if this was certain. "C'est si nouveau," he answered; "qu'il est permis d'y soupçonner quelque ruse, peut-être est-ce un moyen de disposer la Cour à la paix, mais je vous assure le fait." The expectation of war has gone on gradually increasing up to this time, and the libéraux are in high spirits at it. "Je ne sais pas si on fera la guerre, mais je sais encore moins qui signera la paix," is Talleyrand's speech upon it; probably he thinks it will be himself. The only way out of this crisis seems to me to lie in the most complete cordiality and understanding between the French government and ours; and instead of advancing towards it, we seem to me to be getting into a system of concealment and controversy. Perhaps I am not justified in writing this even to you; but I feel that impressions are sometimes more strongly received in one place than in another, and that the calling your attention to them can do no harm, and may be useful; at all events I have no fear of being misinterpreted by you; you know that I have no object except that the thing may go well; but I should be most excessively sorry if you were to mention my letter to anybody, and have no doubt it would produce me a disagreement in some shape or other.

Believe me, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

F. LAMB.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Madrid, 22nd Jan., 1823.

I arrived here very early yesterday morning, and I was never more tired of a journey in my life. Nothing could be more tedious than our progress through Spain. A very heavy fall of snow began soon after we left Irun, and continued for many hours; so that we had some difficulty in getting over the high ground near Salinas and Mondragon, and after Vittoria we were constantly stopped, either from want of horses or from the state of the

* Afterwards Lord Beauvale.

roads arising from the snow. Every horse worth five shillings has been stolen by the "facciosos." The mules are good enough, but not sufficiently numerous; and the passage of M. Bulgary detained me twelve hours in one place. The country is in a sad state, and the people are ruder and more unaccommodating than ever. Indeed the sort of indifference we met with from the postmasters and postillions was such as we might expect to find in America, où les droits de l'homme are so well understood.

I have seen Alava, and think him looking pretty well. He is grown very grave, and is much affected in his spirits by the state of the country. I have not yet communicated to him the object of my mission, but I think, from his refraining to question me on the object of my coming here, that he is aware of it, and that he is afraid that I shall call upon him to become the channel of communication with the persons of much of your sentiments on the necessity of modifying the Constitution. I shall speak to him, however, as soon as I have settled with Sir W. A'Court my mode of proceeding. Sir W. thinks I have not much chance of success. He considers it to be quite impossible to prevail upon any party to act in concert with the King. Alava has sent you the 'Expectador,' which is reckoned the best paper here, and he has promised to give me this morning the journals of the proceedings of the Cortes, in which the speeches of Galiano and Arguelles are given in detail. It is quite clear from what he says that, in case of invasion, the Government will not allow the King to fall into the hands of the French. The only amusing thing I have heard is that the priests have persuaded the Facciosos that the Constitutionalists have *ravos*. The other day Mina ordered a young man for execution who had been taken with arms in his hands, and who threw himself at his feet, saying, "Spare my life, and I will become a Jew like yourself." The Royalists, too, call Torrijos a Jew.

The King has got the gout, and has not been seen for some weeks.

Your most faithful and affectionate,

FITZROY SOMERSET.

Alava has not brought me the proceedings he promised me.

Le Prince de Metternich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MON CHER DUC, Vienne, ce 23me Janvier, 1823.

J'ai soumis dans le tems les deux lettres confidentielles que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser après votre retour à Londres, à S.M.I., qui m'a chargé de vous en remercier.

Le courier que Mr. R. Gordon expédie ce soir à Londres y porte les résolutions définitives de l'Empereur sur l'affaire pénible de *l'Austrian Loan*. Vous vous convaincrez que S.M.I. n'a qu'une parole; elle vous avait dit qu'elle consentirait en dernier résultat à régler la chose au taux de 3,000,000 de livres sterling, dont un million acquittable en matières, en réservant toutefois la fixation des termes de l'acquittement. Elle s'était flattée qu'une diminution pourrait être consentie par le gouvernement Bri-

tannique sur le montant de la somme; celui-ci s'est prononcé contre, et l'Empereur admet ce qu'il a dit qu'il admettrait.

Maintenant il s'agira de régler, dans le plus bref délai possible, le détail de l'affaire; et si de votre côté on y met ce qu'il nous faut, c'est-à-dire des égards positifs aux meilleurs modalités, afin que nous puissions payer sans faire courir à tout notre système de crédit le risque d'une culbute, on parviendra à s'entendre bien vite. L'Empereur désire que tel soit le cas; l'intérêt bien entendu de ses finances elles-mêmes est à l'unisson avec les vœux de S.M.I. Il est donc impossible que l'on ne s'entende pas. Je me refère avec une confiance entière aux rapports de Mr. Robert Gordon; il est appelé à dire ce qu'il sait et ce qu'il a appris et observé dans tout le cours d'une transaction que je compte personnellement parmi les plus pénibles de ma longue carrière.

Ne voulant point arrêter le courier de votre ministre, je me borne, mon cher Duc, à vous offrir les assurances de ma considération très distinguée, et de mon bien sincère attachement.

METTERNICH.

To Lord Bathurst. [281.]

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, Stratfieldsaye, 27th Jan., 1823.

Since I spoke to you on the subject of the despatch of the 10th December I have looked at it again; and I was very certain that the writer had not been aware of the law under which the export of arms to Spain was prohibited. But the repeal of the Foreign Enlistment Bill was in terms proposed! It may be a question how far it may be fair neutrality between Spain and France so far to alter the position of the former in relation to the latter at the moment of the breaking out of the war as to allow her to purchase arms in this country, from which purchase she had been so long prohibited; but it is quite clear that to remove the prohibition it is not necessary to repeal the Foreign Enlistment Bill.

Ever yours, most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Madrid, 27th Jan., 1823.

I take advantage of the departure of a French courier to inform you that M. de la Garde received orders the day before yesterday to demand his passports; and he at the same time received two despatches from M. de Chateaubriand, one of which he is directed to read to M. de San Miguel and the other to him and the King, stating the intentions of the French govern-

ment. Both papers are very important, and you should see Sir William A'Court's despatch, giving the substance of them, as soon as possible. Notwithstanding that they announce that the Duc d'Angoulême is immediately to place himself at the head of 100,000 men, and that the royalist corps of Bessiere and Hulmann are on this side of Guadalaxara, having defeated the constitutional troops under O'Daly, (who lost the only guns in the field), the Empecinado and Abisbal, neither the government nor the Cortes have yet made any communication to us. I suspect O'Daly owes his disaster to the idea, on which a Spanish general always acts, that it is necessary to cut his enemy off. In the endeavour to get round Bessiere, he so weakened himself that the attack upon which he imprudently ventured did not last five minutes, and in the evening Bessiere turned round and beat the Empecinado almost as easily and with greater loss in muertos y heridos, among whom are a good many of the Madrid militia. I am assured that Abisbal, who was last night driven out of Guadalaxara, having the day before only taken the command from O'Daly, has not now above 800 men, including cavalry, under his command. He is either at Alcala or at the Venta de Mecco. Yet it is not expected that Bessiere will come further.

The Cortes have to-day authorised the government to employ "en servicio activo" the Council of State, and Ballasteros is, I believe, to have the command here. I should not be surprised if we were to have a change of ministers in a few days. Their warmest friends were abusing them pretty roundly this morning.

Your most faithful and affectionate,

FITZROY SOMERSET.

The Hon. Frederick Lamb to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Paris, 27th Jan. 1823.

I thank you very much, my dear Duke, for your kind letter. The reports about the French army have diminished, but the approach to war is rapid, and it seems now to be inevitable unless our interference prevent it.

The real active promoters of it are ten or fifteen people, who surround Monsieur, who employ his name with the Deputies, and by means of their power in the Chambers urge the ministers further than they are disposed to go.

The war is neither the work of the government nor of the nation, but of this court party; and to prevent it this court party must be acted upon.

It has already shown itself to be inaccessible to reason; if anything can move it it will be fear.

The exaltation in it has greatly increased from the idea of the weakness of the Spaniards. A march to the Ebro is looked upon as a party of pleasure, and the plan at present is, when the Duc d'Angoulême arrives on the frontier, to recognise the Regency, adding to it some fresh members, collecting round it a mock Cortes, and accrediting to it as Commissary Jules de Polignac, who prefers this employment to the Embassy in London.

The Duc d'Angoulême is averse to the war, but acts from obedience to the King.

The King is supposed to desire peace, but he is full of prejudices, which increase the difficulty of preserving it, and is not active enough to take a decisive part.

In this way a few individuals, whose names are hardly known, are deciding the fate of France and of Europe. Among them are Jules de Polignac, Baron de Bruges, Vitrolles, l'Archévêque de Paris; probably you know many more of them.

It remains to see in what way England can efficaciously interfere. I look upon an interference through the ministers as hardly striking at the root of the evil. If the action of the war party is not diminished, the ministers must either advance towards war, or yield their places to new men.

The only efficacious step I can contemplate is a letter from our King to the King of France, stating his anxious wish for peace, and his hope that a contest may be avoided, which would open the door to new revolutions, and might place him in the unnatural state of being opposed to a Sovereign with whom he had made common cause for thirty years, and whose interests he always regarded as his own.

If such a letter could be brought by some man of great name and services, who would be in immediate relations with the King and with Monsieur, I think a disposition for peace might be created in the war party, arising from fear, and I look to no other motive as *now* adequate.

To enable the French government to retreat with honour, it is necessary that the Spaniards should make some concessions. But I should be sorry to see concessions offered until a fear of war has been created here, they would only tend at present to increased pretensions.

In the state of things I contemplate use might again be made of Metternich. He does not wish for war, and it would be just a trick in his way to pretend to act still with the Emperor of Russia, and yet to assist us underhand to maintain peace.

The march of the Guards to the frontier requires forty-four days, so we may calculate what time we have to operate in.

I expect that the departure of the Guards and the debates in the Chambers may create some slight alarm as to the effects of the war, but the real fear can only come from England. Already there is a check to industry. Workmen are thrown out of employ in almost every trade in Paris. But it is felt that a war with England would be the annihilation of credit, the loss of all capital employed in commerce, and the diminution of the value of all enterprises and property whatever.

Whether the Court would have courage to face such a prospect you can judge better than I. The nation certainly regards it with the greatest apprehension.

Not venturing to write to you again without having heard from you, and being strongly persuaded of the truth of what I state, I have sent a note of it to Mr. Canning through a hand which may get it a more favourable reception than if it came from me.

The whole résumé of my opinions may be shortly stated. That the

danger of war arises not from the government, but from a part of the Court. That the Court cannot be acted upon except by fear.

I believe the whole question to be yet in the hands of England, but without her efficacious interference I am convinced we shall have war.

Whether you think with me or not, pray don't mention me; and

Believe me, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

F. LAMB.

The Hon. Frederick Lamb to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

DEAR DUKE, Paris, 28th Jan., 1823.

I wrote in such a hurry yesterday that I am afraid I hardly explained myself. Your view of the march of this affair is the truth itself, but it has led to a state of things very different from what it was when you were here.

The same means which would then have been sufficient would not be so now.

If you can present to this Court, on one hand concession from the Spaniards, and on the other fear of our taking part, you may yet preserve peace. The best mode of doing this would be your arrival with a letter from the King. If you are not prepared to take so decided a line you must expect war. The language of Monsieur is that he regrets it, but that it is inevitable. The clergy urge it strongly, they somehow connect it with the interest of the Church. I happen to know intimately a great friend of M. de la Bourdonnaye. He is disappointed by the warlike tone of the King's speech, as it weakens his hope of overturning M. de Villèle. I am confirmed in my opinion that Villèle must either act against his opinion, or yield his situation.

We are abused on all sides on different grounds, yet all look to us, and to us only, for peace. The wildest only of the Libéraux and of the Ultras rejoice in the war.

Langenau writes me word that Metternich has put off his German proposition in the Diet till the middle of March. I shall therefore linger on here as long as they will let me, it is full of interest.

You may have heard that it turned out that Canning had no pension to give me, which forces me to hold Francfort a little longer, which under all circumstances I detest. I want to be out before Lord George Bentinck is put over my head.

You can hardly conceive how easy these people have come to regard the war.

Ever yours,

F. LAMB.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Stanhope Street, 28th Jan., 1823.

I send you a 'Gazette' which prohibits the exportation of arms, &c., to Spain, &c. In the event of war between France and Spain, upon a principle of neutrality, we must either extend the prohibition to France or revoke it in favour of Spain, &c. This order you will see has no reference whatever to the Foreign Enlistment Bill, but under the provisions of the 29 Geo. II.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

At the Court at Brighton, the 15th of November, 1822, present, the King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

Whereas the time limited by his Majesty's Order in Council of the 18th of May last, for prohibiting the exportation of gunpowder, arms, or ammunition, to the places therein specified, will expire on the 30th day of this instant November; and whereas it is expedient that the said prohibition should be continued for some time longer; his Majesty, by and with the advice of his Privy Council, doth hereby order, require, prohibit, and command, that no person or persons whatsoever (except the Master-General of the Ordnance for his Majesty's service) do, at any time during the space of six months (to commence from the 30th day of this instant November), presume to transport any gunpowder or saltpetre, or any sort of arms or ammunition, to any port or place within the dominions of the King of Spain, or to any port or place on the coast of Africa (except to any ports or places within the Straits of Gibraltar), or in the West Indies, or on any part of the continent of America (except to a port or place, or ports or places in his Majesty's territories or possessions on the continent of North America, or in the territories of the United States of America), or ship or lade any gunpowder or saltpetre, or any sort of arms or ammunition, on board any ship or vessel, in order to transporting the same into any such ports or places within the dominions of the King of Spain, or into any such port or place on the coast of Africa (except as above excepted), or in the West Indies, or on any continent of America (except as above excepted), without leave or permission in that behalf first obtained from his Majesty, or his Privy Council, upon pain of incurring and suffering the respective forfeitures and penalties inflicted by an Act, passed in the twenty-ninth year of the reign of his Majesty King George the Second, intituled "An Act to empower his Majesty to prohibit the exportation of gunpowder, or any sort of arms or ammunition, and also to empower his Majesty to restrain the carrying coastwise of saltpetre, gunpowder, or any sort of arms or ammunition;" and also by an Act, passed in the thirty-third year of his late Majesty's reign, cap. 2, intituled "An Act to enable his Majesty to restrain the exportation of naval stores, and more effectually to prevent the exportation of saltpetre, arms, and ammunition, when prohibited by Proclamation of Order in Council."

And the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of his Majesty's Treasury, the Commissioner for executing the office of Lord High Admiral of Great Britain, the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, the Master-General and the rest of the principal officers of the Ordnance, and his Majesty's Secretary at War, are to give the necessary directions herein as to them may respectively appertain.

JAS. BULLER.

[282.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Brighton, 1823.

I enclose you a Memorandum upon the only subject connected with foreign politics on which the King spoke to me yesterday. I don't think I ever saw him more disturbed than he was on the subject of the Order in Council. He has heard that the Spaniards are exporting 60,000 stand of arms, and he thinks that we shall be accused of knowing of this exportation, and of having repealed the Order in Council to favour it.

He desired me to write a Memorandum of what had passed between us, and to show it to him; but he did not ask to see it in the evening, and I did not tell him I had written it. After he had retired to his apartment at night he received your letter with the news from Madrid of the 19th, given by Mr. Cock.

He sent for me immediately, and afterwards for Lord Bathurst, and was very much annoyed at the effect of Lord Liverpool's speech, as stated in Mr. Cock's letter. He entered again upon the subject of the Order in Council, and desired we should mention to you his anxiety to have it clearly explained.

I tried again the reasoning upon the analogy between the enactment of the Enlistment Bill and the repeal of the Order in Council; but I don't think he was so satisfied with it as he had been in the morning. I shall be in town for the Cabinet to-morrow, as will Lord Bathurst.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM REGARDING ORDER IN COUNCIL PERMITTING EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO SPAIN.

His Majesty expressed to me his anxiety about the Order in Council permitting the export of arms to Spain and her colonies, which, combined with the effect of Lord Liverpool's speech on the first day of the session, as represented in Sir W. A'Court's despatch, was calculated to mislead the Spaniards in respect to the intentions of this country, and considering the vast supply of arms, not less than 60,000 stand, which they had exported, it was likely to be complained of by France as a breach of neutrality, as well as by his Majesty's Allies, after what had passed at Verona.

His Majesty particularly observed that the Order in Council altered our position relatively to the two contending parties; and gave to one of them (Spain) an advantage which she did not possess when the discussions between the two powers commenced.

I stated to his Majesty what the nature of our proceedings had been in 1819 regarding the Foreign Enlistment Bill. That we were at that period neutral in the contest between Spain and her colonies, but that it was found that the colonies enjoyed an advantage in the service of his Majesty's subjects. The Foreign Enlistment Bill was brought in then to render his Majesty's neutrality perfect, and by depriving one party of an advantage it enjoyed exclusively, to give each party in the contest equal advantages; that the Order in Council must be considered in the same light, and must be justified on the same grounds as the Foreign Enlistment Bill had been.

His Majesty approved of this view of the case, and particularly desired that I would tell Mr. Canning that he wished that the case should be thus explained to Spain, as well as to France and to the Allied Courts. He wished that the Spaniards should be made to understand that his Majesty did not intend by this Act to favour their cause, or to do more than render his neutrality perfect and equal to both parties, and that it should be fully explained to France as well as to the other Allied Courts in the same terms.

I asked his Majesty if he had seen the despatches to France and Spain upon this subject. His Majesty said he had, but that he did not think either of them explained the case sufficiently.

His Majesty expressed his wish that the same opportunity should be taken of calling the attention of the Allied Courts in a more particular manner than had been done yet to the deviation of the French government from the line agreed upon with the three Allied Courts at Verona, as well in principle as in all the details; and that those Courts should be called upon to unite to bring back France to the course agreed upon; and that those Courts should be assured that his Majesty had done and would do everything in his power to prevent the contest, and that he had observed in everything the most strict impartiality.

WELLINGTON.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Madrid, 29th Jan., 1823.

I wrote you a few lines by a French messenger the day before yesterday. We have since received intelligence of the retreat of the "facciosos" on Sacedon and of the advance of Abisbal to Guadalaxara, from whence, having formed his junction with Velasco, who has come from Aragon with about 1000 or 1200 men, he intended to proceed in pursuit of the enemy.

The loss of the Constitutionalists has been pretty considerable, particularly in dispersos and prisioneros. The latter I understand amounted to 1200; but they have been allowed to return home and have been kindly treated whilst in the hands of the other party. Notwithstanding the smallness of the force which the government were able to collect to cover Madrid, they took no adequate measures to supply it with provisions, and I am assured that several men of the Empecinado's corps absolutely died of hunger. One must bear in mind that he had the militia with him, who had never before made a march or quitted Madrid, and therefore fatigue as well as hunger may have contributed to their death.

I understand that Ballasteros owes his appointment to the distrust which is generally entertained of Abisbal. Ballasteros is looked upon as a Communero, and his address to the troops, which you will see in the 'Espectador' of yesterday, on his nomination, would show that he still wishes that faction to consider him disposed to act as may be agreeable to them. I have been told, however, that his opinions are not so extravagant as they have been represented, that he is aware of the objects of the violent Jacobins, and that in the actual situation in which the country is now placed he is not unlikely to side with those who desire the establishment of a good government. But the difficulty is to find anybody who will take the first step. If Bessiere's corps had persevered and had moved upon Madrid, after the defeat of the Empecinado, when, in point of fact, he could have met with no opposition, the Exaltados would have been at our feet; but as the danger of immediate overthrow diminishes, the reluctance of these patriots to pronounce an opinion, which might excite a popular feeling against them, prevents them from taking a step which can alone preserve to them any portion of the present constitution.

The King has lately told several people that he does not wish to return to the system of government pursued from 1814 to 1820; but at a moment when the facciosos have been so successful and when a French army of 100,000 men has been announced to him, I doubt much that he is sincere in his professions. The horror in which he is held is universal; and I find no one, however dissatisfied with the present order of things and however convinced that a change is necessary, who is disposed to revert to the former system.

It is amusing to hear the members of the Conseil d'État talk. They all speak openly of the necessity of a reform, but they at the same time declare that it cannot be brought about by them; that they are bound by their oath to originate no measure, and though it be true that the Cortes are equally bound to propose no alteration but in the mode prescribed by the constitution, yet as that assembly is composed de la canaille, of men without

honour or regard for their oaths, there could be no occasion for them to be delicate or to plead the solemn engagement which they have contracted to avoid bringing forward such modifications as the present moment may render necessary. This was gravely observed to me by a Conseiller d'Etat whom you know, and who acknowledges his obligations to you with a readiness which gives me pleasure.

Alava is very much changed; is very grave and unhappy at the state of his country. He is afraid, too, of committing himself; but I think the late disasters which the government troops have met with will tend to open his eyes and to convince him that something must be done. Not, however, that under present circumstances he will take a leading part himself, and perhaps considering his connection with us it is as well that he should not. He may be more useful as an intermédiare.

M. de La Garde has asked for his passports, but as late as last night he had not received them. The ministers I presume did not wish him to depart till it should be known that they were likely to repair the defeats their troops have just experienced. He has given Sir William A'Court copies of the two despatches which I mentioned to you in my last. It is evident from the one marked confidential that war is the object of the French government. If it were otherwise they would not exact as a condition that the King of Spain should place himself at the head of the Spanish army and meet the Duc d'Angoulême on the banks of the Bidassoa. M. de Chateaubriand might be certain that such a proposition could not be complied with, and he could have advanced it solely with the view of rendering war more certain. The insertion of my name and Sir W. A'Court's in this extraordinary despatch could only have been made to give the Spaniards an idea that England was acting in concert with the French government. I have omitted to say that Sir W. A'Court will send copies of these papers to Mr. Canning by to-day's messenger.

The rumours of a change of ministry continue. What the moderate party out of the Cortes hope for is the return to administration of Martinez de la Rosa, Moscoso, &c. San Martin, who was the Xefe Politico of Madrid on the 7th of July, is a man of more character than any of them, and is the only one who has no fear of clamour or a mob. But it is not impossible that if these ministers were to resign they might be succeeded by those who are still more violent than themselves, and then we should only go from bad to worse. In the mean time there is no society in Madrid, and the dullness of the place is beyond all description.

Your most faithful and affectionate,

FITZROY SOMERSET.

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The French messenger referred to in the beginning of this letter not having been dispatched, I send the letter of which he was to have been the bearer with this.

10 at night.

La Garde has not yet got his passports, and the Xefe Politico informs him that he has not time to sign them.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Pavilion, 1st Feb., 1823.

Liverpool has this morning received a letter from Canning, in which he says, "From what I have heard from Paris to-day, I am sure that the profession of neutrality is much too large, and will have the effect of ensuring war." This part of the speech is therefore to be considered to-day. As you will not be able to attend to-day, I write to ensure your attendance and that of Lord Westmorland to-morrow.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

[283.] *To Lord Bathurst.*

Maresfield, 1st Feb., 1823.
½ past five P.M.

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST,

I have received your note of this morning, and write by the messenger to tell you that I shall certainly be in town to-morrow by two o'clock. I have shown your note to Lord Westmorland, who proposes to be in town likewise at that hour.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

NOTE from Mr. CANNING to Lord LIVERPOOL at Brighton.

I earnestly hope that you remember that the speech is liable to revision, and that you will not have given any copy of it before we meet. From what I have heard from Paris to-day I am sure that the profession of neutrality is much too large, and will have the effect of ensuring war.

[The speech of 1823. Mr. Canning had it altered after it was agreed to in Cabinet and read and approved by the King.]

[284.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

London, 3rd Feb., 1823.
At night.

MY DEAR MR. CANNING,

I return your letter, which I had in my pocket to give you at the Cabinet, but I forgot it. I have since kept it locked up.

I wish you would reconsider the last paragraphs of your despatch respecting neutrality. Why should you account to the French government for the omission of the word in the speech? May not the French government consider this complaisance on your part in a different light from that in which

you intend it; or at all events so represent it? They would say, he directs his Ambassador to state to us the reason why the word Neutrality is not mentioned. They mean then to be neutral. If not, why should they say anything on the subject? I here suppose that our neutrality (which I admit is desirable to them) is what induces them to go to war; and that the certainty of our active interference in favour of Spain would stop them in their career, which I really believe it would not.

But I'll now put the case the other way, and suppose that they take alarm at the paragraphs in your despatch, and that it is whispered at Paris, as it certainly will be, that you have hinted that we shall not remain neutral. Are you not apprehensive of the consequences here of the *contrecoup* of such a report from Paris? Putting out of the question the immense losses to individuals from the fall of the funds, might we not find the country unmanageable upon the question of war or peace, if it was discovered that the government doubted whether it should remain neutral?

I think we stand on admirable ground in the speech; and your despatch is perfect without the last paragraphs, which are at least not necessary for the discussion of your subject.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON. Gloucester Lodge, 4th Feb., 1823.

A few minutes before I received your letter this morning I had received a despatch from Sir Charles Stuart, which had induced me to consider whether it might not be advisable to *separate* that part of my despatch of yesterday, to which your letter refers, from the preceding part. Your letter determined me to do so.

Since that Marcellus has been with me, and has asked "whether *neutrality* was to be announced in the speech?"

This has given me an opportunity of writing to Sir C. Stuart on that subject, in the way of *explanation*, which I hope may have all the good effect and none of the ill that might have followed from a gratuitous bringing forward of the subject.

If you could call at the Foreign Office in your way to the House of Lords, I should be glad to show you what I have written. I shall be there at four.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Madrid, 9th Feb., 1823.

I enclose the 'Patriota' of yesterday and the 'Zurriago' of the day before, both of which contain violent attacks on the present ministers. The first was the paper in which were published the debates of the Laudaburcana Society; the latter has been considered as the most violent of the periodical publications. The article to which I wish to draw your attention is curious, inasmuch as the dislike which it expresses of the present ministers is grounded on the circumstance of their being freemasons; and it is supposed here by the friends of the government that such an objection will have great weight; more particularly as it is stated that they, as being freemasons, are excommunicated. Ballasteros, too, who attributed his late appointment to the command in Biscay and Navarre to an intrigue to get him away from Madrid, is strongly incensed against the present administration, and has advised the King to dismiss them. The King has assured him that he would very readily do so if he could be assured of support in the Cortes; but that without that he could do nothing, although ready to nominate any persons who might be pointed out to him as most fit for employment.

I cannot help thinking that this earnest desire among the "communeros" —for such the Zurriagistas, the 'Patriota,' and Ballasteros, may be considered—to get rid of the ministers, proceeds from a knowledge that they will take no step to bring about modifications which these gentlemen are aware can alone save them from receiving the law from the French army; and if I am right in this supposition, there is reason to hope that the war may still be avoided. If the "communeros" were once to declare openly for a revision of the constitution, they would be supported by the greater portion of the "moderados," who show no disposition to put themselves in front of the battle, although they are fully sensible of the consequences of their entering into hostilities with France. The original framers of the constitution might, indeed, still hold back, but they would stand almost alone.

Is it not extraordinary that the press is still in a great degree in the hands of the "Afrancesados?" The 'Diario Nuevo de Madrid' is constantly full of articles reflecting on the British government, in the style of the *Imperial Moniteur*, and they venture in this town to speak of Bonaparte as "el admirable guerrero," "el illustre caudillo," and they are not stoned for it. Alava is much pleased with your letter. He will answer it by the first opportunity.

The Royalist forces have evacuated the Seo de Urgel, which has been taken possession of by Nuna's troops. Bessiere's corps remains at Huete, which he has been for some days employed in fortifying, and Abisbal is looking at him and is doing nothing. There are not wanting those who say that Abisbal is playing a double game, and yet, notwithstanding that he is held in such general distrust, the government have nominated him to the charge of the 1st district, which will give him the command of Madrid. The 'Expectador,' which is now edited by Infante, a member of the Cortes, but is generally looked upon as M. de San Miguel's paper, contained, in some observations on the King of France's speech, in its number of Wednesday last, the most indecent attack on the dynasty of the Bourbons that it would be possible to pen. I inclose the paper of that day, and you will observe that the Bourbons are there spoken of as "*rancia, caduca, y*

disonante con la ilustracion del siglo." It cannot be supposed that the King can have much confidence in ministers who speak of him and his family in such terms. The government were absolutely forced to shut up the Laudaburcana. How do you think they accomplished so desirable an object? By getting an architect to declare that the building in which the meetings were held was in a dangerous state. The xefe politico who hit upon so notable an expedient is no other than the guerilla whom we found in this neighbourhood in 1812, under the name of "El Medico," and to whom you gave a sword, which he still has. He himself I believe belonged to the society. The weakness of the government in this affair is unpardonable, for the Cortes in general were so convinced of the impossibility of allowing the club to continue open, that they proposed to the government to bring the question before them (the Extraordinary Cortes not having the power to originate any motion), expressing a determination to support the measure they should recommend with a view to get rid of such a nuisance. The ministers, however, preferred the remedy of "El Medico."

Arguelles has received a letter from Lord Holland, in which I understand he urges him to continue to resist all propositions for reform, although he (Lord H.) adheres to his former opinions of the badness of the constitution. This would be good advice if Spain had withal to oppose a French army and if the war were to be carried on in another country; but when it is a matter of notoriety that they engage in the contest without either army or resources, such a suggestion is cruel and may do much harm, particularly as addressed to a doctrinaire, who cannot make up his mind to consent to an alteration of a system established by his influence. I am told that the letter is shown about.

This town is very quiet, and with a little management might easily be kept in order under any circumstances. I suspect that the sufferings of the militia under the Empecinado have had the effect of convincing them and their families that war is no joke, and that if they engage in it they may be required to do more than parade about the streets in uniform singing patriotic songs. The government is openly blamed for exposing "des pères de famille" to such hardships and dangers, and it is generally agreed that the militia should be demanded to do only the city duty and maintain order there. The opponents, however, of the present system, and particularly the grandees, affirm that the militia will act under the orders of the ayuntamiento to oppose the King's departure. Such an opposition, however, must depend on the number of regular troops which can be assembled here to cover that operation.

Your most faithful and affectionate,

FITZROY SOMERSET.

MEMORANDUM NO. 1. TO MR. CANNING, ON THE NECESSITY OF HIS PURSUING IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS THE LINE CHALKED OUT IN THE KING'S SPEECH. [285.]

10th Feb., 1823.

Mr. Canning is the Minister of the Crown in the House of Commons, and every word that will drop from him will be

scrutinized and weighed with the utmost nicety, particularly in regard to our foreign policy, not only in this country but abroad.

Conclusions will be drawn respecting the future views and intentions of the government regarding peace or war from what he will say, and every man will be prepared to construe the King's speech accordingly.

I earnestly recommend to him to confine himself in respect to the future to what was put into the King's speech. Every day's experience shows that this speech was satisfactory to the country, and that it is the desire of the majority of well-thinking people that our peace should be preserved, if possible.

It must be observed that the language of the Speech in the mouth of the minister is the best calculated to induce the Spaniards to listen to reason. It is from them that we must obtain concessions which may preserve their peace with France. It cannot be expected that any language held by the minister in Parliament will induce the French government to recede.

On the other hand, although I really believe that the wish of the soberminded and reasonable people in the country is that we should remain at peace if it should be possible, it does not appear that it would be very difficult to rouse the country to war, if war should be necessary.

It is not necessary, then, prematurely to deviate from the line adopted in the King's Speech.

To all this I have to add that I am certain that it would distress the King if he were to see that his minister in the House of Commons held a language more warlike than he had sanctioned in his speech. So far in respect to the future.

In respect to the past, there is no doubt that we have much reason to complain of the Allies in every part of their conduct respecting the affair of the day.

But the question is not whether the Allies have behaved well or ill, but whether the Minister of the Crown in the House of Commons can impeach their conduct; nay, more, whether if that conduct is impeached, he can avoid so far to defend them as to remind the House of their former services and of the friendly relations still existing between this country and them, notwithstanding their recent conduct.

It must be observed that the paragraph upon this subject was put in the Speech by the King's desire, and if the Allied

Sovereigns should be left without something being said in their favour the King will not be pleased.

It must be our policy not to offend these Sovereigns. We must wish and endeavour to remain at peace with them, and, remaining at peace, we must desire and endeavour to be on good terms with them. In proportion as we are upon good terms with them, we may hope that we shall influence their conduct in the expected contest between France and Spain; and that at all events the best mode of alleviating the evil which must be the consequence of a successful result of the invasion of Spain by France will be to prevail upon the Powers of the Continent hereafter to join with us to prevent France from profiting by that result by obtaining objects of French or family ambition.

If we allow the Sovereigns, our Allies, to be abused, and say nothing in their favour—much more if we join in such abuse ourselves—we may rely upon it that we shall excite the enmity of at least the most powerful of them, the Emperor of Russia, and that no opportunity will be lost of doing us an injury; and that on the contrary, a word said in his favour by the Minister of the Crown, which after all is due to him and to every Sovereign at peace with his Majesty, when he is run down by the Opposition in Parliament, will do more good, and will tend more to reconcile him to this country and to revive confidence, than anything that could be done.

I have one more observation to make, and that is that, in respect to the affairs of Italy the Austrians deserve our praise, and most particularly in respect to those of Piedmont, in which we did interfere and successfully.

WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM NO. 2. TO MR. CANNING — CONSIDERATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF GOING TO WAR, AND OF THE MODE OF CONDUCTING THAT WAR. [286.]

10th Feb., 1823.

The question of peace or war is very important, and I don't think has yet been looked at in all its bearings. I see that maritime war alone is thought of; but very little consideration

will show that unless we abandon our position on the continent of Europe that is impossible.

I'll first see who will be our enemies, in case we should enter into the war, whether only with ships or as a maritime and military Power. Secondly, what are the points we have to defend or to abandon in either case.

We may rely upon it that the first shot we may fire, whether at sea or on shore, will bring upon us declarations of war by the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, and even the Emperor of Austria and their allies and dependents. This is the natural consequence of what passed at Verona, and we should deceive ourselves if we do not reckon upon this consequence.

We are bound by treaty to defend the Netherlands and Portugal; and Hanover has a natural claim upon us which we should find the present King less disposed to abandon than the late King his father was.

But we may rely upon it that even if the King of France were disposed to allow us to thwart his measures in Spain by our operations at sea, and to refrain from diverting our attention from that element on which we have the undoubted superiority to the other on which the result may be more doubtful, we cannot suppose that the other Continental Sovereigns will be disposed to be equally moderate.

Hanover will be seized by the King of Prussia; the Sovereign of the Netherlands will be obliged either to declare war against us and to join what is already called the Continental Alliance, or to abandon his dominions; and Portugal, equally with Spain, will be occupied by a French army. It is the greatest mistake to suppose that if we enter into this or any war we can do it by halves, or confine our operations to one branch of our military power and resource. We must deploy our whole force by land as well as by sea, and, after all, we shall scarcely have enough to defend all that we are bound to protect.

If we omit to do so, whatever may be our maritime successes, we shall only come out of the war disgraced, and with the loss not only of Spain but of every other ally and possession on the continent of Europe.

For this reason it was that I lately recommended that before we should express anything like a menace or ill-temper upon the occupation of Spain by French troops we should consult our

Allies, and the King of the Netherlands in particular. But there is another view of this case, to which I beg to draw attention.

Supposing that we could, without loss or inconvenience, operate by sea only, what good could we do to Spain in her critical circumstances by such operations?

We might render difficult the siege of Barcelona and of other places on the coasts of Catalonia and Valencia, but not impracticable, as the events of the late war show; and we should render impracticable the siege of Cadiz, at least if the Spaniards would fortify and defend the Isla de Leon with the same skill and valour as both were done for them in the late war by our officers and troops.

But, in respect to the latter object, as it would be certain that the French would not undertake it if they knew that we intended to keep open the port, and considering the advantage which the Spaniards will derive from their carrying their operations to such a distance, I am not quite certain that we should not do them more harm than good by any measure which should induce the French government to abandon that enterprise. Thus, then, we should enter upon this war with a certainty of the loss of Hanover and of Portugal, and of the alliance with the King of the Netherlands; and with the equal certainty of doing no service to Spain excepting the doubtful one of preventing the French government from attacking Cadiz.

I leave out of the question all consideration of operations upon the French colonies. I believe it is admitted that no additional colony would be of any use to us, and I know that the French government are very doubtful whether the possession of any colony is advantageous to them. I likewise leave out of the question all consideration of the part the United States would take in this war, though I think that not doubtful.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Colchester, Tuesday, 11th Feb., 1823.

I thank you for the communication of Lord F. Somerset's letters (which I return), but still more for the letter and memoranda, which I have received from you at the same time.

I am indeed half inclined to quarrel with you for the beginning of that letter, from which it appears that you would not have spoken to me upon the subject of the Memoranda if I had not invited you to do so. Now this is not according to our compact. I hope you will never stand upon such ceremony again. Be assured that no suggestion of yours can ever be otherwise than most welcome to me; that if I do not always ask for them, it is only because the current business of every day so fully occupies and overflows the day, that I have seldom a moment for *seeking* communication, but that I rely upon your offering it; and, if I had not had that reliance, should have hesitated much more than I did to undertake an office so full of difficulty, at a moment so critical as the present.

Pray believe in the sincerity of this assurance once for all; and believe me

Ever faithfully yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

Could you call at the Foreign Office to-morrow?

Lord FitzRoy Somerset to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Madrid, 13th Feb., 1823.

A very important communication was made to the Cortes yesterday by the government, which you will see in the enclosed paper of this day. It was referred to a committee which reported upon it to-day. The report goes to recommend to the Cortes that authority should be given to remove the government, *i. e.* the King, Cortes, &c., from hence, provided such a measure should be necessary between this time and the 1st of March, when the ordinary Cortes assemble as a matter of course, thus limiting the power to that period, when, if the necessity shall not previously have warranted the transfer of the government to some other place, another application must be made to the Cortes. The report of the committee is to be discussed to-morrow. A military council is to decide upon the town at which the government is to be established.

Several of the most violent of the deputies are opposed to the King's removal, and from what I have heard to-day, I should say that it is doubtful whether or not the recommendation of the commission will be complied with. Canga would not attend it, though you will observe that he is one of the members nominated to the committee. The grandees and the inhabitants in general are averse to the King's departure, and it is not impossible that there may be a little row to-morrow if from the course of the debate it should appear that the measure is likely to be carried. If it should be rejected, those who are in favour of it must see that they have only to choose between the adoption of modifications and submission to the dictum of the French.

It is, therefore, a very interesting movement. Should anything important occur Sir William will send off another messenger, but he don't like to detain Mr. Jackson any longer.

The King repeats his assurance of his readiness to follow that course which shall be deemed most conducive to the prosperity of the country.

He has been for the last two days under an alarm that he was to be carried off in the night. The public manner in which the question of his removal has now been brought under consideration must tend to quiet his apprehensions. It is said, however, that the present mode of proceeding has been adopted solely because the government found it impossible to get him off privately. I rather doubt this account.

Your most faithful and affectionate,

FITZROY SOMERSET.

From Lord FitzRoy Somerset.

[Extract.)

Madrid, 14th or 15th Feb., 1823.

"I don't write to the Duke by this opportunity, which is a chance one. You may tell him that the Cortes have authorised the removal of the King and government in case of its being necessary, after a considerable debate in which Arguelles took the principal part, but that several who are looked upon as the most violent, such as Riego, Canga, Bertran de Lis, &c., opposed the proposition. In the course of the debate Arguelles mentioned a general amnesty as a measure which would be expedient at the present moment. The idea was well received, and has since been acted upon by the government to a certain extent, as they have proposed to the Cortes to proclaim an amnesty to those now actually serving against them. This has been referred to a committee, whose report was expected to-day, but I have not heard what the nature of it is, or if indeed it was made to-day. I hope the operation of the amnesty will be extended as much as possible, and that the officers of the Guards, who were implicated in the affair of the 7th of July, may be included in it. Bessiere el Faccioso has retired to the neighbourhood of Siguenza without suffering at all from the pursuit of Abisbal, whose troops appeared to have suffered much from fatigue and weather.

"The extraordinary Cortes close the 19th; the ordinary meet the 1st of March. Since writing the above I have learnt that the amnesty has passed the Cortes, but it applies only to the 'facciosos,' and is not extended to those already in prison. This is a pity, as it will do little or no good."

The Hon. Frederick Lamb to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Paris, 17th Feb., 1823.

You may like to hear something of the opinions of M. de la Garde. He holds that the great mass of the Spanish nation is inactive if not indifferent; that the contest lies between two small parties, of which the constitutional one is the most active and the most numerous; that the march of a French army to Madrid will meet with very little opposition, but that their remaining there would expose them to the greatest risks. He represents the situation to be a very unpromising one, but that if there is no retreating from it, at least the military operation ought to be made as short as possible, and not to exceed three or four months. These opinions have

increased his unpopularity with the war party without diminishing their eagerness for war; for some days they seemed to cast a damp over those whose opinions are less exalted. He says he has never been able to get the King of Spain to enter into any consideration or discussion of the state of affairs; that after he, M. de la Garde, had ceased to speak to him, the King's regular question was, "Les étrangers arriveront-ils bientôt?" and that when it was represented to him that their arrival might compromise his safety, he always answered, "Oh, je n'ai pas peur." La Garde will not say these things to me, but I am as sure of them as if I had heard them from himself. I never saw a town so full of reports and so alive to them as this at this moment. The interest it takes in the question is universal and extreme, and the general feeling is, not only aversion to the war, but indignation against those who are the cause of it. The King's speech and Lord Liverpool's were felt by all, except the war party, to place us on the best ground both for ourselves and for France. Lately there has arisen among the friends of the ministers a feeling that we have not acted *de bonne foi* in our attempts to obtain concessions from Spain. No greater mistake was ever made than the not communicating Lord FitzRoy's instructions; it has not only deprived us of the good effect they would have produced, and of the strength they would have given to the peace party, but it has laid us open to all sorts of misrepresentation and suspicion as to the object of his mission.

The foyer of the war party is always round Monsieur. The only possibility of a retreat lies now in a change of ministry, and I see no probability of it, unless for the worse, still less any means of contributing to it. All that could be done by showing the possibility of our taking part has been done in the best way by Lord Liverpool's speech.

I enclose General Aurial's order, which you may not have observed; there have been some officers broke before, but this is the first time I have seen a reason stated.

Have you any key to the meaning of the sort of declaration of neutrality in the Austrian 'Observer'? Is it that M. de Metternich will now assist us to prevent war? In that case he has declared himself rather late, but if he were in earnest, I should not even now despair. But I still hold that the only efficacious mode of acting is directly upon the King himself; not upon Monsieur, for he is too wild upon the subject to be converted; and I am equally convinced that if you had remained here we should have had no war. The abuse of us for not obtaining concessions evidently shows that the fear of war has increased upon some of the ministers, and it is only to the fear of it that I look for the last hope; but unfortunately the violence of the public discussions and declarations and their action and reaction between this and Madrid nip everything in the bud. To-morrow comes a discussion on the law for the veterans, and if it takes the turn I expect, with a violent speech from Chateaubriand, and a warlike one from Villèle, what can be expected but increased obstinacy and violence in Spain? I shall attend the discussion, and write to you if there is anything worth while.

Adieu, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

F. LAMB.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Madrid, 20th Feb., 1823.

The King dismissed his ministry yesterday, and under circumstances which in other countries would have rendered it impossible for him to take them back or for them to serve him; but intimidation, here the only powerful weapon, was employed last night to shake his determination, and he has submitted to recal them to their posts.

It is, however, desirable that you should know the causes which immediately led to their removal, although, as you will see by my private letter of yesterday to Mr. Canning, the King had already in contemplation the expediency of changing them. The night before last the ministers waited upon his Majesty in order to point out to him the propriety of making arrangements for the removal of himself and his family and the government from Madrid. The King is said to have answered that he did not think it necessary that he should then occupy himself with that question, as the situation of affairs was not so critical as to call for his departure. One of his ministers, I believe Gallo, observed upon this, that his Majesty's dislike or unwillingness to quit Madrid was not unknown; but that the government had decided that such a step was necessary for the honour and safety of the nation, and that the members of it felt they were strong enough to oblige his Majesty to go, however determined his objections might be. This reply irritated the King extremely, and he expressed his feelings in the most violent and offensive language. He told them that the government was in his person, and not in theirs; that they were his secretaries, and bound to obey his orders, while, on the other hand, no order of theirs unless given in his name was valid, and that they were cowards; and then, making use of the following phrases, which you will understand—"Car—o! car—o! Tengo mas cojones que Dios; tengo bastante cojones para comer á todos vosotros. Fuera! fuera, car—o!" he dismissed them his presence.

If the tone and manner of Gallo were as is described, it is natural that they should have excited the King's displeasure; but it is much to be lamented that he should so far have forgotten what he owed to himself and his station as to express himself in such coarse and vulgar terms; and his friends admit the fact of his having done so. Such conduct, and the knowledge that in a moment of difficulty he cannot be depended upon, will tend to make it almost impossible to bring about any changes in concert with him.

The conversation which I have above related took place between ten and eleven the night before last, and in about an hour afterwards the ministers appeared again at the door of the King's apartment with the intention of tendering their resignations. His Majesty, however, refused to admit them; and yesterday morning they were equally unfortunate, every attempt to obtain an audience having failed. As it was necessary that the Extraordinary Cortes should be closed, they were consequently obliged to appear there and read the speech, which the King, on the plea of ill health.

had objected to do in person. In the afternoon they were removed by a decree.

The vote of the Cortes of the preceding day having deprived the King of the power of employing the Council of State, he had nobody at hand to compose an administration. The friends of the ministry availed themselves of the opportunity of there being no government, to organise a row, and towards night they succeeded in collecting a crowd of about 500 people, who appeared before the Ayuntamiento at the Palace, some of them crying, "Mueran los Borbones! Muera el tirano!" while others cried "Vuelva el ministerio!" It was the poorest attempt at a riot that I ever saw, and six soldiers would have been sufficient to have dispersed it. Weak, however, as the effort was, it was sufficient to overcome the King's resolution, and he yielded *to the wishes of his people* about eleven at night. The 'Espectador' of to-day, which I enclose, will show you that the ministers profess a determination "á no entrar jamás en transaciones contrarias al decoro y á la dignidad nacional."

I also enclose the petition, or rather the remonstrance, of the Ayuntamiento, addressed to the King in consequence of the removal of the ministers.

It is remarkable that the sittings of the Cortes have never been closed till yesterday without some demonstration of public feeling; yesterday, however, though the concourse was great, though the galleries were filled, not a voice was raised in their praise, not a "viva" was heard, and the ministers walked through the crowd in their uniforms without attracting the least notice. Several publications have lately contained articles showing the necessity of their removal. Indeed, I have already sent you two papers on that very subject. The efforts therefore that were last night made to re-establish them must have proceeded either from their personal friends or from those who wish to degrade the King, and not from any general feeling in their favour.

The removal of the ministers was not the only cause of the dejection which was visible among the supporters of the present system yesterday. It appears that several towns in La Mancha, such as Alcazar de San Juan, Villa Cañas, and Herencia, have declared against the constitution; that that whole province is in so unquiet a state that a general insurrection may be expected.

The Jefe Politico of Guadalaxara writes word that the esprit is so bad that he will not answer for his district: and though in the paper of to-day it would appear that Abisbal has had some success at Siguenza, I believe it will prove that he has not defeated Bessiere, but that the latter is in a condition to make head against him. A party of "facciosos" have likewise occupied El Molar, a village on the great road to Burgos seven or eight leagues from hence. There has also been a riot at Colmenar which has rendered necessary the disarming the militia of that place. Colmenar is situated near the great road, and is about six leagues from hence. The militia of Madrid, under the Jefe Politico, has been sent there, and has occupied the town in order that a contribution might be levied upon it. To these disturbances may be added a riot at Cadiz, where the militia remained a whole day under arms in order to enforce the departure of a

regiment which was not esteemed sufficiently liberal. The Jefe Politico was there, however, firm, and the militia were at last induced to quit the position they had taken and retire to their homes.

I have not been able to ascertain the truth of the reports respecting the insurrection in Galicia, which have been for some days extremely prevalent.

I have, however, mentioned enough to show that the spirit of uneasiness and discontent is not confined to one spot or one district, and that this weak and inefficient government have quite enough upon their hands without having France upon them. Even in the neighbourhood of Madrid Bessiere's corps has been able to maintain itself for nearly three weeks, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the government; and Abisbal, who has never been able to muster a force of 4000 men, complains that he has been frequently without provisions. Such is the foresight of these ministers that they could not supply even a small corps which was posted in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital, and yet they talk of being able to cope with France.

If France be resisted it will be entirely owing to the people themselves, and in no degree to their rulers. But the spirit is not what it was in 1808, and it differs materially in one class of persons. I don't wish to mention it officially, but I think it right that the government should know that the invasion of the country and the occupation of the capital is not looked upon by the grandees and the higher classes as an evil of such magnitude as the continuance of the present system. In the established order of things they feel that they have neither power nor influence, and that their property is insecure, much having already been taken from them, and the compensation which they were taught to expect having been withheld. They are therefore, although unanimous against the re-establishment of absolute power, anxious for relief, come from what quarter it may; and hence it is that they hold the language that it is impossible to resist the advance of the French army. They are also opposed to the King's removal, from a conviction that if he remains till the French arrive the game is up. The personal efforts of the grandees in the late war were perhaps not great, but they set a noble example of devotion to the cause by abandoning all their possessions and by refusing to swear allegiance to Joseph.

In my letter of the 13th I mentioned that the question of the removal of the government from hence had been submitted to the Cortes, and in a letter which I wrote two days ago by a Spanish messenger, I desired that you might be informed of the result of the debate upon the report of the committee. Arguelles' speech, which occupied nearly two hours, showed anything but a disposition to conciliate. Though addressed to the passions it was, however, but coldly received by the galleries, and it was evident that the enthusiasm which was displayed on a former occasion had wholly evaporated. I am quite convinced that he is the great, if not the only, obstacle *in the Cortes* to any amendment in the constitution, and it is because he finds the ministers equally disposed to resist modifications, that he affords them his support. The amnesty which he recommended in his speech was afterwards proposed by the government and adopted by the Cortes; but is of so limited a nature, being confined only to the "facciosos"

now in arms, that I fear it will be productive of no advantage. We were told that Arguelles, who was President of the Committee to which the projet of the government was referred, was so convinced of the importance of the measure, that he would extend its operations and include everybody in it, except perhaps a few bishops. We have, however, been miserably disappointed, and the officers of the Guards, about whom it was said that there could no difficulty, have not been affected by it.

The debates in Parliament on the Address, and the general display of feeling in England in favour of the Spanish cause, will not tend to facilitate the adoption of any arrangement which might be proposed with a view to induce France to stop her warlike preparations.

Your most faithful and affectionate,

FITZROY SOMERSET.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Madrid, 20th Feb., 1823. Thursday evening.

This evening about five o'clock Sir William A'Court was summoned to the Palace, and he desired me to accompany him. We found the King sitting up in bed, having a slight attack of the gout. Very little passed at the interview. The King's object in desiring Sir William to wait upon him being to inform him that he did not like quitting Madrid, and if he did leave it that he should not do so *voluntarily*; and this he desired Sir William to communicate to the British government. Sir William assured him that he should feel it his duty to accompany his Majesty, and should be ready to be of any use to him if his services were required. This, with a few observations on the tumult of last night, of which he acquitted the people of Madrid, and which he attributed to a faction; two or three words about the ministry, whom he spoke of as "bien grossier," formed nearly the whole of what passed. He appeared desirous of talking of the constitution, and indeed remarked, "Elle est mauvaise la constitution;" but this topic was not encouraged by Sir William, who merely observed that it required some modification, and it was dropped.

Before, however, we took our leave, Sir William informed him that the French government now only required some extension of the powers of the Council of State and the fixing the qualification of the deputies of the Cortes. This apparently surprised him.

Your most faithful and affectionate,

FITZROY SOMERSET.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Madrid, 20th Feb., 1823. 10 P.M.

We were about to make up the mail when Sir William A'Court received the following important communication :—

Mr. Bertran de Lis desired Mr. O'Gorman to request Sir William to defer the departure of his courier till to-morrow. That the Council d'Etat, acting in concert with the Ayuntamiento, had determined to recommend to the King not to continue the present ministers in office, and that they were occupied in selecting persons as their successors, who should receive their appointments with the understanding that they should, through the mediation of Great Britain, endeavour to make up the differences of this country with France. Mr. Bertran de Lis added that he hoped to have the whole business arranged by to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock.

Sir William has accordingly decided not to despatch his courier to-night.

Bertran de Lis is a most extraordinary man, and though nobody knows what his real principles or politics are, I believe him to have more influence than any man here. He is brother to the man of that name in the Cortes. He is a violent *communero*, and yet he concealed several officers of the Guards in his house, and was very intimate with the French minister, M. de la Garde, up to the moment of his departure. His son suffered the punishment of death at Valencia during the government of Elio, and yet he has never ceased to have constant communication with the King, and particularly lately he has had frequent interviews with his Majesty. I believe he may be classed under the head of "grand intriguant," with a good deal of talent. I fancy he was originally a baker.

If he makes good his promises, I will not fail to inform you by this opportunity.

Your most faithful and affectionate,

FITZROY SOMERSET.

The Hon. Frederick Lamb to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Paris, 20th Feb., 1823.

The debate I announced in the Deputies has been put off till Monday, in order that they may have the reports on the veterans and on the 100 millions on the same day, and make but one debate on this great question. Chateaubriand's speech (I hear from pretty good authority) is to contain great praise of the conduct of England and particularly of Mr. Canning, and is to assume that the operation is to be a French one exclusively. It is odd that Pozzo undertook the day before yesterday a long conversation with me, exculpating himself from having urged on this state of things. He abused Villèle for not foreseeing the consequences of his own note and of the King's speech, but disclaimed having had anything further to do with any of these measures than foreseeing what they led to. He assured me in his own words, "que personne ne voulait plaies et

bosses;" but allowed that, in the state things were in, a military operation could not be avoided. In the course of the day I had been told that Pozzo had had letters from Petersburg, in which they thought that the French government had been rather in a hurry. I had looked upon this as mere gossip, but mention Pozzo's language to you for the chance of its throwing light on anything else. If the bon Dieu would send us but a trifling concession from Spain, there is fear enough here to let us out of the scrape, if not there are the materials in France of great misfortunes. I only hope you may be able to keep us out of it.

Most truly yours,

F. LAMB.

2 o'clock.

The town is full of reports of Villèle's defeat and downfall; if this be true all chance is over. Blacas has been intriguing for his post, and would very likely succeed him.

The Hon. Frederick Lamb to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Paris, 21st Feb., 1823.

I shall make no excuses for writing to you again at this urgent crisis. If out of the communications from Spain you have framed, or are yet able to frame, a distinct proposition to be submitted to this government peace may yet be preserved; but it must be something distinct, and the communications seem to offer the means of doing so.

Modifications of the constitution to be freely concerted between the King and the Cortes at the time allowed by the constitution, and amnesty might be the groundwork of it.

I have engaged Stuart to get Chateaubriand to put off or modify his speech, which would have been equivalent to a declaration of war.

It is very possible that the system cannot be changed here without a victim; it is evident that if the war system prevails it will be Villèle, if that of peace and negotiation it may be Chateaubriand, and our government must help (if necessary) to overthrow him. If this could be done, and Lainé succeed him, the cause would be gained. Pozzo told me that the difficulties in the Chamber of Deputies were nothing; that the government could carry a majority in any sense it pleased: others deny this, but I believe Pozzo's opinion to be the true one. It seems to me that we have at this moment the faint glimmer of a way out of these difficulties, provided it is ably seized. To this you must contribute as much as possible. Adieu, my dear Duke. I shall go in six days, but hope to be able to settle in England by the end of the summer.

Believe me ever yours,

F. LAMB.

Does not the state of opinion in England afford the means of representing to this government the danger of a war with us as imminent without employing it as a threat? If any means could be devised of procuring for

Stuart an opportunity of a direct conversation with the King, I should think it an advantage and an appui to Villèle, who in all these transactions has stood very much alone and unsupported. Might not also an offer to procure similar modifications in Portugal be thrown in? If the French government should be disposed to look upon this as a bonus, of which I am not sure, it would settle the whole question, which in any other way must remain imperfect. These modifications seem to be already understood to be, in the Spanish constitution, the creation of a second chamber, and the absolute veto. I don't know if there are any others, nor what would be the corresponding ones in Portugal, but even if we should ultimately fail in obtaining them entirely, we may yet save time and avert in the end this frightful war.

5 o'clock.—I hear that Chateaubriand will not assume in his speech that negotiations are at an end, and that which he professes would content him, if his phrases and eloquence are put aside, is not essentially different from what the Spaniards seem disposed to grant. But neither this government nor that of Spain will come forward with a proposition and pledge themselves to it beforehand. It remains, then, for England, on the data which she has, to frame one on which both parties may by her weight, powerfully exerted, be induced to negociate. This is the last chance I see; were you here I should think it a good one. If anything of the sort is tried I would even yet communicate FitzRoy's instructions.

F. L.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Madrid, 21st Feb., 1823. 5 P.M.

No arrangement is yet made, and Sir William, having plenty of messengers here, has determined not to detain his despatches any longer. It is, however, certain that the ministers will be removed. Indeed, they themselves and their own friends see that, after the scandal of the night before last, it would be impossible for them to continue any longer in the King's service. The arrangement of a new ministry is a matter of no small difficulty, and it may be some days before it is completed.

The *communeros* had drawn up a paper, condemning the late proceedings, to which, I understand, above 2000 names have been affixed.

The town was perfectly quiet last night, and continues so to-day. Indeed, the tranquillity of the city might easily have been restored on Wednesday evening, if the precautions which were taken last night had been adopted on the previous evening.

Your most faithful and affectionate,

FITZROY SOMERSET.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Madrid, 23rd Feb., 1823.

No administration is yet formed, and I have not heard that much progress has been made towards effecting that object. Bertran de Lis has sent no further message to Sir William A'Court.

The friends of the ministers say that, when the latter consented to remain in office, they did so on the condition that the King should permit the preparations for the removal of the government to be made; but that when they, on the 21st instant, waited upon his Majesty to urge the expediency of his no longer delaying to sanction that measure, he informed them that, being resolved that his departure should not be his own act, he had decided to refer the question to the Council of State. This answer induced Gasco, the Minister of the Interior, to tender his resignation yesterday, and I believe it will be accepted.

In the mean time the Council of State have been deliberating on the subject, and, though I believe they either have or will recommend that the means of transport for the King's journey should be held in readiness, they have shown themselves decidedly hostile to his departure, and have expressed themselves in society strongly adverse to it.

On the other hand the ministers have been in daily communication with the permanent deputation of the Cortes, where the unwillingness of the King to quit the capital and the disposition evinced by the Council of State to countenance his opposition to the wishes of the government have excited a good deal of irritation which will probably display itself when the Cortes shall open. Unfortunately the evident instability of the present order of things and the destruction with which it is menaced have not operated to awaken the deputies to a sense of their situation, and they still turn a deaf ear to every proposal of modification. That question they decline to agitate, but they feel qu'il s'agit de leur salut personnel, and therefore are determined that the seat of government shall be established elsewhere.

From the anxiety which has been shown to carry this point, and from the irritation which the King's refusal has produced, I should suspect that the object of the ministers was not confined to the point of preparation, but that they had intended to move the Court before the 1st of March, and to convene the Cortes at the place at which the King should take up his residence, instead of allowing it to open here.

It must be admitted that those who are decided to engage in the war are perfectly right to take every precaution to prevent the King from falling into the hands of the French, as they must be convinced that the game will be up as soon as that power shall have possession of his Majesty's person. But seeing, as they cannot fail to do, that the country is in no condition to contend with France, it must be a matter of surprise, as well as regret, that they should be so obstinate and infatuated as to prefer to risk the loss of the whole, rather than bring about a revision, which would preserve to them all that is valuable in their constitution.

I enclose the 'Patriota' of yesterday. The correspondence between Abisbal and the Empecinado will amuse you. The paper also contains

a remarkable letter from a man of the name of Rotalde, who was attached to the Staff of Castanos' army, and is said to have distinguished himself under Burgoyne, at the siege of Burgos. He was one of the most furious of the Laudaburcana Society, and is altogether as great a vagabond as ever lived. There is also a paragraph accusing ministers of establishing in the Plaza de la Constitucion a table for the receipt of signatures to a petition for a regency. There is always a post of cavalry in that square, which of course could have nothing to do with the table or the signatures. The story, however, is well put to operate against the ministers.

Since writing the above, Sir William A'Court has had a long conversation with M. de San Miguel, whom he had not seen for many days. M. de San Miguel gave Sir William to understand that he should not remain in office much longer. He also stated that in his opinion there was not the most remote chance of the adoption of any modifications, and that the British government had been under an error in supposing that such a measure could be effected, after the conduct pursued by the Allied Powers. "Let," said he, "the ministry be changed a thousand times, and I still think it would be impossible to find that man in Spain, who would under present circumstances go down to the Cortes, and propose to that body any change of the constitution, with a view to satisfy the government of France. I conceive, indeed, that it would be easier to upset the whole system and re-establish despotism, than to agree to the first demand of the French cabinet—viz., that the Conseil d'Etat should be named by the King." In holding this language he expressed his confidence that he was speaking the sentiments of the Cortes.

M. de San Miguel did full justice to the intentions of the British government, which he believed to have been throughout sincerely desirous of preventing a rupture; but he acknowledged that he was not so sanguine as to suppose that England would now embark in the contest and spend her treasure in the cause of Spain, although she might eventually be drawn into it, if Russia were to take a part in the war.

I have observed that by no means an uncommon impression here is, and I believe the same idea exists among the Liberals at Paris, that England owes the system of policy which her government has lately pursued to a fear of Russia; and I saw in a letter from Paris the other day, that "L'oligarchie Anglaise craint moins les radicaux que la Russie." The object of these gentlemen is always to discover any rather than an honest motive in the policy of our administration.

M. de San Miguel had not left Sir William long, when Mr. O'Gorman made his appearance with information of a very contrary nature. He stated that the "exaltados" were determined immediately on the opening of the Cortes, to bring forward a motion for deciding the qualification of a deputy; and, having gained that point, they intended to proceed on the question of the *eight years*, which, if they could succeed in carrying, would enable them to make any modifications in the constitution which they might consider desirable. He said that they spoke confidently of success, and flattered themselves that they should be too strong for the "moderados," whose opposition they had reason to apprehend. I hope they may be as good as their word; but hitherto they have not answered the expectations which their friends have held out to us on more than one occasion;

and unless the cry of the public be decidedly in their favour, I doubt their being able to outnumber the adherents of Arguelles, who has lately had everything his own way. A few days, however, will decide whether the opinion which M. de San Miguel has expressed of the sentiments of the Cortes be or not a correct one.

Mr. O'Gorman also held out the hope that a new administration was on the eve of being formed, and that the members of it would be chosen from a list which should be submitted to the Conseil d'Etat. From what, however, I have heard of the proceedings of that body to-day, I do not expect much from their deliberations. The King, it appears, referred to their consideration the resignation which had been tendered to him by Gasco; and out of twenty-three members, who were present at the council, eleven voted against its being accepted. The majority, indeed, were in favour of it, but the largeness of the minority shows that the support of the Conseil d'Etat cannot be reckoned upon as very important.

As Sir William will probably not send off a messenger till the new appointments shall be made, it is useless now to mention the names of those who have been talked of as the successors of the present ministers.

Your most faithful and affectionate,

FITZROY SOMERSET.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Stanhope Street, 25th Feb., 1823.

I have been thinking over the proposed mission to Madrid, and I am more and more convinced that it will be unadvisable for you to accept it.

To whom are you to be sent? With whom are you to negotiate? What rational hope is there of final success? You are too great a card to be employed on such an adventurous mission. The Jacobins of France would have too great an interest in contributing to your failure, and you are not called upon to make such a waste of public character.

But this is not all. It is not only what good will you be able to do at Madrid, but what good are you sure to do here? Consider only what has passed during the last three weeks. I am sure you will see that the mischief which would have happened, if you had been absent at Madrid then, would have counterbalanced all the advantages which the most sanguine can imagine you could have obtained there. I am convinced that you will not have been absent a fortnight, before you will, and all of us will, repent it. Let me then implore you not to absent yourself at such a crisis, on such a mission.

Yours ever most sincerely,

BATHURST.

Your accidental absence on the Saturday before the meeting of parliament has entailed much embarrassment upon us.

The Hon. Frederick Lamb to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Paris, 28th Feb., 1823.

No mention has been made to Stuart from home of the idea of your coming out. I state this, because it does not tally with your letter. If I thought there was a chance of your passing through, I would strain a point to remain here till then; but this mess in Spain seems to me to destroy all chance of it, nor can I regret it. I think your presence here would have been fully as useful as it could be there, or more so; yet, since the King's speech, I should have been sorry to see you come out. By rights you should never have quitted Paris; but I cannot wish to see you return here, or go to Madrid, when the enterprise has become, if not hopeless, at least, more dependent upon circumstances than upon the weight or power of the individual engaged; added to this, the bad faith of Ferdinand would make me very sorry to see you set out for Madrid.

The Duke of Orleans begged to see me to-day, and gave me an account of an interview with Monsieur, who has found his full courage again, and will not admit of the possibility of war not taking place. He scouted the idea of any concession from the Spaniards averting it, and looks upon it as the easiest of undertakings. He told the Duke that the first debates in the British parliament had rather alarmed him; that if England were really likely to take part with Spain, that would be serious; but that all the accounts from thence, and a careful examination of the speeches, showed that the British government meant neutrality, and that this being the case, the resistance of the Spaniards was not worth thinking of; that they had no means whatever, and that his only regret was that there would hardly be a pistol-shot fired, to give the army some little opportunity of distinguishing itself. The Duke added, under great injunctions of secrecy, that one thing which contributed much to the exaltation of Monsieur was the pressing and repeated solicitation of Ferdinand for the arrival of foreign troops. This, I am afraid, is the real ground of his running any risks rather than quit Madrid, and gives perhaps less reason to hope for good from the change of ministers, should it take place, than one should otherwise have formed.

I don't much value the reasonings of the Duke of Orleans; but this was a mere statement of what had passed in a conversation yesterday with Monsieur, and is, I conclude, to be relied upon. I told it to Stuart, but begged him not to mention the name. If you write me a line to say definitively whether you are coming out or not, don't allude to this part of my letter, lest I should be gone, and yours follow me by the post. If this war should begin, and succeed, no man can foresee what scrapes these people will get into from excess of insolence and presumption; should it fail, the precipice is still deeper on the other side.

Adieu, my dear Duke, believe how thankful I am to you for your letter, and how sincerely yours.

F. L.

Lord Strangford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Constantinople, 28th Feb., 1823.

Will your Grace allow me to congratulate you on the successful accomplishment of one part, perhaps not the least difficult, of the instructions with which you honoured me on my departure from Verona? The letter to the Russian cabinet, announcing the evacuation of the two principalities and the appointment of the hospodars, has at last been written. It is a great deal better than I expected; and in truth may, for a Turkish composition, and on a comparison with the preceding notes of this government, be considered a very good one, though certainly not all that I could have wished. I send it by this messenger to Vienna, begging Prince Metternich to forward it. He will contrive to make it appear in the eyes of our Russian friends *much better* than it really is.

We are now going to set to on the Sardinian question, which I confidently expect we shall carry; and then, I hope, you will all permit me to think a little of my English duties here.

I hope your Grace's health is perfectly restored, and that you have recovered from all the fatigue of body and mind which your glorious Verona campaign occasioned.

I have the honour to be, with the truest respect, my dear Lord Duke,
your Grace's most faithful and devoted humble servant,

STRANGFORD.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Madrid, 1st March, 1823.

In my letter of the 23rd ultimo I informed you that the Minister of the Interior had tendered his resignation. His colleagues followed his example, and it is generally said in the town that whenever a minister transacted business with the King during the last week, he availed himself of the opportunity to resign his appointment. The difficulty of forming an administration, however, made the King keep them in office, and the speech which was read in his name at the opening of the Ordinary Cortes this morning was consequently drawn up by them. It is, I understand, very warlike, and it announces his Majesty's intention to remove from hence whenever such a step shall be necessary. Such a declaration may tend to calm the irritation which I alluded to in my last. As this letter will not be dispatched till to-morrow, I shall enclose a copy of the speech, which will be in the papers of to-morrow.

As soon as the formality of opening the Cortes was gone through, the nomination of the new ministry was made public. It consists of the following persons:—Foreign Department, Flores de Estrada; Interior, Diaz del Moral; Grace and Justice, Antonio Zorraquia; Finance, Lorenzo Calvo de Rozas; Marine, Romay; War, Torrijos.

Such a selection has astonished all parties; and it is not known by whose influence the King has been prevailed upon to make it. Flores de Estrada,

Diaz del Moral, and Romay, were refugees in England, and I believe received pensions from the British government during their residence there. The whole, with the exception of Torrijos, whom you may remember seeing at Badajoz, when we passed through there on our way to Cadiz in December, 1812, are looked upon as "exaltados" in the extreme. They do not, however, belong exactly to any party in the Cortes. If, therefore, it was intended that anything should be done there, I fear their nomination can but delay the bringing forward any measure which may have been in contemplation.

For several days I have had some reason to hope that the "moderados" would not be unwilling to cooperate with the violent party in support of propositions for fixing the qualification of the deputies of the Cortes, and for declaring that the eight years during which no alterations in the constitution could be effected, have expired. But now I am told to expect nothing with such an administration. A few days, however, will show what line the ministers are likely to take, and with what party in the Cortes they will connect themselves. Whatever we have heard of their sentiments has not inspired us with much confidence, but of this we may be certain, that they cannot be more adverse to measures of conciliation than their predecessors.

I have been at great pains to discover what the "facciosos" have been about for the last ten days, but I have not met with much success. Bessiere's corps has dispersed, he having quarrelled with the several chiefs, or cabecillas as they are called, and some days ago he appeared at Buytrago, and for forty-eight hours prevented all communication with the capital. Having, however, only 80 cavalry with him, he could not maintain his post, but has retired towards the Guadarama, and yesterday some of his men were cut up by a detachment of the regiment of Saguntum.

Little has been done elsewhere. The party at El Molar, which I mentioned in my letter of the 20th February, has disappeared; and the several towns in La Mancha which I therein alluded to as being in a state of insurrection are restored to tranquillity. But the spirit in that province is not spoken of as favourable to the constitution, and though the provincial authorities have been successful in raising the men who were voted in the late proceedings of the Cortes, I am told that the government have no reason to be satisfied with the disposition which the country in general displays.

I have been able to ascertain nothing regarding the state of Gallicia, but as the troops employed there have but one or two superior officers, I apprehend that the Royalists, who have appeared in arms there, must be in some force.

The messenger arrived in the night, but having been plundered on the road, he brought only two or three despatches which he had secreted in the lining of his waistcoat. The bag with which he was charged was taken from him. It is most unfortunate that our communications with England should be so uncertain at such a moment, and it is much to be lamented that the government should have allowed a gang of robbers to exist for so considerable a period on the same spot without making any effort to destroy it. You are, however, too well acquainted with the nature of a government in this country to be surprised at such an act of supineness,

or at the answer given to Sir W. A'Court by the Secretary of State, when he represented the inconveniences attending the robbery of his despatches at this interesting period. "That," said M. de S. M., "is not in my department. It is the business of the Ministers of the War and Interior Departments to attend to the security of the roads."

Believe me, your most faithful and affectionate,

FITZROY SOMERSET.

March 2nd.

I enclose the paper containing the speech. It is more violent than it had been described to me. I have mentioned in a private letter to Mr. Canning that there was an extraordinary proposition in the Cortes to-day, and that there was a good deal of discussion about the King's journey. Arguelles, I hear, spoke on that subject, and dealt freely in insinuations against foreigners. He meant us, I presume.

We are told this evening that it is not impossible that the Cortes may determine, after the removal of the government shall be decided and the reports of the late ministers heard, not to proceed upon any other business till they are assembled at the place to which the seat of government is to be transferred. This resolution would render all further negotiation impossible.

[287.] MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CANNING ON THE COMMAND OF THE SPANISH ARMIES DURING THE LATE WAR, AND THE EFFECT WHICH THE WANT OF IT BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF HAD ON THE OPERATIONS.

2nd March, 1823.

It is certainly true that, during the whole course of the late war in the Peninsula, the utmost jealousy was manifested, as well by the Spanish government as by the principal officers of the Spanish army, of the influence and authority of the British Commander-in-Chief.

The operations in Spain may be classed in three periods. Those which were carried on in the Peninsula in general in 1808 and 1809, till the battle of Ocaña and the consequent siege of Cadiz; those which took place in Portugal by the British army, and by the Spaniards in Spain during the siege of Cadiz; those which were carried on in Spain in 1812, which led to raising the siege of Cadiz, and the subsequent operations of the war in 1813 and 1814, which led to the final expulsion of the enemy.

I am not aware of any attempt made by the government in

my time to obtain for the British Commander-in-Chief the command of the Spanish armies during the first period; and I am inclined to believe that government refrained from making the proposition because they were aware of the existing jealousy, and it was their wish to allay rather than to excite it. It must be admitted likewise that the reputations of the officers who commanded our armies was not in 1808 and 1809 what it was afterwards in 1812, 1813, and 1814; and that the Spanish general officers had not proved themselves to be so incapable as they were found to be in a subsequent period of the war. However, there is no doubt that the very worst effects resulted from the want of unity in the command and the jealousy of British influence during the first epoch.

First, in the operations carried on by Sir John Moore, and in his retreat to and embarkation at Corunna; secondly, in the defeat of General Cuesta in Estremadura, in March, 1809, previous to the battle of Talavera; thirdly, in the failure of all the operations agreed upon with the British Commander-in-Chief previous and subsequent to the battle of Talavera; fourthly, in the loss of the Spanish corps in Castille in the autumn of 1809; and fifthly and lastly, in the loss of the battle of Ocaña, and the only army the Spaniards had at that time remaining, and in the investment of Cadiz by the enemy.

In the same period of time this same jealousy was manifested in a remarkable degree on a variety of minor occasions, in each of which the result was highly prejudicial to the cause of Spain and of the Allies. The principal of these was the refusal of the Spaniards to allow the British troops to form part of the garrison of Cadiz; the consequence of which would have been the loss of Cadiz and the termination of the war as far as Spain was concerned, if the Commander-in-Chief had not by accident been near Lisbon, and had not had at his disposal British and Portuguese troops to enable him to detach a garrison to Cadiz at the moment it was required.

Then during the siege of Cadiz in the years 1810, 1811, and part of 1812, a variety of instances occurred of the same jealous spirit and of the inconveniences resulting from it to the cause; of which the most remarkable was the battle of Barrosa, in which the British troops alone fought and won, and the Spanish Commander-in-Chief would not move even to take advantage of the victory.

In the year 1810 the French attacked Portugal, but the Spaniards were unable to avail themselves of this diversion of the enemy's force. In fact, Badajoz surrendered without adequate reason in March, 1811, after Massena commenced his retreat, and the Governor knew that the British Commander-in-Chief had detached Lord Beresford to his relief.

In the subsequent operations of that year, which had for their object the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, and the different attacks made upon the latter place, the Spaniards did not co-operate, excepting in the battle of Albuera, in which the formal jealousy of General Blake was remarkable and highly injurious to the service.

In the first operations of the last epoch, the successful sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, and the battle of Salamanca, the Spaniards did not co-operate, excepting by means of very small corps, principally of guerrillas, which were paid by the British Commander-in-Chief, and which were therefore under his orders and control.

The battle of Salamanca raised the siege of Cadiz, and the Spanish government in the first moment of exultation upon that success appointed Lord Wellington to be Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish Armies. These armies did not, in fact, then exist. General Blake had, in the end of 1811, lost in an operation in Valencia the only body that could be called an army by capitulation; and Lord Wellington commanded already the guerrillas and other troops within his reach, as he paid them. In the same spirit of forbearance, therefore, which had prevented the British government from asking for the command for the British Commander-in-Chief, Lord Wellington declined to assume the command till he should be able by communication with the government to ascertain what authority it was intended to give him.

In the mean time General Ballesteros, at the head of a Spanish corps, having heard of the appointment of Lord Wellington to be Commander-in-Chief, refused to attend to his suggestions for the operations of his corps in combination with those of the troops under Lord Wellington, and resigned his command. The subsequent loss of Madrid and the necessity of the retreat of the Allied British and Portuguese army into Portugal was the consequence of Ballesteros's conduct.

Lord Wellington went to Cadiz in December, 1812, to dis-

cuss with the government the nature of the authority which it was intended that he should exercise, and with some difficulty settled the matter to his satisfaction. But the intrigues to defeat the arrangement agreed upon commenced as soon as Lord Wellington set out upon his return to head-quarters; and they were carried into execution as soon as he commenced the operations of the campaign of 1813. He received the account that the Spanish government had broken their agreement with him before the battle of Vittoria, and he sent his resignation of the command with the report of that battle, at the same time assuring the Spanish government of his determination to act with their generals with the same cordiality as he had always done, and as if he commanded them.

After reference to the Council of State and the Cortes, and a very lengthened discussion, it was determined that Lord Wellington should retain the command, and that all the conditions agreed upon at Cadiz should be fulfilled.

The advantage in the operations was obvious. Mistakes were made as usual; but there was no notable disaster; no corps was lost; and the Spanish armies partook of the general success of the campaign and finally of the war.

It must be observed, however, that Lord Wellington always insisted upon the application of the British subsidy to the payment of the troops acting with his army, and under his command.

WELLINGTON.

Mr. Harrison to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Treasury Chambers, 4th March, 1823.

I have the honour of sending to your Grace a copy of the opinion of the law officers on the application of the act of the 54th of the King to the Deccan booty.

The King's Advocate is preparing the grant to the trustees with reference to this opinion. When I am furnished with the draft of it I will send it your Grace, and shall be happy to have the honour of waiting upon you any time you may be pleased to appoint.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

My Lord Duke, your Grace's most faithful, humble servant,

GEORGE HARRISON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

To the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Treasurer of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

May it please your Lordships; Doctors' Commons, 1st March, 1823.

In obedience to the directions of your Lordships, communicated to me by George Harrison, Esq., one of your Lordships' secretaries, that I should prepare and submit a case to the law officers of the crown for their opinion as to the application of the Act of Parliament of the 54th Geo. III. cap. 86, to the grant to be made of the booty taken in the years 1817 and 1818 in the Pindarree and Mahratta war, and that Mr. William Harrison and Mr. William Adam, as having been the leading counsel of the contending parties before your Lordships, should be invited to a conference with the law officers upon considering this question; I do most humbly report to your Lordships that I prepared and submitted a case for the opinion of his Majesty's Advocate and the Attorney and Solicitor-General upon the following question, viz.:—

"Whether the Act of the 54th Geo. III. cap. 86 will necessarily apply to the circumstances of this case on the grant being made to the trustees by warrant agreeably to the minute of the Board."

And the law officers having conferred upon the case in conjunction with Mr. William Harrison and Mr. William Adam have given the following opinion upon the question so proposed to them.

"It is difficult to give a very confident opinion upon an Act of Parliament which is imperfectly and in some respects inconsistently framed. But upon the whole we think, considering this Act in conjunction with the 51 and 52 Geo. III., which are referred to in the preamble, and intended to be consolidated by the present Act, that it will in its general provisions apply to this case upon the grant being made to the trustees by warrant agreeably to the minute of the Board."

All which is most humbly submitted to your Lordships' wisdom.

(Signed) ILTID NICHOLL.

Mr. Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 4th March, 1823.

I return you Lord FitzRoy Somerset's letters; and with them I send a curious paper relating to yourself. It comes from Paris. Mr. Ma——o is the Spanish Consul there. Who his correspondent is I know not.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

Thanks for your Memorandum on Spain.

[ENCLOSURE.]

(Translated.)

To Mr. Machado.

Paris, 27th Feb., 1823.

I transmit the accompanying note that you may make use of it. I can conceive the scruples of the English ministry, but it will at any rate serve as a touchstone to ascertain how far their regard for us will carry them.

BALDRIC.

"Les discours prononcés par M. de Villèle et M. de Chateaubriand ne laissent plus aucun doute sur le projet bien arrêté de faire la guerre à l'Espagne.

Il est donc sûr que la guerre aura lieu. La Grande Bretagne ne saurait plus l'empêcher.

Mais il n'est pas probable que cette nation puisse prendre part à la guerre, à moins que les alliés de la France n'y prennent part aussi de leur côté

. On peut donc établir deux bases :—

1. La guerre aura lieu.

2. L'Angleterre ne peut aider l'Espagne ouvertement.

Mais sans aider l'Espagne d'une manière ostensible l'Angleterre peut arrêter les armées françaises, et les enchaîner au pied des Pyrénées *pendant deux mois.*

Or, deux mois de retard sont d'une grande importance :—

1. Parceque la France dépensera une partie de ses moyens pécuniaires inutilement.

2. Parceque ce délai refroidera extraordinairement les partisans de la foi, et empêchera leur organisation.

3. Parceque l'armée Espagnole aura le tems de recevoir les conscrits, les armes, et l'équipement. Les places fortes seront mises en un parfait état de défense.

4. Parcequ'en renvoyant au mois de Mai l'ouverture de la campagne les Français auront franchi les défilés des Pyrénées, et atteindront les plaines meurtrières de la Castille précisément *au mois de Juin, et les mois formidables d'Août, Septembre, et Juillet feront périr le quart de l'armée.*

Il est donc évident, que jamais un si court délai n'aurait pu produire de plus utiles résultats. Ce fait est hors de doute.

Quant au moyen dont la Grande Bretagne peut se servir, il est bien simple.

C'est de conférer à S.G. le Duc de Wellington la mission difficile mais bien honorable de réconcilier le Roi avec les Cortes. S'il y réussit, son illustre témoignage sera cru dans toute l'Europe ; on ne doutera plus de la sincérité et surtout de la liberté de Ferdinand. L'Espagne aura franchi d'un trait l'immense période de sa révolution, et arrivera comme par enchantement au point où la mèneront naturellement les choses dans 25 ou 30 ans.

Mais supposons que M. le Duc ne réussisse pas. Il est sûr que tant qu'il restera à Madrid les Français n'oseront pas franchir la frontière. *Ce serait faire un affront à la personne du Duc et au gouvernement qui l'emploie. Ce serait annoncer à l'Europe qu'on ne veut pas de réconciliation, et qu'on veut la guerre à tout prix.*

Les Français ne le feront pas.

Peut-être sa Grâce éprouverait quelque répugnance à se charger d'une mission qui peut ne pas réussir. Mais au moins il l'aura tenté, et la postérité ne l'accusera pas d'avoir négligé le sort d'un pays auquel il doit sa renommée, dont il est Capitaine-Général, et Grand, et possesseur du Soto de Roma."

The Hon. Frederick Lamb to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Paris, 5th March, 1823.

I am extremely obliged to you, my dear Duke, for your letter of 28th. Since I wrote to you the news from Spain has taken such a turn that I have the greatest hopes of seeing you here. In comparing what we know of Ferdinand's communications to the French Court with the language he is reported to hold at Madrid, there is no sort of perfidy I do not expect from him, nor any vengeance which he may not be expected to exert, should he ever have the power. Quesada, by-the-bye, openly professed this

intention here, and stated his intention of hanging Alava first, because he is his greatest friend. Looking upon all Ferdinand does as a mere game, in order to remain at Madrid till the French troops can reach it, I am far from thinking an arrangement so easy as it might appear without this view. Your passage here and your presence at Madrid would certainly give the best chance both of knowing precisely the ground we stand upon, and of terminating the affair; but while I feel the immense good it might do, I also feel so strongly the very disagreeable situations in which you might personally be placed, that I hardly know what to wish. Whenever the Duc d'Angoulême shall leave this it seems to me that the effective negotiation will be in a great measure removed to the frontier. Pray let me know whenever the decision about your going is taken. I shall linger on here, if possible, for the pleasure of seeing you.

This affair of Manuel confirms me in an opinion I have taken very strongly, that this country is in no danger of revolution, nor can any be created unless by measures which should impoverish it, and render it unhappy. A greater outrage, carried through with more indecency, could hardly have been devised. Such a one committed in London upon a popular member would have put the whole town in a state of riot: it has passed here almost without notice. But the violence and injustice for which both parties are prepared in the Chamber show how little a representative government is suited to this nation, and an unpopular and unsuccessful war, accompanied by taxation and stagnation of industry, would create another state of things. I can't but fear that the means of avoiding it are less than they appear. This affair of Manuel confirms me in this opinion. The ministers are generally believed to have been adverse to it, but they cannot make their majority; they must either follow it or lose it. I am assured that in this majority at least half the members disapprove of the course pursued; but such is the spirit of party that only ten or twelve separated themselves from it. Thus the majority of the Chamber is in the hands of a few violent leaders, and the Ministry in the hands of the majority. Add to this, Monsieur, with his communications with Ferdinand, and I think you will agree that the case is a difficult one. If you were in Madrid should you have much influence upon Ferdinand himself? If you should, there is no calculating the good your presence might produce. One advantage arises from the secession of the côté gauche. It enables ministers to pass the two laws, and bring on the budget without loss of time. As soon as this can be got through they will adjourn the Chamber, and such has been M. de Villèle's intention for some time back. This would free his hands, but unless time can be gained the war will have begun first. Adieu, my dear Duke. I write boldly all I believe and think, not because I feel sure of being right, but because it may always be useful to compare the notions and information of others, before you form your own decision.

Most truly yours,

F. LAMB.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Madrid, 5th March, 1823.

Yesterday the government received intelligence of the insurrection of the garrison of Chaves, under the direction of the son of Silveira Shenacarthé, and of their example being followed by the troops quartered at Braga. Their cry was for the "Rey João." The Portuguese chargé d'affaires would not acknowledge that he had received any account of what had passed, but he admitted that he had received a letter from that part of the country to forward to his government, and that it had been stated to him that the state of the north of Portugal was such that it was easier to communicate through Madrid to Lisbon than by the direct road. If this insurrection takes, it is all over with the constitution of Portugal; and I believe King John has acted very judiciously in letting the thing take its course.

The report of this event has made a great sensation in this town. We may derive some advantage from it.

The King has decided to remove to Seville, and he will probably set out in the course of next week, although he protests that his gout is very bad. The Cortes propose to remain here some days after him, and I have still a faint hope that they may do something.

Flores de Estrada and Calvo de Rozas have followed the example of their colleagues Diaz del Moral and Zonaquias, and have declined office, having found that no party would support them. Indeed, the Cortes are bent upon keeping San Miguel, &c., in administration till the King shall be on his road to Seville, and therefore they still refuse to allow them to read the reports of the state of these departments, which some deputy this morning proposed they should be called upon to do. The Council of State will follow the King, but the wives remain here, and very few of the non-employés intend to quit Madrid.

Your most faithful and affectionate

FITZROY SOMERSET.

Mr. Harrison to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, 4, Spring Gardens Terrace, 7th March, 1823.

The enclosed Memorandum has run to such a length, that in this note I shall not venture to intrude further upon your Grace's time, or trespass further upon your kindness, than to solicit your perusal of the Memorandum, and your further commands upon it, in case your Grace should deem it necessary.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke, with the highest respect,

your Grace's most faithful and obedient servant,

GEORGE HARRISON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM.

6th March, 1823.

By Mr. Arbuthnot's desire I had the honour of waiting upon the Duke of Wellington on the subject of the warrant for the appointment of the trustees in the Deccan prize business.

I mentioned to his Grace that the King's Advocate and the King's Proctor were appointed to come to me the next day to discuss the terms of the warrant, and I took the liberty of suggesting whether his Grace would permit us to wait upon him, as it would be much more satisfactory that the law officers, in preparing this authoritative document, under which his Grace and his co-trustee are to act, should know accurately what his sentiments were respecting it, and might be the means of saving his Grace trouble when the draft of the warrant should be submitted for his final approbation.

To this suggestion his Grace was pleased to accede. On the next day, Mr. Arbuthnot, at my request, came to the Treasury to meet the Duke, and we had some discussion with the King's Advocate and Proctor before the Duke came from the Cabinet. The discussion was resumed when his Grace came into the room.

The King's Advocate stated his doubts as to the construction of the Act of the 54th Geo. 3., with reference to its application to the Deccan case. He thought the expression in the 2nd clause, "*or otherwise*," might bring the case within the meaning of the Act; but he also thought that the words of this clause which had reference to the condemnation of booty by the Courts of Admiralty would be inconsistent with such a construction. These doubts suggested the expediency of taking formally the opinion of the law officers upon the question.

The King's Advocate suggested that upon the result of this opinion might depend whether or not it would be expedient to have a *special* Act of Parliament.

The suggestion (arising out of the doubts of the King's Advocate) that the formal opinion of the law officers should be taken upon the subject was assented to by the Duke and Mr. Arbuthnot. (If any dissent had been expressed by his Grace or Mr. Arbuthnot, the suggestion would certainly not have been adopted.) Mr. Nicholl, the King's Proctor, in consequence of this assent, made a memorandum in writing, at the dictation of the King's Advocate, of the *form* in which the question should be put to the King's Advocate and the Attorney and Solicitor-General. This Memorandum was read by Mr. Nicholl to the Duke, who made no objection to it; and Mr. Nicholl was instructed by me to lose no time in obtaining the opinion of the law officers upon the question.

Here the matter ended. The measure of calling in Mr. William Harrison and Mr. Adam to assist at the consultation was altogether the suggestion of the law officers themselves, with which I could have nothing to do.

I took no further steps whatever in the business until I communicated the opinion to Lord Liverpool, and sent to the Duke of Wellington a copy of it.

GEORGE HARRISON.

7th March, 1823.

Since the above Memorandum was written I have had the honour of an interview with the Duke of Wellington, in which I took the liberty of adverting to the apparently conflicting opinions of the Crown lawyers in the case of the Kandy booty and the present case; and I expressed an apprehension lest some embarrassment might thereby be occasioned. Upon which his Grace was pleased

to observe that he did not think so; that in the view which he took of the case, and with which it was his wish that the warrant should be prepared, it was wholly immaterial whether the Act of the 54th of the King did or did not, in *strict construction of law*, apply to the present case. For, whether that Act did or did not apply, in law, to the case, it was clearly competent to the Crown to declare in the warrant that the provisions of that Act should be made applicable, and be the rule of conduct by which the trustees were to be governed in the execution of their trust, in so far as those provisions *might be applicable* to the present case; and his Grace desired that the warrant might be *so framed*. It was impossible not to concur in his Grace's view of the subject. I took the liberty of saying so, and that I was much gratified in having had this conference with his Grace, as it put me in full possession of his opinions on the subject, and of his wishes as to the form in which the warrant should be prepared, and which should be submitted to him for his approbation as soon as the draft was completed. On leaving the Duke I sent to the King's Proctor to see him this morning, with a view of giving him instructions in strict conformity with his Grace's directions.

But *since* I had the honour of this conference with the Duke I have received a note from Mr. Arbuthnot, which has placed me in considerable embarrassment, the more especially as, from the tenor of it, it is evident that he has seen his Grace *since* my interview with him yesterday afternoon. Mr. Arbuthnot says:—"Having consented to be a trustee, and having talked the subject over with the Duke, who was also to be a trustee, I, in conjunction with him, had fully resolved to act, or not, according to the powers to be confided in us. I will not, and the Duke will not, submit to a heavy responsibility, if our powers should not be *sufficiently extensive;* and our minds being fully made up in respect to *this point*, I was quite indifferent as to the nature of the legal opinion. If Lord Liverpool wishes that the Duke and I should be trustees, I feel confident that he will also wish to invest us with sufficient powers, and that is all we care about."

The Duke of Wellington's opinion and view of the case, and his Grace's wishes as to the form in which the warrant should be prepared, were expressed in terms so clear and explicit that I think it is impossible I could have misunderstood him.

If the Crown should in the warrant declare (as it is unquestionably competent to the Crown to declare) that the provisions of the Act of the 54th Geo. 3 shall (in so far as they may be applicable) be the governing rule of conduct for the trustees, it would be precisely the same thing *in effect* as if the Act had itself enjoined that rule of conduct for them. And *therefore* it is that his Grace (if I understood him rightly) considers the apparently conflicting opinions of the law officers as wholly immaterial. The governing rule of conduct for the trustees will be the *same* whether it be enjoined by legislative authority or by the Crown in the exercise of its prerogative.

I clearly understood it to be his Grace's wish that the Crown should *so declare* its pleasure in the warrant.

The extent of the powers of the trustees would therefore, in *either* case, be *measured* by the true interest and meaning of the provisions of the Act of the 54th of the King.

As the expression in Mr. Arbuthnot's note to me, "I will not, and the Duke will not, submit to a heavy responsibility, if our powers should not be sufficiently extensive," might imply a supposed opinion or wish of mine that the powers of the trustees should be *more limited* than in his Grace's or Mr. Arbuthnot's opinion they ought to be, I must in justice to myself and to prevent any such misconstruction of my opinions or motives, declare that so far from

possessing any opinion or wish that those powers should be limited, it has always been my opinion that the powers of the trustees should be *as extensive* as the circumstances of the case would admit of, and I have expressed that opinion in the most decided manner whenever I may have conversed upon the subject.

I am at some loss therefore to know whether I am to consider Mr. Arbuthnot's note of yesterday *evening* as superseding or in any manner qualifying the *previous* directions which I received from the Duke in the *afternoon*.

In order to avoid delay, however, I shall venture to instruct the King's Proctor to proceed according to those directions, relying upon his Grace's kindness to excuse it if I am in error in so doing; and that he will have the goodness to desire my attendance upon him, if I should have misunderstood his meaning in the conference of yesterday afternoon, or if his Grace should wish to give me any other or further directions upon the subject, it being not less my anxious desire than it is my duty not only scrupulously but cheerfully to execute his Grace's commands, satisfied that in so doing I am best meeting Lord Liverpool's wishes upon this subject.

GEORGE HARRISON.

Mr. Lushington to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Treasury, 7th March, 1823.

Will you have the goodness to read and consider the accompanying draft of a warrant granting the booty taken from the Pindarries and Mahrattas in 1817 and 1818 to trustees for the benefit of the army.

Your Grace will observe that this warrant is purposely drawn in the simplest manner; and whatever authority it may be thought proper that the Crown should hereafter grant to the trustees for applying any of the provisions of the 54th Geo. 3. can be given in the warrant of distribution.

The only three things now necessary seem to be the grant of the booty to the trustees, power to them to obtain possession of it, and authority to them to frame a scheme of distribution for the King's final sanction.

Lord Liverpool and Mr. Herries entirely agree in this view of the case, and we shall immediately act upon it, with any alterations or additions you may think necessary.

Very faithfully yours,

R. LUSHINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

TREASURY MINUTE.—DECISION ON THE DECCAN PRIZE CASES.

Treasury Chambers, Wednesday, 5th Feb., 1823.

PRESENT:

The Earl of Liverpool; the Chancellor of the Exchequer; the Honourable Berkeley Paget; Viscount Lowther; Lord Granville H. Somerset.

My Lords having heard counsel in support of the claims of the Marquis of Hastings and the Grand Army, and of those of Sir Thomas Hislop and the Army of the Deccan, and having maturely and deliberately weighed and considered all the documentary evidence laid before them in behalf of the several

parties, and the arguments of the counsel, are of opinion that the most just and equitable principle of distribution will be to adhere, as nearly as the circumstances of the case may admit, to that of actual capture; and that although they are aware that the principle of constructive capture must, under certain circumstances, in a degree be admitted, the disposition should be to limit rather than to extend that principle.

They are therefore of opinion that the mode of distribution originally intended by the Marquis of Hastings would be most equitable and just with respect to the booty taken at Poonah, Mahidpore, and Nagpore, and that the booty taken on each of those occasions respectively should belong to the divisions of the Deccan Army engaged in the respective operations in which the same was captured. But that as the division of the Bengal army under Brigadier-General Hardyman appears to have been put in motion for the purpose of co-operating directly in the reduction of Nagpore, and to have been actually engaged with a corps of the enemy antecedent to the surrender of that place, this division appears to my Lords to be justly entitled to share in the booty captured at Nagpore; and that such other booty arising from the operations against the Mahrattas in the years 1817 and 1818, as may now be subject to his Majesty's royal disposition should be granted to such divisions of the Grand Army under the command of the Marquis of Hastings, and of the Deccan Army under the command of Sir Thomas Hislop, as may respectively have captured the same.

My Lords are also of opinion that conformably to the letter of the Marquis of Hastings to Sir Thomas Hislop, of the 12th of January, 1818, Sir Thomas Hislop, as Commander-in-Chief of the Deccan Army, and all the officers of the general Staff of that army, are entitled to participate in the booty which may arise from any capture by any divisions of the Army of the Deccan, until the said Army of the Deccan was broken up on the 31st March, 1818.

My Lords have felt it to be inconsistent with their duty to recommend to his Majesty to give his sanction to any agreement for the common division of booty into which the several divisions of either army may have entered, as it is their decided opinion that if the principle of actual capture be not adopted in this case as the rule of distribution, no other correct or equitable rule could have been adopted than that of a general distribution amongst the forces of all the Presidencies engaged in the combined operations of the campaign.

My Lords do not consider that, under all the circumstances of this case, it will be expedient to recommend to his Majesty to grant any part of this booty to the East India Company.

And my Lords will submit to his Majesty their recommendation that he will be graciously pleased to direct that his royal grant of the said booty may be made in conformity with these principles.

And for the purpose of better carrying into effect his Majesty's gracious intentions in this behalf, my Lords will recommend to his Majesty that a grant be made of the said booty to trustees, to be appointed by his Majesty, for the purpose of ascertaining and collecting the said booty, and for preparing a scheme for the distribution thereof, conformably to the principles above stated, which my Lords will submit for his Majesty's final approbation and sanction, under his royal sign manual warrant.

And that if any questions or differences should arise thereon, or between the East India Company and the said trustees, in regard to what may or may not be properly considered as booty, according to the legal acceptation of the term booty, with reference to the principles governing any capture of property from an enemy in Indian warfare, and the chartered rights of the East India Company, and the true intent and meaning of his Majesty's grant, or if the Go-

vernor-General, or Governor-General in Council, may have ordered any captured property to be restored, or may have considered any such property as not the proper subject of prize or booty, and the said trustees shall claim the same as such, all questions or differences relating to any such property or booty which may arise between the East India Company and the said trustees should be submitted to this Board, either for his Majesty's decision thereon, or for such directions as his Majesty may be pleased to give for referring the same for final adjudication, as the case may require.

And my Lords are pleased to direct that a copy of the aforegoing minute be transmitted to the agents of the respective parties for their information, and also to the Chairman and Deputy-Chairman of the East India Company for the information of the Court of Directors; and that a copy thereof be also transmitted to the King's Proctor, with instructions to him to confer with the King's Advocate, and, under his advice, to prepare and submit for their Lordships' consideration and approbation a draft of a warrant to be submitted to his Majesty for granting the said booty to trustees, to be appointed by his Majesty for the purpose of ascertaining and collecting the said booty, and for preparing a scheme for the distribution thereof, conformably to the principles above stated.

Mr. Harrison to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, 4, Spring Gardens Terrace, 7th March, 1823.

I sent this morning for the draft of the proposed warrant, which I have received in the state in which I have now the honour to transmit it to your Grace, with the exception of three or four lines which I have struck out in the fifth sheet, and with the exception also of the clause in pencil at the end, which I have added, and which I think may probably meet your Grace's view of the subject. It directs the application, *under the royal prerogative*, of such of the provisions and regulations of the Act of the 54th Geo. 3 as *the trustees may deem* practicable and applicable to the purposes of the grant, leaving it therefore in *their discretion* to adopt the *whole* or any of them, as they may think fit.

I shall be most happy to attend your Grace's commands whenever you may be pleased to appoint.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke, with the highest respect,

your Grace's most faithful and obedient servant,

GEORGE HARRISON.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Madrid, 9th March, 1823.

Having written a despatch yesterday to Mr. Canning, I did not conceive that I should have anything to trouble you with to-day, except to refer you to that despatch; but having called upon Sir William, I have learnt with astonishment that M. de San Miguel had asked him this morning what were the precise terms which France required. You may imagine that Sir William was equally surprised, after the language which the Spanish

minister has always held regarding the question of modifications. I beg to refer you to Sir William's private letter to Mr. Canning, which will show you what passed at the interview, and what he has done since to comply with San Miguel's wishes.

This proceeding certainly looks more like a disposition to listen to reason than any which has come under my observation since I arrived here, and I hope it may lead to something which shall enable the British government to draw France into a negotiation with this country. People are certainly inclined, as you will see by my despatch, eventually to make material alterations in their system, but the general impression is that nothing can be agitated here, and that all must be deferred till they get to Seville. So universally has that opinion been stated, that yesterday evening Sir William and myself both felt that we could expect nothing till the government should be removed; and Don Miguel, who dined with us, was so convinced of the impossibility of effecting our object at present, that he told us it was useless to attempt it. I hope, however, that we were all mistaken, and that some step may yet be taken.

I have heard nothing of the armies lately, except that Bessiere is said to be collecting another force, and with that object has seized upon some conscripts who were about to join a regiment.

It is said that one of Mina's officers has hanged nine priests.

Your most faithful and affectionate,

FITZROY SOMERSET.

To the Hon. Frederick Lamb.

MY DEAR LAMB, London, 11th March, 1823.

I did not receive yours of the 5th till yesterday. I had before received another, to which I did not write an answer immediately, because I concluded that as soon as you would have received my last you would have moved, and I did not like to trust to any common conveyance of a letter.

I believe it is since I wrote to you that the answer has been received from Sir William A'Court to a private letter written to him by Mr. Canning, in which the former states that he thinks I could do no good at Madrid in the position in which things then were. His opinion agrees very much with my own, but there are several people who think differently and among others the King.

In respect to France, I believe if I could have remained at Paris in December I should have prevented much mischief which followed the return of Chateaubriand from Verona. I should have prevailed upon Villèle to take a line separate from

the Continental Powers, but less objectionable than that which the French Government have taken, and I might then have gone to Spain with some hopes of success. But the truth is, that our government stand upon false grounds both in France and Spain, and even at home. We have given the Spaniards reason to believe that we should assist them, and we have shaken the confidence of France in our desire of maintaining peace for her sake as well as our own. Then at home, nobody knows what the policy of the Government is, and it will turn out at last that the country and Parliament will declare for neutrality before the government will have an opportunity of doing so; and it will be believed that the government have been forced by the country to be neutral, their intentions having been to interfere in favour of Spain. From this false position I may be able to assist the government at home; but till we stand clear and fair in all these questions as we ought, and as we did when I quitted Verona and Paris, I am certain I can do no good abroad, and even if asked to go I shall decline unless our position is altered.

I have always been of opinion that complete success or complete failure by France in this Spanish concern would be equally unfortunate for us. But I don't think either very probable. Complete failure is out of the question. I give no credit to the stories of the revolt of the military, and at all events none to the consequences predicted from the state of their *morale* upon the operations of the war. This Spanish bubble will burst, and there will be no military resistance at all; and the real truth of the late war will come out, and the French will be successful in their military operations as far as they can carry them. But this is not success in producing a political result. Much time, very large armies, and enormous expense will be required to conquer the country and establish a government in Spain. The French government will be tired, and will be too ready to patch up the business and to leave Spain to itself, and to new misfortunes. Monsieur de Villèle knows this as well as I do, and it is this knowledge which induces him to wish to get out of the concern if he can. I quite agree with you likewise respecting the interior of France. There is no danger of revolution excepting from the military, who are the real government. They could overthrow

the Bourbons, but if they will serve the Bourbons the latter can overthrow the Constitution any day. Therefore this Constitution is not fit for France. I never thought it was so, and I know it will not last. As soon as the Bourbons are well seated in the saddle, that is to say, have the real command of the army, they will kick the Constitution to the devil in reality, whatever may be the form which they will have. That is one of the reasons for the expedition to Spain. But they are, as usual, mistaken. That expedition will not answer that purpose. There will not be difficulty, or military opposition, or a sufficiency of decidedly successful political result to place them in the saddle as they ought to be. They will still be in shackles, and exposed to the storms and hazards of a popular Assembly for whose deliberations nobody can answer.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Clancarty. [289.]

MY DEAR CLANCARTY, London, 11th March, 1823.

I wish to mention to you that I know that your King has complained to his intimates of your treatment of and conduct towards him and his government. The complaint is of this kind: that you presume upon old acquaintance and friendship to talk to him with more freedom than he likes, or than suits your relative positions, and that your language to him and his government is sometimes not to be borne. This is very foolish and ungrateful, but to a wise man is worthy of observation.

Now, my dear Clancarty, allow me who see both and indeed all sides of this question to advise you to avoid as much as possible altercations with the King, and to be very moderate in your language to him and to his Ministers. I should have said nothing upon this subject to you if I had not seen yesterday a series of your despatches upon the *Lutine* frigate, upon the slave trade at Surinam, upon the navigation of the Rhine, Scheldt, &c., written in a style of familiar acrimony which the subject and the conduct of the government well deserve, and fully justified by what you believed to be your relations with them; and encouraged, I believe, and as I think I perceive, by

the Foreign Department here. But all is not gold that glitters. In my opinion our late friend would have warned you of the position in which you stood in relation to the King, and I should have done so when the information came by chance to my knowledge, if I had not thought that you would have received the warning from the proper authority. As it is, and as I think I perceived, in the despatches which I read yesterday, that, instead of being warned, you had been encouraged and indeed fresh matters of irritation had been suggested to you on the question of the navigation of the Rhine.

I take the liberty of an old friend to give you this warning and advice. You may be just as strong, *but a great deal more polite!* From all this you will see that I think you were right and I wrong in the last discussion you and I had together in the room in which I am now writing. God bless you.

Believe me ever yours most affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 12th March, 1823.

I am obliged to employ Planta's hand to acquaint you that I have an opportunity of doing something which I hope will be agreeable to you, for a gentleman in whose welfare I understand you take an interest. The person to whom I allude is Mr. M'Tavish, and the office to which I am enabled to appoint him is that of Arbitrator under a commission to be established in America for the final settlement of the questions in dispute under the first article of the treaty of Ghent.

I have received, by the last mail, from my cousin Stratford, in America, a satisfactory report of Mr. M'Tavish's fitness for the office. I thought to have mentioned this to you when we next met; but as the American mail may be despatched before I am out of my room, I would no longer delay the communication. Perhaps you would look in upon me here in the course of to-morrow.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Madrid, 13th March, 1823.

The Cortes have not ceased to press the ministers to continue the arrangements for the King's departure, and on Sunday night there was a meeting

of some of the principal deputies and the ministers, in which the former gave the latter to understand that they should bring the question again before the Cortes, if the ministers felt themselves unequal to the task of obliging the King to set out for Seville. This menace induced them to proceed, but in the mean time the King called a consultation of physicians, and yesterday he caused their report to be laid before the Cortes. It is given in the 'Espectador' of to-day, which I enclose. The Cortes, on the proposition of Galiano, referred it to a committee, the result of which is that a deputation has been sent to the King, requesting his Majesty to fix any day between this and the 18th for his departure, and they have been graciously received, the King having named Thursday, the 20th, unless something should arise in the mean time to render his removal at an earlier period necessary. I had no idea that he would make any resistance when it came to the point, more particularly as the Cortes declared their sitting permanent till his answer should be received. Unless therefore something extraordinary should occur we may reckon on his leaving Madrid on the 20th.

I wish the Cortes would take advantage of the time that yet remains before they close the session here, and discuss the measures which we hear are eventually to be brought forward; but I fear they will do no such thing. The country, however, is in a very unpleasant state. The facciosos increase rapidly, and occasionally make their appearance all round the capital. Bessière is at Tarancon, or in the neighbourhood, and a certain Pelayo, who was lately released from prison at Colmenar, has been at the Escurial with a considerable force, many of them, however, being without arms. The newly-raised conscripts in this province and that of Guadalaxara have joined the Royalists, as have the conscripts of the Huerta of Valencia, who are said to be from 1200 to 1500 men. Such intelligence is very alarming, and if the insurrection should spread it would be fatal to the Constitution. One can only wonder at the continued obstinacy of the doctrinaires.

Vigo, the messenger, whom I have seen since I began this letter, is just returned from town, having gone there with Lord Francis Leveson. He says that the road from Aranda to Madrid is covered with "facciosos," who have been joined by all those who were drawn for the army, and he was robbed twice. Another chief has started up of the name of Ysidoro.

You will observe by the paper of to-day that Abisbal is named Jefe Politico of this province, in addition to his military appointment. Madrid is therefore completely in his power. Some of the troops which have lately been employed under his command have marched in here in sad condition, and almost without shoes. It is said that only 300 cavalry can be mustered to escort the King; but of course there will be some infantry with him, or at least on the road.

14th March.

I enclose one of the papers of this day, which will give you a better notion of what passed yesterday in the Cortes. The government have received sad news from Valencia, where Uhlman has defeated a considerable corps of troops, and has taken 400 prisoners. Uhlman has since occupied Segovia, and threatens Valencia, where there is considerable agitation, and where the authorities have thought proper to arrest thirty or forty persons, and embark them forthwith for Majorca or Ivisa.

Bertran de Lis has left Madrid, and has taken refuge in some town in the neighbourhood. He still, however, threatens to prevent the King's departure; but I believe his threats are about as much to be apprehended, as his promises are to be valued. Alava talked of writing to you, but I have heard nothing of his letter. We have nothing from Portugal later than the 'Lisbon Gazette' of the 7th, from which it is not possible to discover more than that Silveira is in considerable strength. It is thought that the government have received more recent advices, but they will not avow it. They can therefore have no good news to tell.

Mr. O'Gorman is to be the bearer of the despatches that go by this opportunity. He is well acquainted with the state of things here.

Your most faithful and affectionate,

FITZROY SOMERSET.

The Right Hon. Frederick Lamb to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Paris, 14th March, 1823.

I have just got your letter of 11th, which contains in a short compass the whole truth of the case. I meet no Frenchman of any party who does not think we have wished the war to take place.

The publication of the documents may in part set this right, but it will be a nice point in selecting from the latter ones to avoid shewing what the French government will feel as an attack upon themselves.

The difficulties the French will find in organizing a government, and their anxiety to get out of the concern, may hereafter afford us an opportunity of bringing about an accommodation, but for this it will be necessary that we should place ourselves on a different footing with the French government from the one we are on at present.

The Duke d'Angoulême goes with a heavy heart, and will probably lean strongly to the side of accommodation. Is it impossible that all parties may ultimately concur in the necessity of setting aside Ferdinand? without which I doubt the possibility of a settled state of things in Spain.

All chance of your arrival being over, I shall go almost immediately. Adieu, my dear Duke, au revoir,

F. L.

Lord Clancarty to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Bruxelles, 14th March, 1823.

It would be impossible for me by any words to express to you the gratitude I feel for your most kind, most friendly advice.* I shall not otherwise attempt it than by assuring you that I shall most strictly and zealously follow it. To persevere in errors which your friendship and good-nature have with such delicacy pointed out, would be unpardonable; by my future conduct it will therefore be my study to avoid their repetition. Neverthe-

* See page 65.

less, I cannot regret what has occurred, because it has furnished me with such a valuable testimony of your good opinion, and of the kind interest you are so good as to take in me. Believe me I shall never forget the thorough gratitude I owe you for this signal instance of your regard.

To this King personally I am not conscious of having ever failed in that respect which is his due, and which I am not less led by sense of duty than by real feelings of friendship to pay his Majesty. He has, however, I know, been much irritated of late against me, it having very industriously been insinuated to him that I am the sole cause of bringing the Congress of Verona on his back in the affair of the prohibitions on river transit. Now, this is partly true; it was my duty to communicate to my chief all the measures which led to this proceeding, and so far I am guilty towards his Majesty. But it was for my chief to decide upon the steps to be taken in consequence of my information. With what delicacy we proceeded, by previous communication and advice, to prevent the King from falling into this scrape, your Grace is already aware. He has, however, for the moment forgot all this, and is now irritated because he has got himself into a disagreeable position, which I did my utmost to prevent him from falling into. With his ministers, I will confess, I have in my notes been harsh at times. When people write arrant nonsense it is difficult to expose the trash they mistake for argument without offending. I shall, however, be most wary in future, and most thankful to you, if you should perceive anything amiss, for a single line of such advice as you may deem requisite.

We are eased for the present here upon the Lutine question; a long despatch from me upon this subject goes by the present conveyance, referring the matter for your consideration. The business is not without embarrassment. On the one hand, the right is, as I believe, ours; and the underwriters will naturally seek to have their own, and bring the matter before Parliament. Thus far as a government, I think there is case enough to lay on the table of the House of Commons, to show that the interests of the proprietors have not been neglected. But then, on the other hand, it is not certainly our interest to show up the King of the Netherlands and his government in an invidious point of view; and again, at this time, when we are so closely knit in continental politics with this Court, it may be worthy of consideration whether means may not be taken, by hanging the matter up for the present by reasoned protest under the direction of the civilians, to delay further steps for a time.

I sent your Grace some time since a letter from Pinneran, seeking, as I understood, your battle of Waterloo clothing to be sent to me, for transmission to him; and I afterwards wrote to Burgh to remind you of it. Possibly they may have been passed to Amsterdam by some other route, but if not, pray have them sent in one of our bags. He cannot finish his great picture without them; and what is more, I cannot have the excellent original portrait he made of you in London, and which you allowed me to take while the King was here, till your figure in the great picture shall have been finished.

Yours, my dear Duke, with the most sincere friendship and gratitude,

CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Bruxelles, 18th March, 1823.

I did not perceive, in the hurry of despatch,* till after the departure of the last messenger, that by omitting to touch upon one part of your Grace's letter to me of the 11th instant, I was in effect guilty of a piece of tacit injustice.

You state that the style of my correspondence with this government (which you so justly reprehend) may have been encouraged by the Foreign Department. I am not aware that I have even this excuse to plead in mitigation. It is true that on the Lutine question my instructions from the first were strong, but not stronger than the case well warranted. They directed that the only argument opposed to the permission sought by us should be met by the strongest and most unqualified protest. I wished to avoid executing these till the last moment, and having followed this conduct, the course I had pursued in this respect was afterwards approved in a very kind private letter from Mr. Canning, addressed to me upon this subject.

When, subsequently finding all private representation vain, and that, after three months, we were, in consequence of gentle proceedings, left precisely where we were, it appeared necessary to take an official course, in the progress of this, the protest has been brought forward, together with other matters of minor importance from my instructions; but with the exception of these, all the rest is mine, growing out of the notes and conduct of this government. So in the case of the river transit. My instructions, as well as my first note, are mild; that of the 12th February is indeed much otherwise; but as this was occasioned solely by Nagell's of the preceding day, the faults of tone and matter are mine alone; the Foreign Office is free from them. That our late friend would (as you have most kindly done) have cautioned me against further perseverance in that tone, I am fully persuaded; and yet I cannot be surprised at Mr. Canning's having refrained from doing so, and am consequently, and from the bottom of my heart, the more grateful to you for having interposed your excellent and friendly advice on the present occasion. Mr. Canning, unacquainted personally with this Court, may well be disposed to give me credit, after some nine years' connection with it, for the adoption of the fittest tone and line of argument by which to effect our objects; while you (and our late friend, while living), well versed in all the mechanism of this government, knowing intimately the dispositions of those who guide it, and standing at the same time somewhat aloof from the scene of operation, are far better qualified to judge how best it may be acted upon than those upon the spot.

This leads me to another part of your letter, which I had not time to notice in my last; but I wish, in further justice, previously to say that since employed here under my present chief, I have received from him every attention which I could in reason have expected.

I well remember our conversation at Apsley House, to which you refer; and abstracted as you will see by what I have above written, from every feeling of personal interest, I am still more abundantly confirmed, from subsequent events, in the opinions I then hazarded. Had your Grace been declared the successor of our late friend, and the future permanent guide of

* See page 68.

our foreign relations, your position and influence at Verona would, I am convinced, have been very different from what they were, and measures which the world will probably have permanently to deplore might, and I think would, have been avoided.

I am far from insinuating, and indeed am far from believing, that there has been occasion of blame in any quarter from matters having turned out counter to our wishes. Personal confidence, with the influence it creates in high quarters, can only be attained by long habits of personal communication on similar interests, nor perhaps even then, unless on difficult political measures, and in difficult times. Our late friend enjoyed this confidence and influence in all the leading cabinets of Europe. After him, there was but one great trump card in our pack; it ought to have been played, it was not, and the world is capotted. Look, yourself, to the effect of your own influence on your return through Paris, and from whence alone we have since derived the slight hopes of peace which have been entertained subsequently to the French proposal at Verona. Farewell, this is a melancholy subject.

Most sincerely and gratefully yours,

Clancarty.

P.S.—My best thanks for a kind communication by Chad.

The King to His Grace the Duke of Wellington.

Pavilion, Brighton,
Wednesday, 19th March, 1823.

My dear Friend,

Sir William has faithfully related to me all your sensible, wise and judicious observations respecting the state of our foreign policy. My feelings are in complete unison with your own on this most important and vital question. My confidence is in you, and you only, and in placing my friendship and affection in you, and with you, I feel safe, happy and comfortable. I could not resist writing you these few lines to assure you that I am, with very great regard,

Your very sincere friend,

G. R.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [290.]

My dear Mr. Canning, London, 20th March, 1823.

I enclose you a letter from Lord FitzRoy Somerset, which I received yesterday morning, but I was so unwell that I could not send it to you.

I see that the papers make you say in answer to Sir J. McI., that you would lay the correspondence on the table on some day *previous* to the recess, and make your statement on an early day after the recess.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know whether you intend to produce the note given in by me at Verona from which M. de Chateaubriand made his quotation; and if you do, whether you intend to make any communication on the subject to the three Continental Courts; as you will observe that the confidential communication reported in my despatch of the 20th November, of which I lately gave you an extract, was common to the five Courts.

I conclude that we shall see the papers before they are laid before Parliament.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Gloucester Lodge,

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, 20th March, 1823, ¼ past 7 P.M.

I too am confined to the house, and ought to have been so both yesterday and the day before, but I was obliged to be both days in the House of Commons.

The newspapers blunder. I have never had the slightest thoughts of laying papers till after the holydays. Of course I shall be anxious to go through the whole with you before they are settled. They will probably be ready for that purpose early next week—not sooner.

I return Lord FitzRoy Somerset's letter. A'Court's to me I suppose you have seen, as I sent it to Lord L. yesterday morning, and I directed Planta to circulate it afterwards. It is marked "private," but is with the despatches.

I do not draw so sanguine a conclusion as Lord FitzRoy Somerset from San Miguel's inquiry. Remember, he is *going out*, and I suspect he means to carry this information with him to make use of it hostilely hereafter.

In any case, I have no expectation that France, now secure of our abstinence, will listen to anything short of *submission* from Spain.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Madrid, 20th March, 1823.

The King set out this morning so punctually at eight o'clock, the time fixed for his departure, that he was already gone when I arrived there a very few minutes after that hour. Hardly anybody appeared near the Palace, and very few people at the gates or at the bridge of Toledo, where however there were a few vivas. Finding I was behind the King I crossed

the Manyannces lower down by a ford, and by that means headed the procession and had a good view of his Majesty and the royal family. He looked ill, and so did the poor Queen. They were all packed pretty close, though the family and the household occupied nearly twenty carriages. The cortège proceeded at a walk, being headed by two companies of infantry and a few cavalry. I did not see many troops, but I understand that some had been sent forward, and that others were in the rear. He has, I believe, been accompanied by five of the ministers. San Miguel and the Minister of Finance Egea will follow in a few days. The Cortes sit to-day, and to-morrow, and on Saturday they adjourn it is said to the 23rd of April. They will proceed towards Seville as soon as the adjournment takes place. They seem to consider that they have achieved a great triumph by removing the King from hence. By others, and I may say by the great majority, his departure is considered a matter of great regret. The town is perfectly quiet. I have heard of no material occurrence in the provinces since I wrote last. Bessiere sent a detachment yesterday morning to Alcala, which was repulsed without any difficulty, and has retired towards Guadalaxara. One of the chiefs in La Mancha, who was expected to oppose the march of the royal convoy, has submitted under promise of pardon, and Pelayo has been defeated in the neighbourhood of San Ildefonso.

Those who disapprove of the journey to Seville, talk confidently of the cortège being attacked and of the deputies who are to follow being taken and hanged. I don't know what chance they have of that punishment, or how far they deserve it, but I cannot help thinking that the King will get safe to his journey's end. I fancy that the government have got a good many troops of one sort or another on different parts of the road, and I understand that the militia generally can be depended upon.

It is not unlikely I think that some of the partisans may make an attempt on Madrid, if they find that the garrison is weak, but it will not signify much if they obtain possession of it. Indeed, their occupation of it will prove to the French how little the possession of Madrid affects the country in general.

The government have issued a decree for closing the ports against all French, Russian, Prussian, and Austrian vessels. Will not this act be considered a declaration of war or something very like it? I don't know the grounds upon which it was published, but it appears to me a very impolitic measure at this moment.

We have nothing important from Portugal.

Your most faithful and affectionate,

FITZROY SOMERSET.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

[291.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 21st March, 1823.

I intended to call upon you this morning, but I cannot get out sufficiently early.

I am sorry to see that you think your declaration of Tuesday

will prevent France from listening to anything from Spain short of submission. The French government are in a great difficulty, which is aggravated by the position of their army; and they may be under the necessity of hurrying on their measures, in order to relieve the difficulties of their military position by the occupation of more ground; and there may not be time for further negotiation. But I am quite certain that our position in the question between France and Spain in a military view has never given the French government one moment's uneasiness.

Whatever they might feel or know of the sentiments of the three Allied Courts respecting their declaration against Spain, they must have been quite certain of the countenance of all those Courts in their attack upon Spain, as well as of the support of some if not of all, if this country had interfered actively in the case; and there are but few people in France who would not consider it a fortunate circumstance for the House of Bourbon to commence a war with this country on any subject, having all Europe (excepting Spain and Portugal) and probably the United States on her side giving her countenance, if not active support and assistance.

I really think that you may make yourself quite easy about the effect of your declaration of Tuesday. Indeed, I think that if it had been made at an earlier period it would have been better, as it would have undeceived Spain and would have conciliated the confidence of France, and would have left more time for negotiation.

I am really very anxious about your giving notice to the continental courts of the necessity of producing my note of the 30th October. I engaged that it should not be produced, and the government must either perform the engagement, or disavow my right to make it; or state some reason for not performing the engagement.

All that passed on that occasion was strictly confidential, and there is an end to all confidence in negotiations if the agents charged with them cannot engage that such communications shall not be made public. But in this case there is a good reason for making the communication public, viz., that one of the parties to the communication has published it partially and unfairly; and the other three parties cannot but admit our right to publish the whole.

But they are clearly entitled to be informed of this necessity, if only as a matter of politeness; and it is but fair to me, as the agent of the government upon this occasion, unless the government should disavow me, that they should know that I had reported faithfully what had passed in the conference of the 20th of November.

I am certain that when you consider this subject you will see it in the same light, and if you are determined to produce this paper, as I think you must, the sooner you apprise the Continental Courts of this intention the better.

Believe mē, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Sir Charles Bagot to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, St. Petersburg, 22nd March, 1823.

I think it not improbable that you may be glad to be acquainted with the following circumstances relating to a person who is now here under the name of Turner, though, as he is not in our service, I am not aware that any steps can be taken in regard to him.

This Mr. Turner arrived here a short time ago from Paris, where he had made acquaintance with several Russians, by some of whom he was furnished with letters of introduction to the Grand Duke Michael, who is at the head of the Ordnance Department.

Mr. Turner's object in coming here was to offer his services to make Congreve rockets of a quality far superior to any that have been yet manufactured upon the Continent, and equal to those made at Woolwich. In order to prove that he was competent to carry his offers into effect, he produced accurate drawings and models of the various parts and proportions of the rockets, and of the apparatus used in preparing them; and he stated that he had at his command two of the principal workmen employed under Sir W. Congreve at Woolwich (one of whom was said to have been foreman), who had either been discharged or placed upon very reduced wages at the late reduction in the Ordnance Department, and who were now actually on the Continent.

The conditions on which Mr. Turner proposed to communicate his secrets to the Russian Government were—

1st. That he should receive 100,000 roubles, to be paid on producing a rocket made at St. Petersburg, which should upon trial be found to be equal in range to the British rockets.

2nd. That he should receive a salary of 600*l.* a year for himself, and 300*l.* a year for his workman; and

3rd. That he should have for a limited time the rank of Captain, during which he would form and instruct a rocket corps.

These terms have not been agreed to. Mr. Turner has, however, been induced to prepare some rockets in the Imperial Arsenal, for which purpose

he is furnished with all the materials and assistance he requires, while the Russians are employed in making rockets at the same time and by the same process, which it is easy for them to do, as Mr. Turner does not appear to take any precautions to conceal or keep to himself any part of his operations, and he has been told that if upon trial his rockets shall prove to be superior to those so made by the Russian officers he shall be rewarded.

In the mean time Mr. Turner seems to be satisfied with this promise, and has certainly sent directions to the workmen before alluded to to join him at St. Petersburg. He is daily employed in the Arsenal, and his work as far as it is yet advanced is pronounced to be very good by a person who has had an opportunity of seeing it, and who is himself a very competent judge.

It appears that Mr. Turner (whose real name has not been ascertained) is the son of a gentleman of fortune, I believe in Leicestershire, and of high rank in the British navy; that he was educated at Cambridge, where he devoted himself exclusively to mathematics and mechanics; that he is himself an excellent practical mechanic and workman; that having some time since while in England turned his attention to the nature of the Congreve rockets, he embarked in a long course of experiments to endeavour to discover their composition, in the progress of which he became acquainted with Sir W. Congreve's workman before mentioned, and with his assistance he finally accomplished his object, and at his own expense succeeded in manufacturing a very considerable quantity of these rockets—it is said 10,000—which he intended to convey to the Greeks, into whose service he was desirous of entering. This part of his plan was, however, defeated by the interference of the government, by whose order the whole of the rockets were seized, and Mr. Turner was himself arrested, and his papers and drawings taken from him by two King's messengers at Brighton in the beginning of last year as he was upon the point of sailing for France.

It seems that on arriving at Paris he received very liberal and flattering overtures from the French government, who appear to have been aware of his circumstances; but he declined them, preferring to offer himself to Russia, from the idea that in the event of a war with Turkey, or in some other way, he might still be able to realise his favourite scheme of assisting the Greek cause.

He has never ventured to call upon me, nor have I seen him, but I am told that his manners and conversation are extremely rough and violent, and he professes the most radical principles.

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours most sincerely and faithfully,

CHARLES BAGOT.

[This is the person about whom we had the information last year. What was his name? What did we do about him?

WELLINGTON.]

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [292.]

London, March, 23rd, 1823.
At night.

MY DEAR MR. CANNING,

I desired Planta to send you my notes on your draft, and I have since turned the whole subject over in my mind, and I confess that the result is a conviction that however good the despatch is it is better not to launch it.

As a *résumé* it ought to be as accurate both as to facts and dates as the documents which it quotes, and which will be published with it; otherwise it will be said by *the enemy*, both French and Opposition, that it is written to fill up gaps in the preceding documents. It is almost impossible to write a *résumé* with effect, preserving such accuracy. The French will certainly publish an answer.

Then I confess I doubt the expediency of the latter part of the despatch. If you declare officially to France your neutrality you must declare something about colonies, family compact, and eventual French occupation.

In respect to colonies, in my opinion our line of proceeding should vary almost in proportion as France should be successful or otherwise; and I can't see any advantage to be derived in any quarter by publishing beforehand what our line will be. In respect to Family Compact, I understand that you will communicate your intentions by a secret despatch, which may be done whether this despatch is sent or not. But even upon that point it might be inconvenient to pledge ourselves beforehand to any particular line of conduct. I can conceive a termination of the existing operation in which a Family Compact might be quite unworthy of notice, and rather a weakness than a strength to both parties; and it might be very inconvenient to be bound by such a published document to notice it.

In respect to French occupation, we may rely on its taking place in some shape or other if the French should be successful even only in the military operation, and the duration of it must depend upon circumstances. The occupation cannot well be mentioned without objection; and yet, if we object to it, we ought to go further than we do in our objections to the invasion.

If we promise neutrality in this despatch, all these objects must be discussed; but I confess that the necessity for dis-

cussing them with France so long before the occasion for the discussion will arise would in my mind be a sufficient reason for saying nothing to the French government on the subject.

I communicate this view for your consideration.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

General Alava to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MI QUERIDO SEÑOR DUQUE, Marzo 23 de 1823.

Aprovecho la salida de nuestro amigo Lord FitzRoy para saludar á V.E., y decirle que hoy por la tarde salgo para Sevilla.

Nada diré á V.E. sobre politica, por que mi situacion no me permite hablar de ella; pero sí que la crisis se acerca, y que vamos á ver pronto el desenlace del drama.

Sin embargo yo no dudo, ó al menos confio mucho en que el odio que el pueblo Español profesa á los Franceses podrá mas que las sugestiones de los que los han llamado, á pesar de que entre estos se cuenta el clero, que, como en todos los paises católicos, tiene mucha influencia sobre un pueblo ignorante, supersticioso, y que se confiesa.

De todos modos yo no puedo perdonar á esta nueva especie de Afrancesados, peores todavia, ó tan malos como los otros, pues si bien concedo á todo Español el derecho de querer para su pais el gobierno que crée mejor, no concedere jamás el de hacer venir extrangeros, y sobre todo Franceses, despues de lo sucedido con ellos en la guerra de la independencia.

Yo ignoro, Milord, la suerte que me està reservada, pero sea la que fuere, mi conciencia nada me reprocha, y moriré contento si logro conseguir que mis amigos, y V.E. sobre todo, me conserven su amistad, y mas que todo su estimacion.

Todos cometemos errores, y necesitamos indulgencia por ellos, pero todavia somos mas dignos de ella los que, colocados en una terrible situacion, no hemos tenido que elegir sino entre la ignominia vestida con las apariencias de conveniencia publica, y la muerte. Esta ultima es bien preferible.

Todo á V.E. for ever, su mas agradecido y fiel amigo,

M. DE ALAVA.

[293.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Brighton, 30th March, 1823.

Prince Esterhazy has informed me that Prince Metternich had written to Paris to remonstrate upon the French proceedings, to which he never could have consented, as they tend to injure essential interests, for the preservation of which the Emperor is bound by treaty.

He disapproves particularly of the King's speech. He says that the word *war* should never have been mentioned unless the Spaniards should have attacked. The words *paix glorieuse* in the Address from the Peers shows what are the objects of the French Government, and on what line they are proceeding; and he says their conduct is quite inconsistent with what was settled at Verona.

These despatches must have been received at Paris as far back as a fortnight ago, and I mention the subject as I think they account for the alteration of the French line of proceeding and language reported by Sir C. Stuart in the private letter to you which you read at the Cabinet on Thursday.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool. [294.]

MY DEAR LORD LIVERPOOL, Brighton, 30th March, 1823.

I beg you to attend particularly to the despatch which we saw in draft at Gloucester Lodge on Wednesday, as what has passed on the subject in Parliament has already created a good deal of uneasiness here.

That which Mr. Canning proposed would go to a break up of the Alliance; and I don't believe any of us, not even Mr. Canning himself, thinks that the affairs of Europe are in such a state as that the Alliance provided in the Second Article of the Treaty of 1815 may not be necessary.

If you think it desirable I will write to him on the subject. But I would prefer to leave it where it was on Wednesday.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Gloucester Lodge, Sunday evening,

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, 30th March, 1823.

I had just sent a messenger off with Lord FitzRoy Somerset's packet to you, when I received your note of this morning from Brighton.

In the box which I sent at the same time to the King, with despatches from Sir William A'Court, is a private letter from Sir Charles Stuart,

containing an account from the Consul at Bourdeaux of the strength of the French army. The account is given in detail, and makes the whole amount under 60,000 men.

Perhaps you can manage to see this box before it leaves Brighton. Lord Francis C., who is at the Pavilion, will procure it for you.

I wish also that you would see the draft to Sir C. Stuart of the despatch containing the résumé of our discussions, which I sent to the King last night, and see whether it now stands exactly as you would have it.

Pray let me know your movements, in case I should have occasion to communicate with you during the holydays.

I am satisfied that the Court of Vienna sees all that has passed at Paris in a proper light. But Pozzo is still pushing on to measures which *mean* a quarrel with this country.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Coombe Wood, 31st March, 1823.

I can set your mind quite at ease about the despatch we saw at Gloucester Lodge on Wednesday. He quite concurred with me on the Thursday morning in giving it up; he thought what had passed in Parliament on the subject was quite sufficient as a *hint*, and that it would be very undesirable to open a correspondence which might be at all events very difficult to manage, and might ultimately lead to a total dissolution of the Alliance.

Ever sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

[295.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Brighton, 31st March, 1823.

I send you my letter from Lord FitzRoy Somerset. I did not send the draft; but the King stated some objections to a few words regarding the establishment in Spain of liberty; and I told him that he had better mark them, and suggest to you to omit them. Upon his reading over the paragraph they did not appear to me to be important. His objection to them was that they pronounced what Spain had been and was doing to be a system of liberty, which others would contend was anarchy; and that we thus prejudged the question.

Since I wrote to you yesterday I have seen Mr. Gordon's despatches, upon which I will write to you either by the post or

by the messenger of this evening, and upon the calculation of the numbers of the French army, if I should be able to see it.

Believe me, &c.

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [296.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Brighton, 31st March, 1823.

Since I wrote to you this morning I have seen the letter from Mr. Scott. The account of the army which he sends was published some days ago in the newspaper, and I should think it little to be relied upon. It omits altogether Moncey's corps, which is to act on the side of Perpignan, and which is stated in the paper transmitted by Sir Charles Stuart some days ago to be 22,000 men. Then Mr. Scott's account makes the Prince of Hohenlohe command the corps to enter by Jura; that of Sir Charles Stuart makes General Molitor command it. I think him much more likely to be trusted with such a command than the Prince of Hohenlohe, who labours under three disadvantages. He is old, an emigrant, and a German. All this tends to show that you cannot rely upon Mr. Scott's papers, which I believe are in general taken from the newspapers in the south of France. I have seen exact copies of some of them in the 'Times.'

I can't judge of Sir W. A'Court's and Lord FitzRoy's last letters, not having seen those which preceded them; but from all that I hear from France I should be apprehensive that nothing could now stop the invasion.

The King is very anxious upon the subject of privateers. He spoke to me about them yesterday, and desired me to-day to attend particularly to Sir Charles Stuart's No. 119. I shall see him this afternoon, and will tell him that Lord Melville was making inquiries respecting the possibility of excluding privateers, and at all events their prizes, from our ports altogether. The King wished yesterday that we should consider the means of prevailing upon both parties not to grant letters of marque. I confess that I doubt the practicability of doing so. We might as well desire them not to use musquetry or cannon, or any other means of annoyance. If the French undertake these operations as auxiliaries, and don't consider themselves at

war with Spain, they can't with propriety issue letters of marque. But there is nothing to prevent the Spaniards from covering the sea with privateers; and the French government will very soon be under the necessity of following their example. I conceive, therefore, that we cannot attain that object. But we may, and ought if possible, to prevent privateers from resorting to our ports; and at all events to prevent them from there selling their prizes.

Sir Charles Stuart does not give a very clear account of the plan of sending with the Duke d'Angoulême Commissioners on the part of the Allied Powers, and I am inclined to believe that he has travelled a little farther than he is warranted to do by the state of the facts. I don't believe there have been any instructions from St. Petersburg since the King of France's speech was known there; and certainly none from Vienna which could lead to the belief that the Austrian government have agreed to such a plan; and I think that Rose's despatch shows that such a plan was not known to Count Bernstorff. It may be in contemplation, but as yet it cannot have been ordered.

It is very obvious that our government and Metternich never can look at Spanish constitutional questions in the same view; and really this is very little important at present, as, happen what may, it is impossible that the views Metternich has should be carried into execution. This being the case, would it not be best to lay them out of the question altogether, and endeavour to make Metternich understand us clearly upon our own questions in Spain.

These, as I understand them, are Spanish independence; that is to say, that France shall not guarantee the internal constitution of Spain, whatever it may be; or, in other words, shall not be to Spain what Russia was to Poland in the last century; no Family Compact according to our Treaty of 1814, and no cession to France of Spanish colonies now in insurrection.

I am much mistaken if Prince Metternich and Count Bernstorff would not be more interested in the two first mentioned objects than ourselves. The Autocrat might not at this moment feel the same interest in these objects. But I think you would do well to open yourself fully to Prince Metternich and Count Bernstorff upon them, and leave to them to find the way of checking the views of the French government on these points.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Prince Metternich. [297.]

MON CHER PRINCE, Londres, ce 1er Avril, 1823.

Il y a bien longtemps que je ne vous ai écrit, mais le fait est que quand je vous ai quitté vous étiez placé dans une position dont je comprenais si peu l'avantage pour la monarchie Autrichienne, et en même temps si décidé à marcher dans la ligne que vous aviez adoptée, qu'il me paraissait inutile de vous adresser, si ce n'était pour tâcher d'effacer des impressions erronées sur mon propre compte, et sur celui du Gouvernement Britannique.

J'ai toujours les mêmes raisons pour me taire que j'avais sur ce qui regarde le fond de la question Espagnole. Il est très clair que vous ne pouvez jamais envisager cette affaire de la même manière que nous la regardons ici. Je regrette toujours que la France non-seulement n'a pas été empêchée à Vérone de se placer dans une position critique, mais que, par les transactions subséquentes à mon départ, elle a été forcée de s'y maintenir, malgré son désir de s'en retirer.

Mais dans cette affaire, tout le monde a pris sa place où il faut rester, et ces questions ne sont plus celles du jour. Il est survenu des incidens dans cette affaire qui sont dignes d'attention, surtout parceque, en mon opinion, tout le monde y étant intéressé, ils peuvent donner occasion à s'entendre encore une fois dans les principes généraux de l'Alliance.

Vous avez vu par le discours de S.M.T.C., et les adresses et les discours des Ministres et des adhérens de la Cour en France, que le Cabinet des Tuileries n'a pas pris pour base de son action la question révolutionnaire comme convenu par les transactions de Vérone, ni même une question française, mais la question de la maison de Bourbon, dont on veut rétablir l'influence et les relations avec la branche Espagnole, comme elles existaient jadis.

Pour moi, je n'ai pas la moindre objection à la véritable et légitime influence française en Espagne. Il serait aussi ridicule de s'attendre qu'elle ne doit pas exister, que de s'attendre que l'Autriche n'aurait pas une influence en Bavière. Mais nous objectons au renouvellement de la relation appelée Pacte de Famille, parceque pour l'Angleterre elle était offensive, et parceque nous avons un traité avec le Roi d'Espagne, par lequel S.M.C. promet que jamais il ne le rétablirait, ni aucun traité de la même nature.

En circonstances ordinaires, nous n'aurions aucune cause de plainte contre le Roi de France, si S.M. voulait rétablir ou rétablissait ce traité, quoique nous pourrions avoir assez à nous plaindre du Roi d'Espagne; mais il me paraît que nous aurions à nous plaindre du Roi de France, si, ayant connaissance depuis l'année 1814 de notre traité avec le Roi d'Espagne, il prenait avantage de la position où il pourra se trouver en Espagne, en conséquence de ce qui se passe au moment actuel, pour forcer le Roi d'Espagne à rompre son engagement avec S.M.B., et à renouveler le Pacte de Famille.

Nous n'aurions pas alors à compter avec S.M.C. mais avec Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne, et c'est pour tâcher d'éviter les complications et les positions qui pourraient s'en suivre, que je m'adresse à vous.

Voici où nous sommes dans cette question. C'est une question d'honneur seulement, mais elle en est une très sérieuse. Quand le Pacte de Famille a été adopté, son objet était de s'opposer à la puissance maritime de l'Angleterre. Son renouvellement ne nous y donnerait rien à redouter. Comme objet d'intérêt politique il nous est important seulement pour les Puissances du continent; et il me paraît que pour l'Autriche et la Prusse il est beaucoup plus important que pour nous.

La question est celle-ci. Est-ce que l'Autriche va permettre à la France de se prévaloir de la contenance et de l'appui que l'Autriche lui donne pour un objet politique supposé général, pour rétablir le Pacte de Famille, et porter une insulte à son ancien allié, et léser les intérêts de toutes les Puissances limitrophes et voisines de la France?

Mais le renouvellement du Pacte de Famille n'est pas la seule question qui va survenir qui nous intéresse comme point d'honneur, et qui intéresse à l'Autriche et à la Prusse comme objet politique. Nous savons que le Roi de France, au mois de Juillet passé, a proposé la Charte Française à l'Espagne, et de *la garantir*. Est-ce que l'Autriche et la Prusse ont l'intention que l'Espagne devienne à la France ce que la Pologne était à la Russie au siècle passé? Sûrement vous ne pouvez pas voir tranquillement l'établissement en Espagne d'une telle influence française.

Je sais qu'en général sur le continent vous avez un tel mépris pour le gouvernement de la maison de Bourbon, que vous êtes disposé à regarder avec indifférence tout ce qu'elle peut faire.

Mais, mon Prince, je crains qu'avec toute votre expérience, et surtout en France, vous vous trompez. Par les mesures adoptées à Vérone la France a été mise en état de crise d'où elle pourra sortir dans l'une de trois manières différentes :—

Par une faillite complète, et alors la maison de Bourbon est perdue : par une réussite militaire, mais faillite complète de tout résultat politique, et alors elle pourra continuer à languir comme jusqu'à présent : par une réussite complète et politique et militaire.

Pour moi, je crois le second alternatif le plus probable, mais vous devez en désirer le dernier, où seul les évènemens que je viens de discuter peuvent arriver.

Vous verrez alors la maison de Bourbon avancée de 30 ans au moins sur ce qu'elle était dans l'année 1822 ; et prematurement, parceque les institutions paisibles et l'expérience n'auront pas accompagnées son avancement.

Observez aussi que cet avancement sera avant que ses cotemporains et voisins aient pu s'établir chez eux, dans les circonstances modernes, du monde d'une manière qui corresponde à celle où la France va se trouver.

La maison de Bourbon sera à la tête d'une nation la plus guerrière du monde, la mieux placée, et la mieux organisée pour la guerre, et avec plus de ressources militaires que toute l'Europe ensemble ; et il ne faut pas s'étonner que même la faiblesse de caractère de cette famille soit un motif de plus de guerre et de trouble pour l'Europe.

Regardez les choses comme elles sont. Voyez la maison de Bourbon sortant de cette affaire Espagnole avec réussite complète et politique et militaire, et dites si cette maison n'a désormais rien à craindre des révolutionnaires ou de la classe militaire du pays, et si elle n'est pas mise à cheval pour toujours.

Regardez alors où est la France dans toutes les questions possibles, révolutionnaires, politiques, financières, ou civiles, comparée avec le reste de l'Europe, et dites moi si ce n'est pas de l'intérêt de l'Autriche et de la Prusse d'empêcher qu'elle ne prenne avantage de la position où elle pourra se trouver en Espagne pour se renforcer encore.

Si je me suis bien expliqué, mon Prince, je m'assure que vous verrez ces questions comme je les envisage ; et que, laissant de côté toute la question révolutionnaire en Espagne, où chacun s'est placé de sa manière, vous parlerez clairement à la France,

et vous la ferez entendre que vous êtes Européen et pas Bourbonien, et que vous ne voulez pas qu'on se sert du nom et de l'autorité de S.M.I. l'Empereur d'Autriche pour avancer des vues de famille qui ne conviennent nullement à l'intérêt général de l'Europe.

Dans cette marche nous reconnaîtrons encore l'Autriche, et de quelque manière que puisse terminer cette malheureuse question révolutionnaire, on pourra espérer que l'alliance se retrouvera.

Malgré que cette lettre soit si longue, je ne veux pas la terminer sans vous assurer que, malgré ce qu'on vous dit en France et les apparences occasionnées en grande partie par le silence du gouvernement Britannique, nous avons toujours été, depuis que je vous ai vu, dans la ligne où je vous ai indiqué le 20me Novembre que nous serions, c'est-à-dire que nous avons tout fait pour calmer et pour faire le bien.

En vérité je crois que nous aurions réussi à faire garder la paix, si des fautes énormes n'avaient pas été commises en France et même quelques-unes ici. Mais la question de la paix ou de la guerre est à présent décidée. Il faut en voir le résultat.

Croyez-moi, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Gloucester Lodge, 4th April, 1823.

I send you the proof sheet of Verona and Paris.

I have added to the beginning two or three extracts, to state our principle, and to establish the Army of Observation; and I propose, as you see, to retrench a part of your Memorandum to Sir C. Stuart, which is argumentative, keeping the narrative part, which is of infinite value.

I have read my despatches to Sir C. Stuart of the 31st, to-day, to Prince Esterhazy, Count Lieven, and Count Werther. The former two, but Esterhazy particularly, profess to be satisfied in the greatest degree, and to consider the *résumé* as highly impartial and conciliatory. Werther wants some *appui moral* for France, which he must find where he can.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [298.]

My dear Mr. Canning, Stratfieldsaye, 5th April, 1823.

I have received your box, which I return. I have made one or two observations on the margins, to which I beg to draw your attention.

But I entreat you to write to the Allied Courts before my paper of the 30th October is laid before Parliament. It will never be believed that government could have made this paper public, notwithstanding Mons. de Chateaubriand's conduct in misquoting it, without making some communication to the Allied Courts, if what passed in conference on the 20th November had been known; and it will be imagined that I did not faithfully report what occurred in conference upon that occasion.

Believe me, &c.,

Wellington.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Gloucester Lodge,

My dear Duke of Wellington, 6th April, 1823. 7 P.M.

I have adopted all your proposed omissions, and I have written notes to Count Lieven and Prince Esterhazy, accompanying the communication of the despatch to Sir Charles Stuart, which will explain and justify our publication, and bear you entirely harmless.

I enclose a copy of my note.

I send you the proofs of the remainder of the papers, which pray return to me to-morrow at Coombe Wood, whither I am going for twenty-four or, if it may be, forty-eight hours of fresh air and quiet, for I am quite knocked up with this occupation of my holydays.

Ever sincerely yours,

George Canning.

Do not hurry yourself, but if you send away the messenger in such time as that he can be in town by six, he had better come *here*, as I find Coombe is not much nearer to Stratfieldsaye.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [299.]

My dear Mr. Canning, London, 7th April, 1823.

I came to town this morning to my aide-de-camp's wedding, and return your papers, upon which I have made some marks.

Upon reflecting upon the papers which you sent to me on Saturday, it occurs to me that the Memorandum at the bottom of Mons. de Montmorency's note of the 20th October might as well be omitted. In fact, we had no protocol upon the Spanish affair; and Mons. de Montmorency, I believe, withdrew the paper referred to, with the exception of the concluding propositions.

I likewise doubt the expediency of making public that conversation which I had with Mons. de Villèle on the day of my arrival at Paris. It was strictly confidential; and although all that is proposed to be published is to the credit of Mons. de Villèle, and would raise him in the opinion of this country, it would lower the continental Allies, who certainly forced him into the war against his inclination; and he might not like its being published, as his evident wish for peace and endeavours to avoid the war would not be relished by his Royalist supporters. I refer to the conversation in which he mentions the *moment opportun*, &c.

It appears to me that this conversation is not important to our case.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Gloucester Lodge, 7th April, 1823.

I strike out the note (or Memorandum) at the foot of M. de Montmorency's paper very willingly.

But I really do not see how to part with the *fact* of M. de Villèle's having referred the despatches back to Verona, without making what follows utterly unintelligible. The very note offering the mediation alludes to that fact as the foundation of our proceeding.

It was also no small part of our temptation to enter into any intervention between France and Spain that the minister of France entertained pacific views.

If you object only to quoting the phrase, "moment opportun," that can be done, as in the enclosed copy. But I think that leaves M. Villèle worse than he was.

But if you like that version better it shall be adopted.

The *fact* is indispensable.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

Le Prince de Metternich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Mon cher Duc, Vienne, ce 8me Avril, 1823.

Un courier de M. le Prince d'Esterhazy du 10me Avril m'a apporté la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 4me du même mois. L'intérêt que m'inspire tout ce qui me vient de votre part, étant renforcé encore par celui des objets que vous traitez dans cette lettre, je ne puis mieux vous prouver le prix que j'y attache qu'en vous adressant sans perte de tems la réponse à la fois la plus étendue et la plus franche.

Vos observations, mon cher Duc, portent sur le passé et elles embrassent l'avenir.

Vous m'eussiez vu faire l'essai de ne pas toucher au premier, si ce que vous me dites ne me privait en partie de cette faculté. Il est difficile en effet de séparer ce qui se tient de si près, et je ne crois pas me tromper en reconnaissant dans la grave affaire d'Espagne, une liaison tellement intime entre le passé, le présent, et l'avenir, que qui touche à l'une des périodes entre de fait en discussion sur les autres. Telle est en particulier la position dans laquelle doit se sentir placé l'homme chargé de la conduite des affaires politiques de l'Autriche ; de cette puissance qui, non-seulement dans les affaires d'Espagne, mais dans toutes celles d'une nature analogue, n'a cessé de voir, de craindre, d'espérer, et de vouloir, ce qu'elle veut, craint, espère, et voudra encore !

Comment avons-nous, en effet, jugé les positions, bien avant la réunion de Vérone? Nous avons reconnu dans la révolution Espagnole un danger tout particulier, et tel qu'aucune des autres révolutions de notre tems ne l'avait encore présenté. Ce danger s'est manifesté à nos yeux dans le choix de *l'instrument* dont s'est servi la faction qui a bouleversé l'Espagne, et après elle le Portugal, Naples, et le Piémont ; cette faction qui, enhardie par un premier succès trop facilement obtenu, a visé et vise à tous les succès futurs et qui déjà a trouvé moyen de se constituer en gouvernement formel ! La voix de la raison, réunie à celle de notre sentiment intime, nous a dit, comme nous le répétons aujourd'hui, que si *la révolte militaire* reste triomphante sur un point quelconque de l'Europe, c'est fait de la société.

Il est superflu d'observer, mon cher Duc, que le sentiment que j'énonce ici n'a rien de commun avec les formes de gouvernement et avec les institutions légalement établies dans les divers états dont se compose l'Europe. Il n'y a que la déraison la plus complète, ou la mauvaise foi la plus insigne, qui puissent nous accuser d'en vouloir à aucune de ces institutions, parceque nous abhorrons les mesures violentes et criminelles qui les renversent sous prétexte de les réformer. Je défends, au contraire, et avec la même sincérité, et les institutions très diverses qui régissent mon pays, et les libertés monarchiques dans d'autres empires, et jusqu'à l'existence républicaine du Canton de Vaud !

La révolution d'Espagne nous a offert l'exemple d'un mal tout autrement alarmant que celui des grands mouvements populaires, qui dans le laps des siècles font quelquefois adopter des changemens dans le régime constitutionnel des états ; d'un mal lequel, en tuant l'ordre public dans une de ses parties fondamentales, n'admet pas même la chance de le voir rétabli par ses résultats. C'est là le mal que nous avons signalé à l'Europe, que l'Eu-

rope nous a signalé à son tour, et que la France a dû sentir plus directement et plus vivement que tout autre état européen.

Lisez, Monsieur le Duc, ma lettre du 8me Juillet, 1822, au Marquis de Londonderry, et vous verrez ce qu'à cette époque j'ai pensé et dit sur ce même sujet.

Vérone s'est présenté et l'Autriche y a défendu les thèses que je viens d'établir. Cette défense nous a semblé un devoir. Fidèles à la marche habituelle de l'esprit de l'Empereur, nous avons eu soin de nous prononcer avant tout sur les principes. Mais les principes les plus incontestables pouvant être bien ou mal appliqués dans un cas particulier, il a fallu nous demander dès lors si le salut commun paraissait plus assuré par le choix d'une attitude active ou passive? Nous nous sommes voués à cet examen, avec le calme qui nous est habituel. Nous avons pesé les argumens qu'offrait l'une et l'autre de ces alternatives. Nous avons senti en même tems qu'il était juste de laisser à la France, placée la plus près du danger, l'initiative du parti à prendre. Si nous pouvions même admettre que cette puissance, comme il est dit quelque part dans votre lettre, ait été "forcée de se maintenir dans une position critique malgré son désir de s'en retirer," ce ne serait certes pas à nous que l'on pourrait reprocher d'avoir créé cette position. Mais du moment que nous avons vu le gouvernement Français convaincu de la nécessité d'opposer à la révolution d'Espagne une résistance active, nous n'aurions pu, sans manquer à notre conscience, combattre une résolution dont le motif était entièrement conforme à notre propre manière de juger la question.

Mais, plus certaines vérités nous ont semblé démontrées, et plus elles se soutiennent comme claires et positives dans notre esprit, moins serions-nous prêts à nous écarter, dans la suite d'une action conforme à nos sentimens, de ce que nous regardons comme la conséquence nécessaire des principes, sanctionnés par notre suffrage. S'il n'a pas été possible dans le tems que les puissances continentales s'entendissent avec l'Angleterre sur la nécessité d'une action, je vois au moins avec beaucoup de satisfaction que l'Angleterre désire s'entendre avec ses Alliés sur les moyens d'empêcher que (dans une hypothèse qu'heureusement rien ne nous autorise encore à admettre) cette même action ne devienne, en changeant de caractère, la source d'un grand dérangement dans le système politique de l'Europe.

Votre lettre renferme à ce sujet plusieurs questions; mes réponses seront courtes et concluantes.

L'Autriche n'aura, ainsi que l'Angleterre, "rien à objecter à la véritable et légitime influence française en Espagne."

Jamais, d'un autre côté, regarderions-nous comme admissible que la France prit pour base de l'appui des Alliés, "la question de la maison de Bourbon, dont cette première voudrait rétablir l'influence et les relations avec la branche espagnole comme elles existèrent jadis."

Non-seulement le gouvernement Français,—s'il devait nourrir une prétention aussi absurde que contraire au premier des principes de l'alliance, à celui de l'indépendance des états,—ne jouirait-il pas de notre appui, mais il rencontrerait notre opposition la plus formelle.

Le *pacte de famille* nous semble aujourd'hui un mot vide de sens, car tous les efforts du monde ne parviendraient pas à le rétablir. Il est un autre pacte non moins chimérique, et qui cependant occupe bien des esprits;

c'est celui des gouvernemens que le langage révolutionnaire désigne exclusivement comme *constitutionnels*. Nous le craignons tout aussi peu que *celui de famille*, ou que ceux qui prendraient les titres de réligionnaires. Le seul qui soit véritablement à craindre, et qui, par conséquent, mérite de fixer toute l'attention des puissances, c'est celui entre les factieux répandus sur toute la surface de l'Europe; pacte qui a su s'emparer déjà de tant de ressorts pour paralyser l'autorité et pour empoisonner les sources de la vie des états.

Vous me parlez des chances de l'avenir comme suites de l'opération de la France contre l'Espagne. Permettez-moi de vous répondre ici avec une sincérité entière.

La première des autorités à consulter dans toute grave complication—le livre de l'histoire—se joint ici à ce qu'une carrière longue, et que j'ai parcouru au milieu des plus grandes tourmentes politiques, m'a permis d'acquérir d'expérience pour me servir de règle en pareille circonstance. Je crois que le succès comme la défaite, les solutions heureuses comme les dangers, sont dans toute affaire en rapport direct avec les points de départ. Dans celles qu'il ne dépend pas de nous d'éviter, la prévoyance des hommes et des cabinets doit se borner à régler ce point de départ, et à empêcher que des erreurs, des prétentions fausses et des ambitions isolées, ne le fassent perdre de vue et dévier l'action de son but primitif et véritable. Au reste, le cours des dix années d'alliance entre les premières puissances de l'Europe a dû leur apprendre une grande et heureuse vérité, celle, que c'est dans leur union la mieux démontrée que se trouve le remède aux maux de la nature même de ceux que votre lettre a prévus.

Le but auquel nous visons dans le règlement des affaires d'Espagne est clair et simple. Nous désirons que la révolte militaire soit punie. Nous désirons que l'autorité légitime soit délivrée du joug d'une poignée de factieux, qui l'insultent bien moins encore par les fers sous lesquels ils la tiennent enchaînée que par les efforts qu'ils font pour donner aux actes les plus révolutionnaires et les plus absurdes la couleur d'actes libres et légaux d'une autorité libre. Nous désirons enfin que l'Espagne soit véritablement libre et arrachée au despotisme des Radicaux, sans rien perdre de son indépendance politique.

Tels sont nos vœux, et tel est le but du secours moral que nous prêtons à la Puissance, que le sentiment le moins douteux de la inusité de sortir des embarras dans lesquels l'a tenue jusqu'à cette heure le voisinage d'une révolte triomphante, a déterminée à une résolution forte, et que nous désirons de voir exécutée avec vigueur.

En vous faisant cette profession de foi, Monsieur le Duc, je réponds à tous les éclaircissemens que vous pourriez désirer acquérir sur nos déterminations ultérieures dans un cas spécial quelconque. C'est dans l'application de nos immuables principes que se trouvera pour nous la solution de toute chance possible. Nous n'en craignons aucune; car nous aurons tout fait pour les amortir d'avance; et si nos efforts pour les arrêter devaient ne pas remplir leur but, nous serions prêts à les combattre le jour où nous en verrions la nécessité, bien sûrs de ne pas rester isolés alors dans le soin d'empêcher que le mal ne naisse de la source même du bien.

Il me reste à vous parler, mon cher Duc, d'un sentiment et d'une conviction dont vous ne serez pas surpris, puisque ce n'est pas la première fois

que je les énonce. Mon sentiment est que si le gouvernement Britannique se dépouille de toute inquiétude sur la sagesse des vœux et des décisions de ses Alliés, il se sentira assez fort pour combattre avec eux les dangers qui menacent l'Europe; dangers auxquels l'Angleterre, sous quelque point de vue qu'elle les envisage, ne peut jamais rester étrangère; car elle en serait atteinte par cela seul qu'ils entraineraient la ruine des puissances continentales.

Ma conviction est—et sachez moi gré de ne pas me laisser dérouter dans ma conscience par une foule d'incidens récens et déplorables—que le gouvernement Britannique suivra cette route de salut commun. Personne ne peut moins que vous m'en vouloir de cette conviction heureuse.

Agréez, mon cher Duc, l'assurance de mon inviolable amitié et de ma haute considération.

METTERNICH.

[If all this be true, why not have attacked it sooner? Why was it recognised?

Why was Lord Londonderry called upon to assist in keeping the Emperor of Russia quiet?

The fact is, that Spain might have been left to herself without danger to any power in Europe. The revolution and the proceedings of the government in Spain were never thought much of in Europe till the French government showed they felt an interest in them. Those proceedings then became an object of interest, not on their own account, but on account of the revolutionary effect which the repressive measures of the French government might produce in France herself. As soon as it was found that no such effect would be produced, and that in fact the French army could be relied on, all interest respecting Spain has ceased, and nobody cares what becomes of that country or its revolution. I conclude, therefore, that Spain might with safety have been left to herself.

The phrase referred to in my letter related to the refusal made in December from Verona to allow the French government to choose its own time for transmitting the despatches to Madrid. The French government certainly at that time manifested a desire to withdraw from the difficult position in which she was placed, but was prevented by the decision of the Allies.

WELLINGTON.]

To Sir Robert Hill. [300.]

My dear Sir Robert, London, 11th April, 1823.

I enclose a letter from the Adjutant-General, of which I beg you will take a copy and return it to me.

It appears to me that it would be very desirable that you should send your riding-master to Lieutenant-Colonel Peters, and ascertain from him exactly what he means by the classification of the drills of officers and men, and exactly what other objects he would wish to have attended to.

Believe me, &c.,

Wellington.

The Duke of Buckingham to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My dear Duke, Avington, 13th April, 1823.

I do not like to commit myself on the papers, not having seen them, and not knowing the tone of them, especially as I have very strong feelings upon the present state of Europe, in which I know not to what extent I go along with the feelings of the King's government. My great object is, as I told you at Stratfieldsaye, *Peace at almost all hazard, and almost any sacrifice.* But if war is forced upon us, I am decidedly opposed to the whole of what is passing in Spain. I consider it only as a cancerous fibre proceeding from the old sore of the French revolution, not to be eradicated by us, as things now stand, because it in no respect approaches us or menaces our safety, unless indirectly, but in no respect to be encouraged or supported by us, even by a *friendly neutrality.* Neutral we ought to be, because our interest demands it, but if we are driven to a war, it should not be against France, supported too, as she is, by the whole of Europe. Such are my feelings on the present state of things. With a relation so near to me as Charles Wynn in the Cabinet, and one to whom I am so nearly attached as I am to you at the head of these negotiations, I do not like hazarding these opinions publicly until I see the papers. Then I probably shall take the earliest opportunity the Opposition gives me of expressing them, and if it is not in that way afforded me, I shall very likely move an address, or a resolution, to that purport. I shall write to have the paper sent me to-morrow, and probably on Wednesday or Thursday I shall be in town.

I think I shall take your advice, and write to Sir W. Knighton, as I continue to receive accounts of the King which make me very uneasy.

Yours, my dear Duke, very sincerely,

Buckingham and Chandos.

[301.] *To Sir Robert Hill.*

MY DEAR SIR ROBERT, London, 15th April, 1823.

I sent you directions to desire the riding-master of the regiment to communicate with Colonel Peters purposely that you might know exactly what he meant to find fault with.

There are some points noticed in his report upon which I am convinced that the Commander-in-Chief could not mean that his judgment and report should be conclusive. One of these is the position of the saddle on the horse's back.

Lieutenant-Colonel Peters considers this point solely in the view of parade and appearance, upon which there may be a difference of opinion; and the fashion may have some influence; but in my opinion the position of the saddle on the horse's back ought to be decided with reference to all that he has to carry upon his back when on a march, and to the strength of the back itself, and to the movement of the shoulders and legs when the animal is carrying his weight. These are objects for the consideration of the cavalry officer, and not of the riding-master, whose business it is to place the man on his saddle be it where it may. I write this only to show you that I have not left this point unattended to in my consideration of Colonel Peters' report; but I never saw a point yet worth quarrelling about. Get from Colonel Peters the information which can be useful to you, and decide the rest for yourself.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[302.] TO GENERAL MANN, RESPECTING INSCRIPTION ON A BRASS PLATE.

Ordnance Office, 14th—21st May, 1823.

I beg General Mann to observe the number of works, buildings, &c., now useless or going to decay, on account of their having been constructed with bad or improper materials, or badly, or upon insufficient foundations, or in a manner not calculated to insure the purposes for which the buildings were intended.

I wish him to look at the expense annually demanded and incurred for such repairs.

Is this system to go on? Is there no remedy? Are the public to be without a remedy?

An individual can dismiss his architect or his builder if he finds fault with him. Can the public dismiss the whole corps of Engineers? If the general knows of any remedy let him propose it. But I really must think it necessary to adopt some remedy, and the following are the reasons for which I have proposed the order.

I am quite certain that no officer of Engineers has ever designedly constructed a building having the faults of which I complain, and of which we have now such innumerable instances.

But young men and old men sometimes commit faults from facility of disposition and negligence, from which the public suffer equally with those committed by design. I know that there is no motive so powerful with men of all descriptions, but particularly with those of the military profession, as the sense of the credit to be obtained, or the blame to be incurred, for the due or the bad performance of a work.

A man who might, and probably would, overlook a defective plan or defective work by a contractor, or even by workmen employed under his own directions, would consider twice of the matter before he would pass over such defects, when he should recollect that his own name was to be handed down to posterity as the constructor of a tower, for instance, uninhabitable from damp, because the mortar of which it is constructed was made of sea-sand; of one costing more than its value in repairs because the foundation is insufficient or injudiciously laid; of a magazine unfit to contain powder, from damp, from any of the numerous causes thus affecting our magazines, or from any of the other defects of their construction which render them unfit for their purpose; or of store-houses almost new, now tumbling down for want of sufficient foundation. I contend for it that without expense to the public, or inconvenience, the order holds out to the officers of engineers one of the most powerful incentives to the mind of man for the due performance of their duty; and before I can consent to refrain from pressing and enforcing it I must call upon General Mann to propose something in lieu of it.

ORDER.

21st May, 1823.

As the recent arrangements and regulations of the Treasury have imposed upon this department the execution of all buildings and repairs of buildings, under the government in all parts of the empire, the Master-General and Board desire to call the attention of the officers of Engineers to the increased trust reposed in their skill, and their attention to their duty.

The Master-General and Board are desirous of having some lasting record of those qualities in the officers of Engineers; and they are pleased to order that whenever any public building may be executed under the direction of an officer of Engineers a brass plate may be affixed in some conspicuous part of it, stating its dimensions, the amount of the estimated expense, the amount of the cost, the date of the commencement, and that of the conclusion of the work, and the name of the officer who has executed or superintended it. The same to be done in case of any repair exceeding the sum of one thousand pounds; and in case any repair should be given to any public building, the expense of which does not exceed one thousand pounds, a particular description of it, and statement of its expense, are to be recorded in the books of the Engineer's office at the place at which that repair has been executed, with the name of the officer who has executed or superintended it, in order that the Master-General and Board may at all times in future know who are the officers who have executed the public works carried on under their directions.

WELLINGTON.

[303.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 21st May, 1823.

I see that the newspapers have again drawn the public attention to the Russian ukase, and, as it is possible some question may be asked upon it in Parliament, I enclose you a Memorandum of what passed at Verona, and stating where you will find the documents.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM.

21st May, 1823.

The Duke of Wellington was instructed to *bring the Russian Cabinet to some distinct explanation as to the mode in which the differences of opinion on the instrument* (the Ukase) *may be reconciled.*

In consequence of this instruction he gave Count Nesselrode a confidential Memorandum on the 17th of October, to which the Count gave an answer on the 28th of November.*

Copies of both papers, as well as of a letter from the Duke of Wellington to Count Lieven of the 28th of November on the last mentioned, will be found in the Duke's despatch to Mr. Canning, No. 39, of the 28th November. On the 29th of November the Duke wrote another despatch to Mr. Canning No. 44, stating that it had been settled that both the papers before sent were to be considered as *non avenus*, and that the Russian ambassador in London was to address to Mr. Canning a note in answer to that of the late Lord Londonderry, assuring him of the desire of the Emperor to negotiate with his Majesty upon the whole question of the Emperor's claims in North America, reserving them all, if the result of the negotiation should not be satisfactory to both parties.

That which is required, then, is to get from Count Lieven this note.

WELLINGTON.

To General Alava. [304.]

MI QUERIDO ALAVA, Londres, le 27me Mai, 1823.

Comme il paraît que la défection du Comte d'Abisbal va mettre un terme aux hostilités en Espagne, je ne perds pas un moment pour vous dire que si vous le trouvez nécessaire de quitter l'Espagne, j'ai plus d'une jolie et confortable maison sur ma terre en Hampshire, où vous auriez un asile si vous le trouvez agréable, et tout près de chez moi.

Si vous préférez d'avoir un asile dans le pays de Nice ou en Toscane, je suis sûr que dans l'un ou dans l'autre cas je pourrai

* See Volume I. of this Correspondence, pages 372, 576, 606, 615.

persuader au Roi de Sardaigne ou au Grand Duc de vous y laisser demeurer tranquillement.

Je suis pressé, et je n'ai rien de plus à vous dire, sinon que le gouvernement a publié le mémorial que j'avais donné à Lord FitzRoy, pour la bonne raison, entre autres, que nous savions que vos amis à Madrid l'avaient communiqué à leurs amis de l'Opposition ici ; et que comme ce papier ne contenait rien qui n'était pas tout à fait régulier, et dans l'ordre, nous ne voulions pas en cacher le contenu au Parlement, et être soupçonné d'avoir écrit des propositions qui n'auraient pas dû se faire.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Duke of Buckingham to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Buckingham House, 28th May, 1823.

Your unvaried kindness to me induces me in strict confidence to write you this letter previous to my leaving London for the summer. You are no stranger to the unmerited and uncalled for reserve and disinclination manifested towards Charles Wynn and myself by Mr. Canning since his return to office. Into his reasons and probable motives for this line of conduct it is neither my wish nor my intention to enter. It was my sincere wish to have seen feelings of private friendship and old intercourse strengthen those of public duty in my connexion with him as a member of the government. He has carefully and studiously showed me that no corresponding feeling animates him, and I have no right to quarrel with his decision. Indeed, perhaps, had I permitted myself to have looked back with a more jealous eye and active memory than I wished to do, to the past, I may rather blame myself for being too sanguine upon that subject. You, however, can bear me witness because you *know*, that I have suffered no feelings to interfere with those of my public duty on Mr. Canning's account; on the contrary, that I exerted myself in a manner perhaps unnecessary and uncalled for to secure to the country what I thought was a necessary and important accession of strength to its councils. Under these circumstances I feel myself obliged by what is due to myself, as well as to those with whom I am connected, to make my complaint to you as a friend, and to request you to take such steps as may be proper, to consulf Lord Liverpool, upon the subject of the manner in which Mr. Canning chooses to treat Charles Wynn in the House of Commons. He not only does not observe towards him the common courtesy of communication with him as a colleague, but on the late occasion of the debate in the House of Commons on the result of Sir Abraham Bradley King's refusal to answer the question put to him, Mr. Canning, as manager of the House of Commons, held a previous communication with Mr. Peel and Mr. Goulburn as to the measures to be then pursued, from which Charles Wynn was carefully excluded, although Mr. Canning must have known that on that subject especially his

feelings were particularly interested. Of this treatment Charles Wynn thinks it beneath him to complain. But I know that he feels it, and the more so because the want of common courtesy in communications of this sort between the minister who leads in the House of Commons, and his colleagues, cannot but have consequences very detrimental to the interests of the government and the King's service. I certainly regret that Mr. Canning does not feel this, and act upon it; but seeing that the consequences may, if this sort of studied neglect is persevered in, be unpleasant to all parties, and detrimental to the interests of the country, I cannot let it go by, or proceed further without calling your attention to it, in the hopes that some means may be taken to carry matters on more smoothly in future. I request that it may be distinctly understood that Charles Wynn is not aware of my writing this letter, but that it is written on the suggestion of my own feelings alone, of what is due to him, as well as to my own connexion with the government, the continuance of which I anxiously look to, and therefore am most desirous that it should not be endangered by treatment so very unpleasant, and unfit to be submitted to.

Believe me always, my dear Duke, yours very sincerely,

BUCKINGHAM AND CHANDOS.

P.S.—I go to Stowe to-morrow, and remain there during the summer, I trust you will redeem your long-given promise to come there.

To Lord Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD, London, 15th June, 1823.

As it appears to be your opinion that no measures ought to be adopted regarding the conduct of Sir Robert Wilson unless the conduct of others concerned in the Spanish and Greek subscriptions is noticed by government, I beg leave to recommend that no time may be lost in obtaining the opinions of the law officers of the Crown upon the legality of the latter and in forming the decision of the government.

If this conduct is to be noticed, it ought to be so immediately, as well out of regard for the dignity of the government as to be beforehand with any remonstrances from foreign Powers, and from a sense of justice to those concerned and to others who might unwarily get themselves into the same scrape.

If some measures are not adopted to obtain speedily from the law officers of the Crown their opinion we shall find ourselves in the same situation upon this subject as upon our proclamation of neutrality.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

From the Right Hon. George Canning.

OPINION of HIS MAJESTY'S LAW OFFICERS on Subscriptions or Loans to one of two Belligerent States by the subjects of a Neutral Power.

SIR, Doctors' Commons, June 17, 1823.

We have been honoured with your commands signified in Mr. Planta's letter of the 12th instant, stating that you were desirous that we should report our opinion upon the following questions—

1st. Whether subscriptions for the use of one of two belligerent States by individuals subjects of a nation professing and maintaining a strict neutrality between them be contrary to the law of nations, and constitute such an offence as the other belligerent would have a right to consider as an act of hostility on the part of the neutral government?

2nd. If such individual voluntary subscription in favour of one belligerent would give such just cause of offence to the other, whether loans for the same purpose would give the like cause of offence?

3rd. And if not, where is the line to be drawn between a loan at an easy or mere nominal rate of interest, or a loan with a previous understanding that interest would never be exacted, and a gratuitous voluntary subscription?

In obedience to your commands we beg leave to report that we have taken the same into our consideration, and we are of opinion that subscriptions of the nature above alluded to for the use and avowedly for the support of one of two belligerent States against the other entered into by individuals subjects of a government professing and maintaining neutrality are inconsistent with that neutrality, and contrary to the law of nations. But we conceive that the other belligerent would not have a right to consider such subscriptions as constituting an act of hostility on the part of the government, although they might afford just ground of complaint if carried to any considerable extent.

With respect to loans, if entered into merely with commercial views, we think, according to the opinions of writers on the law of nations and the practice which has prevailed, they would not be an infringement of neutrality; but if under colour of a loan a gratuitous contribution was afforded without interest, or with mere nominal interest, we think such a transaction would fall within the opinion given in answer to the first question.

We have, &c.,

CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON.
R. GIFFORD.
J. S. COPLEY.

COPY of REPORT of HIS MAJESTY'S LAW OFFICERS on the means of proceeding legally against individuals and corporations engaged in Subscriptions to Belligerent Powers.

SIR, Lincoln's Inn, June 21st, 1823.

We have been honoured with your commands, signified to us by Mr. Planta in his letter dated 18th instant, in which he states, with reference to the

queries proposed to his Majesty's law officers in his letter of the 13th instant, he was directed by you further to ask for our opinion whether, having regard to the municipal law of this country, there exists any and what means of proceeding legally against individuals and corporations engaged in such subscriptions as were described in those queries.

We have accordingly taken the same into our consideration, and beg leave to report, that, reasoning upon general principles, we should be inclined to say that such subscriptions in favour of one of two belligerent States being inconsistent with the neutrality declared by the government of the country and with the law of nations would be illegal and subject the parties concerned in them to prosecution for a misdemeanor on account of their obvious tendency to interrupt the friendship subsisting between this country and the other belligerent, and to involve the State in dispute and possibly in the calamities of war. It is proper, however, to add that subscriptions of a similar nature have formerly been entered into (particularly the subscription in favour of the people of Poland in 1792 and 93) without any notice having been taken of them by the public authorities of the country, and without any complaint having, as far as we can learn, been made by the powers whose interests might be supposed to have been affected by such subscriptions. Neither can we find any instance of a prosecution having been instituted for an offence of this nature, or any hint at such a proceeding in any period of our history.

We think, therefore, even if it could be proved that the money had been actually sent in pursuance of the subscription, it is not likely that a prosecution against the individuals concerned in such a measure would be successful.

But until the money be actually sent the only mode of proceeding, as we conceive, would be for counselling or conspiring to assist with money one of the belligerents in its contest with the other, a prosecution attended with still greater difficulty.

We beg leave further to report that no *criminal* proceeding can be instituted against a corporation for contributing its funds to such a subscription, but that the individual members who may be proved to have acted in the transaction can alone be made criminally responsible.

We have the honour to be, &c.,

R. GIFFORD.
J. S. COPLEY.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [306.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 21st June, 1823.

I received an order this morning to attend the King, as he wanted to speak to me about Lord Londonderry.

After talking about him, he referred to your draft of yesterday respecting the Madrid regency, upon which he had desired, as he said, to see you to-morrow. His objections were principally that he had not seen the former letters, and that he

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thought the time was come at which Sir W. A'Court ought to be withdrawn from the Cortes. After some discussion, his Majesty was convinced that the draft was right, and he noted his approbation upon it and gave it to me to return to you. He desired me at the same time to tell you that as he had desired to talk to you only on this subject, he would not now give you the trouble of going down to him to-morrow.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[307.] *To G. Sydenham, Esq.*

MY DEAR SIR, London, 23rd June, 1823.

I have received your letter of the 20th instant, and it gives me much concern to be under the necessity of declining to do anything which you think would be advantageous to you. Mr. Canning was very lately appointed to the Foreign Office, and I know that he found all the offices under the Secretary of State filled up, and arrangement made and sanctioned by his Majesty for filling others likely to become vacant. Under these circumstances it is impossible for me to press anybody upon him at present; and even if I could bring myself to do so, there are two gentlemen who served me upon my late mission to Verona who have the first claims upon me, and I must provide for their interests before I can volunteer to apply for others.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[308.] *Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington to Lord Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD LIVERPOOL, London, 16th July, 1823.

Arbuthnot told me last night of Sir William Knighton's application to you, upon which I think it may be convenient to you to know what I think as soon as possible.

Since Sir William Knighton has filled the confidential situation which he does fill about the King's person, I have considered that the admission to the Privy Council must follow sooner or later. In fact, he must know everything; and unless

sworn of the Privy Council, he is not, like others, bound by any oath of secrecy, nor can he be so.

I think, therefore, that a person in his situation ought to be of the Privy Council; and as both the King and he are anxious that the appointment should be made immediately, I think it would be desirable to have a Council on Saturday for the purpose of swearing in Sir William Knighton.

Ever, my dear Lord Liverpool,

yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, London, 16th July, 1823.

The admission of Sir William Knighton into the Privy Council may be *necessary* to avoid ill humour and other inconveniences, but I am sure I could convince you that it is most objectionable in principle and precedent.

No King ever had a private secretary till George the Third was blind. Sir H. Taylor was then in that situation, and the late King, who understood these matters better than any one, decided that he should be put upon exactly the footing of an Under-Secretary of State. No Under-Secretary of State is ever a Privy Councillor, and yet he necessarily from his office knows more of the secrets of government than any Cabinet Minister, except his principal and the First Minister.

Sir J. McMahon and Bloomfield were both made Privy Councillors; but in the discussions last year, when Bloomfield was to be removed (and indeed amongst ourselves on many previous occasions), it was admitted to be the *great blot*, for in fact it gives authority and consequence where confidence to any degree may be placed, but where authority and consequence ought not to exist; and I remember the King completely concurring with me then in opinion, that the private secretary of a king, or even of a minister, ought never to be a man who lives much in the world.

The case, however, of the Under-Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury is quite decisive in principle; and I think the King and Sir William are very unwise in wishing to effect this, for it will be the subject of much invidious comment, and the more so from Sir William's profession. At all events, I could not do it without first communicating with Canning and Peel.

Ever yours,

LIVERPOOL.

[309.] *To S. R. Lushington, Esq.*

MY DEAR SIR, London, 23rd July, 1823.

I enclose a letter and its enclosure which I have received from the late Commissary General Sir Charles Dalrymple.

If the system of the Commissariat were different from what it is; if the officers of the Commissariat were liable to render an early account, and to be submitted to an early audit; or if, on the other hand, they appointed the persons who act under them, for whom they are thus held responsible, I would show no mercy to them. They had time, and they should have had the means of performing their duty, and ought to have performed it; and they ought in such case to indemnify the public for the losses incurred by their neglect or that of the persons employed by them to perform their duty.

But when I know that a man in Sir Charles Dalrymple's situation, having millions passing through his hands, and with a severe responsibility resting upon him for the supply and issue of daily food and necessaries to an army, was assisted by persons totally ignorant of their duties, picked up as the Treasury could obtain them at the recommendation of Members of Parliament; when I know, besides, that our system of accounts is so erroneous, that no account at all is rendered for years; and then that no audit takes place for years afterwards, and that, in fact, the settlement of the account is a very high percentage upon the original sum expended, and that all the persons capable of giving an explanation of a surcharge, or who may have received an overpayment, are either dead or gone to a distance, I cannot but think that an accountant in Sir Charles Dalrymple's situation is hardly dealt with who is called upon to make repayments under the circumstances under which it appears that he labours.

No man can accuse me of ever endeavouring to screen a person who is in the wrong either from wilful neglect, or corruption, or even idleness. But in this case the fault is in the system; and I am certain that if the Lords of the Treasury had seen it work as I have, and witnessed all the difficulties with which men like Sir Charles Dalrymple had to contend, they would not be disposed to withhold their indulgence from him.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

P.S.—I beg you first to observe that between thirteen and fourteen years have elapsed since this expenditure was made, of which nine of peace! I beg you likewise to observe that Sir Charles Dalrymple has been kept upon half-pay employed upon Commissariat accounts for five years; that he has nothing but his half-pay, very much to his credit, although millions have passed through his hands, and that this surcharge will totally ruin him.

Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington to Lord Liverpool. [310.]

MY DEAR LORD LIVERPOOL, London, 28th July, 1823.

I have seen Sir William Knighton, and read over to him the papers which I now return, and explained to him the inconveniences which would result to the King and to himself from calling him to the Privy Council. He was aware of the existence of these papers, which he thought applied only to the situation of Private Secretary, which did not exist, and he said that the King had discussed them with him repeatedly. He urged the necessity of calling him to the Privy Council on account of the great trust and confidence necessarily reposed in him, for which the necessity might augment daily along with the King's increasing infirmities. He said that it appeared to him that it might be very desirable that he should be relieved from the chance of being examined on oath regarding the King's state of health or his affairs; and that, moreover, it would be a real comfort to the King's mind that the person thus confidentially employed by his Majesty should be bound by an oath of secrecy.

He did not admit either the inconvenience or the danger which I had stated to him. He said that four-fifths of the members of Parliament believed that he was a member of the Privy Council; and he was convinced that we had taken an exaggerated view of the consequences to be expected from the appointment. These were very much the arguments brought forward. However, he said that he did not wish to push the matter in contradiction to your opinion and mine, and that, although he was not convinced by our reasoning, he would endeavour to reconcile the King's mind to the disappointment of his wishes. He recommended that the subject should drop without your writing or speaking to the King, as the King had neither written nor spoken to you.

He said more than once that he hoped he should be understood as having henceforward nothing to say to any question of the government; which gave me an opportunity of expressing my expectation that he would understand the communication which I had made as being of the most friendly and conciliating description, and that although I could not but approve, and had before recommended to him to keep himself clear of the discussions between the King and his ministers, I hoped that, for the sake of the King and for his ease and comfort, he would assist him, and endeavour to conciliate his mind towards his ministers as he had done hitherto. He promised me faithfully and repeatedly that he would.

In the course of the conversation he said that he hoped you did not consider him as *Nobody;* which gave me an opportunity of assuring him that you objected to call him to the Privy Council only while he should be situated as he is near the King's person, and that on account of what had passed when Sir B. Bloomfield was removed, and on the King's and his own account. But that if removed from that situation you would not object; and that I was convinced you felt that he had conducted himself in his office as he ought, and that you were pleased with him.

Upon the whole we separated in very good humour.

I did not tell him that anybody knew of the application excepting you and me.

This matter being settled, I conclude that it is not necessary that we should meet at your house to-morrow.

Ever yours, my dear Lord Liverpool, most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[311.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Cheltenham, 30th July, 1823.

You did not send me the Mexican draft with the box.

I have had a letter from Lord Beresford on the subject of his carrying out the Garter to the King of Portugal, and he had before spoken to me on the subject. I have told him what I really think, that the arrangement was made in such a manner as to render it impossible for the Government to give the commission for conveying the Order to anybody but Sir Edward Thornton.

I have likewise recommended him not to go to Portugal, because I know that we are considered as Jacobins all over Europe, and particularly in the Peninsula, and I cannot but think that, till the rage for the French has subsided, we had better keep ourselves and our claims, however well founded, out of sight.

The question between Lord Beresford and Count d'Eguia appears to be one rather between Count d'Eguia and the Portuguese government. The count claims his house. Was it lawfully confiscated? If it was not, it could not be granted to Lord Beresford. Was it lawfully granted? It could not be if not lawfully confiscated; but it might have been legally confiscated, and yet illegally granted; and in this case the Count might ask the re-grant to himself as a favour. In either case the question is one between Count d'Eguia and the King, in which it is scarcely possible for the British government to interfere.

If the result of Count d'Eguia's measures should be to deprive Lord Beresford of the property, it will still remain for this government to consider whether they will take any and what steps to obtain for Lord Beresford compensation from the King of Portugal. The Portuguese government have behaved very ill to us all. I have a pension in Portugal which was granted to me in the year 1809, and of which I paid the produce into the Treasury regularly as it was received during the war till the year 1814. The revolutionary government thought proper to stop the payment of it and to question my right to it. No power on earth should have induced me to relinquish it, or to give them the produce; and I waited only for some documents in order to lay my case before the government and request their interference, as the first intimation of the grant of the pension to me and my family came from the King's government, and I accepted it by their permission. However, I conclude that there is an end to these questions, and I mention the subject only to show what the spirit of the revolutionary government was.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Fife House, 30th July, 1823.

In consequence of the communication the King commanded you to make to me, I have had some conversation with Canning, and Hobhouse of the Home Department, and we will take the most effectual measure within our power for preventing recruiting for the cause of Spain.

As to Captain ———, he is a scoundrel who was dismissed from the navy for the most disgraceful conduct; and even if his character had been different, the object could not have been attained without the most serious risk to the lives of the King of Spain, and of the rest of the royal family.

I fear the French are going on now a little too fast with their blockades. They either have, or ought to have, a force sufficient for the blockade of Cadiz, but I should very much doubt their having a force sufficient for Barcelona, Santona, and St. Ander, still less for Ferrol and Corunna, the blockade of which is first to be announced in the evening papers of this day.

It would be well that they should have some hint on this subject, for it is one of the risks we have always apprehended; and if anything unpleasant should occur at sea, it might not even be in our power to avert the consequences.

Ever yours truly,

LIVERPOOL.

[312.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Cheltenham, 31st July, 1823.

Since I saw you in London I have reflected upon the measure which was then determined upon in the Cabinet, and before you send the instructions in the box, I request you to consider the subject in the point of view discussed in the enclosed Memorandum.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM ON THE INSTRUCTIONS TO MR. HERVEY.

We are bound by the protocols of Aix-la-Chapelle at least to *explain* ourselves to the signing parties of those protocols upon all our measures respecting the possessions of any other power of Europe. I write from recollection, not having copies of the papers here; but I believe the words are such as to require something more than explanation.

The instructions with which I left London for Verona, and those which I received after my arrival at the Congress, stated the principles on which I was to explain to the Allies the conduct of my Court, and my note to the Allied Courts was founded upon these instructions. After pointing out the conduct of my Court in anterior transactions in relation to the Spanish colonies, the note states the necessity under which we found ourselves of proceeding still further to recognise the existence *de facto* of some of the independent governments established in them on account of the multiplied relations of the King's subjects with those countries, and on account of the necessity of coming to some understanding with certain of those governments in consequence of the operations we were obliged to carry on in that part of the world against pirates.

But my note does not contain a syllable which can be construed as adverting to the reasons stated in Mr. Hervey's instructions, or as adverting to the real motives for recognising the independence of Mexico. Indeed, I believe we should find it difficult to show that we have any commercial relation with Mexico; and the operations against the pirates are now out of the question. I don't mean to say that it is not very proper to take measures to inquire into the state of Mexico with a view to recognise the government of that country if our necessities or our interest should require it; but if we alter the ground of our proceeding, if the danger of that country falling into the hands of France or becoming an ally of America is the motive for the recognition of its government, we ought to explain ourselves to our Allies, and ought to draw our instructions in such manner as to be able to communicate them.

That which I would recommend then, in the first instance, is that the disinterested conduct of the government in its anterior transactions in relation to the Spanish colonies should be put forward.

Secondly, that we should not be quite so cold respecting the reconciliation between the colonies and the mother-country.

Thirdly, that our real motive for making the inquiry and for these new measures should be distinctly set forth.

And lastly, that, instead of expressing *our readiness to meet any overture* from the Mexican State, which, in fact, pledges us to everything, Mr. Hervey should be desired to urge the Secretary of the government to send a person to England to explain

any wishes they may have for recognition on our part, and their situation, rather than that we should appear to court an opportunity of recognising them.

WELLINGTON.

[313.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Cheltenham, 31st July, 1823.

I return the box with Count Palmella's letter, and your letter to the King upon the subject of his demand, and the instructions to Mr. Hervey.

I conclude that it is determined to discountenance the demand for troops, because we have none to send. But if we had any I should certainly be of opinion that they ought to be sent under restrictions as to their employment, and with secret instructions to their commander in conformity with the restrictions to be stated to the Portuguese government.

It would be quite safe to send the number of troops stated, in the existing state of the country and of the army in Portugal. Their presence would answer the purpose effectually of enabling the Sovereign and his ministers to settle the country upon a reasonable principle, and no more; and the British government would not be involved in a greater degree in principle with the Portuguese government in the details of the settlement of the country than it will be by sending a squadron to the Tagus, if that squadron is to answer any purpose beyond that of enabling the King, and such of the royal family as choose, to run away from the country when the difficulties begin to thicken about them.

The restrictions which I would impose upon the operation of the force are: That they should have nothing to say to the internal police of the country; that they should be merely a defensive force; and that, in case of civil war, they should be employed to attack none excepting regular troops or regular militia in a state of mutiny or rebellion against the Sovereign. That if possible they should remain united in one corps at Lisbon, but if detached, they should be detached only to Oporto; and that whether united or detached (and their commanding officer should judge of the expediency of detaching at all, and of the strength of the detachment) they should act and do duty

only under the orders of their own officers, and as much as possible alone.

These are the restrictions under which I would give the troops; and I contend for it, that to give them goes no further in principle than to give the squadron, unless it should be contended that the squadron can do nothing excepting protect the retreat of the King and royal family.

The presence of the troops can and will effect their purpose; which the presence of the squadron cannot, unless that purpose should be confined to provide for the abandonment of the country by the King.

Whether you give the one or the other, I conceive that you can do nothing in the way of settlement of Portugal excepting by advice in very general terms, and this we ought to give, whether we give one force or the other. We ought by all means to avoid the responsibility, moral as well as political, of details upon this subject. But there is a great deal of difference between advising details and enabling our ancient ally the King of Portugal to settle the distractions of his country by affording him the protection which he solicits during the period necessary for the settlement against the treason of his rebellious subjects and the mutiny of his undisciplined troops. Necessity has no law; and if we have not the troops and cannot get them, we cannot give them. But if we have the troops I cannot see how we can refuse them, allied as we are to the King of Portugal, unless we make up our minds to give up our position in Europe, and to leave to France to act the part which has hitherto been ours.

The sending troops is certainly liable to misrepresentation, both in the newspapers and in Parliament, to a greater degree than sending only a squadron; but it will be the misrepresentation of a day. When the demand, and the restrictions on the employment of the troops, and the secret instructions to their commander, shall come before the public, unless the people of England are become much more fond of revolutions founded upon military mutinies and confiscations than I believe, and, I may add I know, they are, the conduct of the government will be approved of.

At all events, however, whether we omit to send the troops because we have none to send or because we do not think fit to send them, I hope we shall make up our minds to the demand

by Portugal of the assistance of France, and to see French troops in Lisbon and Oporto, if the necessity for the demand should exist in the opinion of the Portuguese government. That this will happen, whatever may be the strength of our squadron in the Tagus, no man can doubt who knows the state of the Portuguese army and of Portugal.

Believe me, &c.

WELLINGTON.

[314.] *To Lord Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD, Cheltenham, 31st July, 1823.

I think it best to enclose you copies of two letters, &c., which I have written to Mr. Canning on Mr. Hervey's instructions, and on the letter from Count Palmella.

It is really very desirable that we should not acquire the reputation of being Jacobins.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Had you not better write to the King yourself respecting the measures adopted to prevent the recruiting?

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 2nd Aug., 1823.

I send you a letter which I have received from Lord Liverpool on the subject of the Portuguese requisition, in the reasoning of which I confess I am inclined very much to agree.

I send you also a draft of the instructions which I have prepared for Thornton on this subject; which I may receive back, with your observations, at Coombe on Monday.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Lord Liverpool to the Right Hon. George Canning.

MY DEAR CANNING, Coombe Wood, 1st Aug., 1823.

The answer as to the first point in the Duke of Wellington's letter appears to be so clear that it might even be unnecessary to enter upon the remaining matter in it.

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* See pages 108 and 110.

I conceive that we have no troops whatever in England for any foreign service, scarcely enough to make up for the waste constantly occurring in our colonies and foreign garrisons.

We have troops in Ireland, but not more than sufficient for the preservation of internal peace in that country.

If troops are to be sent, they must be raised; if troops are to be raised, Parliament must be called, and all the inconvenience of alarm, connected with armament and eventual war, incurred.

For an adequate object this and even greater inconveniences must and ought to be incurred; but would it be expedient to send the troops now even *if we had them*? I cannot bring my mind to answer this in the affirmative. They would be sent, not to guard against an *external*, but an internal danger. We should have taken therefore *ostensibly* the first step in interfering in the internal affairs of another country, and that not upon an existing case, but upon an eventual and suppositious one. We might put our officers and troops under restrictions, but how can we answer for these restrictions being observed? There might be circumstances under which they neither could nor ought to be observed. In short, we should be committed in the internal struggle in Portugal by sending any troops; and if six thousand men were not sufficient to settle matters as we could wish them settled, we must and ought to make up our minds to send twelve thousand or even twenty thousand men.

It is quite true that if the danger is considerable a naval force may not be of much use. It may, however, be of some service in averting the danger; and we know the full extent of the inconvenience (if any) which we incur in sending it.

With respect to the Portuguese government applying for a French corps, I believe the French have too much on their hands to make it easy for them to supply such a force; but granting that this may be the result of our refusal, I would rather incur the risk of this than all the inconveniences of sending British troops to Portugal; at the present moment the question is not, however, about sending them, but about raising a force for *this purpose*. In this case Parliament must be called, nay, I think Parliament must be called even if you send a force which was now in existence upon such a service. I do not allude to the calling of Parliament as any matter of personal inconvenience to ourselves; but before such a step was taken it would be well to consider all the evils which might result from the debates in Parliament upon a subject of this nature being forced upon them.

Ever yours truly,

LIVERPOOL.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [315.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Cheltenham, 3rd Aug., 1823.

Since I have been in the Cabinet I recollect two instances in which men have been raised for service without calling Parliament. The first in 1819, when 10,000 men were raised—and I particularly recollect the anxiety felt to make the levy before Parliament should meet; the second, when 3000 men were raised by the Irish government, and the levy confirmed by the Cabinet long before Parliament was assembled.

I recollect recently likewise a discussion in the Cabinet re-

specting a fresh levy which might be required for Ireland during the year, and it was determined to make it as the former levy had been made; and not only not to call parliament together to have authority to make the levy, but not to take a power to make it during the late session. I think therefore that you had better omit in the Instruction what relates to the necessity of going to parliament.

Between marines, infantry of the line, cavalry, and artillery, I believe the greater part of the force could be given for this service without making any new levy. However, upon this point I have not the information to enable me to form a judgment.

I certainly differ from Lord Liverpool's view of the effect to be produced by this force, if sent. It will be said that it is an interference; but it is, in truth, none. The ancient ally of the country states an undeniable fact, viz. that his mutinous troops had twice overturned the government of the country; and, founded upon this fact, he calls upon this government to send him a detachment of troops for a time, to enable him to settle his country, to disband his mutinous army, and to raise another.

If we were to give any advice, excepting that there should be a settlement, or to interfere in the details, we should make ourselves liable to the imputation of interference; but it is no interference to enable an ally, upon his call, to get rid of an evil which will destroy him to a certainty unless it is got rid of. In fact, that which is to be done is to render the King of Portugal the same service as was rendered the King of France by the army of occupation. The difference is, that the danger to the King of Portugal is greater, because the army, instead of having been subdued, has been twice triumphant, and knows its own force. It is true that the army of occupation was said to have interfered in the French government; but nobody can know better than I do that such imputations were false, and no proof of their truth ever has or could be adduced. The advantages to be derived from the measure are, the saving of Portugal from the influence of France; and likewise from the tyranny of a despotism established under French influence on the one hand, or from that of the mob on the other; the assertion of the influence of this country, and the demonstration of its power in a cause of which no reasonable man can doubt

the justice, which in its consequences may, and indeed must, tend to give this country all the weight it would desire to have in the settlement of affairs in the Peninsula, and of those between Portugal and the Brazils.

I confess that it opens a scene of operations for us in our neutral character, and affords an opportunity which I am astonished that you don't seize.

As for Lord Liverpool's notion that six thousand men might not be sufficient, and that we might have to reinforce them, I believe it will be admitted that I ought to know Portugal as well as most men, and I'll answer for it that such a detachment would effect all the purposes. To send them would be a measure; to send the squadron will be a half measure: like other half measures, it may in part be successful, but it cannot produce all the effects of the other; and it may fail altogether excepting in the object of bringing off the house of Braganza from Portugal. I confess I don't see how such an employment could degrade the British army.

Believe me, &c.,

Wellington.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My dear Duke of Wellington, Coombe Wood, 4th Aug., 1823.

Upon reading over your letter of yesterday with Lord Liverpool we have agreed that whatever may be the ultimate decision upon the subject of it, it is impossible to come to that decision satisfactorily without having had a full conversation with you upon it.

Could you, without serious inconvenience, come up to town for that purpose? And if so, could you be in town so that we might meet on Thursday morning?

I am commanded to Windsor on Friday with the Prince de Polignac, or I would give you the choice of another day. But I am to stay at Windsor Friday night, and it would be better that the point in question should have been settled before I see the King.

Ever sincerely yours,

George Canning.

P.S.—I send copies of your two letters and of Lord Liverpool's to Lord Bathurst, to Peel, and to Robinson. I enclose to you a copy of the King's answer to my letter announcing the project of sending the squadron.

[Enclosure.]

King's Lodge, 30th July, 1823.

The King has read with the most scrupulous attention Mr. Canning's letter, and readily acquiesces to the proposals contained in it. Nevertheless, while the King is anxious to afford the King of Portugal every assistance in his power the King is equally anxious that no alarm should be excited in this country as to the observance of our neutrality.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My dear Duke of Wellington, Foreign Office, 12th Aug., 1823.

I have communicated with Lord Liverpool on the subject of your letter of yesterday. Our joint opinion is that there is no reason for giving up your intended visit of the fortifications of the Netherlands; but there *would* be a great awkwardness in your going to Paris at the present moment.

We think that the new state of things would sufficiently account for the omission. But if *you* feel any difficulty in paying the one visit without the other, and would therefore prefer omitting both, we do not think the visit to the Netherlands of sufficient importance to make it necessary that you should go there this year. But of this you are the only competent judge.

Ever sincerely yours,

George Canning.

Sir W. Adams to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

26, Albemarle Street, 13th Aug., 1823.

Sir William Adams has the honour to enclose to his Grace the Duke of Wellington copies of documents which have been transmitted to Lord Liverpool, and to the other members of Administration.

[Enclosures.]

I.

Sir W. Adams to the Earl of Liverpool.

My Lord, 26, Albemarle Street, 7th Aug., 1823.

In calling your Lordship's particular attention to the Memoir which I have the honour to enclose, upon the vast importance to the commercial and financial interests of this country, which would result from an early recognition of the independence of the late Spanish colonies, it may be necessary for me to state to your Lordship the circumstances which have connected and brought me so fully acquainted with the subject, as well as my sources of information.

Last year a gentleman nearly related to my family, who had resided twelve years in Chili, Buenos Ayres, and Peru, returned to this country. From him I derived much interesting and valuable information respecting those provinces.

He brought me into communication with Mr. Zea, and also with the widow of the late General English, who had resided upwards of five years in Colombia, and who, after the death of her husband, continued as it were under the parental protection of the President Bolivar, until after the formation of the Colombian government.

Mrs. English, whose husband took out to Colombia the expedition of English soldiers by whose exertions the liberation of Colombia was mainly effected, being a person of *rare* and *extraordinary* talents, and having traversed the greater portion of the habitable part of Colombia in the prosecution of her husband's claims upon the Colombian government, had the means of affording very correct information with regard to that much favoured country.

General Wavell, the Envoy from Mexico to this country (whose pamphlet I have the honour herewith to enclose), is a Devonshire gentleman of highly respectable family and connexions, and whom I have intimately known ever since he was a child.

The General at the conclusion of the Peninsular War, during which he obtained the highest distinctions from the Spanish government for his military conduct, proceeded to Chili, where he was appointed second in command of the Chilian army, and virtually acted as Commander-in-Chief. On the termination of the war in Chili, he was dispatched on a diplomatic mission by the Chilian to the Mexican government, into whose service he subsequently entered.

The General had been but a short time in Mexico before he manifested such superior talents, that all parties in the Mexican government concurred in selecting him as the fittest person to send to England to solicit the recognition of the independence of that most important and extraordinarily gifted country —a country abounding in natural riches in a *tenfold* greater degree probably than any other in the known world.

From General Wavell I have obtained more information than from all other sources, and here I hope to obtain your Lordship's excuse for stating that it is probable no Englishman has come to this country so capable of affording valuable information with regard to the political and statistical situation of these countries as General Wavell; to which I can add, that he has most successfully exerted his influence with the Mexican government in favour of the interests of his native country, in opposition to French and North American intrigues and hostility.

I am also in communication with the Colombian and Peruvian deputies, as well as with the two opposing mercantile houses, at this time most engaged in South American commerce, from whom respectively I am to receive such further information, as is calculated to afford your Lordship and his Majesty's government the most correct information which can be obtained respecting the political, statistical, and commercial situation of the New World.

These Reports are now in preparation, and I shall forward them to your Lordship as soon as received.

In order to be as correct as is possible in the Memoir which I now do myself the honour of forwarding to your Lordship and to his Majesty's ministers, I have taken the precaution to submit my manuscript to the perusal of each of the foreign envoys and of the merchants.

The enclosed Reports, in the form of documents, are drawn up by the parties in whose names they appear, as will those hereafter to be forwarded.

If it should be the pleasure of your Lordship to see or converse with any of these gentlemen, or to make any communication to them, I beg to state that I am deputed to receive your Lordship's commands, and to transmit them.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

WILLIAM ADAMS.

II.

STATEMENT by GENERAL WAVELL, Envoy from Mexico to Great Britain.

MEXICO.

Population (together with Guatemala), 8,000,000. Population of capital 110,000.

Captaincies-General, 7.—Guatemala, the South Puebla, Yucatan and Honduras, Mexico, Gaudalaxara, and internal provinces.

Guatemala (scarcely any data), population stated to be 1,200,000; productions very valuable—indigo, cacao; soil very fertile; has united itself with Mexico.

Southern part of Empire.—The immense elevated plains of the Central part excessively rich, comparatively very populous, productions very valuable; also some very productive mines; coasts, except those of Yucatan and Honduras, unhealthy.

Central part of Empire abounds with valuable mines; but is, generally speaking, arid and sterile, although banks of rivers and streams are excessively rich and fertile.

Eastern coast unhealthy.

Northern part of Empire.—Texas, on the east coast, almost unpeopled; but in every respect, one of the finest countries in the world. Central parts, excepting New Mexico, but little known, said to be very arid, and in parts overrun by wild Indians. Lands along the coast of the Gulf of California, generally beyond measure, fertile. Gold, in dust and lumps, abounds in alluvial soil; there are mines of gold and silver, but few worked, owing to the scarcity of population. Of California little is known; it is stated, excepting the valleys, to be rocky and arid; the coast of the Pacific from thence to the boundary-line very rich and fertile, but little known, and thinly peopled.

Exports. Precious metals, cochineal, grana (scarlet dye), vanilla, logwood, sarsaparilla, pepper, sugar, drugs and dyes, jalap, cacao, coffee, tortoiseshell, skins, and furs.

Revenue was, before the revolution, 20,000,000 drs.; now very much diminished. Collection absorbs immense proportion.

Sources are, import duties, 25*s. ad valorem;* monopoly of tobacco, gunpowder, and cards; export duties on precious metals, cochineal, vanilla, and grana; ecclesiastical presentations; taxes on shops, taverns, spirituous liquors and pulque (fermented juice of the agave aloe); on goods and articles entering cities; lotteries, post-office, mint (very trifling duty on coinage), very much reduced, cockfighting, and sale of ice.

Harbours.—On the coast of the Pacific, Acapulco, one of the finest in the world and abounding in timber, and several others very good. In the Gulf of California, Huaïamas, excellent; provisions of every description very abundant and cheap. On the east side, Galveston, in Texas, good, 18 feet water; and in that province the Bay of Espiritu Santo and mouths of the rivers Vaca and Colorada afford shelter for small vessels, as do also Tampico, the rivers Bravadel, Norte, and Gausacualco. There are, it is stated, one or two good harbours close to the south-east frontier; but Campeachy, Vera Cruz, and Tampico are very unsafe roadsteads.

Rivers.—Bravo del Norte is navigable almost to New Mexico, and in Texas the Brasos, Colorado, Guadaloupe, Sabina, and Trinidad are navigable; as are also, there is reason to believe, on the west side of the Gila, Zacatula, Santiago, and Hiaqui, nevertheless the principal part of the country is very ill-supplied with navigable streams. Canals may be cut latitudinally (north and south), but not longitudinally (east and west).

Mines—before the revolution—produced 24,000,000 drs. annually sent to the

mint, and it was calculated the value of 8,000,000 was smuggled uncoined; now produce about 7,000,000 drs. annually; are not unhealthy, nor at very great heights.

Climate. On all the high land, beyond measure, fine. West coast, from south frontier to San Blas, sickly with bilious and intermittent fevers and dysenteries; and all the east coast, except that of Texas, with yellow and bilious fevers.

Army.—Number not yet determined; but, doubtless, will be about 30,000 regulars, of which a large proportion cavalry, and a numerous regular and local militia. The maintenance of 5000 regulars costs about 1,000,000 drs. per annum, including pay and every expense.

Navy.—Agents are sent to North America, to purchase men-of-war.

Importation prohibited of tobacco, except snuff and segars, provisions, and corn of every description, cotton (raw), and leather.

Free from duties—Quicksilver, machinery, books, prints (models and plans used in teaching the arts and sciences), music, exotic seeds, and plants.

Manufactures at Queretaro, Puebla, and Mexico.—Coarse cottons and woollens, segars, china and glass, silk handkerchiefs (China silk), ribbons, jewellery, furniture, hats, coaches (clumsy), leather, gold and silver wire, epaulettes, and embroidery.

Have made considerable progress in architecture, sculpture, and painting.

Produces or may produce, as containing every climate, every species of production. Fruit very fine, numerous, and abundant. Tobacco, sugar, corn of every description. Horses very fine, as also cattle very abundant (wild in the northern provinces). Lowlands abound with cedars, mahogany, and log-wood; quibracho, white, yellow, and red; and numberless other woods, excellent for the lathe and every other purpose. Higher up, oaks; and on the cold lands, pines. Coals found in the northern provinces. Grapes wild in Texas; tin, lead, copper, iron, mercury, sulphur, carbonates and muriates of soda, and nitrate of potash. The cacao of Soconuzio, Guatemala, is the best known; cotton, fine, but short staple. Pearls in the Gulf of California; whales (Spermaceti) abundant close to the north-west coast. Vanilla, cochineal, grana, sarsaparilla, drugs, gumeno and dyes, jalap, columbo root, ginseng, quercitron bark, wool, hides, furs and skins, bees'-wax and honey, olives, tortoiseshell, coffee, pepper black and red, rice, turkeys wild.

Roads from Mexico to Vera Cruz, good to Acapulco; very bad those which run north and south; are with equal ease made and kept in repair as passing along the almost flat back of the mountains, or rather the elevated plains. The reverse is the case with those which run east and west, crossing the vast mountains and rugged low lands.

Indians. Those living amongst the Spanish creoles, are strong, laborious drunken, and stupid; the wild tribes hardy, strong, brave, and often intelligent.

Slave population very inconsiderable.

Ecclesiastics numerous, rich, and powerful; revenue very considerable, derived in great measure from mortgages; influence amazing.

Gales of wind, very heavy, are often experienced during the winter in the Gulf of Mexico, and not unfrequently on the west coast, almost as far south as Panama.

Government constitutional, hereditary, imperial. A committee of the Congress was appointed to frame the Constitution, and elected by vote, provisionally, a Council of State of thirty members.

Ministers of State, 4.—Foreign and Home department; War and Marine; Finance; Favour and Justice.

The zone of lands along the sides of the vast mountains, at the elevation of about

1500 yards, possesses probably the finest climate known, and the most abundant and luxurious vegetation. The mines, I imagine, consume a quantity of mercury nearly equal in weight to the quantity of precious metals produced, about 1,500,000 lbs., before the revolution. Probably not one-twentieth of the mines are now worked; many, and very valuable, abandoned for years as inundated; in others, vast quantities of ore, which, owing to the high price of mercury, formerly would not pay the expense of extracting it. The silver generally contains a quantity of gold, separated at the Mint for the benefit of the government. Miners possess much practical skill, very little science, and scarcely any knowledge of mechanics. The gunpowder, of which an incredible quantity is used in the mines (a government monopoly), is very dear and very bad. Mercury was procured from the mine of Almadan in Andalusia, Spain, and the mines of Indria, belonging to the Emperor of Austria; that of Greancaulicia, Peru, was very rich, but has fallen in.

Desiderata.—Capital, mechanical skill, science, and machinery to work the mines, a system of finance taxing luxuries, a vigorous police, and a division of the legislative body (in order to interpose between the Emperor and representative body), a paper currency (in order to create a fictitious capital, and enable the miners, landholders, &c., to resume their labours, and make up the deficit caused by the funds transferred by the opulent Spaniards to Spain.)

N.B.—Having been plundered by the pirates of all my papers, except a very few notes, far the greater part of this statement is made solely from recollection; consequently, in addition to the difficulty of procuring correct information relative to countries possibly only in very few parts yet visited by men of science or intelligence, many inaccuracies will probably be discovered, attributable to a treacherous memory.

III.

Memoir on the Republic of Colombia, by Mr. Ravenga, Envoy from Colombia to Great Britain.

Outline of her Political History.—The revolution began in Caracas on the 19th of April, 1810, and within a few days the whole country was independent under different governments. The provinces formerly composing the Captain-Generalship of Venezuela constituted a federal government; those formerly composing the Vice-Royalty of New Granada were divided between federated provinces and provinces aiming at only one central government. The first essays in such a new career were full of difficulties, which, though often overcome, were succeeded by new ones. The terror caused by the earthquake and the inhuman cruelty of Boves subjugated, at last, the whole of Venezuela to the Spanish government; and the unexampled expedition of General Morillo, aided by the army of Morales, subdued shortly after the New Granada independent provinces. There are no privations which the garrison of Carthagena did not bear in defence of the place, yet Carthagena fell also.

Though the country was subdued, many patriots who had retired to the wilderness continued the warfare, and, assisted by the emigrants who returned from the West India islands, gradually became stronger; and the military government, which circumstances had rendered necessary, ceased on the 17th February, 1819, that the representatives of the people, convoked by General Bolivar, met together in a general Congress. That body framed a Constitution for Venezuela, and the greater part of New Granada having been liberated during that year the union of New Granada and Venezuela into the same political body, (which, since the beginning of the revolution had been kept in view), was generally demanded by the people, agreed to by the Congress of

Venezuela, and finally sanctioned by the Constituent Congress of Columbia in 1821; when the remains of Morillo's army were reduced to Puerto Cabello, the only stronghold that the Spanish troops keep in that country, since those who were at Quito were conquered and made prisoners at the beginning of last year. The first steps after the revolution were, as it was natural, doubtful, staggering, uncertain; but, since the year 1816, the improvements in the political institutions have been gradual, systematic, steady. The laws are obeyed in Colombia; the government is respected all over the country, and the Constitutional Congress now sitting is actually composed of representatives and senators of all the ten departments or intendancies into which the republic is divided. General Bolivar is President of Colombia, and there is no other person equally deserving that situation; while he is yet conducting the military business, the Vice-President, General Santander, is at the head of the Colombian government, and few are his equal as an industrious public officer.

Army of Colombia.—In the year 1821 that Colombia was waging war against her oppressors almost all round the country, her army exceeded 50,000 men; but after the capture of Cumania and Carthagena, and the battles of Caxabobo, Pichincha, and Bombaná, a large part of that army has been disbanded, and the soldiers of independence have again become agriculturists. The returns which will have been presented to Congress, now sitting, have not yet been received; but, judging from known facts—viz., that there are between three and four thousand men near Puerto Cabellos, between eight and ten thousand round the Lake of Maracaibo, and a more or less strong garrison in all the frontier places and cities, as also that Colombia has sent in aid of Peru four thousand men, and four thousand additional troops more offered, and a body of from six to eight thousand more promised to be stationed near the province of Trascillo in Peru, as a *point d'appui* for the Peruvian army, it cannot be doubted that the Colombian active army exceeds at present 30,000 men. This is, indeed, a small number for such an extensive country yet in a state of warfare; but as almost the whole population has served, or has at least been trained to military duty, and as the long protracted war of independence has caused that the present generation should have been brought up in the field, there is not the least difficulty to increase, at any time, the number of troops as much as desired, with the advantage of recruiting among veterans. This circumstance renders also more effective the militia of the country, which is composed of all the male population from 18 to 45 years of age.

Revenue of Colombia.—The sources of the revenue of Colombia are—1st., the custom-house duties; 2ndly, the profit arising from the monopoly of tobacco; 3rdly, the proceeds of the income-tax; 4thly, the salt-mines; 5thly, the mint; 6thly, stamp-paper, and other minor sources of revenue. The post-office, the proceeds of which are exclusively destined for opening and bettering the roads, does not increase the revenue directly.

As the returns presented, or which were to be presented to Congress, have not yet been received here, nor could they have been made during the war of independence, the proceeds of each of these sources of revenue, at present, cannot be accurately stated. Before the commencement of the war the custom-house duties may have produced between three and four millions of dollars; the tobacco two millions of dollars net revenue; the salt-mines, 700,000; the two mints near 400,000; stamps and other minor sources of revenue, about one million. In this estimate the tribute of Indians and the Alcabulo are not included. The former have been entirely abolished; the other has also been abolished, and instead of it the income-tax has been established. Its proceeds ought to exceed one and a half million dollars.

Notwithstanding the ravages occasioned by the war, and the exemption from

all duty of some articles of exportation, the accumulated revenue produces almost as much, and is thriving every day.

Resources of Colombia.—The land of Colombia is extremely fertile, and the people principally agriculturists. The exportation articles consist chiefly of cocoa, coffee, indigo, cotton, dye-woods, bark and different other drugs, provisions, gold and silver, coined money, copper, platina, black cattle, mules, &c.

The nature of the colonial code, to which Colombia has been subject heretofore, prevented her growth as much as it ought to have been expected from such an agricultural and fertile country; but she is at present free, though yet with a population entirely disproportionable to her extent and fruitful soil. The mines have never been explored, yet the gold-dust gathered by washing the sands of the rivers and creeks has, in tranquil times, exceeded 500,000 oz., which have been coined, besides what has been exported in bars or dust.

There are very rich silver mines in the country, which have never been worked for fear of foreigners becoming too fond of the country. The copper mines are yet very imperfectly explored; more so the lead mines. The iron, quicksilver, coals, and different other mines, of which the country abounds, have never been explored.

Population of Colombia.—About twenty years ago the population of the whole territory of Colombia was about 3,000,000 inhabitants. It ought to have increased during that time; but the war of devastation carried on by the enemies of independence, during the last thirteen years, ought to have diminished it at least in an equal proportion.

Commerce of Colombia.—It may amount at present to about 13 or 14 millions of dollars. A few articles are imported from the United States; but the European goods are principally carried thither from St. Thomas's, Curaçoa, Jamaica, &c., in a much smaller compass from Barbadoes, Trinidad, and the rest of the Windward Islands. By the Colombian law, goods directed "direct" from Europe pay 5 per cent. less duty, and this advantage begins to excite to direct mercantile operations from France, Germany, and Great Britain, notwithstanding the disadvantages under which the shippers labour, for want of consuls or commercial agents.

Colombia is not to be spoken of by what she has been, nor is yet, unless the nature of the Colonial Spanish government be taken into consideration. It would be more proper to calculate by what is capable to be a people, who has so nobly fought for independence, from the moment they may set themselves tranquilly at work.

IV.

NOTES with reference to the policy of a timely Recognition by this Government of the Independence of the late Spanish Colonies, and to the important advantages to be derived therefrom by all classes of the community in GREAT BRITAIN.

Impossibility of Spain reconquering her late Colonies.—The population of the late Spanish colonies amounts to *seventeen millions*, that of Spain to *ten millions*. Such being the comparative number of inhabitants, it may be confidently asked whether it is probable, or even possible, that the former can in so distant a quarter be *reconquered* by the latter, if the emancipated colonists are determined to continue free.

Look at the United States of America as an example of what a nation can effect when determined to be free, and compare the present *six times* greater population of the Spanish colonies in America with that of the United States, when the latter conquered her freedom, her population then being 2,700,000;

and contrast the *present impotent state of Spain* to undertake a new war against her refractory colonies with the *energies* and *resources* of England at that period, when, after a seven years' unsuccessful struggle with her American colonies, she declared their independence.

Be it further recollected that Spain has maintained her ascendancy in the New World for the last *three centuries* by the strong impression of her superiority and invincibility, and by the ties of religion and consanguinity; all which powerful moral sources of union cease to exist. The result is that the Spaniards with but two exceptions have been driven out of the Spanish Americas at the point of the bayonet, at a time, too, when these colonies neither possessed governments, money, nor credit. *Now*, however, they *do* possess all these, and consequently the means of procuring whatever they require to secure their independence.

If, then, the Spaniards were unable to *maintain their ascendancy* while their colonies were in their subjugated and degraded state, surely the attempt to re-establish it in their present renovated and improved condition must prove abortive, even were Spain provided with means (which she notoriously is not) of undertaking the enterprise.

Inhumanity in prolonging the war in the late Spanish Colonies.—Assuming from these premises the *moral* and *physical* impossibility of Spain recovering her authority in South America, would it not be *an act of humanity* on the part of Great Britain no longer to delay the recognition of the independence of that country, as such a step must speedily put an end to the lingering and predatory warfare still carried on in Colombia and Peru, where alone, in all the Spanish Americas, is to be found a hostile force, with the exception of a small garrison shut up in a fortified island opposite to Vera Cruz.

In Colombia Morales, the Spanish General, has from 1200 to 1500 Royalists, besides some negroes, under his command; whilst the regularly organised army of Colombia exceeds 20,000 men, among whom are many English and French officers, and a considerable number of British soldiers. The Spaniards, however, retain Puerto Cabello (a second Gibraltar), from whence they have recently sallied on a sort of marauding expedition along the coast, and have seized property to an immense amount belonging to *British merchants established in Colombia*, and many individuals suspected of being hostile to Spanish supremacy have been hung or shot.

In Peru there are from 5000 to 6000 Royalist troops, of whom a large proportion are natives; but as the new governments of Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Chili, and Buenos Ayres have entered into treaties to guarantee each other's independence, there can be but little doubt but that the few remaining Royalists will speedily be driven out of the country.

The late Spanish Colonies entitled to the recognition of their independence by the law of Nations.—As the late Spanish colonies have formed themselves into separate States, have established regular governments, with armies to support the decrees and ordinances of these governments, and as Old Spain is no longer capable of exercising any authority over them, are they not by the law of nations *free* and *independent*, and may they not, therefore, legitimately claim to be acknowledged as such by other governments?

Commercial advantages which would result to this country by its recognising the independence of the late Spanish Colonies.—It is scarcely necessary to advert to the advantages which must inevitably result to this country from Spanish American independence. The increased *commercial intercourse* which would necessarily follow, must prove incalculably beneficial to both parties, England being enabled to supply a population of 17,000,000 with almost every thing they require, including manufactures, machinery, and scientific skill, to enable

them judiciously to work their mines; while the South Americans, besides the most valuable productions above ground, have within their reach an incalculable abundance of the precious metals to offer in return.

Baron Humboldt, who was permitted to inspect the official returns of the quantity of dollars coined in the different states of South America, estimated the whole at 36,000,000 annually, without making any allowance for the quantity of silver smuggled away uncoined; and he gave it as his opinion that that quantity would be *trebled* whenever the mines were judiciously worked. This estimate did not include the produce of the gold mines (which all the States, more or less, contain), and which would greatly increase the value of the bullion raised.

It appears by the pamphlet of General Wavell (an English gentleman belonging to the Mexican service, sent as Envoy to this country by the Mexican government) that, prior to the commencement of the South American revolution in 1810, 24,000,000 dollars (independent of silver to the amount of 8,000,000 more, which was smuggled out of the kingdom), were annually raised in Mexico alone; and this, too, without machinery and comparatively without skill, the miners being obliged to drain their deepest mines with buckets made of bullocks' skins!

By a law of Mexico (which, it appears, is an old Spanish law, and therefore applicable to each of the new States), all mines which have ceased to be worked for ten years revert to the government, by whom they are granted anew to Mexican citizens capable of recommencing the working of them. Now, as General Wavell asserts that nineteen-twentieths of these mines are at present inundated, it is evident that the necessary consequence of the employment of British skill and machinery, aided by British capital and enterprise in working these mines, would be to increase to a vast extent the quantity of silver annually raised. It is therefore within the reach of the British speculator and capitalist to raise bullion to almost any amount by supplying the South Americans with machinery and capital; and, as it is a recognised axiom in political economy that the consumption of a country is regulated by its means of payment, it is apparent that England having thus the power to raise that means, she is thereby enabled to *create* a market for her manufactures to an almost unlimited extent. Indeed, it is confidently asserted by competent judges that the commerce of the South Americas and of the East Indies, in addition to that of our own colonies, would be abundantly sufficient to employ the population, and to satisfy all the various interests of Great Britain.

Such being the commercial advantages to be derived from the adoption of a conciliatory policy by Great Britain towards the Spanish Americas, it would be exceedingly to be regretted were any obstacle to stand in the way of an *immediate recognition* of their independence, and thereby to prevent that intimate commercial intercourse between the two countries, so anxiously desired by the mercantile interests of both.

This becomes the subject of still more grave consideration when it is known that, owing to the tardiness of Great Britain in taking this most important step to the best interests of the country, not only are other nations in the mean time procuring for themselves a commercial preference; but it is also to be seriously apprehended that a predilection for foreign instead of English manufactures may thus be created, to the *permanent injury* of the British manufacturer and the revenue of this country.

Financial advantages to be derived by this country from the independence of the late Spanish Colonies.—It remains to be shown that a friendly alliance with the Spanish colonies would prove of superior importance to this country in a *financial* and *commercial* point of view.

As Great Britain is capable of supplying the chief wants of the South Americans upon better terms than any other country, her recognition of their independence is therefore alone required to insure to us the immediate formation of a most advantageous commercial treaty, thereby securing to this country the chief part of the trade and commerce of the South Americas. Now, as this commerce would consist in an exchange of our manufactures for their most valuable productions, but more particularly for *bullion*, the precious metals (as soon as the mines are brought into activity by British skill, capital, and machinery), would be imported into England in such *vast quantities*, as necessarily to produce the *most important financial consequences*. These consequences would not be confined merely to the improvement of the revenue, depending upon an increase of trade; but from the greater quantity of specie thus introduced into circulation, the price of labour and of the products of agriculture, at present so much depressed, would immediately improve,—the community at large would be enabled to make good their pecuniary engagements, as well to the State as those of a private nature, with much less inconvenience than at present,—and from the deterioration in the value of the precious metals consequent on their increased quantity, it is probable also that the minister would then be enabled to effect operations with a view to the reduction of the annual amount of the *interest* of the National Debt, and even of the debt itself, which will be wholly impracticable as long as the *quantity* and *value* of the precious metals in this country remain at their present standard.

The result which may be fairly anticipated from these financial operations would be a return of times similar to those when the paper-currency was at its height, when landlords, tenants, professions, and trades were all affluent and prosperous; but with this important difference, that the currency being *real* not *fictitious*, the nation would be exempt from the evils consequent upon the pernicious system of a paper-currency.

Surely, then, as the British government, to meet the unavoidable exigencies of the moment, originally created the evil of an overstrained paper-currency, by restricting cash payments; and as the sudden subsequent return to cash payments has been severely felt by all classes of the community, the mitigation of those evils, if within the power of government, is on every account most desirable and urgent.

Political advantages to be derived by Great Britain from her recognising the independence of the late Spanish Colonies.—The *political situation* of Great Britain, it is apprehended, would be still more materially affected by this state of things, MORE ESPECIALLY BY HER INDEPENDENCE OF THE TRADE AND COMMERCE OF THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE, than would her *commercial* or *financial* interests.

Upon this part of the subject it would be presumption in the writer to enter. But, as an Englishman, he may be permitted to express the extreme exultation and delight which would be afforded to him, in common with every other Briton of right feeling, by seeing Old England, placed as she is upon the pinnacle of fame and glory, in circumstances of *financial opulence and independence* which would enable her upon every emergency proudly to promulgate, and to enforce the observance of, those just and sound political principles which are alike dictated by the laws of God and man. Secure as she then would be from the effects of any hostile Continental decrees and ordinances which might be enacted against her commercial interests, and from a repetition of those insulting threats of *political annihilation* thundered against her by the late continental despot.

It is confidently (but with respectful deference to the opinions of high

authorities) maintained that, in no manner can all these vitally important objects be so effectually accomplished, as by the recognition of the independence of the late Spanish colonies; and thereby securing to Great Britain the main part of the trade and commerce, and, consequently, of the immense treasures raised from the mines of these countries.

[Compliments, with thanks for the documents which he has sent him, which he has perused with pleasure.

WELLINGTON.]

[316.] MEMORANDUM FOR MR. GRIFFIN—DRAFT OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR WEST INDIAN COMMISSION.

10th Sept., 1823.

The Board have recently had brought to their consideration various plans and estimates for the construction of barracks, hospitals, and other public buildings, in the West Indies; viz., barracks at Demerara for 400 men, estimated at 80,591*l.* 13*s.* 2*d.* sterling; barracks at Berbice for 200 men, estimated at 59,861*l.* 15*s.* 6*d.* sterling; barracks at Trinidad for 800 men, estimated at 53,370*l.* sterling; two estimates for an hospital at St. Vincent's, the one 3433*l.* 12*s.* 7½*d.* sterling, the other 8323*l.* 6*s.* 3½*d.* sterling; upon which they have not been able to decide for the want of the information regarding the prices of materials and workmen, and the quantity of work which each description of artificer and labourer can perform in those countries comparatively with the same description of artificer and labourer in Europe. They have, therefore, considered it proper, with the concurrence of the Lords of the Treasury, to send a Commission to the West Indies to inquire into these and other matters referred to in these instructions.

This Commission is to be composed of the following persons, viz.: Colonel Sir Carmichael Smyth, of the Royal Engineers; *

They are to be paid * ; and are to take their departure on the * . The first object for their inquiry will be the buildings above referred to, of which the plans accompany these instructions.

They will observe that these buildings, expensive as they are in their original construction, are intended to be of wood, which

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* Blanks in manuscript.

material, it is to be observed, is recommended by the present Medical Department in the West Indies.

It must be observed, however, that the opinion upon which this recommendation is founded is singular. Officers who have served in the hospitals in countries probably more exposed to rain than any part of the King's dominions in the West Indies, are of opinion that the buildings in which troops are permanently placed ought to be constructed of the most substantial materials, such as brick or stone. This is the positive opinion of the late Commander-in-Chief, Lord Combermere, in reference to buildings for the accommodation of the troops in these very countries, as appears by the paper enclosed; and it is impossible for this Board to consent to incur such an expense as is now proposed, which will probably be to be repeated in a few years, without getting to the bottom of this question, and knowing exactly upon what this opinion of the Medical Department is founded. The first point, then, for the consideration and discussion of this Commission is to ascertain exactly from the Medical Department the ground of their opinion that it is desirable that the troops should be lodged in wooden buildings instead of in those built of more substantial materials.

If the foundation of this opinion should be that these buildings dry more quickly than those built of brick or stone, it might then be proposed to them to consider of the expediency of constructing double walls of durable materials; the inner of the smallest possible dimensions, but sufficiently distant from the outer always to keep it dry.

If they should still persist in the opinion that the buildings for the accommodation of the troops ought to be of wood, it will then be to be considered by the Commission how far it will be possible to make use of cast-iron uprights, rafters, &c., so as to render the buildings as durable as possible, to render the public as little liable as possible to a renewal of the expense, and to have as large a proportion as possible of the expense of these buildings laid out in this country. With this view it would be desirable to ascertain whether it would not be practicable to construct the whole building in this country, to send it out in framework, and to have it put together where required for use in the West Indies. It must be observed that this plan, if practicable, would be attended by the advantage of enabling the Commander-in-Chief to select the position of the troops, and to

'alter it from time to time, as any particular position might be found unhealthy, or otherwise inconvenient or injurious.

The real subject for inquiry is the price of the different descriptions of materials in the West Indies; whether the produce of these islands or colonies, or of the continent of America, or of Great Britain, purchased on the spot. It is desired that the Commission should enter into the most minute detail upon this point.

The next is the price of labour of the different descriptions of artificers and labourers, European as well as Negro, in the different colonies and islands.

The third, is the average quantity of work which these artificers and labourers will perform in a given time, compared with the work which the same description of artificers and labourers will perform in England.

Another subject of inquiry is the possibility of working in the West Indies by contracts, whether for the whole or parts of any building or work. It is desirable that the Commission should direct their inquiries to this point.

The Report of the Commission on these points will, it is hoped, enable the Board of Ordnance to decide upon the plans or estimates for the buildings and works now under consideration, as well as upon others which may hereafter be brought before them.

But, besides these objects, which are the cause of sending out the Commission, there are others which require their attention and report. Enclosed is a Report from the late Commander of the Forces, Lord Combermere, on the state of the public buildings and works in the several islands and colonies as far as it goes. It is desirable that, if the season should permit, the Commission should visit all these islands and colonies, and report the state of the public buildings and works in each, which are not colonial.

Annexed is a correspondence regarding the works and buildings on the Island of Tobago, and the Commission are called upon to make a special Report on the schemes proposed for strengthening that island.

Another subject for inquiry is the corps of military artificers recently handed over to the Ordnance by the Quartermaster-General's Department.

The first question is, whether it is useful or economical to

keep up this corps. Are they constantly kept at work? What proportion of sick have they usually upon their whole numbers? What is their ordinary pay? What their pay in addition when at work? What the expense of superintendence, or of officers and non-commissioned officers? What the expense of clothing, barracks, fuel and candle, and rations? If the public had not this corps in their service, could the artificers of which it is composed be procured for hire in the West Indies? Is the organization of the corps the most convenient for the service in the West Indies? Is any other organization proposed?

These are the questions which appear to bear upon this point, the answers to which, and any other information the Commission can procure, will enable the Master-General and Board to decide whether it is expedient to retain it in the service.

On their arrival in the West Indies the Commission will report themselves to the Commander-in-Chief. They will lay before him their instructions, and request from him the necessary assistance to enable them to prosecute their inquiries, and such instructions as he may think proper to give them.

They will communicate with his Excellency constantly, and keep him informed of the progress of their inquiries.

Lord Combermere's Report, and the correspondence regarding Tobago, are in this portfolio. Refer this Memorandum to General Mann and to the Board, and beg them to consider it, and to note such additions as they please, and then to let me see it. We will then refer it to the Treasury.

Let Carmichael Smyth see it and the papers in the mean time, and let him make all his arrangements for going in the end of this month. Beg all parties to let us have the Memorandum back, so that he may have his instructions by that time.

Carmichael Smyth ought, in my opinion, to have 500*l.*; the other two half the sum; and all their expenses paid out and home.

Refer this point to the Board; see what the Commission got before.

Request the Board to look over the instructions to the last Commission, and see whether anything from them can be added to these.

WELLINGTON.

[317.] *To Mr. Adolphus.*

17th Sept., 1823.

The Duke of Wellington presents his compliments to Mr. Adolphus, and incloses him the 'Morning Chronicle' of Friday, the 12th instant, to which the Duke's attention has just been called, in which Mr. Adolphus will observe that he is stated to have represented the Duke as a person *known sometimes to play at Hazard, who might be committed as a rogue and vagabond.*

The Duke concludes that this paper contains a correct statement of what Mr. Adolphus said upon the occasion, and he assures Mr. Adolphus that he would not trouble him upon the subject if circumstances did not exist which rendered this communication desirable.

Some years have elapsed since the public have been informed *from the very best authority* that the Duke had totally ruined himself at play; and Mr. Adolphus was present upon one occasion when a witness swore that he had heard that the Duke was consequently obliged to sell the offices in the Ordnance himself, instead of allowing them to be sold by others!! The Duke has suffered some inconvenience from this report in a variety of ways, and he is anxious that at least it should not be repeated by a gentleman of such celebrity and authority as Mr. Adolphus.

He therefore assures Mr. Adolphus that in the whole course of his life he never won or lost 20*l.* at any game, and that he has never played at hazard, or any game of chance, in any public place or club, nor been for some years at all at any such place.

From these circumstances Mr. Adolphus will see that there is no ground for making use of the Duke's name as an example of a person *known sometimes to play at Hazard, who might be committed as a rogue and vagabond.*

[318.] *To the Right Hon. Henry Goulburn.*

MY DEAR SIR, Woodford, 17th Sept., 1823.

Since I wrote to you yesterday I have received two letters from you of the 13th, the one stating that Lady Ormonde wishes that Captain Eaton should be appointed Barrack-master

of Castle Connor, the other conveying the application of Mr. Davis Brown that Mr. Jackson should be appointed Barrack-master of Foxford; and Mr. Brown sends a letter from a Mr. Jackson expressing as to the reason for his wish that his brother should be the Barrack-master at Foxford, that he has property in that neighbourhood.

I have been lately wading through the reports on the different barracks in Ireland, in which the most flagrant of the abuses are occasioned by the neglect and insufficiency of the persons recommended by the gentlemen of the county to be barrack-masters, and by the abuse of those persons of the trust and confidence reposed in them, with a view to forward their own interests or that of their patrons, in hiring land or houses, or the purchase of articles of consumption for the barracks, &c.

The simplest mode of getting the better of these abuses would be to refuse to appoint as barrack-master of any barrack a gentleman belonging to the county in which it is situated, or recommended by a gentleman of that county. But I hope I am too powerful for these petty abuses without the assistance of such a rule. I will not, therefore, refuse to attend to your recommendation of Lady Ormonde's friend for the barrack at Castle Connor, nor of Mr. Brown for the barrack at Foxford.

But I beg you will inform both, and any others who may hereafter apply to you, that I am determined to put an end to all the petty abuses which have existed hitherto in the barrack concerns, and that, without respect for recommendations, I shall at once dismiss any barrack-master who may neglect his duty or abuse his trust for the purpose of forwarding any local interest.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

I hope that the Mr. Jackson to be appointed to Foxford is a military man; I don't much like to take others.

To his Grace the Duke of Buckingham.

[319.]

MY DEAR DUKE, Woodford, 18th Sept., 1823.

I have received your letter of the 16th, and I regret very much that I had not the pleasure of seeing you at Cheltenham.

I hope you have derived benefit from the use of the waters. I am a great deal better.

I think you are mistaken respecting the cause of Mr. Huskisson's admission to the Cabinet. It had long been intended to promote him in office, and a particular office was intended for him, to which subsequent arrangements prevented his being appointed. Mr. Huskisson then stated fairly that if he was appointed to any other office which had been held with Cabinet by his predecessor, he likewise must have a seat in the Cabinet; and, having been appointed to the Board of Trade, the King's consent was obtained to his admission to the Cabinet within a limited period of time.

With all this Mr. Canning had nothing to do. Indeed he did not belong to the government during the discussion of a great part of it; and although I do not doubt that he sees with pleasure Mr. Huskisson's admission to the Cabinet, the claim to be admitted, however reasonable under the circumstances in which Huskisson is placed, was, I know, quite unexpected by him. There is another point discussed in your letter in which I think you mistaken, that is the expediency and desirableness of having two members of the same family or party in the Cabinet. Whether it is a fault or otherwise, I assure you that in the existing Cabinet such a confederacy does not exist, and if it did it would be useless. I have never known two members of the existing Cabinet go into the Council determined to be of the same opinion, and it is a mistake to suppose that the relationship which existed between Lord Sidmouth and others, or between the late Lord Londonderry and Robinson, ever gave either more weight or more facility in the Cabinet than they would have had otherwise. I do not think that my position in the Cabinet is altered by the relinquishment by my brother of his seat there for the convenience of the other arrangements of the government.

To become a member of the government is an honourable object of ambition, and I am not astonished that a person of your talents and station should be desirous of it. But I cannot but think that I should not serve your cause nor promote your object by laying before Lord Liverpool your letter, to which this is an answer. I know that it has been felt by the King and by others that the Cabinet is too numerous, and that it is objectionable to admit to it any person not holding a regular

Cabinet office. It is not necessary to discuss the difference between your situation and that of Lord Sidmouth; but I am certain that if Lord Sidmouth was to relinquish his seat in the Cabinet, you would experience insurmountable difficulties in being called to fill it. In regard to the other situations to which you refer, I don't believe there is the most remote chance of any of them becoming vacant; and of this I am very certain, that your desire to belong to the Cabinet being known, which it is by what passed in 1821, and again last year, it would be much more dignified in you to wait for an offer than to bring forward your claim and your wishes upon the occasion of every move in the inferior offices of the government.

I hope you will excuse the freedom with which I have written to you upon this subject, and will attribute it to its real motive, my desire to show you the true position of the government in respect to the points discussed by you, and my sentiments regarding the relation in which you stand towards it.

Ever, my dear Duke, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Mr. Adolphus to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Percy Street, 21st Sept., 1823.

Mr. Adolphus has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of a note from his Grace the Duke of Wellington, and would have done so yesterday, but was detained in court till a late hour in the evening. Mr. Adolphus is extremely sorry that any expression used by him should have occasioned a moment's uneasiness to the Duke of Wellington. Mr. Adolphus cannot deny that the report in the 'Chronicle' is accurate, so far as it recites his mere words, but the scope of his argument, and the intended sense of his expression was, that if the Vagrant Act were to receive the extensive construction contended for, the most illustrious subject of the realm might be degraded to the condition of the most abject and worthless, for an act in itself indifferent, and which, until the times had assumed a character of affected rigour, was considered rather as a proof of good society than as an offence against good order. Mr. Adolphus is however perfectly sensible that his illustration in his Grace's person was in all respects improper, and, considering the matters to which his Grace has adverted, peculiarly unfortunate. Mr. Adolphus feels, with regret, that any public expression of his sentiments on this subject in the newspapers would not abate, but much increase the evil. Should an opportunity ever present itself of doing it naturally and without affectation, Mr. Adolphus would most readily explain, in speaking at the bar, the error he has committed; but it is very

unlikely that there should exist an occasion of which he can avail himself with a due regard to delicacy. Mr. Adolphus relies, however, on the Duke of Wellington's exalted mind for credit to his assurance that he never meant to treat his name but with the respect due to his Grace's exalted rank and infinitely higher renown.

[320.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Woodford, 23rd Sept., 1823.

I received this morning your letter of the 22nd and your proposed note, which I lose no time in answering. A party in this country have long wished that we should be defeated by the Modern Revolutionists; but, that object having failed and being hopeless, they now wish to enlist us under their banners, and to obtain for them our support; military, if possible, but at all events moral. They hope thus to establish them at all events, and possibly to involve this country in all the expenses and the consequences of another extended contest.

To these views I attribute the newspaper reports, paragraphs, &c., to which you refer, of which, however, I must say that I had seen but little till I looked in the newspapers of the 22nd.

But surely we must not allow ourselves to act according to these views. We must not get into a war of notes, at least with our neighbours, peace being our object, only because the editors of newspapers and their Jacobin patrons are desirous of enlisting us in the cause of revolution.

As for my part, I have seen nothing which would induce me to believe that the French government entertain any intention of interfering in the Spanish-American concerns. They have no troops in the West Indies, that I know of, excepting the necessary garrisons of their islands, and when I was at Paris they certainly did not intend to send more ships than the usual relief; and eventually, that is to say, if we should undertake anything ourselves against Cuba, Porto Rico, or other Spanish colonies, to keep both the relieving and the relieved ships in those seas. I never heard that they had more.

But, at all events, if they have both ships and troops in those seas, and you have intelligence of their designs, of which I confess I have seen none, it appears to me that having laid down your principle clearly in your despatch of the 31st March, it would be far more conciliatory and more effectual for every purpose, excepting to gratify those who wish to push us to a

quarrel, to communicate verbally either with Monsieur de Polignac or with the Ministers at Paris, and, if there be real ground for uneasiness, explain it to them and call for an explanation of their conduct.

I would therefore recommend it to you not to send your note at all. But if you should determine to send it, I would observe that the omission to give any answer to your despatch affords a reason for calling for explanation if there is anything in their conduct inconsistent with what you required it should be, and it would be better to state it broadly then as you do. This is the more desirable, as I believe the next ground stated, viz. the intimations of the Regency, is taken from the newspapers, which cannot be authority to be quoted in an official note.

Then, in respect to the object of the note, I doubt your being authorised to declare it in the form in which you have put it. You may have a right to tell France that this government will not allow her to interfere in the contest between Spain and her colonies, because the result of such interference may be to alter the relative state of France and this country in respect to those colonies: but I don't think it is the law of nations that the right of the parent State (to regain its territories by force) is not communicable to a third party. This, therefore, ought not to be stated in an official note.

Believe me ever yours most truly,

WELLINGTON.

Since writing the above I have seen the 'Times' of the 22nd, and it is quite clear that the faction propose to write up a case. But I don't think they have any fact to rely upon excepting the visit of two French ships at La Guayra.

To Mr. Adolphus.

Woodford, 23rd Sept., 1823.

The Duke of Wellington presents his compliments to Mr. Adolphus, and assures Mr. Adolphus that he is convinced that Mr. Adolphus never intended to reflect injuriously upon him. If the Duke had believed that Mr. Adolphus could have entertained such an intention he would not have addressed him. The Duke troubles Mr. Adolphus again upon this subject, as, in consequence of the editor of the 'Morning Chronicle' having

thought proper again to advert to this subject in a paragraph published on the 18th instant, the Duke has referred the paper of that date and that of the 12th to the Attorney and Solicitor General, his counsel, to consider whether the editor ought not to be prosecuted.

The Duke requests, therefore, that Mr. Adolphus will not notice the subject in the way he proposes until the gentlemen above mentioned will have decided upon the advice which they will give the Duke.

[322.] *To the Duke of Buckingham.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Woodford, 23rd Sept., 1823.

I have received your letter of the 21st.

You may rely upon it that I am not mistaken respecting the facts which I stated to you in my letter of the 18th regarding Mr. Huskisson. There is no person who knows better than I do all the circumstances attending Mr. Canning's introduction to the Cabinet, and he certainly made no stipulation or request in favour of any person whatever, nor did he ever consider as an object to himself that Mr. Huskisson should be in the Cabinet.

In respect to yourself, my last letter contains the opinion which I formed when I received yours of the 16th, which subsequent reflection has confirmed. I am convinced that you will not forward your object by the communication which you propose to make to Lord Liverpool.

Whenever I enter into a case it is with a view to effect some good and to conciliate parties which the public interest requires should be well together; but I could not charge myself with a communication which must, I am certain, produce irritation and must end in disappointment.

I won't enter into discussion on other points of your letter, on which, however, I confess that I don't entertain the same opinions that you do.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Gloucester Lodge, 24th Sept., 1823.

The alternative, as it appears to me, is between giving fair notice of what we intend, in time to prevent collision, or waiting till we are called upon to speak out with all the Allies leagued against us. That France meditates, and has all along meditated a direct interference in the affairs of Spanish America, has been shown by M. de Villèle's general language, and by M. de Chateaubriand's specific offers of succour (through M. Lagarde), and the accompanying despatches show that one mode by which they propose to paralyze our opposition to such projects, is the assembling of a Congress to deliberate upon the affairs of America.

To such a Congress I certainly think (as at present advised) we can be no party. It will not do, I think, to go a third time to a consultation in which we are to have no voice; and to acquiesce in proceedings against which we have protested. But I am for avoiding, if possible, the necessity of refusing such an invitation. That can best be done by taking our line beforehand. If the proposal should come upon us I know but one way of evading it altogether, or of neutralising its effects;—that would be, to propose on our part that the United States should be invited to send their plenipotentiary to the meeting. It would be strange indeed that the powers of the European continent, some of whom never had a colony, nor saw a ship in their lives, should sit in judgment upon a great maritime, colonial question, from which the American government should be excluded. It may be very fit that the Allied Sovereigns should govern the Old World as they list; but they have no business to expect that they shall be suffered to extend their continental rule to the New.

Our way out of this complication is to act for ourselves before the Congress have decreed (as they will do) that the colonies shall be recovered for Spain, and that France, backed with the "moral force of the Alliance," shall be the instrument of their recovery.

Now as to the question of right, I confess I adhere to the opinion that a mother country cannot communicate to another country the claim which she has herself to the allegiance of her colonies. She may hire mercenary armies, perhaps, as we did Hessians for the war in America, but it would surely be an excess of dupery to consider a French army employed by Spain in Mexico, as Spanish and not French.

The right of France, or of any other country to take part, if it shall think fit, with either party in another State divided by a civil war, is undoubted. But that right is surely quite of a different sort from the right of the parent State to the allegiance of its subjects, and imposes quite different obligations upon other powers. It must be a very strong case, I admit, which should induce us to side with the Spanish colonies in arms against Spain. But it must be a much stronger—and one indeed which I can hardly figure to myself—which would justify us in not opposing by every exertion the attempt of France to put herself toward those colonies in the place of the mother country. And it would (as I have said) be the excess of dupery to suppose that a French army in those colonies meant anything else.

But all this, however true, it may not be necessary to state in a communication to France.

I continue, however, to be of opinion that we shall do well to take the best chance of avoiding collision by speaking plainly to France while she is yet uncommitted. But I quite agree with you that a *general* view of the question and a reference to our former declarations upon it are better introductions than any allusion to unauthenticated reports which imply suspicion, and may admit of denial.

I will amend the draft in this sense, and send it to you again.

I sent a draft to Lord Liverpool on the same day as to you, and I enclose to you his answer, as I shall yours to him.

Ever, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[323.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, 25th Sept., 1823.

I have received your letter and enclosure of yesterday. The doubt stated in my last letter was, whether it was inconsistent with the law of nations for one country to assist in the subjugation of the revolted colonies of another at her call. I did not mean to assert that we might not be obliged, by a sense of our own interest or by the public voice of the country, to interfere to prevent France from assisting Spain by troops to subjugate her rebellious colonies, and that our interest in the case might not justify our interference. But that is a view quite distinct from the other. The law of nations may authorise the assistance by troops by France, as I believe it does; at the same time that our interest in the case might justify our taking measures to prevent that assistance from being given.

It was with this view that I recommended that you should not state in your note that a third Power could not be called upon to assist in the subjugation of the colonies; although you might state that our view of our own interests would oblige us to prevent France from giving that assistance. I see that you have taken this line in your proposed letter to Monsieur de Polignac, and I advert to the subject now only to explain what I meant in my last. But I confess that I don't see now any ground for such a letter, or for taking any notice of the subject, excepting the fact that two French ships have been at La Guayra. In Monsieur de Villèle's conversations with me, which were all founded upon his jealousy of our proceedings, he never went farther than to inform me that he had offered the ships of France, the squadron then ready in their ports, to carry out

Spanish troops. To think of carrying these Spanish troops now for any purpose excepting to create a fresh mutiny in Spain, and, if they should arrive in America, fresh confusion there, is ridiculous; and, at all events, it is impossible that either France or all the Powers of Europe can intend to carry troops, whether French or Spanish, to America to conquer the Spanish colonies, without the consent of this country. What has passed already must show them what we should think on such a proposition and what they must expect. If it should occur, however, it must be observed that this country will be pledged by your note to a course of action of the expediency of which it might be as well that the government should judge at the time. I think it desirable, therefore, to avoid any farther irritating correspondence with our neighbours on an event which appears so improbable.

If you should determine to send this letter to Monsieur de Polignac, I would request you to look at the words which refer to the reconcilement of Spain with her revolted colonies, which I think convey rather less than we intended when we last communicated with foreign Powers on this subject.

I won't add to the length of this letter by discussing other topics in yours which do not appear to bear upon the question, whether you should send this letter or not, more particularly as I shall be in London to-morrow.

Yours sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Gloucester Lodge, 25th Sept., 1823.

In the letter which you were so good as to write to me the day before yesterday, you said that there was no authority for the paragraph in my proposed note to Prince Polignac, about "indemnity" to France, except the newspapers. Perfectly true; and I should be glad to know what authority we have had during the last six months for almost any event in Spain, except the newspapers, tardily confirmed by reports from our ambassador at Paris, and still more tardily (of necessity) from A'Court. A'Court's reports come now up to the 31st of August, but they confirm what the newspapers had told us a fortnight before they arrived.

However, to-day's post has brought me a letter from the consul at Bordeaux, from which I have made an extract, herein enclosed. I confess to *my* mind this is satisfactory evidence of the design, and I very much

doubt whether we shall have more authentic information of it till it suits the French government to avow it.

You said also that we had no proof of the French projects respecting Spanish America. Proof certainly not, that would convict them in a court of justice: but pregnant indications quite enough, in my opinion, long ago, to justify our taking precautions.

However, here again, to-day's post has come in aid of my argument—or my suspicion; as you will see by the enclosed copy of a despatch just received from Sir Charles Stuart.

In short, it appears to me that a scene is now opening before us of quite a different nature from any that have passed, and requiring quite other combinations. I am morally convinced that if France is suffered to get a sway in Spanish America, not only will our ministry be overturned, and I think deservedly, but the reputation of this country will be irretrievably lowered. I am convinced equally that the French ministry, Villèle particularly, have that object still, and have all along (Villèle at least has all along) had it in view; and that we have not many months, perhaps weeks, to lose in thwarting them. That it is our duty to thwart them in it I am more convinced than of either of the former propositions.

Now all this is too important matter for me to venture to decide alone; or, where there is so great divergence of opinion, upon an interchange of discussion with two or three colleagues. And events pass too fast to be able to wait for our reunion in November. I must get together such as I can next week. Could you attend a Cabinet on Wednesday or Thursday?

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—I say Wednesday or Thursday to give more time for writing to others after I hear from you. But Lord Liverpool is ready to come up at any time. And if Monday would suit you, and I could receive this messenger back (from Windsor, where I understand you are to be) in time to write by to-day's post, I dare say that Lord Bathurst and Peel might be had up for Monday, and Robinson, who is in the neighbourhood of town, might be kept till then.

I will, therefore, propose *Monday* at three or four, subject to your convenience.

G. C.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

EXTRACT of a Letter from Mr. Vice-Consul BELL, dated Bordeaux, 18th September, 1823.

"There has been much talk in Madrid of indemnity to the French in consideration of their losses and expences having far exceeded what Mataflorida, Erro, Calderon, and Quesada had led the ministers to expect, but the finances of the government are so completely a nullity that pecuniary indemnities are out of the question."

II.

Sir Charles Stuart to the Right Hon. George Canning.

SIR, Paris, 22nd Sept., 1823.

The desire of this government to take advantage of the ascendancy resulting from the success of the war in Spain, in order to obtain an influence over the colonial possessions of that kingdom, is so distinctly manifested upon every occasion by the language of the French ministers, and the assembly of a Congress for the express purpose of coming to a thorough understanding upon this subject, and deciding upon the removal of the younger branches of the Spanish royal family to South America, has been so repeatedly the topic of their conversations, that I was not much surprised to hear the chargé d'affaires of the United States advert two days since to this subject, stating that his government are perfectly aware of the views entertained by France, and manifesting his anxiety to learn the course which my government intend to pursue respecting the affairs of South America, in a tone which induces me to think that the establishment of a good understanding between Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of regulating the commercial intercourse of both Powers with the new States which have been formed in that quarter of the world, will not be a difficult matter if it can be done before the meeting of the Congress, in which the French ministers are desirous this question should be treated.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

To Lord Clancarty.

MY DEAR CLANCARTY, Stratfieldsaye, 28th Sept., 1823.

I have been out of town for the last three weeks, and did not know anything that was passing, till the King sent for me yesterday on my return to town, to communicate to me the letter which his Majesty had written to you, and which Mr. Canning had been directed to retain in his hands until his Majesty would show me the copy of it. I cannot add anything in the way of explanation to what the King says in his letter. It is understood here that there had been some dispute between the King of the Netherlands and you; which his Majesty never had, nor never would forgive; that he was determined to have you removed; and that the appointment of Fagel to the ministry, and the intention to have here only a mission, are entertained with that only view.

The removal of Fagel is very disagreeable to our King, and he is very desirous of avoiding to receive the insult which will be given to him by the King of the Netherlands altering the nature of the mission by which the intercourse between the two countries has so long been maintained. Under these circum-

stances the King thinks that the most friendly thing he could do by you was to write to you himself; and he has particularly desired me to tell you that he is quite satisfied that Mr. Canning has conducted himself quite fairly by you in this transaction; and that it is this conviction which has induced the King to come forward upon this occasion, to relieve him from the embarrassment which he must have felt in giving you the advice which the King has given you in his letter.

The alteration of the mission is certainly a new feature in this case. If it is altered you cannot stay; and I entertain no doubt that the existing crisis must bring one of three results, —either your resignation, the alteration of the mission, or an explanation with the King of the Netherlands, in which he will make known his displeasure with you, and his desire that you should be recalled.

No friend of yours can hesitate respecting the choice to be made; and I recommend you to resign. I cannot tell you how much this has annoyed me, but I am convinced it cannot be avoided.

Believe me ever yours most affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

The Duke of Buckingham to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Cheltenham, 28th Sept., 1823.

I have still the misfortune to differ from you very widely in opinion. At the same time I must acknowledge most warmly the candour and openness with which you have given me that opinion. I consider it as a true and valuable mark of your friendship. Upon the terms alone of actively and officially cooperating with my friends in Cabinet, can I hope efficiently to support the government. I do not pretend to dictate the time when that admission into Cabinet shall take place, but I cannot agree to my claims being put by whenever the fair opportunity shall occur for pressing them. You think decidedly that the present is not that moment, and that the urging this subject now would lead only to irritation and disappointment. My object in public life is to support Lord Liverpool and yourself, and therefore where I can, I feel myself called upon to listen to your advice. Under these circumstances I shall for the present forbear to press this subject, as most certainly it is not my wish to produce "irritation" where I want to give strength and aid. I regret, however, to think that I must see existing towards any pretentions personally of mine a disinclination on the part of the government, the marks of which have scarcely been concealed.

Believe me always, my dear Duke, with the utmost regard,

yours very sincerely,

BUCKINGHAM AND CHANDOS.

Lord Clancarty to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Bruxelles, 3rd Oct., 1823.

I received your most kind letter this morning. That from his Majesty reached me by the same conveyance, and I send you herewith a copy of the answer I have addressed to his Majesty, and which will go by this messenger; this I hope you will approve.

Under the circumstances there was certainly but one thing to be done, viz., to follow the King's and your kind advice. To stay here, or even to attempt to do so, after a pronounced displeasure towards me from this King, which, however it has been covered up by every testimony of personal friendship and confidence by his Majesty here, has certainly been expressed in England,—as sufficiently appears from our King's most gracious letter to me,—would neither have entered into my feelings of regard for the public service, or respect for myself. You will see therefore that I have humbly solicited his Majesty's orders for my recall, and thus ends my public life.

To say that I do not feel this,—and far more on account of the source from which this necessary proceeding upon my part flows, and which was the very last from whence I could, or ought to have expected it,—would be to say that which would be very far from the truth. I feel the whole most poignantly. The deceit which, it should seem, has been practised here, adds rather than detracts from this feeling. In this King's conduct to me, I should have said he was *aux petits soins* with me; and as to the change in the diplomatic relations between the two countries, in a very recent interview with his Majesty,—there being question of Fagel's transplantation to the Foreign Office here,—upon my stating my hopes that this would not lead to any change in the diplomatic relations between the two countries,—the King gave me positively to understand that such a measure was not intended. I should hope therefore so pernicious a proceeding (which I doubt not was once in contemplation) has now been entirely relinquished, and will so be declared, as soon as by my letters of recall, a change in the person of his Majesty's accredited agent here shall have been made known.

In my letter to the King I have not, (because it really is not in the power of words to convey), stated anything like the amount of gratitude I feel to his Majesty for his gracious, condescending, and delicate conduct to me upon this distressing occasion. His letter, and yours, my dear Duke, are real comforts under this trying emergency; and believe me I shall ever feel grateful beyond any powers of expression I can command, for the kindness you have shown me upon this and on all other occasions.

I hope I have not gone too far in the suggestions set forth in the concluding paragraphs of my letter to the King, as directly addressed to his Majesty; if so I should hope your Grace will take an opportunity of pleading my ignorance to his Majesty, as the best excuse I can offer for my conduct.

In leaving the public service, I could have wished for interest to have pushed poor Pakenham forward. No man can be more efficient, or thoroughly trustworthy; I cannot say for him more than he deserves;

should opportunity occur, may I recommend him to your good offices? Poor Chad also! it is a sad breaking up. You know him well. I need say no more.

Most sincerely and ever gratefully yours, my dear Duke,

CLANCARTY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Lord Clancarty to the King.

SIRE, Brussels, 3rd Oct., 1823.

Your Majesty's most gracious letter, dated the 24th September, did not reach me till this morning.

The kindness and condescension of your Majesty's proceeding in this communication have penetrated to the bottom of my heart, and are felt by me with the most sincere gratitude and devotion.

Much as I feel afflicted with the information of the displeasure entertained towards me by the King of the Netherlands, so graciously and with such condescending attention to my feelings announced by your Majesty, I can well assure you, Sire, that the most honourable distinction you have been pleased to confer upon me, by thus immediately, and with your own royal hand, assuring me of your Majesty's approbation of my public services, conveys with it the best palliative to the distress which I cannot avoid experiencing upon this occasion.

I had been aware, through secret information, that in the month of February last, when the Verona protocol, upon the subject of the river transit, was communicated by me officially to the King of the Netherlands, that his Majesty had taken umbrage at this joint effort of his Allies, and led away by the insinuations of persons here, had at the time been induced to suppose that it was intended to force him on this subject, and that I was the person who suggested *this* measure and with *this* view.

That the measure grew out of communications from me to your Majesty's government is most true. These it was my duty to make, but that there was, or could have been, on the part of any of your Majesty's servants the most distant design of trespassing in any manner upon the respect due to the King of the Netherlands, is quite without foundation.

I had hoped, nay and felt convinced, that his Majesty upon very short reflection was thoroughly satisfied upon the subject, because from a very few days subsequent to that period, up to the present moment, I have never ceased to experience from his Majesty every proper testimony of his confidence and condescending friendship. Your Majesty's gracious letter has undeceived me, and doubtless under such circumstances there is but one course for me to pursue, that of following, as well from entire conviction of its perfect soundness, as from the deference and obedience which through inclination and duty are due from me to your Majesty, the excellent advice your Majesty has condescended to give me; and I therefore humbly request permission to lay my resignation of the highly distinguished post of your Majesty's ambassador to the King of the Netherlands at your Majesty's feet, and that your Majesty will be pleased to issue your commands for my recall at such time as may be judged most eligible for your Majesty's service.

The favourable testimony which Mr. Canning has given to your Majesty of my conduct under him since he has held the seals of the Foreign Department, is very gratifying to my feelings. From him I have constantly, during that

period, experienced every degree of confidence and facility which I could have desired for the good progress of your Majesty's affairs at this court.

Any change in the diplomatic relations between the two countries would indeed be a measure most impolitic, especially in the present posture of European affairs. I should hope and believe that any intention, which may have existed in the King of the Netherlands to this effect, has already been relinquished; at least, in a very recent conversation with his Majesty, he gave me to understand that such an intention was not entertained. At all events, when, by the issue of your Majesty's commands for my recall, that fact shall be made known to this court, the main object stated by your Majesty being thus obtained, I should think it little doubtful that under your Majesty's commands the absolute rejection of so pernicious a measure might be easily obtained from this government.

Permit me, Sire, again to express my heartfelt gratitude to your Majesty, for the manner in which you have condescended to act towards me upon this distressing occasion, and for the highly honourable manner in which your Majesty proposes to mark your gracious approbation of my public conduct. Your Majesty's offers are far beyond my merits, and fully equal to anything I could have personally desired. If I dared to express an additional wish, it would be that my brothers, most loyal and devoted servants to your Majesty, might be placed in heritable remainder to the additional English honour by which your Majesty is pleased to state your intention of distinguishing me; by which means the Irish and English honours of my family would become inseparable.

This suggestion may be improper:—if so, I throw myself upon your Majesty's goodness to pardon it, and to consider it as already relinquished; again repeating that without it I consider myself more than sufficiently rewarded for the feeble though zealous services I may have had the good fortune to render your Majesty.

I have the honour to remain, with the most entire respect and attachment to your Majesty,

Sire, your Majesty's most obedient, humble, and most devoted subject and servant,

CLANCARTY.

To the Duke of Buckingham. [325.]

MY DEAR DUKE, 4th Oct., 1823.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 28th. You may rely upon it that whenever I give you an opinion upon any subject it shall be my real one, and I will disguise nothing from you. You fill a very high station; and your talents qualify you eminently for a seat in the cabinet. But that is not always enough; and it is impossible for any man to force himself into that situation. When the connection between your family and the government was formed C. Wynn was considered its representative in the Cabinet. It is certainly true not only that there was no exclusion of you or of anybody else;

and, on the contrary, I know that you stipulated that you might bring your claim under consideration when you should think proper. But I think that the recollection of Wynn's position should in some degree guide your discretion upon this subject, and that you should look for occasions on which your very natural wish to have a seat in the Cabinet can be gratified without injury to him.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Duke of Buckingham to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Wotton, 12th Oct., 1823.

I feel truly obliged to you for your letter, and consider your advice as most friendly and kind. I must, however, set right one misconception which appears in your letter. You state that when my friends joined the government, Mr. Williams Wynn was considered as the representative of my family in cabinet. I beg to assure you that no such exclusive arrangement was ever even implied. On the contrary, in the first moment of my first interview with Lord Liverpool, I stated our junction was not a question of terms, but of measures, and that the arrangement then made was in no respect to interfere with my claims to cabinet office. This was assented to by Lord Liverpool at the time, and afterwards was repeated to and acquiesced in by the late Lord Londonderry. It was repeatedly stated on both sides, that the reason why those claims were not urged at the time, was that there was no opening for me in the House of Lords.

In compliance with your advice, I forbear pressing these claims at the present moment; but in declaring that I shall press them with the greatest earnestness on the first favourable opportunity, and that I consider that under no circumstances short of an acquiescence in them, can I make my support of the government as complete and efficient as I wish it to be, I feel that I best consider the interests and situation of Charles Wynn in the Cabinet, as well as the dignity of my own family, of which I am the representative.

Believe me always, my dear Duke, yours most sincerely,

BUCKINGHAM AND CHANDOS.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Cirencester, 12th Oct., 1823.

In consequence of the account which I have received of the insurrection at Demerara from Sir Henry Warde, and of his impossibility of sending from Barbadoes any reinforcement, it appears necessary to send some from hence. But Sir Herbert Taylor has at the same time written me word that there is no disposable force here, unless we draw upon Ireland, which in

its present state I conceive to be impossible. I have, therefore, written to Sir Herbert to suggest the calling out some of the veterans, by which means I hope that two regiments at least may be relieved and made fit for duty, so as to be sent off with all expedition; for though I flatter myself that the insurrection at Demerara will have been suppressed, the facility with which the insurgents can retire into the interior, where we cannot follow them, will leave that colony long, I am afraid, in an unsettled state; and the alarm will be so general in all the islands, where the force is certainly barely sufficient for common duties, that I am persuaded two regiments are the least which ought to be sent. I have written to this effect to Lord Liverpool, as an increase of the establishment cannot, of course, be made without his previous sanction.

If anything more effectual, and as expeditious, should occur to you for the reinforcement, I shall be obliged to you to let me know.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

To Lord Bathurst. [326.]

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, Cheveley, 14th Oct., 1823.

I received your note yesterday, as I passed through town from Windsor, and I found the Duke of York here, and have spoken to him on the subject of it, and have seen his returns.

It is obvious that nothing can be taken from England. The Duke says that one battalion can be taken from Ireland by postponing the relief of a battalion at Gibraltar, and sending to the West Indies the battalion destined for this relief. But there is then an end to all reliefs.

We ought really to look at our situation and our difficulties seriously.

I don't know whether you have ever read the history of the Maroon War. If you have you will see that this insurrection at Demerara is the most serious event in relation to our military force that has occurred for a great length of time. If the Maroons had been at Demerara instead of in the island of Jamaica, that rebellion would never have been got the better of, and I see no reason why the insurrection in Jamaica should keep out of sight the consequent result of the continued successful insurrection of the negroes at Demerara upon the other colonies, considering the temper in which the question of emancipation has avowedly put all the negroes.

We ought to look then to the necessity of reinforcing permanently the garrisons in the colonies, and of having there a

small reserve, to enable the commanding officer there to act vigorously at once upon the occurrence of any revolt or insurrection. In providing for this emergency we ought likewise to provide for others, and to have some battalions, say two or three, to carry on the reliefs. I don't think the battalions of infantry could well be on any establishment than that on which they are. But more are wanting to perform the general service of the country.

His Royal Highness tells me that the Irish government are not satisfied with the veterans, and that there is reason to suspect them. At least they are an inferior description of troops, and not disposable, which is what is wanted at present, and the want will be felt more and more every day. It will take nearly as much time to raise them as to raise others; and as officers are now taken from the half-pay to officer them, there is a considerable diminution of the saving which has been supposed to result from the employment of the veterans in preference to raising new battalions.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Walmer Castle, 15th Oct., 1823.

I think it right to send you the copy of a letter which I have just written to Canning (who is with Lord Bathurst at Cirencester), in consequence of the decree of the King of Spain, as it appears in the 'Courier' of last night, as I cannot suppose it otherwise than substantially correct.

I have stated in this letter all that occurs to me on the subject. If my motives appear to be wrong, I readily give them up, but the point is one which certainly ought not to be passed over without serious consideration.

It is most probable that Sir Wm. A'Court will have taken his own line, and that we shall think it right to support him, whatever it may be. However, in so new a state of things, he may be waiting for instructions, and if my opinion is well founded, we ought not to delay sending them to him.

Ever sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

Canning intended to stay at Cirencester till Monday morning, and then go on to Lord Morley's.

I think it not improbable that this intelligence may detain him at Cirencester. I have so arranged that my letter shall reach him early on Friday morning.

[Enclosure.]

Lord Liverpool to the Right Hon. George Canning.

My dear Canning, Walmer Castle, 15th Oct., 1823.

I hope this letter will still find you at Cirencester.

I conclude you have seen the King of Spain's decree, as published in the 'Courier.' I assume that it is published correctly, and if so, according to the letter of it, it annihilates our convention of December last. I enter not now into what it may be fit to do, in consequence of this act; though I think our course is very clearly pointed out by what we intended to do, if the terms of that treaty had not been substantially agreed to by the Spanish government in December last. I think, however, we ought not to be precipitate in taking even this course; but can we, if we have an option, suffer Sir Wm. A'Court to take his station as ambassador near the person of the King, in the face of such an instrument.

It is very probable that Sir Wm. A'Court will have joined the King before he knew of this decree. I rather wish this may have happened, and I would not in such case recall him; but permitting him to join, and recalling him after he has joined, are very different questions.

If the new Spanish government should explain the decree as not relating to *external* acts, we ought to be entirely satisfied. If they should say that they would conclude a *new treaty* upon the same conditions, I think we might acquiesce; protesting, however, that foreign governments had nothing to do with internal revolutions, and that new governments must, as to foreign Powers, succeed to the obligations of those whom they had replaced.

You will see by what I have already said what is the inclination of my opinion. I shall send a copy of this letter to the Duke of Wellington; and if Bathurst, yourself, and the Duke should be of a different opinion, I am quite ready to acquiesce.

Perhaps you will ask whether I would decline any diplomatic correspondence till a satisfactory explanation had been given. I answer I should have no objection to authorise Sir Wm. A'Court to send his Secretary of Embassy (if he is with him), or any other person of inferior rank, to enter into explanations with the Spanish government upon the point in question; but I incline to think that the King's representative ought not to take his place near the person of the King of Spain, in the face of such an act, and knowing it to have been issued, without some satisfactory explanation.

Believe me to be, &c.,

Liverpool.

Sir Charles Stuart to the Right Hon. George Canning.

Sir, Paris, 16th Oct., 1823.

Every successive communication received from Spain tends to contradict the language held by the French ministers, and to create suspicions of their designs in that country. Two important decrees, explaining the motives which determined the Cortes to liberate the King, and to admit the French troops into Cadiz, have been studiously concealed. The first of these acts (of which I enclose a copy), although signed at Cadiz by his Catholic Majesty on the 30th of September, was reversed by the decree published at Port St. Mary's on the 1st of October. The latter, of which I have not

been able to obtain a copy, delivers up the fortress of Cadiz and the Isla to France. I am assured that the determination of the French government to take every possible advantage of this decree, is already manifested by the equipment of expeditions to take possession of Ceuta and the Canary Islands, which statement is confirmed by the following account of the military arrangements in contemplation :—

The regiments of the Royal Guard, which have been employed in the siege of Cadiz, are to be embarked on board the squadron under the command of Admiral Duperré, who has orders to convey them to Brest, while the remainder of the army will march to the frontier, with the exception of 30,000 men, of whom 10,000 remain in Cadiz under the command of General Bourmont, 5000 are to be stationed at Madrid, and 15,000 men in the provinces north of the Ebro.

As the French ministers profess to abstain from all interference in the internal affairs of Spain, it would appear from these arrangements that, having crushed the revolutionary party, they abandon the civil government of that kingdom to the faction which have obtained the ascendancy in his Catholic Majesty's councils, determining only to take advantage of every circumstance in the present state of things which can indemnify them for the risk and expenses of the war.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect, Sir,
your most obedient humble servant,
CHARLES STUART.

Lord Westmorland to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

DEAR DUKE, Apethorpe, 16th Oct., 1823.

I shall be very happy to see you on Tuesday, and will keep the grass partridges as quiet as possible. For their quantity I can answer; not so much for their docility. I do not myself see much difficulty in our questions, except the last. Without doubt the terms of the treaty made with Spain must be done; but there seems nothing to involve us, if quietly managed. How far the acts of an imprisoned King are binding on himself and his people, is a point of public law that would require some argument on both sides to elucidate. It was the de facto power of the State, which is all that is apparent to foreign nations. But suppose this principle non avenu, each party returns to its right; we to our grievances and our remedy; and if Spain is told—if this treaty is not executed we shall capture to the amount complained of—the King of Spain must make such another convention, or we have the remedy in our own hands. The convention signed by the Cortes was a fraud; they never intended, they had no assets to pay. Whether the King of Spain has, or will have, is perhaps doubtful; but the prizes may always be taken to the amount—which I suppose is not very large. As to the colonial question, my view is that we have a right, if we please, to acknowledge the colonies, but that we have no policy so to do till their government is better known and defined: that we should have agents as to powers de facto; but I do not think our acknowledgment would alter our relation with those States, as to Spain or

other powers. I cannot discover in the law of nations, any principle upon which we can say to Spain or any other country, European or American, you shall not conquer back; or to others, you shall not assist Spain in reconquering—you shall not go to war with them—you shall not annex them—except we can show the annexation is dangerous to ourselves. The treaty of Utrecht engaged that Spain should not part with their American dominions. That treaty is I fear abrogated; but the stipulation shows the opinion that otherwise she had the right, and we are erecting ourselves into grand signors indeed, if no power is to add to its territories, either American or European, without our permission. Our conduct about the Floridas shows we had no such stomach for war. I am sure we had better wait quietly and recover, than get into squabbles for trifling and speculative matters. The state of force in our colonies is a much more serious and pressing subject, and some persons may thank themselves for the hazard and scenes of cruelty likely to arise. Perhaps the present circumstances coming so suddenly upon the first blush of this new system, may be fortunate in enabling us to stop and secure our colonies. Of the many wicked and cruel propositions that I have witnessed, I thought Mr. Wilberforce's last year was the *acmé*; the government ought not to have countenanced it at all, and it would in my opinion have been scouted, for I do not believe there is any feeling amongst people of any weight in favour of it. Have you read a pamphlet by Barham? it is very ridiculous, but states well the West Indian case. To my view the King of Spain has acted quite right in principle in his declaration of nullity of every act since his imprisonment. It seems to me he had no choice, either to sanction all or annul all; he could not select; but having annulled all, he may make anew every thing that was right.

Mr. Gaudem and Lord Duncannon are waiting with great impatience my political ravings, as impatient as you are perhaps in reading; however, as you are, I hope, in the seat of these discussions, it may be as well you should know and tell what may occur to uninformed persons on these questions, which persons happening to agree together, it does not occur to them what may be thought by others. I do not know if I have made myself understood for want of a scrap of Latin this time.

Yours very sincerely,

WESTMORLAND.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Cirencester, 16th Oct., 1823.

You will have heard before this that the insurrection in Demerara is suppressed; but this ought not I think to induce us to relax our exertions in sending out reinforcements to the West Indies. Not less than two regiments should be sent, and much of the good effect will be lost if they are not promptly sent. The Duke of York has told you of the means by which one regiment may be sent from Ireland without diminishing the force there. The measure of augmenting the three battalions of veterans there being objected to by the Duke, it cannot at present at least be pressed,

and the only means I can think of is to send the 12th from Sheerness to Gibraltar, and a regiment from thence to the West Indies. The reasons which exist against sending the 12th to the West Indies do not apply to Gibraltar. Some temporary expedient must be adopted to supply the duty of the 12th at Sheerness, until a decision is taken by the Cabinet with regard to the permanent military establishment of the country. It would be very inconvenient to summon a Cabinet now, and very objectionable to make the reinforcement to the West Indies wait for a decision of the Cabinet three weeks or a month hence, when I propose to have a Cabinet on the subject. I have, therefore, strongly pressed that some means should be found to send out the 12th regiment immediately, and I trust you will see the necessity of making a temporary arrangement so as not to postpone the intended reinforcement.* Let me know whether the second week in November will suit you to attend the Cabinet.

Yours ever very sincerely,

BATHURST.

[327.] *To Lord Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD, London, 17th Oct., 1823.

I have received your letter of the 15th, with the copy of that to Mr. Canning of the same date.

I entertain no doubt of the authenticity of the King of Spain's Proclamation, to which you refer; which appears to me to involve us in great difficulties.

As well as I recollect our convention was not ratified by the Spanish government, till subsequently to the period at which the King declared to Sir William A'Court at Seville, that he was in a state of *duresse;* and that at which Sir William had withdrawn himself, in consequence of the King's temporary deposition by the Cortes. Was the government at Cadiz, blockaded by sea as well as by land, and having no communication with any part of the world, *bonâ fide* a government *de facto,* upon whose ratification we could rely; and found upon it any measure of force or hostility, in consequence of the King's refusal to carry the convention into execution in conformity with the Proclamation? But the solution of this question does not relieve us from our difficulty. We last year forced the Spanish government to make this treaty during the negotiations at Verona, and at the eve of the discussions with France. It must not be supposed that we brought forward our claims at the moment we did, in order that we might have the advantage in negotiation, which the discussions with France would give

us, and still less to assist France. I should say then that whether the King of Spain is formally bound by the ratification or is not, we cannot do otherwise than in some shape or other require him in the one case to carry the convention into execution, in the other either to ratify the convention, or to agree to some other instrument equally advantageous to us.

I recommend that we should proceed in this negotiation in the most measured terms, and with the utmost moderation. From the Proclamation to which you have referred, and another which I read in the 'Courier' of last night, which I consider equally authentic with the first, it is quite clear to me that the King of Spain has taken his line; and that he thinks he has nothing to fear from the revolutionary party, and nothing to do but to punish with more or less severity, according to the degree of interference of his French allies.

It may be relied upon that the only interesting object to the King of Spain will be the re-establishment of his internal government, and if he thinks himself strong enough not to be under the necessity of conducting himself with mildness towards the revolutionary party, he can have no interest in courting us as far as regards his internal objects. Neither has he any in courting us as far as regards his colonies. Our line in respect to them is, I fear, already too decided to afford him ground for hope of any arrangement through our means.

We must look for strict justice only from the King of Spain, and that not from his own inclination to grant it, but from the desire of his allies, and particularly of France, to avoid hostilities with this country.

I therefore anxiously recommend that we should proceed with the utmost moderation, and should show the justice of our cause in every stage of this transaction, if we mean, as we must mean, that the country should not be involved in war.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Duke of York to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Cheveley, 19th Oct., 1823.

I take the earliest opportunity to acknowledge the receipt of your Grace's letter enclosing copy of Lord Bathurst's answer to you, by which I am happy to find that his Lordship appears to be aware of the present insufficiency of

the Infantry force of this country and intends to take an early opportunity of bringing the subject under the serious consideration of his Majesty's government.

In regard to the urgent demand for another battalion for the West Indies, in order as far as I can to meet Lord Bathurst's wishes with the least possible inconvenience I have formed a plan which I have directed Sir Herbert Taylor to communicate to your Grace and the Admiralty, and expect, if you are able to give me the temporary assistance that I request, can be carried immediately into effect.

I remain ever, my dear Lord Duke, yours most sincerely,

FREDERICK.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Saltram, 21st Oct., 1823.

Are we bound by our neutrality to suffer France to pick up spoils of Spain, after the conclusion of the war? and would not cession by Spain in cold blood (not in consequence of warlike capture) come within the spirit of our prohibition? Would you suffer France to acquire Cuba by cession? if not—why Canaries—or Ceuta—or Minorca?

I desire Planta to send you a copy of a letter which I have addressed to the Prince de Polignac in consequence of the enclosed memorandum from Planta. I send you at the same time the memorandum of my conference with Polignac.

You see how he would shuffle out of it, if he could. I fear very much, that nothing is to be gained by *verbal* communications with Frenchmen. And I am quite sure, we gain nothing by leaving our meaning unexplained.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[328.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Apethorpe, 24th Oct., 1823.

I have just now received your letter from Saltoun of the 21st, and I return immediately the box with the papers which it contains.

I have read over all the papers with attention, and I confess that I don't see any reason to believe that the French intend to take any cession from Spain. The intention to send expeditions to Ceuta, Minorca, the Canaries, &c., is denied. But even if it should exist and be carried into execution on account of Spain, surely our reasoning in respect to assistance to Spain to recover

the dominion of the colonies cannot be applied to the grant of assistance to recover the dominion of those possessions for the King which Spain has never lost. Our case would be so good, if the French were to endeavour to obtain cessions from Spain, that I make sure they will avoid it by all the means in their power. I would earnestly recommend, then, that we should avoid to notice such reports until we shall have some ground to stand upon; which we have not at present.

If the state of possession of France should be altered in any part of the world in consequence of the French operations in Spain, the question would then be fairly before us, and there is no reasonable man who would not support us in the measures which the honour or interest of the country might render necessary. But there is neither dignity nor advantage to be derived from angry discussions upon reports of designs which are so vague as to be entirely unworthy of attention.

So far from thinking your verbal communication with the Prince de Polignac to be useless, it appears to me to be the most satisfactory paper that I have yet seen upon the question to which it relates. The former conduct and future intentions of both governments are fairly brought out and explained; and the French government have been explicitly told in what light we shall consider their interference with the Spanish colonies; and they have given a clear answer to this communication.

Your letter to the Prince de Polignac brings to an issue in the most moderate terms the question to which his conversation with Planta had given rise. But in point of fact it did not depend upon Monsieur de Polignac to make the memorandum of this conversation an official document. He had admitted its accuracy, and you might have communicated a copy to the Ambassador at Paris, with directions to lay it before the French government. If any doubt remained whether the Prince de Polignac spoke by authority, the French government might have been called upon to state whether what the French ambassador said in that conference was authorised by them. It is not probable that Polignac will force you to recur to these measures. Your letter must set him right.

In respect to your proposed draft to Sir W. A'Court, I have already written my opinion upon the question of the convention with Spain to Lord Liverpool on the 17th instant, in answer

to a letter which he wrote to me on the 15th, and I think it probable that he has sent you my letter.

Lest he should not, however, I mention that it appears to me that we must, in some shape or other, obtain from King Ferdinand either the execution of this convention or the signature of another to the same effect. Upon this convention it is a question, at what period was it ratified by Spain? If subsequently to the period at which King Ferdinand was deposed at Seville, and to that in which he declared to Sir W. A'Court that he was in a state of *duresse* (in consequence of which Sir William withdrew himself from his Court), can King Ferdinand be bound by the ratification?

But Lord Liverpool, in his letter to you of the 15th, reasons upon the convention as the act by the government *de facto*. The real question is, whether the government shut up in Cadiz, having no communication either with Spain or any other part of the world, can be considered in the light of a government *de facto*, whose acts are to bind the King?

But the answers will only alter the form of our proceedings, and I put them only with a view that they may be considered, and that our proceedings should be well grounded, and be of the most moderate description. We must have this convention executed, or some other signed by the King, or we must have recourse to the measures which we had in contemplation and for which we had made preparations last year.

It is quite clear to me that King Ferdinand has taken his line in Spain, and he will punish the revolutionary party with as much severity as his French allies will support him in adopting. He will then have no motive for courting us with a view to the settlement of his internal government, and he can have no hope of our aid in the settlement of the questions with his colonies. If I have not mistaken the character of King Ferdinand, of his councils, and of his country, I should say that he would oppose every object of this country by every means in his power; and that however hopeless such course might be, he would be prevented only by the influence of his French allies from resorting to the extremity of war rather than execute this convention.

In entering upon this question, therefore, I confess I feel very anxious that we should know exactly the ground upon which we stand, and that we should place ourselves on that which we can with certainty maintain. But the justice of our

case in every part of this transaction should be clearly brought forward; and that although our object should be distinctly stated, our tone should be very moderate. We must by all means keep out of this disgraceful contest, or we shall not satisfy the King or the public of this country.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Le General Alava to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MI QUERIDO SEÑOR DUQUE, Gibraltar, le 27me Oct., 1823.

El 16 escrivi à Lord FitzRoy pour lui annoncer mon arrivée dans cette place. J'avais demandé au Duc d'Angoulême quinze jours pour rétablir ma santé par l'entremise du Duc de Guiche, et on me répondit le 5me qu'on donnait l'ordre au Comte de Bourmont pour employer toute l'autorité que lui était confié à protéger ma personne tout le temps dont j'aurais besoin pour rétablir ma santé. On me conseillait de partir pour l'Angleterre après que je serais en état de partir, ce qui était mon intention. Le 6me le Comte de Bourmont me répéta ces mêmes expressions, ajoutant que S.A.R. les lui avait répétés, et m'invita à continuer mon traitement médicale pour me mettre en état de partir. Mais le 6me, au soir, tout changea d'aspect. Bourmont reçut, ou au moins il donna sa parole de l'avoir reçu, une lettre de Monsieur Luiz, Ministre du Roi, l'invitant à prêter main forte au Colonel Espagnol Delpan pour arrêter les personnes des Généraux Quiroga, Lopez, Baioz, Valdez, Ciscar, et Vigodet; les trois premiers chefs de l'insurrection de l'Ile, de l'année 20, et les trois derniers les Régents nommés à Seville pour vérifier le voyage du Roi à Cadiz. Comme j'avais été de la commission qui les avait nommés, je ne crus pas décent, ni honorable, de rester à Cadiz même pour quinze jours quand ils étaient proscrits, et ne devant la conservation de sa vie qu'au Général français, qui les facilita les moyens de s'en évader; en conséquence, je déclarai à M. de Bourmont que j'étais décidé à partir avec eux, quelque fût le risque pour ma santé de partir dans l'état actuel de ma santé. M. de Bourmont me répondit que n'étant pas dans la liste des proscrits (il s'en trouvaient quinze) je n'avais pas besoin de partir, mais que j'étais le seul juge qui devait diriger ma conduite. Quel fut mon étonnement, le 7me au matin, quand je suis allé lui demander mon passeport, entendre dire de ce même M. Bourmont qui me disait la veille que rien ne pressait mon départ, "*Général, il me tarde de vous voir parti?*" Je reconnus alors qu'il devait se passer quelque chose que je ne comprenais pas alors, mais que certainement n'était pas très rassurante. Ainsi je partis la soirée du 7me, avec Madame Valdes, pour rejoindre son mari, qui, avec ses deux camarades, se trouvait à bord de la frégate française *La Nereide*, dans laquelle nous arrivâmes à Algeçiras, où, ayant transbordé à une méchante barque, nous arrivâmes à cette baie à minuit, escortés par le canot de la frégate pour éviter tout accident de la part des douaniers espagnols, qui n'auraient pas été mécontents de la prise, s'ils avaient réussi à

nous prendre. La quarantaine que j'ai été obligé à faire dans cette maudite barque, l'humidité que nous étions obligés à supporter, étant logés au fond de cale, et ce que la morale avait souffert tout le temps du siège de Cadiz, surtout le dernier mois, craignant à chaque instant un regicide, pour lequel le Roi donnait à chaque moment de grands et plausibles motifs, toutes ces choses unies ont tellement dérangé et affaibli ma santé que les docteurs anglais ont jugé impossible que je fusse en état de partir pour Londres avant deux mois. Aussitôt que je serais en état d'entreprendre mon voyage, je partirai sans perdre un instant. Je ne veux pas mourir sans vous voir une fois encore, et sans vous serrer la main; et je vois que si je retarde le moment, je n'aurai peut-être ce plaisir, qui dans toute occasion serait un grand, mais surtout dans ma situation présente. Si je puis obtenir l'approbation de ma conduite, dont je suis sûre quand vous m'aurez entendu, je mourrai content, et je m'en moque de toute la Sainte Alliance, y compris *mon protecteur* Alexandre, votre ami.

Mes deux amis, Argüelles et Quadru, sont partis hier pour Londres. Ils se proposent vivre dans la plus grande obscurité, et sans aucun rapport avec qui que ce soit. Je suppose qu'on croit dans le Cabinet que nous avions de la correspondance avec l'Opposition. Détrompez-vous; elle n'a jamais existé. Sir William A'Court, qui devait me croire avec préférence à d'autres intriguants, ne l'a pas fait sur cet article; et le fait est que toute cette correspondance, dont il faisait tant de bruit, s'est réduite à une lettre de Lord Holland à Argüelles, par l'entremise de Mr. A'Court, en lui envoyant son discours au Parlement dans les affaires d'Espagne, à laquelle M. Argüelles répondit; une autre du même Lord en parlant des notes passées par les Trois Puissances, et dans laquelle il se plaignait de notre silence, et de ce que nous n'écrivions jamais pour tenir l'Opposition au courant de ce qui se passait en Espagne, tandis que les Français tachaient de donner toutes les nouvelles aux membres de l'autre parti. M. Argüelles ne répondit pas à cette lettre, qui fut reçue à Séville; et voilà toute la correspondance dont on a tant parlé. Je défie à qui que ce soit à prouver le contraire, et je suis prêt à faire ce défie dans les journaux. De toutes les manières je vous prie de faire qu'on les laissent tranquilles. Ils ne sont pas des intriguans ni des tapageurs qui puissent donner le moindre motif à des plaintes, et ce serait horrible de les faire sortir par l'Alien Bill du seul pays au continent où ils peuvent trouver un asile.

Je suis tellement traité par le 43me Régiment que je n'ai rien à désirer. Ce sont des actes de conduite qu'on ne connait pas qu'en Angleterre. Si jamais V.E. a l'occasion de faire connaître par FitzRoy ma reconnaissance à ce Colonel, et combien cette conduite vous a été agréable, je regarderais cela comme une faveur très grande. God bless you, my Lord! Mes respects à la Duchesse, et tout à vous,

M. de Alava.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My dear Duke of Wellington, Saltram, 28th Oct., 1823.

Of the two parts into which you divide the question of the convention, the first, I am happy to say, admits of what must be in *your* view, a

completely satisfactory answer. The ratification took place only *in May*. The removal to Cadiz was not till the 12th of June. The King therefore was in *your* view, a free agent at the time of the ratification. In his own view, probably, he was as much under *duresse* then, as after his removal; and not then only but ever since the revolution of March 1820. I, however, understand you to feel no difficulty about any period antecedent to the forced departure from Seville.

I own (but it is an unimportant difference, the facts being as they turn out) that I do not quite agree with you as to the effect of that coercion. Remember the King of France's flight to Varennes, and his bringing back in triumph to Paris. Yet we did not recall our ambassador. I incline to think that there is no safe course in dealing with foreign states, but to deal with them each as a whole and to take as government that which they, each, present to us as such, without inquiring how it comes to be so, unless, indeed, we *wish* for our own purposes to interfere. Then it is certainly competent for us to inquire. But no State, I think, has a right to say to us "you *shall* take cognizance of our internal dissensions." And if any State professes to have no head through which to deal with foreign powers, so as to pledge the national faith, that State is *pro tanto* a barbarous State, and out of the pale of political society. Charles II. repealed Cromwell's laws, but he never dreamt of abrogating his treaties.

The King of Spain has hit upon a new vagary now, and thinks it expedient that Sir William A'Court should be accredited to H. M. afresh. The letters of credence which he has having been in force under the constitutional government. This is still a foolisher pretension than the former. *All* letters of credence are addressed to the sovereign, nor in the most limited monarchies any more than in the most absolute is there any trace of the acknowledgment of any other power than the monarch. It is quite absurd, therefore, to pretend that A'Court's letters of credence can have been vitiated by anything that has happened in the interior of Spain. We might if we pleased, have said, "This is not the sovereign to whom A'Court was accredited. It would have been very unwise to say so, and we did not. But as we did not, Ferdinand has no earthly pretence to say it for us. And it is a little too much to insist upon it that the revolutions of Spain (such as they are) shall affect the credentials of the King of England.

The Prince de Polignac has not answered my letter, as he ought to have done. He evidently wishes to shirk the giving authenticity to the memorandum. Planta will send you a copy of his last letter and of my reply. I think, however, that in spite of his reluctance to record what he has said, and what he has heard from me, his government cannot get out of it.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Le Prince de Polignac to the Right Hon. George Canning.

MONSIEUR, Londres, ce 23me Oct., 1823.

Je me hâte de répondre à la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire en date du 19 de ce mois. Je commencerai d'abord par vous remercier de la

manière franche avec laquelle vous m'exprimez votre désir relativement au *memorandum* que vous m'avez envoyé; je répondrai avec le même abandon, bien convaincu que cette manière d'agir nous mènera toujours plus promptement au but que vous et moi nous désirons atteindre.

Il faut considérer deux choses dans les conversations que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir avec votre Excellence les 9me et 12me de ce mois :—

Premièrement, la communication verbale que j'ai faite à votre Excellence des intentions que comptait apporter le gouvernement Français dans l'examen de la question des Colonies Espagnoles; secondement, le mode que votre Excellence a cru devoir adopter pour recueillir cette communication.

Quant à ce qui concerne le premier point, rien ne se trouve changé; les choses restent sur le même pied sur lequel elles étaient lorsque les deux conférences que nous eûmes ensemble furent terminées. La communication que j'ai eu l'honneur de faire à votre Excellence exprimait bien toute la pensée de mon gouvernement; les principes qui le dirigent portent l'empreinte du désintéressement et de la loyauté, et je suis trop fier d'avoir été en cette occasion l'interprète de ses sentimens pour prétendre rétracter une seule de mes paroles.

Le second point est donc le seul qui puisse présenter quelque difficulté. En effet, on conçoit la possibilité de prendre un *memorandum* d'une communication faite verbalement, mais, dans ce cas, un tel *memorandum* (ainsi que je l'ai mandé à votre Excellence dans ma lettre du 18me de ce mois) ne peut être considéré que comme un secours offert à la mémoire, que comme un moyen plus certain de fixer les idées. Un semblable *memorandum* n'est, en quelque sorte, qu'une note particulière, et ne peut avoir un caractère officiel, car autrement elle changerait la nature de la communication, et de *verbale* qu'elle était, en ferait, pour ainsi dire, une communication par *écrit*, mode de procéder que votre Excellence paraissait ne vouloir pas adopter, comme le trouvant revêtu d'un caractère trop solennel, et qui, dans tous les cas, ne peut être employé qu'autant qu'une des deux parties, aussi bien que l'autre, est *autorisée* à en faire usage.

Quant à l'offre aimable que votre Excellence me fait d'examiner de nouveau avec elle le *memorandum* qu'elle m'a envoyé, en cas que j'y remarquasse quelques inexactitudes, soit dans les expressions, soit dans l'exposition des faits, je m'empresserais indubitablement de l'accueillir, si ce *memorandum* devait effectivement avoir ce caractère officiel que votre Excellence désire lui donner. J'ai déjà noté en marge de la copie qui m'a été adressée quelques changemens à y apporter, qui n'altèrent en rien le fond de la pensée, mais qui l'expriment plus fidèlement; or, l'exactitude la plus scrupuleuse des expressions devient une chose nécessaire dans un écrit qui doit porter un caractère officiel.

Voilà, Monsieur, les explications que je crois devoir vous soumettre en réponse à la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire; vous voyez qu'elles n'apportent aucun changement à la substance des deux conversations que nous avons eues ensemble. L'objet que se proposait sans doute votre Excellence était de connaître quels étaient les véritables sentimens du gouvernement Français relativement à la question des Colonies Espagnoles; je me suis empressé de le remplir, et j'ai vu avec satisfaction l'impression favorable qu'avait laissé dans l'esprit de votre Excellence, la communication franche que j'avais été chargé de lui faire.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

Le Prince de Polignac.

II.

The Right Hon. George Canning to the Prince de Polignac.

Saltram, 26th Oct., 1823.

I have to thank your Excellency for your prompt acknowledgment of my letter of the 19th. I am perfectly satisfied that, so far as you and I are concerned, we entirely understand each other. But what I am anxious to learn is, how far what has passed between us answers the purpose which I had in view in our conferences; that of enabling each of us to convey our own individual impressions to our respective governments. Without that ability, we have conferred, I will not say in vain (because it will always be the greatest satisfaction to me to know that your Excellency does that justice to my frankness which I willingly render to yours), but certainly with less advantage than I proposed to derive from our communication.

I do not entirely agree with your Excellency that an acknowledged memorandum of a conference becomes altogether a different thing from a conference itself. I have always apprehended a *note verbale* (which according to your Excellency's theory would be a contradiction in terms) to be precisely that species of document which I was aiming at:—an attested record of what passed in a conversation. And I have always conceived the occasion for that mode of communication to be precisely such a one as had now occurred, where it might be desirable to discuss with more freedom than could be done *wholly* in writing; and yet to ascertain results with more precision than could be done by *unrecorded verbal* discussion.

What a *note verbale* is to *one* part of such a communication the memorandum appears, in my judgment, to be *to both*.

But what I am most solicitous to learn, because it is matter of practical importance, is what your Excellency's letter does not enable me to conjecture, whether your Excellency has communicated a copy of the memorandum to your government.

If you have done so, my object is fully answered; for that object was not so much, as your Excellency suggests, to learn what might be the views and intentions of your government (which I nevertheless acknowledge myself to have learnt from your Excellency with the highest satisfaction) as to ensure a frank and full explanation to your government of the views and intentions of the British cabinet.

If there be any points among those which your Excellency has noted in the margin of your copy of the memorandum in which you wish corrections to be introduced, if not for the purpose of changing anything in the meaning (which you say is throughout substantially correct), for that of giving precision to the expression of it, your Excellency has only to indicate them to me, and you may depend upon the corrections being made.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GEORGE CANNING.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [329.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Stratfieldsaye, 31st Oct., 1823.

Planta sent me last night your letter of the 28th and the letters which have passed between the Prince de Polignac and yourself.

I think that the ratification of the convention by Spain previous to the period at which our Minister withdrew himself in consequence of the transactions at Seville makes a material improvement of our case. After that period Spain was to us what you describe as out of the pale of political society, and you would have been told so by all those who would have interfered and will interfere in this question.

But although this fact relieves us from one difficulty, we must not suppose that we are relieved from all those attending this question. We must persevere, and this even at the risk of war; and I am sorry to say that the King of Spain, the other only party, not only will have no interest in settling the question but his interest as well as his inclination will lead him to carry it to extremities. There cannot be a greater misfortune for this country than to get into a war with a country which in fact it cannot injure. In truth, we cannot injure Spain, nor, under existing circumstances, would our friendship be of any service to her. On the other hand, Spain might do us as much injury as all the Powers of Europe leagued against us; and we should soon see the Adventurers and Revolutionists of the whole world in the service of the *Rey Neto* against us as willingly as they entered the service of the Cortes against France.

I am therefore very anxious that we should proceed in this question with as much moderation as is possible, so as to carry with us those, however few, who wish to get the world and ourselves out of the worst scrape that we have ever been in.

I cannot understand the conduct of the King of Spain in regard to Sir W. A'Court. We did not give fresh credentials in 1820, and there can be no reason why we should now unless Sir W. A'Court's withdrawing from Seville amounts to a discontinuance of his mission.

I cannot understand what Polignac is driving at, unless it is to gain time. If he has not sent the memorandum to his government, I would recommend to you to send it through your Ambassador, whether he does or not make any alterations; sending with it his letter of the 23rd October, which does in fact acknowledge the truth of the report of the convention which the memorandum contains.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My dear Duke, Cirencester, 31st Oct., 1823.

Canning has begged for a few more days of holiday, and I have therefore agreed to postpone the Cabinet (unless Lord Liverpool should object) to Tuesday the 18th of November, as this will set you at liberty by the time you wished, viz. the 20th.

The increase of the establishment must have a reference to the occasion which has shewn the necessity of the increase, but I am quite sure we shall break down, if much more is proposed than what can be shown to be necessary.

I have reason to believe that what the Duke of York intends to propose is, an increase of 10,000 men; viz. 5000 by an addition of eight men per company, raising them from 72 to 80, and 5000 by raising seven new regiments, making the whole 100 regiments instead of 93.

Now there can be no assignable reason given for so large an increase, except the probability of war, which we should not be justified in asserting.

If we can get an increase of 5000 we shall do very well: by that means doing much more than covering the amount of any reinforcements, which we are likely to be called upon to send out to the West Indies; particularly when it is considered that we are to have an increase of our naval establishment there also.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will assist me with your opinion, which of the two modes of increase will it be desirable to prefer, supposing the augmentation to be only to the amount of 5000; that of increase of the strength of the companies, or an addition to the number of regiments? I should conceive that the latter would be the more effectual, particularly with a reference to any measure of general augmentation which the course of events might render necessary. But the first has its advantages, and would probably go down much easier in the House of Commons.

Yours ever most sincerely,

Bathurst.

To Lord Bathurst. [330.]

My dear Lord Bathurst, Stratfieldsaye, 3rd Nov., 1823.

The time now fixed for the Cabinet will suit me perfectly.

When I saw the Duke at Cheveley, he would have been satisfied with 5000 men, in eight or nine additional regiments of the strength of those now on the establishment. If the regiments were not already as small as they ought to be, I should say that what we want is more regiments and not more men. But, in truth, the regiments are as weak as they ought to be; and if we increase the number of regiments we must increase proportionally the number of men.

If you give the Duke 10,000 instead of 5000 men, let him have them in seventeen or eighteen regiments. It is bodies of that size that you want in time of peace for the purpose of garrison reinforcements and reliefs.

If you give him 5000 men in nine regiments, you may immediately disband the three battalions of veterans in Ireland, which are 3000 men; and as three regular regiments, although of but little more than half the effective strength, will be as efficient as the three battalions of veterans, you will have six regiments in reserve for other services and for reliefs. This is the doctrine which I will preach at the Horse Guards and at Windsor. It is obvious, however, that the Duke has risen in his demands in proportion as he has found that there was little disposition in the Cabinet to oppose them.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[331.] *To Lord Beresford.*

MY DEAR BERESFORD, London, 3rd Nov., 1823.

I have received your letter of the 20th October. I have really no knowledge of such proceedings on the part of the Continental Courts as those to which you refer, and I don't believe our government has any. I should think that the statement is made in order to induce us to come to something like a guarantee of the internal system of government of Portugal.

Now, I'll tell you what I think of such a guarantee. First, as it relates to ourselves. Before we can guarantee anything, we must know what it is. We must be sure that it will stand the test of inquiry and discussion in the most acute assembly of men in the world; and it must provide not only for the rights of the monarch but likewise for the freedom of the person, and for the property of the subject, and above all *for the security* of those advantages for the subject. Probably in these days of speculation and theory, it would be necessary that the system established should go farther, particularly in respect to the last object, than would be deemed wise in Portugal, in order to be approved of here.

Secondly, as it relates to Portugal, Count Palmella knows

that when we give a guarantee it is in earnest, and that we saddle ourselves at least with a contingent burthen. He may rely upon it then that we should be obliged to see the stipulation performed on the part of the Portuguese government. Every act of the Portuguese government in regard to its interior, even the decisions in courts of justice, would become liable to question in the British Parliament, and would be questioned or not according to the dictates of prudence of the members of that Parliament.

I won't take up your time or my own in developing these ideas further; the very statement of the principle of such a guarantee, which is strictly true, is sufficient for my purpose.

I will now ask, Is the situation of a government under such a guarantee by the government of Great Britain a desirable one? Is it bearable for an independent high-minded nation? It certainly is not, and I earnestly recommend to Count Palmella not to come to us with such a proposition. We shall not adopt it, to a certainty, but I think the very proposal would lower our opinion of the Portuguese government.

As for my part, I cannot understand the existence of a guarantee of internal government in any country by a foreign Power and the existence of independence in such country. I admit that in modern times an internal guarantee by us would be more disagreeable than one by any other Power. But look at the danger of it by any Power! Look at the example of Russia and Poland! Consider the various occasions which may and must occur in which the guaranteeing Power would be justified in interfering, even to the extent of invasion, in order to redress some grievance or pretended grievance of the people on the one hand, or to repress some tumult or insurrection on the other. In short, this internal guarantee is a novelty. in politics, to which I for one can never consent that this country should be a party.

But there is another view of this case which is very important. If we guarantee the internal government of Portugal, can we object to the guarantee by France or by any other Power of the internal government of Spain? Yet it is as clear as the sun at noonday that if the internal government of Spain is guaranteed by France, Spain becomes, by that act alone, French. Would that arrangement suit Count Palmella? Certainly not, any more than it would ourselves. I recommend to

him to draw as near to this country as he can, to keep us well acquainted with all that he does, and to interest us as much as possible in the welfare of Portugal; but to take good care to keep us clear of his internal concerns, with which we cannot interfere but to his loss and damage.

With respect to yourself, I don't see what you have to do with the decision of the question of the English guarantee. If I were M. de Palmella, I would take you because it would save Portugal from the necessity of either applying for the guarantee of England or of the Continent. What does he want? An army upon which he can rely. If he has that, he has nothing to apprehend internally. You will give it to him, and, in my opinion, you ought to take the command, if the efficient command is offered to you, whether the relation with England remains as it is or becomes more intimate.

If Portugal takes the guarantee of any other nation, then your situation would be altered. You would not then be serving an independent country in alliance with your own, nor a country dependent upon your own, but a country dependent upon some other foreign country, possibly in a state of rivality or even of enmity with your own. This you cannot do. In respect to the mediation, if I were M. de Palmella, I would ask for the mediation of England alone with the Brazils without condition *referable to England.* He annexed a condition to his last demand to which it was not thought proper to accede. I won't say here whether our decision on that occasion was right or wrong, but of this I am very sure, that the annexation of that condition to the proposition has caused a delay, perhaps a fatal one, of some months.

Believe me, &c.,'

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Saltram, 3rd Nov., 1823.

I have received this morning your letter of Friday.

The difficulties which we have been discussing are happily removed.

The King of Spain has made up his mind to receive A'Court without new credentials. And he has determined to acknowledge our Convention. So much for Spain.

At the same time Polignac has thought better of his refusal to give to the memorandum an official character. He has suggested certain additions

to his own part of the dialogue, all of which I have adopted; and with them he has declared himself ready to adopt, sign, communicate to his court,—in short to make the paper whatever I wish it.

I have even done more for him than he asked; for, finding that he was disquieted at the proposition that "any interference of Foreign Powers would be a motive for our recognition of the Colonies," although as it was what I did say, he could not suggest to me any alteration in the record, I have voluntarily subjoined to the word "interference" the qualification "by force or by menace," so as not to make the mere assembling of a Congress (though we may not take part in it) a case calling for our recognition, which was what Polignac professed to apprehend.

I returned the memorandum with these alterations yesterday.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—I took advantage of the opportunity afforded me, by the ceremony of presenting to me the freedom of Plymouth (in which I have the honour to be associated with you), to tranquillize the apprehensions of war which the fitting-out of the troop ships had excited.

G. C.

I learn to-day that the Marquis de Casa Ynijo is to be Ferdinand's minister in London. Do you know him?

G. C.

If you write, pray direct to the Foreign Office. I shall leave this place on Saturday or Sunday, but shall not reach town till Saturday the 15th.

G. C.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Cirencester, 5th Nov., 1823.

I am much obliged to you for your letter. I do not know from whom the Duke of York can have taken his impression that there existed little indisposition in the Cabinet to a larger increase than 5000 men. Lord Liverpool has written to me a strong remonstrance against *any* considerable increase. Mr. Canning, when he was here, said little on the subject, but I should collect he would be to the *full* as adverse. You are the only other Cabinet Minister with whom I have communicated, and the only one with whom I have entered into any particulars as yet. I am quite sure that 5000 men is the utmost of the increase that will go down, and I should be afraid that even that will not go down, if the proposition comes in the shape of raising nine additional regiments. This would be more than 5000 increase, if the veterans were not to be disbanded, and less than 5000 if they were. There are, however, strong arguments for contenting ourselves with less than the increase of the 5000, coupled with the disbanding the veterans, not only for the reason you assign that three regiments of the line would be more efficient than three battalions of veterans, although the latter are nearly double the number, but also because we should leave entire the veteran force to be drawn upon as a fund in case of any sudden emergency. The only objection to the disbanding the veterans is that the proposed increase of regulars will be apt to startle more than the leaving

the veteran force as it is, and making a proportionably less increase of regulars. Perhaps my best way will be to get an estimate of the two plans, viz., the raising six regiments, and not disbanding the three battalions of veterans, or raising nine regiments, and disbanding the veterans.

It is clear that in the end the latter must be the cheaper course, but the first charge may startle the Treasury. Tell me if you think that this will be a good way of stating it for consideration. In the mean time I shall be much obliged to you to cancel the impression which the Duke of York seems to have, that there will be no difficulty in the business.

Yours most sincerely,

BATHURST.

The Duke of York to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Stable Yard, 7th Nov., 1823.

I enclose for your information the copy of a paper which I have sent to Lord Bathurst, and I trust that you will concur with me in the general reasoning upon the insufficiency of our present military means, and on the necessity of an augmentation. In proposing that the addition should consist of nine battalions upon the present establishment I have adopted your suggestion, conveyed to me in our general conversations upon the subject and since through Sir Herbert Taylor, and to this main feature of the measure I have added some minor points, the adoption or rejection of which will of course depend upon the view which the government may be disposed to take of the question.

Ever, my dear Lord Duke, yours most sincerely,

FREDERICK.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Horse Guards, 6th Nov., 1823.

The communications recently made to the Commander-in-Chief by Lord Bathurst, having shown that his Lordship, impressed with the insufficiency of the military means of the empire, and with the absolute necessity of augmenting them, intends to bring this subject under the early consideration of his Majesty's government, the Commander-in-Chief deems it to be his duty to convey to Lord Bathurst, without delay, what has occurred to him as best calculated to effect the object in view.

Much as he laments the circumstances which have at length produced a conviction of the inadequacy of our military peace establishment, he owes it to himself to observe, that he has not ceased to represent against the successive reductions of that establishment, and to urge the difficulties which they have caused, and the embarrassment which they would inevitably entail.

Those difficulties and embarrassments have prevailed to a considerable extent in the ordinary course of service; they have been sensibly felt when the state of Ireland has occasionally called for reinforcements to that country, and even when partial disturbances in England have required the movement of small detachments, and these demands have been met by expedients generally inconvenient, unworthy of this great empire, highly prejudicial to the discipline of

the troops, and destructive of the system by which it had been intended to provide for the security of its distant possessions, and for the occasional relief of corps stationed therein, whose service has consequently been, in some instances, converted into little short of perpetual banishment.

Another evil, and perhaps the most serious, arising from resorting to temporary expedients in the absence of arrangements of a more decided and permanent character, has been its progressive influence upon the state and the general application of our military force, inasmuch as it has been impossible to preserve any balance between the means allotted to foreign stations and those which had been calculated upon for service at Home, or as a reserve whence the reliefs could be supplied. The insufficiency of the general amount was soon felt in Ireland, and in the foreign stations, and the deficiency was supplied by calling for reinforcements from that portion of it which, in the original calculation, had been considered applicable to domestic purposes and to ordinary reliefs, and which, conformably to the general system, had been estimated on the lowest possible scale. Hence this reserve, if it could be so called, was diverted to purposes distinct from the first object, and was soon absorbed; the means of replacing it had not been provided, and, as everything was brought into action, the expenditure was necessarily out of all proportion to the possible supply.

Under these circumstances there has been no want of exertion or of endeavour to suit the existing means to the exigency of the State, and to apply them in such manner as to prevent the public service from being interrupted and impeded by the expedients to which the military departments were obliged to resort; and, so long as no extraordinary exigency occurred, these exertions have proved not unavailing; but recent events have shown that the Commander-in-Chief was not mistaken in his apprehension that the difficulty would become so obvious as to be felt even by the government, whenever its demands should extend beyond the ordinary services, and should be made under contingencies requiring additional supplies to foreign stations, of which the possibility had been wholly excluded from its previous calculations.

It is not the Commander-in-Chief's intention further to enter at large into the question, nor to repeat upon this occasion what he has so often urged, experience having unfortunately shown that his representations were not undeserving of attention, and he will therefore confine himself to two points as more immediately connected with the circumstances which have produced this result; namely, the state of Ireland, and that of our colonies in the West Indies.

He begs to remind his Majesty's government that, adverting to the always uncertain and more or less disturbed state of Ireland, he proposed in 1816 that the force stationed in that kingdom should not be less than 25,000 men, and that, with a view to any reinforcement which might be required to that quarter, and to our distant possessions, there should be a strong reserve in England, independently of a floating force applicable to reliefs.

It was, however, considered unnecessary so to provide for the security of Ireland, and when the increased disturbances in that country called for reinforcements, it was not without considerable difficulty, without interrupting other services, and without draining England of every resource which might be required for other quarters, and without bringing into action corps very imperfect in their discipline, and therefore ill suited to the duties imposed upon them, that these reinforcements were supplied; nay, it became necessary to resort again to the embodying of veteran battalions, almost immediately after others had been disbanded as unnecessary, in order to carry the force in Ireland to 20,000 men of all arms.

That this amount is not considered sufficient at this period needs no other

proof than the positive injunction conveyed recently to the Commander-in-Chief, when a reinforcement for the West Indies was so urgently called for, that the numerical force in Ireland should, upon no account be reduced, whatever might be the embarrassment elsewhere; and if such be the view of the state of Ireland at this moment, it appears almost useless to ask whether it will admit of any diminution of the force in January next, and whether on the contrary, it may not call for additions: yet it must be evident, from the difficulty which has been recently experienced in providing two additional regiments for service in the West Indies, that no further reinforcement can be sent from hence to Ireland, however urgent may be the demand.

The Commander-in-Chief equally stated in 1816 that the amount of force appropriated to the security and protection of the West India colonies, *including Jamaica*, should be 15,000 men, and upon no consideration less than 11,000; and although this representation was supported by the concurrent opinions of the late Sir Ralph Abercromby, and other General Officers, whose local experience had suggested them, at a period when those colonies were of much less extent than at present, the force so stationed was suffered to be successively diminished to 6000 men, distributed in the several colonies in detachments barely sufficient for the ordinary duties, affording no reserve, and offering no resource in the event of sudden emergency.

The effects of such a diminution have been so recently manifested, they have been rendered so glaring by the alarm excited, not in that quarter only, but at home also, and by the urgent demand for reinforcements, with so much difficulty produced, that the Commander-in-Chief needs no other proof of its impolicy. He cannot, however, help observing that this alarm was produced by the partial insurrection of negroes in one colony, and it is unnecessary to point out what might have been the consequences, if the contagion had extended, at a period when the local means were so insufficient, and when the general military establishment of the empire offered nothing in reserve, as if the possibility of such events had been placed entirely out of sight. It appears, nevertheless, reasonable to consider that the call for reinforcements might not have been confined to the West Indies; and that, with our widely extended foreign possessions, many of them with a restless population, in the neighbourhood of countries convulsed by revolution and intestine broils, all circumstances combining towards rendering the maintenance of tranquillity doubtful, other quarters might have required, or may yet require, an addition to the force allotted to their protection, and which has been, in all, subjected more or less to the same system of diminution.

Hence it is obvious that some augmentation is necessary which shall establish a reserve applicable to contingencies such as have lately arisen, and it remains to be considered in what manner, and by what means this measure shall be most readily effected, and best suited to our existing establishment.

In the proposal which the Commander-in-Chief means to offer for the consideration of his Majesty's government, he will not suggest resorting, as upon recent occasions since the peace, when circumstances have called for an increase of our military means, to the embodying of pensioners, as he can view this merely as a resource for temporary and local purposes, and not as applicable to general contingencies, such as those which have produced the present question. It has indeed been argued that the formation of veteran battalions has the effect of setting free, for foreign service, some regiments of the line, and this may be admitted in some degree, but it applies to the momentary object only, and the general nature of our service in time of peace requires that all that constitutes our force should be disposable for any and every service, and that we should in no case be restricted in its application. Limited as are our means, and various and sudden as may be the demands

upon them, they ought to be independent, and to admit of arrangements free from local or restrictive considerations, and they ought to be of the most efficient and active description. In the event of the renewal of hostilities producing the necessity of large augmentations, and of arrangements purely defensive, the pensioners would afford a valuable resource from the facility and expedition with which large numbers of them might be assembled and embodied, before other additional levies could be rendered effective, and the Commander-in-Chief conceives that it would be wise to reserve this resource for such periods when the expedition with which we may avail ourselves of it shall form a main consideration. But, where the augmentation may be made at leisure, he is persuaded that the government will find its advantage in the employment of that description of force only which shall prove most efficient and generally disposable, by which also it will effect its present object without depriving itself of a facility which may become valuable at a future period of more general pressure requiring more rapid results.

Adverting to the various contingencies which do and may occur, the Commander-in-Chief conceives that our disposable force will require an augmentation of not less than 10,000 men, but as there may be objection to raising at once the whole number, he would propose that the first levy should be that of 5000 men, and bearing in mind that the object is to provide a reserve for any exigency, and not an addition of numbers to be distributed generally in small proportions to each station, he would further propose that the augmentation should be one of battalions, at the present establishment of eight companies and 576 rank and file each. Nine battalions of this strength would give a total of 5184 rank and file, and would raise the number of regiments to 102, including the 1st and 2nd West India regiments.

The additional officers would be:—

9 Colonels, 9 Lieutenant-Colonels, 18 Majors, 72 Captains, 90 Lieutenants, 54 Ensigns, 9 Adjutants, 9 Quarter-Masters: 270 Officers. 216 Sergeants 108 Drummers and Fifers, 45 Sergeants additional: 639. Total augmentation 5823.

He would propose that the battalions should be raised progressively in order to obviate the necessity of increasing the bounty, and that the officers selected, in part from other regiments by promotion, and in part from the half-pay, should be employed in recruiting, the date of their appointments to depend upon the result of their exertions in that service.

Sensible as he is of the extreme importance and utility of the Staff corps, and adverting to the manner in which it is detached and otherwise employed, the Commander-in-Chief would wish, upon this occasion, that it should receive an augmentation of 12 men per company, which would place it on the same establishment as the other regiments of the line, and add 96 rank and file to its strength.

As a further arrangement connected with the general measure in contemplation, but more immediately with the security of the West Indies, he would propose that the 1st and 2nd West India regiments should be augmented from 576 to 800 rank and file each, or of 448 on the whole, to make up for the reduction of the five companies of the 3rd West India regiment about 350.

Further an increase to the Colonial African corps to the extent of 800 rank and file, and that the 2nd West India regiment should then be transferred from the West Coast of Africa to the West Indies.

Actual state: —1st West India regiment 576, 3rd West India regiment five companies 350: total 926. To be disbanded when the barracks at Trinidad are finished.

Proposed:— 1st West India regiment 800, 2nd West India regiment seven companies 560: total 1360, increase 434. Officers, 4 Captains, 4 Lieutenants,

4 Ensigns, 12 Sergeants. And it might be advisable to add a recruiting company to each of the West India regiments for the depôt on the coast of Africa; namely, 2 Captains, 2 Lieutenants, 16 Sergeants, 4 Drummers.

Nine new battalions: Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and men, 5823; Staff corps, 96; 1st and 2nd West India regiments, 482: total 6401.

If a further augmentation should be determined upon, and the government should object to the addition of more regiments, the Commander-in-Chief apprehends that the most advisable mode will be then to add a certain number of men to each company, and this might admit of the reduction of the three existing veteran battalions, a measure which he would suggest as desirable upon the general principles advanced in this paper, although he apprehends that it could not be entertained if the augmentation of the more useful and disposable force should be confined to 5000 rank and file, as the numerical addition would in such case not exceed 2000, exclusively of the augmentation to the two West India regiments, which appears very desirable, and cannot be liable to local objections, as the proportion of white troops has been increased by the addition of two battalions.

FREDERICK.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Walmer Castle, 11th Nov., 1823.

I have received the King's authority to direct that Mr. Huskisson's name may be added to the list of his confidential servants.

I have accordingly written to Lord Bathurst to desire that he may be summoned to attend the Cabinet fixed for the 18th instant on West Indian affairs.

I have requested Lord Bathurst would inform me what is the nature and extent of the military augmentation he intends to propose.

I should hope that an addition of two or three thousand infantry to our present force will be considered as sufficient, for we shall be involved in all our former difficulties, if instead of looking to such an increase of force as the present state of the West Indies obviously requires, we shall be supposed to make this a pretence for the general augmentation of the army.

Ever sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

[332.] *To the Earl of Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD, London, 12th Nov., 1823.

I have received your letter, and I hope that we shall now be able to get on without any further changes. I have considered the question of the augmentation of the army, as the Duke of York has spoken to me about it more than once since my return from the Continent.

In my opinion, we have upon every successive reduction brought our establishments too low, and upon each reduction we have been obliged to resort to some temporary expedient to make up the deficiency of our force. It may have been very right to resort to such an expedient in 1821; but now that it is obvious that the want of troops is likely to be permanent as well in Ireland as in the West Indies; that we have not even one post throughout the empire sufficiently garrisoned for defence against a *coup de main*, nor many sufficiently even for the purpose of police; that we have not men to perform the necessary duties in England nor a battalion nor even a company disposable to relieve or reinforce any post; we ought, as a government, to revise our military establishments and to propose to Parliament that which appears to us absolutely necessary.

I have sent Lord Bathurst a paper on the subject containing my opinion, of which what I have above written is the abstract.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Bathurst. [333.]

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, London, 12th Nov., 1823.

I send you a paper containing my opinion on the state of our military establishments, and on the means of augmenting them. I don't propose to communicate this paper to the Duke of York.

I was very sorry that I could not wait upon Lady Bathurst from Warwick.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

INSUFFICIENCY OF OUR MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS, AND MEANS OF AUGMENTING THEM.

London, 12th Nov., 1823.

A review of the circumstances attending the several reductions made of the army since the year 1818 will show that upon each of these occasions the army was diminished to a greater

degree than was consistent with the public interests and security.

Before the year 1819 had drawn to a close it was necessary to raise ten thousand infantry by calling in all the veterans in all parts of the country. These were kept in the service during the year 1820; but in 1821 they were gradually discharged and a farther reduction of men of the regular regiments was made. But before the year 1821 had drawn to a close the Irish government were so pressed for want of troops, notwithstanding that every man that could be spared from other services had been sent to Ireland, that they took upon themselves to call out again the veterans in Ireland and to form them into battalions. If I recollect right, they wished that powers should be taken from Parliament in the last session still further to augment the army in Ireland during the recess, if such measure should be necessary.

Fortunately the service in Ireland has not yet required an additional force since the last session. But two occasions have occurred since July last in which the employment of a military force has been in the contemplation of, and on the last occasion ordered by, government, and not a man could be found without taking them from other services, for which provision must be made by shifts, which are detrimental to the service and disgraceful. Besides, the system of reliefs recognised and even urged in Parliament, and which is so necessary on every account, impeded by the first reductions of the army, is now at a total stand. There are not troops enough in England, from whence alone the reliefs can proceed, to perform the necessary duties. Even the half battalion employed upon the King's duty at Windsor was to have been moved in consequence of the recent call for troops for the West Indies; and there is not now one disposable battalion or even company, either in England or elsewhere, which can be moved either to relieve another or to reinforce the troops in any part of the empire.

Surely this is not the state in which the government can think that the country ought to be left. The establishment must be revised; and augmented so as to provide for the wants of the service. To call in the veterans is not the mode which ought to be adopted to augment the army. First, it is unjust to the individuals called upon. Secondly, it deprives the country of that resource to provide for a sudden emergency, when to

make use of it would not be unjust. Thirdly, it forms a force less disposable and efficient than an augmentation by regular battalions; less disposable because these battalions cannot be sent on distant foreign service; less efficient, because these men being no longer soldiers by trade, nor for a longer term than the urgency may require, neither take such pains to perform their duty, nor do the officers take such pains with their discipline as they do with others. Accordingly, we find that the Irish government complain of them, and they cannot be employed on the same services with the regular battalions. Fourthly, at the same time that they are less disposable and efficient they are, even when of the same number, nearly as expensive as regular regiments, as it has been found necessary to take the officers for these battalions from the half-pay, and not, as was at first intended, to employ in them the veteran and retired officers receiving their full pay in compensation of their wounds and services. Their officers, therefore, cost as much as the officers of the regular regiments; and if, as I believe, four regular regiments, amounting to little more than 2000 men, would perform the duty of the 3000 veterans now existing in Ireland, I believe it will be found that the former will be upon the whole as cheap as the latter.

But these are not the only considerations which ought to guide the government upon this subject.

The truth is, that the establishment, as left in the session of 1821, is too low for the performance of the ordinary service. We cannot now look at the state of Ireland as only temporary. We must provide permanently for the security of that country; and we must combine with that security the measures which are now become necessary, and will be so permanently, for the security of the lives and properties of the King's subjects in the West Indies; and those for the regular reliefs of the troops on foreign stations, and those to give the government the power to reinforce any station at which such reinforcement might be necessary, and those to perform the regular duties in England.

It is certainly true that the regular battalions are now too weak to be really efficient on foreign service with an enemy, and the least expensive augmentation would be one of men to each battalion. But it must be observed that such an augmentation would not answer our purpose at present. I'll suppose that we could add even 100 men to each of the 90 regular battalions

now existing in the service, making an augmentation of 9000 men. I doubt that such an augmentation would enable the government to withdraw even one battalion from Ireland. I am certain that it would not from any other station, and that after that augmentation should be completed the distress of the government for want of troops would be as imminent as it must be admitted it is at the present moment.

The fact is, that the British empire is now extended in separate parts to all quarters of the globe; and troops are required in each separate part either to perform the legitimate service of troops, that of defence against the attacks of a foreign enemy, or to preserve the lives and properties of his Majesty's subjects against domestic insurrection and disturbance, which is more properly the business of the civil government and of the police.

The performance of these services and the arming and arrangements of the army, and the discipline of the troops, without which they could perform no service, require that they should be regularly organised and formed into battalions; and what is wanted is more of these organised bodies, to enable the government to detach to more stations and to provide for more reliefs. What I would recommend, then, is that additional regular battalions should be raised of the same strength with those now in the service, and that a large proportion of their officers should be taken from the half-pay.

It is obvious that three of these battalions are wanted, and permanently, to supply the deficiency of the three recently sent to and required permanently in the West Indies, and four to supply the place of the veteran battalions in Ireland.

But this review of the consequences of the several reductions and the existing state of our military establishments shews that the government cannot go on as it has done. The Commander-in-Chief must have some force at his disposal upon which he can reckon either to relieve a battalion abroad which has been long at any station or is worn out by sickness or service, or to provide for any sudden call for reinforcements. Is such call so improbable in the existing state of the world as that it ought not to be taken into consideration along with the other motives for an augmentation of the army, considering that no part of this vast and detached empire is garrisoned with a view even to a mere defence against a *coup de main*, and very few stations

effectually even for the purposes of police and of preserving the lives and properties of his Majesty's subjects?

I earnestly, then, entreat the government to take this opportunity of revising their measures regarding the military establishment, with a view to provide a sufficient force for the permanent demands of the country; to meet and provide for those demands fairly; and not to depend upon temporary resources for that which can be provided for in an efficient manner only by measures of a permanent nature, the expense of which will exceed but little, if at all, those temporary measures of which it has been one of the objects of this paper to expose the inconvenience and inefficiency.

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Beresford. [334.]

MY DEAR BERESFORD, London, 12th Nov., 1823.

I have this day received yours of the 28th. I have nothing to add to that which I wrote to you on the 3rd regarding the guarantee. I am quite certain that the government of this country cannot guarantee the internal institutions of any foreign State. I answer this at once, without seeing any of my colleagues. What I state is my private opinion.

Your letter of the 28th is a register of miserable intrigues, of which the only importance is that they manifest the intentions and object of their author. Did the French ambassador make his offer for the guarantee in writing? Did he state that he was authorised by his Court to make it? Did he make it, or has he since made it, in the regular official channel of the Secretary of State? If all these questions are answered in the negative, as I believe they must, we must conclude that the offer of what is called the Continental Guarantee is a part of the intrigue, and that in fact there is no such thing. As for my part, I don't believe there is any such thing, particularly on the part of France, or that any French minister would venture to offer in writing such a guarantee as Monsieur de Neuville is stated to have made verbally to the King.

Upon the other points I have nothing to add to my letter of the 3rd.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[335.] *To the Duke of Newcastle.*

MY DEAR LORD, London, 12th Nov., 1823.

I have received your letter respecting the appointment of Sir W. Clinton to be Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance upon the supposed vacancy in that office in consequence of the employment elsewhere of Lord Beresford.

I have no knowledge of such employment or of the vacancy; and till the vacancy shall exist I cannot think of any arrangement to fill it, much less make any engagement to make one.

Sir W. Clinton is perfectly aware of my respect for his talents and abilities and of my regard for his person. But the office of Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance is one of peculiar importance, and the selection of the person to fill it one of great delicacy to the individual who fills the office which I have the honour to hold.

Under these circumstances I am anxious to come to the consideration of the subject unfettered by any previous engagement, and I hope your Grace will excuse me if I decline to say anything further upon the subject.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[336.] *To Sir Robert Williams.*

MY DEAR SIR ROBERT, London, 12th Nov., 1823.

Although I see that Dr. Myers is a good preceptor of grown persons as well as of youth, I am very sorry that I cannot comply with his desire. My patronage is supposed to carry something with it. If it does not it is useless, and to grant it would be ridiculous. If it does, I ought and must take care not to grant it lightly. I ought to be well acquainted with the person to whom I grant it, and ought to be certain that he is equal to his competitors in his line, if not the best; as I shall certainly make myself more or less responsible to all those who, whether grown persons or youth, put themselves under this preceptor in consequence of my patronising him. There is likewise another reason why I must decline to comply with this request, and that is, I some time ago had a youth at Mr. Levasseur's establishment. Now, I don't patronise that or any other establishment of this description; but as I had no reason

to be dissatisfied with Mr. Levasseur, I don't think I ought to patronise another to his disadvantage without having any knowledge of the gentleman at the head of it.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Chatham. [337.]

MY DEAR LORD, London, 12th Nov., 1823.

I take the liberty of introducing to your Excellency and of recommending to your protection Lieutenant-General Don Miguel de Alava. His services with the British army in the Peninsula are too well known to render it necessary for me here to detail them. He has since, to my very great concern —and, if I know him well, to his own—been involved in the political discussions and disasters of his country, from whence he has been under the necessity of seeking an asylum at Gibraltar. I believe he now proposes to remain at Gibraltar for two months, after which period he will come to England. The object of this letter is to solicit for General Alava your Excellency's protection as long as he may remain at Gibraltar.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To General Alava. [338.]

MI QUERIDO ALAVA, Londres, le 12me Nov., 1823.

J'ai su par votre lettre à Lord FitzRoy que vous étiez arrivé à Gibraltar, où vous aviez rencontré des anciens amis du 43; et je me réjouis que vous ayiez enfin quelque repos. Je voudrais bien que ce fût encore entre l'Agueda et le Coa, même si la conséquence en était que le Coa n'eût plus suffisamment d'eau pour nous donner à boire!

Quand vous voudrez venir à Londres vous trouverez chez moi un logement; et si vous préfériez demeurer à la campagne, j'ai une jolie maisonnette toute meublée, même avec bibliothèque, qui est à votre service. Elle est à une demi lieue de chez moi, et le site très joli, très sec, et très sain. Le ciel même y est bleu, et pas jaune comme ailleurs.

Si après avoir passé en Angleterre vous préfériez un asile en

Italie, je pouvais en faire la demande ou au Grand Duc de Toscane, ou au Roi de Sardaigne, ou au gouvernement de S.M. l'Empereur. J'aurais préféré avoir pu faire cette demande avant les évènemens de Séville, dont la nature n'est pas trop bien comprise par les personnes qui n'ont pas eu l'avantage d'avoir reçu leur éducation de los frailes Dominicanos!

Mais n'importe, je tâcherai d'éclairer leur esprit là-dessus; et j'espère pouvoir réussir à vous procurer l'asile que vous désirez. Je vous envois une lettre par Lord Chatham, et je vous prie, &c. &c.

WELLINGTON.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Cirencester, 14th Nov., 1823.

Many thanks for your paper,—I think that Lord Liverpool will agree to the raising six battalions. The doubt which I suspect he will have, will be the raising three additional battalions in order to disband the three veteran battalions.

I observe that in your paper you imagine that four battalions of regulars (576 rank and file) will not cost more than three veteran battalions of 1000 rank and file each. Now, according to a calculation which I have received from the Horse Guards a battalion of regulars of 576 will cost 23,500*l.*; whereas a battalion of veterans of 1000, after deducting pensions, &c., does not cost more than 20,000*l.* I suspect, however, that in making this calculation, they did not take into consideration what may be saved by placing half-pay officers in the regiment to be raised, and I have written to that effect by this day's post.

Yours ever sincerely,

BATHURST.

[339.] *To Lord Lauderdale.*

MY DEAR LORD LAUDERDALE, London, 20th Nov., 1823.

I have received your letter, and I assure you that there is nothing that can give me more satisfaction than to adopt any mode of testifying my regard and respect for the memory of the late Lord Hopetoun. If I were or could be in your neighbourhood I would with pleasure promote and attend the meeting; as it is I must request you to be so kind as to put down my name as a subscriber of 100*l.* for a monument to be erected to his memory.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [340.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 21st Nov., 1823.

Since the Cabinet yesterday it has occurred to me that some inconvenience may result from the official communication to the Allied Courts of the Memorandum of your conversation with Prince de Polignac.

It was a free conversation, of which the object was to communicate to the French government what would be the consequences of their interference by force to support the Spanish claims in the colonies; and everything was said on both sides which would open the views of each government to the other.

As long as the Memorandum is the record of the conversation and is confined only to the two parties to it, no other party, although such party may obtain a knowledge of its contents, can take offence; but as soon as the Memorandum is communicated officially all its contents become official, and the other parties referred to must notice those parts which relate to themselves.

Is it polite to state, or is it so true that it can be stated officially, that neither Austria, Russia, nor Prussia, have any interest in the fate of the Spanish colonies?

Then there are some points adverted to in the conversation upon which the Cabinet have not decided, and I don't believe you yourself have made up your mind. One of these is the calling the government of the United States to a Congress of the Powers of Europe; yet, if you make this paper official, you must adhere to that determination, be the consequences what they may.

These circumstances did not occur to me yesterday. I was really quite unprepared for the discussion; and I lay them before you now, that you may turn them over in your mind, being quite certain that the Allied Courts will not be quiet when it is officially communicated to them by this government that they have no interest in these questions.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[341.] *To Lord Beresford.*

MY DEAR BERESFORD, Beaudesert, 25th Nov., 1823.

I received on Saturday your letters of the 6th, 8th, and 9th, and last night at Hatfield that of the 15th. From my former letters you will have seen that your opinion and mine are not far from each other respecting the guarantee of the internal Constitution of Portugal, and respecting the nature of the proposal made to the King by M. Hyde de Neuville.

I should not have written to you by this occasion if I had not been desired by the Cabinet on Saturday, before I received your letters, to mention to you that they are very anxious, in view to the questions which will be brought under discussion in Parliament in respect to your situation as Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance, that you should endeavour to bring your affairs at Lisbon to a conclusion in the course of this month and the first half of December, so as to arrive in London by the end of that month, or at all events early in January. You will have seen that Parliament meets on the 3rd of February, and, considering what passed last Session respecting your office, we shall have an awkward discussion in the House of Commons if you should not have returned some time before the meeting.

I reckon that you will have brought your discussions on your political position to a close shortly after you will have received my letter of the 3rd, and that the issue of those regarding your affairs will be accelerated rather than impeded by your announcing your early departure.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 4th Dec. 1823.

I have received a letter from the Duke Decazes, of which I trouble you with a pretty long extract. It relates entirely to his German affairs, of which I know absolutely nothing but what he here tells me; and upon which he refers to you for information. Is there anything to be done for him? and can you put me in the way of doing it?

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

To Lord Beresford. [342.]

MY DEAR BERESFORD, Woodford, 11th Dec., 1823.

I have received your letters of the 18th and 19th. I entertain no doubt that the French Minister at Lisbon has held the language stated, and that the Austrian and Russian Ministers have done the same to the princesses at Madrid. It is not improbable also that the latter at least, and not impossible that the former, may have talked at the instigation and by the desire of their respective Courts. But I am very certain that they will never put these sentiments in writing, and it is quite certain that they have never come to this government in any ostensible shape. The note of the Duque de Villa Hermosa is, however, official; and Count Palmella appears to have taken the notice of it which he ought. We shall see what will come of his answer, which is certainly of a nature to bring the case out. This might come to be a case for us.

I see that we are all agreed respecting the principle on which you ought to stay in Portugal, or to come away. But I intreat you to bring the matter to a decision and your private affairs to a conclusion as soon as you can, and to return as soon as you can, if you should not remain altogether in Portugal. I have already informed you of what the opinion and wish of the Cabinet is upon this point. These are founded upon the topics upon which the discussion of last year turned in Parliament.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To ———. [343.]

MY DEAR ———, London, 23rd Dec., 1823.

I have received your letter of the 19th, and I have nothing to add to my former letter on the subject of the Legion of Honour. I have not yet received Mr. Canning's official answer; but I entertain no doubt that he cannot recommend that the King should consent to your accepting this honour consistently with the existing regulation.

In respect to the other part of your letter, although I confess that it has surprised and vexed me, I am very happy that you have stated its contents, as to have done so must be a relief to

your mind, and it is perfectly easy for me to satisfy you as far as I am concerned on every part of it.

You cannot suppose me unjust; and conscious as you are that during the period of your command in France you never gave me reason to be otherwise than satisfied with you, you must believe that I was satisfied.

But I will go further and will ask you this question, Did you ever know me dissatisfied with anybody that I did not openly and at once state my dissatisfaction? If I had been dissatisfied with anything, I should have stated the grounds of my dissatisfaction to you, as I had hundreds of times to others; and I dare say we should, upon explanation, have been as good friends as ever, as I have been with others. But I declare that I can recollect nothing that ever passed with which I had not every reason to be satisfied.

But you say, "If you were satisfied, why have other junior officers without my pretensions been preferred to me?" and you particularly name Lord Howard of Effingham.

In answer I can solemnly assure you that not only I had nothing to say to the appointment of Lord Howard of Effingham to the Great Cross of the Bath, but that I never have had any thing to say to the appointment of any officer of the army to that honour, or to any other, excepting those officers whom I recommended by desire for the third class of the Bath for the battle of Waterloo.

All that I have ever done has been to bring forward to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief the services of the several officers, and I have not failed to do so by yours. He rewards those services as he thinks proper, and most positively no trace can be found of my having ever asked him to confer a particular favour on any general officer. After that statement it is useless that I should say anything further, and I will here drop the subject.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[344.] *To Lord Beresford.*

MY DEAR BERESFORD, London, 23rd Dec., 1823.

I have received your letters of the 4th and 8th December, the last this day. I have never talked to Mr Canning of his notion

of a guarantee of the House of Braganza, and I have not considered it very deeply myself. But upon the first view of the subject I should think it almost if not quite as objectionable as a guarantee of internal institutions. I am certain I should think so if I were the adviser of the House of Braganza. We did guarantee the House of Orange in the office of Stadtholder. But observe that this was a guarantee against the efforts of a faction in Holland avowedly French, and patronised and encouraged by the cabinet of Versailles.

If you will show us the existence of such a party in Portugal against the House of Braganza, we shall have no difficulty in giving and acting upon the guarantee.

I wish I could see your question brought to a close in Portugal.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Gloucester Lodge, 29th Dec., 1823.

I send you the enclosed despatch from Sir C. Stuart (which is in the main satisfactory as to France), for the purpose of learning your opinion as to that part of it which relates to the Prince de Carignan.

Is it advisable to interfere with any expression of opinion or not? I should hardly have hesitated to say No (upon the general principle of not meddling in matters no way our concern), if it were not that I think I recollect your having had some conversation respecting Prince Carignan both with the Emperor and the King of Sardinia at Verona.

I will do, or not do, what Stuart's despatch seems intended to suggest, as you think best.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [345.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Stratfieldsaye, 30th Dec., 1823.

When I read Sir Charles Stuart's despatch, No. 650 in circulation, it occurred to me that either he must have misunderstood Monsieur de Villèle in relation to the Prince de Carignan, or that Monsieur de Villèle must have misunderstood or forgotten what were the views and conduct of the Austrian government regarding this person.

I sent you from Verona last year a long paper drawn up by Prince de Metternich, in which the situation and conduct of the Prince de Carignan are detailed, and the question of depriving

him of the succession in Piedmont discussed and decided in the negative, and the proposition made that a simultaneous effort of all the parties to the Treaty of Vienna, by which the succession of the Prince de Carignan was secured, should be made to induce the King of Sardinia to allow him to live at Court and to restore him to his favour. I write from recollection of the paper; but you will find it in the office.

This was quite an unnecessary act on the part of Metternich, and I am quite certain that he was sincere in it, as well as in his endeavours to induce the King of Sardinia to restore the Prince to his favour. He asked me to do the same, which, however, I did not do for the following reasons:—

First. I was not instructed to do so.

Secondly. I talked on the subject more than once with Monsieur de la Tour, who was very anxious that I should speak to the King upon it. But he agreed that as I was not and could not say I was instructed upon it, it was better that I should wait to see if the King would mention the subject to me, which he thought he was inclined to do. The King, however, did not mention the subject, nor did I.

If I had had an opportunity, I intended to tell the King that it was quite hopeless to expect to be able to set aside the Prince de Carignan from the succession and to take his son, which is what his Majesty wishes; that any acceding party to the Treaty of Vienna might protest; but that even the great powers could not agree to such a measure, and that his Majesty would lay the ground for perpetual wars in Europe and disturbance in his own dominions. That being the case, I intended to recommend to his Majesty to recall the Prince to his Court (which is the object), and to have his conduct under his own view and inspection, rather than to keep him in a state of banishment abroad and exposed to the machinations of the revolutionary party, of which there were too many in all countries ready to take advantage of the supposed disposition of that Prince in their favour.

From this statement you will see that there cannot be the slightest objection to you recommending the Prince's case to the King's favour; but as I am writing from recollection I would request you either to look over the papers yourself or to get Planta to look over them before you write.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Captain Mulcaster, R.N. [346.]

SIR, Stratfieldsaye, 30th Dec., 1823.

I have this morning received your letter of 26th December.

There is no person who entertains a higher respect than I do for the services and character of Sir Samuel Auchmuty; and I know no man more deserving than he was of his Majesty's favour.

But situated as I am, it is impossible for me to undertake to recommend that his Majesty's favour should be extended to his nephew on account of those services. You must be aware that there are many deserving officers who have performed the most brilliant services under my directions, who have the strongest claims upon me; and I cannot undertake to bring forward the services of others without injury to them.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the King of the Netherlands. [347.]

SIRE, Londres, le 31me Déc., 1823.

J'ai été à la campagne quand la lettre est arrivée que V.M. m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire.

Je désire seulement expliquer à V.M. la raison pour laquelle je n'ai pas communiqué à V.M., au mois d'Août, quand je me trouvais à Bruxelles, ce que j'avais été commissionné par le Roi d'Angleterre de dire à Lord Clancarty. La confiance dont V.M. m'a toujours honoré exigeait de ma part une confiance et franchise sans bornes; et je n'y aurais pas manqué si l'occasion l'eut demandée. Mais le fait est que la commission dont j'étais chargé avait pour objet que Lord Clancarty puisse la conduire de manière à concilier la bienveillance de V.M., et on espérait ici qu'il pourrait réussir.

Ce n'est que quand on a cru qu'il n'avait pas réussi que le Roi s'est décidé à lui écrire; et il n'y avait pas lieu à rien dire à V.M. à ce sujet quand je me trouvais à Bruxelles.

Ce qui est soumis à V.M. par son très dévoué et très fidèle serviteur,

WELLINGTON, PRINCE DE WATERLOO.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Gloucester Lodge, 17th Jan., 1824.

I send for your consideration, and request you to communicate to Lord Bathurst, a draft of the answer which I propose to be returned to the Spanish invitation to a congress upon South-American affairs.

I send with it a copy of the invitation itself; and a copy, for reference, of the Memorandum of my conference with the Prince de Polignac.

Lord Liverpool has seen the draft, and concurs in it.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURE.]

To the Conde de Ofalia.

1. The undersigned, &c., has received through Sir William A'Court, his Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary, &c., at the Court of Madrid, and has laid before the King his master the copy of a despatch addressed by the Spanish government to his Catholic Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, and to his Ministers Plenipotentiary at the Courts of Vienna and St. Petersburg.

The object of the Spanish despatch is to invite the several Powers the Allies of his Catholic Majesty "to establish a conference at Paris, in order that their Plenipotentiaries, together with those of his Catholic Majesty, may aid Spain in adjusting the affairs of the revolted colonies in America."

2. If this communication were to be considered as addressed directly to his Majesty, it would be necessary for the undersigned to observe that his Majesty was no party to the "events in the Peninsula" which are stated in this despatch to have "paved the way" to the "desired co-operation" of his Catholic Majesty's Allies; that during the whole of the "three years" which are described as having been a period of "rebellion" in Spain, his Majesty had either an ambassador or a minister in that country, accredited to the Court of Madrid, in constant intercourse with the Cabinet of his Catholic Majesty; and therefore, that so far as the present appeal of his Catholic Majesty to his Allies is founded upon the manifestation on the part of those Allies of their opinions as to the state of things in Spain during the last "three years," and upon their participation, either by act or by counsel, in the late "events in the Peninsula," the appeal is one in which his Majesty cannot be included.

But the undersigned is commanded to come at once frankly to the answer which the British government is called upon to return to the invitation of the King of Spain.

It is quite impossible to read the despatch of the Spanish government without perceiving that the purpose for which the co-operation of the Allies is demanded is to re-establish the "sovereignty" of Spain over the "revolted colonies." It is not indeed distinctly stated that this re-establishment is to be effected by forcible means; but neither is the employment of force disclaimed either directly or by implication.

Great Britain has not withholden from Spain the knowledge of the opinions or of the intentions with respect to the Spanish colonies; she has long ago spoken out fully and unreservedly; she declared ten months ago, in the face of all the world, that she considered the separation of the American colonies from Spain as practically and irrevocably decided; and the recognition of their independence as a question of circumstances and of time.

She has declared more recently to France, to her other Allies, and to Spain,

that while she would continue to observe a strict neutrality in any hostilities (if hostilities should unhappily be prolonged) between Spain and her colonies, any interference by force or by menace on the part of any foreign power in that contest would constitute a case in which Great Britain must act as her own essential interests might require. She has further declared that she would aid and countenance any negotiation for an accommodation between Spain and her colonies, which should be opened upon a basis which appeared to her to be practicable; but she has not disguised her persuasion that the only practicable basis on which such a negotiation could be opened would be an acknowledgment of the independence of the New States by Spain.

It has hitherto been the desire of Great Britain to leave open to his Catholic Majesty the opportunity of leading the way in such an acknowledgment before the other powers of Europe, and to afford to the mother country the grace and the advantages of that precedency.

With this view, as well as with that of collecting accurate information as to the internal state of the colonies, the recognition of Great Britain has been postponed, but that postponement she has declared could not be perpetual; nor could her recognition of the New States be made dependent upon the recognition of them by Spain.

To such ample declaration of its opinions and intentions what can the British government add, except that the events of every month have confirmed those opinions; and that the time is now nearly approaching when it may become necessary not only for the interests of Great Britain, for those of the colonies and of Spain herself, but for the interests of the civilised world, that those intentions should be reduced into practice?

It would be idle to carry opinions and intentions such as these into a congress assembled under the summons contained in the Spanish despatch.

If the purpose of Spain in inviting Great Britain to that Congress was to learn her sentiments, that purpose is answered, for her sentiments are distinctly known; if the purpose was to alter them, it is useless, for they have been made up upon full reflection, and declared with deliberate solemnity.

We could not expect, on the other hand, to bring over to our way of thinking any members of the proposed Congress whose views and feelings are correctly estimated in the Spanish despatch.

Where opinions among powers in amity with each other are so essentially different, it is surely far more desirable to avoid than to seek occasions of controversy.

The undersigned, &c., requests the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs to accept the assurance, &c., &c., &c.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [348.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Brighton, 19th Jan., 1824.

I enclose a Memorandum on your note to the Conde d'Ofalia, in which you will see that although I agree in opinion with you that you ought to decline to become a party to the proposed conference, I think you might find in antecedent circumstances and in the nature of the case reasons for declining, which will give less offence.

M. de Lieven told me at Stratfieldsaye that he had received a

copy of the proposition of the King of Spain. I told him in answer that if I had an opportunity of seeing his Majesty the Emperor himself, I would say to him, as I now did to his ambassador, that we were the only power which had any influence in this question, and that they had no right to call upon us to go into a conference to decide in what manner that influence should be exerted, when it was well known that over the decisions of that conference we should have no influence whatever.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM ON PROPOSED NOTE OF MR. CANNING TO THE CONDE D'OFALIA.

19th Jan., 1824.

No. 1.—Ought not this note, according to the usual form, to be addressed by Sir William A'Court? Is it desirable in this particular case to depart from the usual official form?

2.—In my opinion the part marked ought to be omitted altogether. This paper will go to the other cabinets, and this paragraph will be considered a revival of a discussion which is gone by, and that for the purpose of stating a difference between his Majesty's government and his Allies. That which it is right should be stated is that whatever might have been or might be hereafter the internal system of Spain, the conduct of his Majesty's government in relation to the colonies had been and would be the same; and this might be stated in very few words, without reviving the old differences. It appears to me that in the remainder of the note Mr. Canning goes further and pronounces his intentions in more peremptory language than in the Memorandum of his conference with the Prince de Polignac.

The note contains an assertion which I don't think is warranted by circumstances, "that the events of every month have confirmed these opinions;" whereas, if I am not mistaken, we shall soon receive accounts that the gentlemen sent to Mexico cannot land at Vera Cruz.

The events on the Costa Firma and in Peru have been more favourable to revolution; but our opinions and conduct in this affair ought not to be founded and to depend upon casual military events in a contest still subsisting.

I think there are very good reasons for refusing to go to a conference upon this proposition.

The King of Spain has not stated specifically what his views are.

Supposing they are such as his Majesty's government can recognise and promote, according to the principles declared in the recent conference with the Prince de Polignac, I don't think that a mediation conducted by a conference of the ministers of the six Powers, assembled at Paris, could answer any purpose.

The recent example of the negotiations at Paris for the cession of Monte Video, show how little capable such a mediation is of effecting any good purpose.

Another reason for declining to become a party to a conference upon the proposition is that, in point of fact, his Majesty's government is the only one which can have any influence upon this question. That influence may be diminished but cannot be increased by using it in consequence of the decrees of a conference; and I think it very desirable, for the sake of Spain herself, that it should not be thrown away. All this may be stated in a note drawn in more moderate terms, and presented by the ambassador.

Upon the subject of a conference for a mediation in the affairs of the Spanish colonies, a good deal passed at Aix-la-Chapelle, to which it would be advisable to refer, as I think a joint mediation was admitted to be impracticable.

Upon the whole I conceive that this note is upon a subject that is so important, and upon which there is so much difference of opinion, that I recommend to Mr. Canning to delay to order an answer to it till the Cabinet shall be assembled.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Gloucester Lodge, Thursday,
22nd Jan., 1824.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

I have *only this morning* received your letter of Monday, with your observations upon the draft of a proposed note to the Spanish Minister at Madrid.

I of course propose to bring the whole question under consideration of the Cabinet before this or any note is sent, because the time is certainly come at which we must take a final decision upon it.

But I was anxious to have your opinion previously on all accounts, but especially as you appeared to be the member of the Cabinet least satisfied

with the decision taken at our last meeting upon the subject, *not* to go into a conference, if proposed.

With respect to the form of the answer, that is a secondary consideration. But it is not altogether unimportant. The form of the invitation is without precedent. It is by the communication to us of a copy of a note addressed to other Powers. If the note is *not* addressed to us, it requires no answer *from* us. If it is, it sets out with assuming that in spite of all our public declarations, we were in our hearts, as a government, favourable to the determination at Verona, and to the invasion of the Peninsula; an assumption which, in my opinion, ought, from whatever quarter it comes, to be contradicted as publicly as it is brought forward.

If the decision of the Cabinet (as I understood it) is adhered to, I am comparatively indifferent as to the statement of our reasons, enough (in my view) being stated in the Memorandum of conference with Prince Polignac. But if there is any statement *at all*, it must be calculated, I think, not *for the Allied Powers only*.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[349.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Woburn, 23rd Jan., 1824.

I have just received yours of yesterday. The question now is whether we shall go to a conference upon the demand of Spain to consider of the means of reconquering the colonies, or of mediating jointly with the Allies between Spain and the colonies with a view to an arrangement. The question before was whether we should adopt a measure singly and refuse to go to a conference, whether to explain ourselves, or to consider of a measure to be adopted by all the Allies.

I never understood that the Cabinet had decided either question. There was no occasion for deciding either, as till now a conference has not been asked.

But certain as I am that we ought to decline to be a party to the conference asked by Spain, I am equally certain that we cannot decline to explain at a conference every part of our own conduct regarding the Spanish Colonies, or to deliberate with the other powers upon a measure proposed to be adopted by all, according to our existing engagements.

I shall see you at dinner to-morrow.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Bathurst. [350.]

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, London, 26th Jan., 1824.

The Duke of York has frequently spoken to me about the paper in the box, but he never showed it to me. If he had I think I could have stated reasons which would have induced his Royal Highness not to bring it forward.

The fact is that the King's army in the East Indies is a corps of auxiliaries acting within the territory of the power they are sent to serve, which power has an army of its own.

This relation of the King's to the Company's army will account naturally for much of what is complained of in the Memorandum. In truth the service could not be carried on if all that is therein proposed was adopted and acted upon, any more than it could last war in Portugal and Spain, where the British army were principals and the Spanish and Portuguese armies auxiliaries, if the Spanish and Portuguese Staff had put forward the pretension of conducting the general duties.

The writer of the Memorandum is either not aware of this relative situation of the King's army, or he has kept it out of view. He has, however, made a tolerably large list of offices from which he admits that the officers of the King's service ought to be excluded; and he states that there are fifty-seven officers of the King's troops on the Staff in India. Now the question is, how many officers of the Company's troops are there in Staff situations which might be filled according to his notion by the officers of the King's troops? The answer to this question and the comparison of the number of officers in the King's and Company's forces respectively would show what real cause there is for complaint, even in the view of the writer of the Memorandum.

The writer of the Memorandum is likewise quite ignorant of the constitution and duties of the military boards at each of the presidencies. These boards were presided in my time by the Commanders-in-Chief in person, and conducted the civil concerns of the respective armies, which are conducted in this country by the Board of Ordnance, the Commissariat, and in some cases by the Secretary-at-War. The staff of the auxiliary troops could have nothing to say to these details.

I cannot but agree, however, that the situation of the officers of the King's troops in India is very painful. The gallant and

brilliant parts of the service are performed by them. The rewards, in that country, at least, are given to the officers of the local army. The King's army in the East Indies is the finest and best in the world, and I must observe that it owes part of its excellence to some of the circumstances attending their situation, of which the writer complains. It is true that they are cut off from all social intercourse with natives or others; but the consequence of that circumstance is that they have nothing to attend to but their discipline, and they acquire military habits and a character peculiar to themselves which have enabled them to perform some glorious services.

I know no remedy for the evils complained of but the good sense of the government and of the Commanders-in-Chief. In my time we had none of these disputes, and, if I recollect right, the King's officers had a fair proportion of the Staff situations. I am certain they had in my command, and I think they had in general, with the exception always of those offices through the channel of which the general service was conducted.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

From the Conde de Villa Real.

NOTE VERBALE présentée par le Comte de Villa Real à son Excellence Mr. Canning, Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de sa Majesté Britannique pour les Affaires Étrangères.

Londres, ce 6me Février, 1824.

Sa Majesté Très Fidèle ayant été informée des ordres qui ont été expédiés par son Excellence Mr. Canning à Mr. Chamberlain, pour engager le gouvernement du Rio de Janeiro à faire cesser toute sorte d'hostilités contre le Portugal, a chargé le Comte de Villa Real d'en exprimer sa reconnaissance. Sa Majesté Très Fidèle ne peut qu'envisager cette démarche de la part du Cabinet Britannique comme une preuve des bonnes dispositions de sa Majesté Britannique à remplir les autres stipulations des traités qui font la base de l'alliance intime qui existe entre les deux pays depuis des siècles.

Sa Majesté Très Fidèle a vu toujours avec un véritable plaisir l'empressement que le gouvernement Britannique a mis dans toutes les occasions à rappeler les rapports de l'alliance qui subsiste entre les deux couronnes. Mr. Canning en ayant fait mention encore dans sa dépêche du 31me Mars, 1823, adressée à Sir Charles Stuart, on ne peut douter que le gouvernement Britannique ne prête également aujourd'hui son appui à sa Majesté Très Fidèle quand il s'agit de conserver l'intégrité de la monarchie Portugaise, et de prévenir les maux qui menacent une de ses plus belles possessions.

Sa Majesté Très Fidèle réclame donc l'exécution des traités à cet égard avec une confiance d'autant plus grande que la position du Portugal n'a éprouvé aucun changement dans le courant de l'année dernière, et que les relations entre les deux Cours ne sont devenus que plus intimes.

Il est sans doute inutile de rappeler à son Excellence Mr. Canning que toutes les stipulations des anciens traités d'alliance sont en vigueur dans tous les points, d'après l'article 3 du traité conclu à Vienne en 1815, qui est conçu dans les termes suivans :—

"The treaty of alliance concluded at Rio de Janeiro the 19th of February, 1810, being founded on circumstances of a temporary nature, which have happily ceased to exist, the said treaty is hereby declared to be void in all its parts, and of no effect, without prejudice, however, to the *ancient treaties of alliance, friendship, and guaranty which have so long subsisted between the two crowns, and which are hereby renewed by the high contracting parties, and acknowledged to be of full force and effect.*"

Il suffira donc de placer sous les yeux de Mr. Canning les copies ci-jointes des articles des traités sur lesquels sa Majesté Très Fidèle fonde sa réclamation, et dont le Comte de Villa Real a cru devoir insérer ici les extraits suivants :—

Dans l'Article 1er du traité de 1642, il est dit, "The said most renowned Kings, their heirs and successors, shall not do or undertake anything, either by themselves or other persons, against one another, nor against their kingdoms, by sea or land, nor consent or adhere to any *war, counsel, or treaty that may be to the prejudice of the one or the other.*"

L'Article 1er du traité de 1654 contient la phrase suivante :—

"That the said people and subjects shall behave to each other with favour and assistance, mutual and honest affection, and that neither of the parties, or their people, subjects or inhabitants shall commit, or attempt anything against the other in any place, either by land or sea, or in harbours or rivers of either, nor shall consent or adhere to any treaty to the damage of the other, nor receive or harbour the rebels or fugitives of either in any of the other's territories, kingdoms, dominions, ports, or borders."

L'Article 16me du même traité termine ainsi :—

"And if the violators of the treaty do not appear, nor surrender themselves to trial, nor give satisfaction within this or the other space of time now limited, according to the distance of the place, they shall be deemed as enemies of both parties, and their goods, substance, and *revenues whatsoever* shall be set to public auction, and sold to make full and just satisfaction for these injuries, which they have suffered from them: and the offenders, when they happen to be in the power of either party, shall be liable to those punishments which their respective crimes deserve."

Enfin, l'article secret du traité de 1661 contient la stipulation suivante :—

"It is by this secret article concluded and accorded that his Majesty of Great Britain, in regard to the advantages and increase of dominion purchased by the above-mentioned treaty of marriage, shall promise and oblige himself, as by this present article he doth, to *defend and protect all the conquests or colonies belonging to the crown of Portugal against all its enemies, as well future as present.*"

Par ces différents articles, l'Angleterre s'est donc engagée à défendre les

possessions de la monarchie Portugaise contre tous ses ennemis, présens et futurs, de ne consentir à aucune guerre, conseil, ou traité que pourrait porter préjudice au Roi de Portugal, de ne recevoir ni accueillir les rebelles qui voudraient se réfugier dans les possessions Britanniques, et enfin de considérer et traiter en ennemi tous les individus des deux nations qui agiraient en contravention à ces stipulations, et de rendre leurs propriétés responsables pour les pertes qu'ils auront causées.

L'application de ces stipulations aux circonstances actuelles est si évidente, que peu de mots suffiront pour l'éclaircir.

Le gouvernement du Rio de Janeiro s'étant révolté contre le Portugal, a attaqué d'abord les autres provinces du Brésil qui étaient encore soumises à sa Majesté Très Fidèle, et est parvenu à les détacher de leur Souverain légitime. Il a continué encore à commettre toute sorte d'hostilités contre le Portugal, quoiqu'il eut appris que sa Majesté Très Fidèle, au lieu d'employer ses forces comme il en a le droit incontestable pour soumettre le Brésil, avait préféré de faire cesser toutes les hostilités contre ce pays. Le gouvernement du Rio de Janeiro ne s'est pas seulement saisi de tous les batimens Portugais qui se rendaient au Brésil sur la confiance d'y être reçus amicalement, mais il a même retenu celui qui y a transporté les Commissaires Portugais.

D'après une telle conduite il n'est pas improbable que le gouvernement du Rio de Janeiro ne fasse d'autres tentatives pour attaquer les colonies Portugaises qui se conservent fidèles à sa Majesté, et pour y établir l'insurrection et la révolte. Sa Majesté Très Fidèle désirant donc toujours éviter, autant qu'il sera compatible avec sa dignité et avec l'intérêt de sa couronne, d'avoir recours à la force, veut plutôt engager sa Majesté Britannique, comme elle le fait en vertu des traités ci-dessus mentionnés à faire faire de nouvelles démarches plus efficaces pour éviter une semblable aggression de la part du gouvernement du Rio de Janeiro.

Sa Majesté Très Fidèle ayant appris d'ailleurs que ces hostilités et ces deprédations sont commises par des sujets Britanniques que le gouvernement du Rio de Janeiro a pris à son service, se trouve dans la nécessité de réclamer de sa Majesté Britannique l'observation de ces articles des traités qui ont rapport à cette circonstance, ne doutant pas que le gouvernement Britannique fera connaître au gouvernement Brésilien at aux sujets Britanniques dont il est question, qu'ils sont considérés comme ennemis des deux Souverains, et que dans le cas qu'ils ne fassent une juste reparation des pertes qu'ils ont occasionnées, leurs biens, de quelque nature qu'ils soient, seront mis en vente pour cet effet.

Sa Majesté Très Fidèle, en rappelant les engagements qui existent entre les deux pays sur ces deux points, ne pourrait passer sous silence ceux par lesquels il est convenu qu'aucun des deux Souverains ne consentira à aucune guerre, conseil, ou traité qui serait au préjudice de l'autre. En vertu de cette stipulation le gouvernement Britannique est lié à ne point conclure avec le gouvernement du Rio de Janeiro aucun traité qui serait au préjudice de sa Majesté Très Fidèle. Si on considère l'exactitude scrupuleuse avec laquelle elle a toujours observé les stipulations des traités qui existent entre les deux couronnes, si l'on considère que le Roi de Portugal a ouvert gratuitement aux sujets Britanniques les ports du Brésil, en leur assurant le commerce de ce pays sur des bases si avantageuses pour l'Angleterre; si

l'on considère enfin que le Roi de Portugal s'est constamment refusé a accéder aux sollicitations d'autres Puissances, et même à accepter les offres de service qui lui ont été faites, par la confiance qu'elle a toujours placé dans la loyauté du gouvernement Britannique, et dans ces stipulations de ses traités avec lui, on ne peut craindre que dans les circonstances actuelles il ne soit disposé à faire tous les efforts qui seront en son pouvoir pour amener la reconciliation du Brésil avec le Portugal, en faisant perdre au gouvernement du Rio de Janeiro tout espoir d'entamer une négociation avec lui qui n'ait point ce seul objet en vue.

Convaincu des intentions amicales du gouvernement Britannique, et confiant dans la bonne foi avec laquelle il désire observer les stipulations des traités, sa Majesté Très Fidèle se plaît à croire que son auguste allié ne pense point à entreprendre aucune négociation avec le Brésil qui puisse avoir un autre but, puisqu'elle ne pourrait la considérer que comme une infraction des traités, et qu'elle se verrait forcée à regret de protester contre elle.

Le Cabinet Britannique ne peut douter du vif désir qu'éprouve sa Majesté Très Fidèle de terminer, par une négociation amicale, les différends qui sont malheureusement survenus entre le Portugal et le Brésil. Mais il ne serait point de la dignité de sa couronne d'écouter aucune proposition sans que le gouvernement du Rio de Janeiro ne fasse cesser toutes les hostilités contre le Portugal, sans qu'il restitue toutes les prises et les propriétés enlevées à des Portugais, et sans qu'il rétablisse les relations de commerce avec lui. Une fois qu'il s'y prête, comme on a tout lieu d'espérer quand les communications du Cabinet Britannique, en vertu de la réclamation qui lui est adressée, seront parvenues au Rio de Janeiro, sa Majesté Très Fidèle est disposé à entrer en négociation avec le gouvernement du Rio de Janeiro, sans exiger aucune reconnaissance préalable, donnant par là une preuve évidente de ses sentiments personnels, et des vues modérées qui l'animent dans cette question.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Gloucester Lodge, 9th Feb., 1824.

I received, on Saturday, a despatch from Bagot, enclosing a Mémoire of the Russian Cabinet on the affairs of Greece.

It is impossible not to perceive in the introductory part of this paper a clear avowal of the wish, which I have all along suspected to exist in the Russian Government (or in some part of it), to *interpose* the discussion upon Greece before the re-establishment of the Russian mission at Constantinople.

I trust the instructions already sent to Sir C. Bagot on this point will satisfy the Emperor that this is a point not to be yielded by us, and that the positive authority which B. so judiciously required and obtained from Count Nesselrode, and from the Emperor himself, to assure Lord Strangford that the setting out of the new Russian mission should be the immediate consequence of the evacuation of the Principalities will not be retracted.

If it should be so, or if the promise made to Lord Strangford should not

be fulfilled, I confess I think we should disgrace ourselves by being the cat's-paw of Russia any longer.

The Russian mission once established, I see nothing in the practical part of the enclosed paper which may not be made ground of fair and useful deliberation.

Very sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S. I shall not appoint to see Count Lieven upon the subject of this paper till I know in what light it appears to you. No one else has yet seen it, as I had not time to read it through myself till this morning.

[351.] *To His Majesty the King.*

RECOMMENDING THAT SIR B. BLOOMFIELD MAY SUCCEED TO THE COMMAND OF THE BATTALION OF ARTILLERY *vice* FARRINGTON DECEASED, AND SUBMITTING OTHER ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ARTILLERY AND ENGINEERS.

London, 10th Feb., 1824.

I beg leave to submit to your Majesty that till the month of December, 1814, the promotion in the Artillery and corps of Engineers respectively was made by rotation up to the command of battalions, the senior of each rank in each of the corps having been invariably recommended as the successor to any vacancy which might occur in either of the corps respectively.

In the year 1814, when your Majesty was pleased to grant to General Officers allowances as such by the warrant of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of the 8th August, 1814, the late Master-General communicated to the corps abovementioned his Royal Highness the Prince Regent's pleasure regarding the application of that warrant in those corps in a letter, of which the enclosed is a copy.

According to this letter it was settled that officers of the Artillery and Engineers, having the army rank of General Officers, but not having the regimental rank of Colonel en Second, were to remove from their regimental commissions on the several rates of pay fixed by the warrant.

That officers having the regimental rank of Colonel en Second in these corps respectively, and the army rank of Major-General, were to be removed on the pay of Colonel en Second; but to succeed to the pay of Lieutenant-General and General, as fixed by the warrant, when promoted to those ranks:

That officers, whether holding the regimental rank of Colonel

en Second, or an inferior regimental rank, were, upon removal as General Officers, *to be eligible to succeed, according to their seniority* AS SUCH, *to the command of battalions as vacancies might arise.*

This letter likewise provides other arrangements upon which your Majesty had declared your pleasure, but to which I will not draw your Majesty's attention in this place, as it is not necessary with a view to the subject upon which I am anxious to take your Majesty's pleasure.

It is obvious from the correspondence in the office, as well as from the paragraph marked in the enclosed copy of the letter from the late Master-General, that it was his Lordship's intention to declare your Majesty's pleasure that officers of the corps of Artillery and Engineers should succeed to the command of battalions, according to their seniority by brevet in the army; and not according to their regimental seniority, as had been the invariable practice up to that period.

There is at present a vacancy in the command of a battalion of Artillery which affords the first occasion for the application of the rule ordered by this letter.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Benjamin Bloomfield was appointed aide-de-camp to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and obtained the rank of Colonel in the army on the 20th February, 1812. He was removed from his commission of Lieutenant-Colonel of the Artillery as a Major-General under the operation of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent's warrant of the 8th August, 1814, and of the late Master-General's letter of the 21st December, of the same year, receiving the pay specified of 1*l.* 5*s.* per diem; and he is now the senior Major-General of the Artillery officers, not having the command of a battalion, although as Artillery officers there are eleven still senior to him not having such command.

Your Majesty is aware that in the year 1818 the warrant of the 8th of August, 1814, was recalled and altered, and that the number of general officers allowed to receive unattached pay in the army was limited to 120. At the same period the number of General Officers in the Artillery and Engineers allowed to receive unattached pay was limited to 13. Thus, then, the circumstances which probably had induced the late Master-General to recommend to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent the arrangement detailed in his letter of December, 1814, are

altered; and as many incongruities would attend its continued execution, it is necessary that some change in it should be made.

I beg leave to submit to your Majesty that it would not be proper to alter the arrangement of 1814 upon the first occasion in which it has come into operation, and to affect by that alteration Sir Benjamin Bloomfield, an officer who has so long been in attendance upon your Majesty's person, who has recently been distinguished by your Majesty's favour, and for whom your Majesty feels such an interest. Neither does it appear to me that it would be proper to revert back to the rule of promotion which prevailed in these corps previous to the regulation of 1814, as such an alteration would affect the interests of many meritorious officers who have served and who have been advanced for their services in the field by promotion by brevet.

But I would beg leave to submit to your Majesty that at the same time that Sir Benjamin Bloomfield should be promoted to the command of a battalion, your Majesty should authorize me to declare your Majesty's intention that from thenceforward the Master-General for the time being should, upon the vacancy of the command of a battalion of Artillery, submit to your Majesty for promotion an officer of the twenty seniors either serving in the Artillery, or who have served in that corps till they became Major-Generals by brevet and received unattached pay under the warrant and the Master-General's letter of 1814, provided such general officer has not accepted the retired pay of 700*l.* *per annum*, stated in the latter part of that letter.

In respect to the corps of Engineers, I would recommend that the Master-General should be authorised to select the officer to be recommended to your Majesty to command a battalion among the eight senior officers, either serving in that corps or who have served in it, till they became Major-Generals by brevet and received unattached pay.

All which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most devoted and faithful subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

For convenient reference I send with this copies of your Majesty's warrants of 1814 and 1818.

Most entirely approved.

G. R.

To Mr. Griffin. [352.]

MEMORANDUM ON BUILDINGS IN THE MAURITIUS.

Ordnance Office, 10th Feb., 1824.

There are several questions regarding public buildings in the island of Mauritius, which must be decided by the government at large before any satisfactory answer can be given to the recent communications from the Colonial Office on this subject.

The first relates to the construction and repair, and to the furnishing supplies to the barracks occupied by the troops.

In France, and in all countries upon the Continent, the troops of the State are by right quartered upon the inhabitants, and the expenses of constructing, maintaining in repair, and furnishing supplies to the troops in barracks, are defrayed by the inhabitants of the place in which any barracks are situated by local contribution; because those inhabitants are by such construction, &c., relieved from a burthen which they would otherwise have to bear.

The inhabitants of foreign colonies defray by local contributions the expenses of barracks in those colonies, and it will be found that the inhabitants of Ceylon, Mauritius, and the Cape, defrayed the expenses of barracks in those colonies respectively, not out of the colonial revenue of the State, but by local contribution.

The first question as referable to barracks is, is it the intention of the British government to relieve the inhabitants of these colonies from the burthen of these expenses?

The second question is, if the inhabitants of these colonies respectively are to be relieved from the necessity of making any local contribution to defray these expenses, is it intended to defray them out of the public colonial revenue? Or, lastly, is it intended to throw them upon the public, and to go to Parliament with an estimate of them?

If either of the two first questions is decided in the affirmative, the management might be left to the colonial officers. Or, if it should be preferred, a sum of money might be taken from the colony annually, either in the way of local tax, or from the general colonial revenue, and might be paid over to the Ordnance department, by which the barracks might be kept in repair, supplied, &c.

If the two first questions are decided in the negative, and the

last in the affirmative, it will then be the duty of the Ordnance department to prepare and lay the estimates for this expenditure before Parliament. But it will be necessary that the Officers of the Ordnance in Parliament should be instructed with the reasons for which these expenses, which have hitherto been defrayed in some shape or other by the conquered colonies, should now be thrown upon the public.

The next question relates to magazines, storehouses, and other public buildings, occupied by the Ordnance and other public departments in these colonies.

The expenses of the building, repair, and maintenance, of these buildings have, up to this moment, been defrayed by the conquered colonies; whether out of the public colonial revenue or by local contribution I cannot tell.

If it is determined that the colonies, which have hitherto defrayed these expenses, shall continue to defray them, the mode of making the expenditure can be settled as easily as the same question in respect to barracks. If it is determined that the colonies shall be relieved from these expenses, from henceforward the officers of the Ordnance must then prepare and submit to Parliament estimates of the expense attending these repairs, &c., and must be instructed as to the reasons for which these expenses are to be thrown upon the public.

The next question relates to the defences of the Island of Mauritius, upon which I agree very much in opinion with the Governor, Lieutenant-General Sir Lowry Cole.

The Mauritius is a place at which, above all others, care should be taken to provide a secure retreat for the troops in case of any general insurrection of the inhabitants, in which the magazines and stores might be kept in security, and to which the garrison might retire to wait for the arrival of the necessary reinforcements and support to enable them to re-establish the British authority throughout the island.

But this is not a simple Ordnance question. It is one of general policy, which does not depend upon the Master-General of the Ordnance, but upon the decision of the government in general. It is not the business of the Master-General even to bring the subject in this view of it under the consideration of the government, but that of those more immediately charged with the consideration of the policy of the country in its several colonies.

In respect to the works for defence against the attack of a foreign enemy, they are at Mauritius only earthworks, with the exception of one bastion of the lines on the land side of the town; and Fort Blanc, one of the defences of the harbour.

When it is considered that the sum of money granted by Parliament to maintain in repair all the works and buildings under the Ordnance throughout the empire is only 54,000*l.* per annum, it is not astonishing that nothing has been done to the earthworks of the Mauritius. Indeed, if this department had means at its command I should doubt the expediency of applying them to keep earthworks in repair, at a moment at which there does not appear even a possibility of their being required; particularly as there is no doubt that, the ground being kept in our possession, there will always be time to put such works in repair long before any attack can be made upon them, or men can be sent out to defend them.

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [353.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 10th Feb., 1824.

I received your box last night. I don't think the Emperor intends to break his promise, but he wishes that some ostensible steps should be taken immediately in the affair of the Greeks, in order to satisfy his people that he did not return to his relations with the Porte without taking some care of the Greeks; and he urges the difficulties of the situation of his Minister at the Porte during the continuance of the contest, as the motive for taking some steps immediately.

I quite agree with you, however, that if I should be mistaken, and he does break his promise, we can interfere no further. The question is, then, whether we can interfere or be a party to the mediation as proposed, supposing the Emperor to perform his promise.

The proposed arrangement between Greeks and Turks would probably work well if the parties could be brought to agree to it, and if it were not necessary that one or all of the Powers, parties to the mediation, should become guarantees of the arrangement. Prussia must be one guarantee, Austria probably another. Can we decline if France is? It will not answer to

allow Russia alone to be guarantee. The Porte would refuse, as probably would the Emperor of Austria; and at all events such an arrangement would place the Porte in the hands of the Emperor of Russia. I did think, therefore, that the safest plan would be that all the mediating Powers should become guarantees. Excepting the guarantee, and some questions arising out of the flag, there would not be much objection to the arrangement itself.

The great difficulty is the mediation itself. Neither party asks it, and it must be forced probably upon both. The Russian paper overcomes this difficulty by a *phrase* upon the force of the Alliance, and a compliment upon the use Lord Strangford had recently made of that force.

I never saw the account of Lord Strangford's last negotiation, but, as far as I know of it, I should think that Lord Strangford had in that case two advantages. First, a right by treaty, belonging to ourselves and other Powers as well as to Russia; secondly, the interest the Porte had in the settlement of the question with Russia, and the restoration of the diplomatic relation with that Power, on account of the influence which those arrangements were likely to have on the contest with the Greeks.

I doubt the *force morale* of the Alliance being sufficient without some aid of the same kind, which it will not have in this instance; and all the prejudices and supposed interests, particularly the individual interests of the Turks, will be against the arrangement.

If both parties should decline the mediation, is it to be forced upon them, and by what Power? and by what Power upon each of the contending parties? If the whole Alliance is to act, what Power is to be the instrument of action?

I believe the first question for a conference would be, whether there can be any mediation in the existing state of the warfare between Turks and Greeks, and what form it shall take.

It is very clear to me that nobody can do anything at Constantinople excepting ourselves, and that the Alliance can do nothing without us. There is no doubt that our hands at Constantinople will be much weakened by becoming parties to this mediation with other Powers; and I think that we should consider the subject well before we enter upon it, as well for their

sake as our own; and if we do enter into it that we should take the lead in it, which the state of our influence entitles us to take.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 10th Feb., 1824.

I entirely agree in every word that you say about the difficulties of allied interference between Turks and Greeks, and about the *almost* impossibility of our undertaking a guarantee.

What I said in my last note was to show that my indisposition was not to concert *with* Russia; but to being duped by Russia into continuing our agency *for* her at Constantinople, if she should now go back from her word.

I have desired Francis C. to send you *all* the Turkish despatches relating to *late* negotiations. They have been in circulation the last three weeks, and I took for granted that you must have seen them. But *circulation* is a very bad mode of getting things read. A morning's ride, or a forgetful valet-de-chambre, makes the difference of twenty-four hours at every stage.

Perhaps when we are all in town it would be best to leave despatches in the Cabinet Room; and only to announce the circulation of them.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Vienna, 10th Feb., 1824.

Prince Metternich, having been informed by me of my intention to dispatch Charles Arbuthnot to England, has determined to charge him with a confidential letter to you. It is his intention I believe to state to you without reserve his sentiments; 1st, Upon the line which his Majesty's Government has taken, or is about to take, upon the King of Spain's invitation to a conference upon American affairs; and 2ndly, Upon the general state of the relations between the two Governments, so different from what it was in the time of Lord Londonderry. Nothing can be further from his wish, however, than to place you under any embarrassment, and he has therefore desired me to say that he does not expect you to answer his letter. Arbuthnot is apprised of everything which has occurred here since my arrival; I have besides conversed fully with him upon the whole subject, and he will communicate with his father, or with you if you shall think proper to talk to him.

I shall only observe here, that if it be the desire of our government (as it must be unless their policy is much changed) to maintain a cordial intercourse with the three northern Courts, it is essential that we shall resume our former system of confidential communication with the Court of Vienna. For any man of common observation must see that Austria not only takes the lead and gives the tone to the other two Courts upon all great political questions, but that their opinions respecting the proceedings of his Majesty's Government are usually formed upon a knowledge of the sentiments prevailing here. I have observed this in more than one instance since I have taken charge of this embassy, and one of the things of which Prince Metternich complains is that total want of previous communication which might enable him to judge correctly of the grounds upon which the decisions of the British government may have been taken.

It is impossible, for instance, to arrive at any correct notion of Mr. Canning's motives for refusing to assist at the conference upon the affairs of America, since he has assigned a different motive to me, to M. de Neumann, and to the government of France. According to my instructions I must maintain that Great Britain will not assist at a conference, grounding myself upon the Memorandum of the conference between Mr. Canning and M. de Polignac. The French government is led to believe, from the report of their Ambassador, not only that we decline the King of Spain's invitation, but that we are about to acknowledge the independence of the colonies; while M. de Neumann's reports justify a belief that, were the conferences to be held in London, Mr. Canning would not refuse to assist at them.

It is but justice to Prince Metternich to say that he has no reserve whatever, and that he is perfectly ready to communicate with me upon all questions, but I have seldom anything to say to him in return. This makes my situation very embarrassing. I think by consulting this Government a little and by a little more confidential communication, we might keep up our influence here, and that without abandoning any of the objects we may have in view.

Believe me ever, my dear Arthur,

most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

They are apprehensive here that Lord William Bentinck will be appointed to succeed Sir Thomas Maitland, and Prince Metternich told me this morning that if such an appointment were to take place, all the Italian Sovereigns would protest against it, and among the rest the Emperor of Austria. I told him that I saw no probability of Lord William's being selected for this situation, but he and Prince Ruffo are in great alarm about it.

Le Prince de Metternich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MON CHER DUC, Vienne, ce 11me Février, 1824.

Le retour de M. Arbuthnot m'offre une occasion trop bonne pour que je pourrais manquer de vous écrire par son intermédiaire. Habitué depuis longtems à vous rendre le dépositaire de mes pensées, permettez-moi d'en user de même dans une époque où les premiers intérêts de l'Europe se trouvent mis en jeu, et où j'ai bien de la peine à m'expliquer la marche du gouvernement Britannique.

Que s'est-il donc passé en politique, ou bien, quelles sont les causes particulières à l'Angleterre qui pourraient suffire pour expliquer la situation singulière des affaires du moment? Je vous avouerai avec franchise que je ne trouve pas la solution dans *les choses;* il faut donc qu'elle existe dans *les hommes.*

Une affaire immense se présente; elle est toute digne de la sollicitude des puissances, et néanmoins soumise aujourd'hui à toutes les considérations secondaires. L'avenir peut, et il devra même être compromis étrangement, si les Cabinets ne parviennent pas à s'entendre sur l'attitude qu'ils auront à tenir dans les affaires du Nouveau Monde; de ce monde qui déjà ne se lève que trop dans un sens qui menace de dissolution et de mort tout gouvernement européen, quelle que pourrait être son organisation particulière. Ces vérités, si simples et si pratiques, ne sont-elles point senties en Angleterre? Je ne puis en raison ne pas l'admettre!

Le gouvernement Britannique semble se vouer à un système d'isolement complet. C'est à lui seul à être le juge des motifs qui le font suivre cette ligne; mais le but—si celui d'un isolement parfait devait en effet être le sien—est-il à atteindre? J'avoue que je ne le crois pas. Si ce gouvernement ne vise pas à ce but, pourquoi emprunte-t-il des couleurs qui ne seraient pas en réalité les siennes?

L'Angleterre, peut-elle un seul instant vouloir lier sa marche politique à celle des Etats-Unis d'Amérique? Le coup d'œil politique le plus ordinaire suffit pour démontrer l'impossibilité d'une entreprise pareille!

En n'admettant ainsi en tout repos de conscience aucun de ces chances, comment expliquer ce que trop malheureusement je suis destiné à voir se réaliser chaque jour? Si les affaires doivent être perdues, elles n'ont qu'à suivre la pente sur laquelle elles sont placées. Que le cabinet Britannique, au lieu de se placer sur une ligne de politique élevée, continue à restreindre son activité à des discussions de chicane avec le gouvernement Français, le mal se trouvera fait de lui-même.

Vous êtes dans le cas de prendre connaissance et de mes expéditions à Londres et de celles dans lesquelles je me plais en toute occasion à entrer envers Sir Henry. Trouvez-vous dans ce qui vous vient de Vienne rien qui ressemblerait à du préjugé ou à de la déraison? Ma conscience me dit que tel fait serait impossible. Que voulons-nous, et que devons-nous, en effet, vouloir?

Nous désirons *que l'Amérique ne soit pas mise par la faute des puissances à même de faire la loi à l'Europe.* Nous ne connaissons pour celà qu'un moyen. Il se trouve *dans une franche entente entre les puissances.* Cette entente doit avoir pour but *d'aviser aux moyens les plus efficaces pour*

influer sur la marche du cabinet de Madrid,—sur ce cabinet fort prompt à se livrer aux seuls calculs de l'erreur et des passions; celui enfin *de régler l'attitude que les Puissances, eu égard à la différence de leurs positions relatives, auraient à prendre toute chance admise, dans le but explicite de ne point livrer tout le terrain à l'ennemi commun.* Cette ligne de politique me semble si claire et si utile à suivre que c'est avec un sentiment de peine que je ne saurais exprimer que je ne vois que des élémens qui devront en éloigner les Puissances.

Je voue trop de confiance aux rapports que Sir Henry a faits à sa cour, pour devoir me sentir dispensé de vous developper davantage ma pensée. J'ai eu souvent déjà le bonheur d'être compris par vous, mon cher Duc, et si je ne me plains pas plus du mal qui se fait journellement, c'est que ma conscience me dit que ce n'est pas à vous que doivent s'adresser les plaintes, mais bien les vœux en faveur du bien qui ne se fait pas. Ce que je me sens en droit de vous demander, c'est d'user de tous vos moyens d'influence pour donner de la vie à ce qui en manque, et pour tuer les chances de perdition que je vois augmenter journellement, par suite d'un système (ou si vous le préférez) d'une marche, que je regarde comme jugée par le seul fait, que la raison ne suffit pas pour l'expliquer, et bien moins encore, pour le justifier.

Recevez les assurances de mes sentimens les plus sincères et les plus distingués.

METTERNICH.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 13th Feb., 1824.

I do not know whether you are aware of the unpleasant affair of ———— daughters, who were stopped and rummaged at Calais in a most unseemly, and, as it turns out, most unjustifiable manner.

I say unjustifiable because you will see by the papers which I send to you that the French Government do not pretend to have had the shadow of a charge, or of a suspicion against the young ladies.

It is impossible to acquiesce in this *no* apology.

I send you the draft of a despatch which I propose to write to Sir C. Stuart in reply to his report of the French minister's answer.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S. I add to the papers a Report from the King's Advocate just received; which affords little hope of obtaining redress; but makes it impossible not to require it.

G. C.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Copy of Draft to Sir Charles Stuart.

SIR, Foreign Office, Feb., 1824.

Among the points in discussion between the two countries, upon which I have on this occasion to express to your Excellency the general satisfaction of your government, I am sorry that I cannot include the answer which the French government have returned to your Excellency's remonstrance on the treatment experienced at Calais by ———— daughters.

The report of the Minister of Police on the question referred to him by M. de Chateaubriand amounts to nothing more than this, that it is a treatment to which all French subjects are liable, and of which, therefore, foreigners have no right to complain.

But surely it cannot be true that even* subjects of France are ordinarily exposed to so harsh a visitation without some, at least, plausible ground of suspicion that they have in some way or other done something to deserve it.

It cannot be true† that young and unprotected females are selected among French subjects for a proceeding so offensive and indecorous against all the presumptions in favour of innocence which sex and youth supply.

Nothing, absolutely nothing, is stated in the French minister's report of any suspicion entertained, or any information of misconduct, actual or intended, on the part of the young ladies who have been so rudely dealt with. The defence rests solely on the ground that what was done to them might have been done to French subjects, and, for ought that appears, at the mere arbitrary will of the lowest retainers of the police.‡

Is this a becoming justification from one friendly government to another of an act of violence which cannot but excite feelings of the most unpleasant nature? What if we were to retaliate in some signal instance on female visitors from France?§ We should be exempted, by the example now set us, from the obligation of assigning any motive whatever for such an outrage.‖

But M. de Chateaubriand knows that the French government have nothing of this sort to apprehend while any hope of redress remains to us; and I am much mistaken in my estimate of M. de Chateaubriand's feelings if the very circumstance of ————'s peculiar situation towards the government of France (of which I have not been backward in declaring the opinion of his own government) does not constitute in that minister's eyes a reason for being the

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* Omit the word *even*.

† The word *true* in both paragraphs might be omitted with advantage, and probably the hint that these young ladies were *selected* for the patients of this outrage.

‡ Does this appear?

§ The object being to draw from the French government a conciliatory answer, is it desirable to put these in the way of questions?

‖ I think the latter part excellent, and it appears to me that its effect is weakened by the sort of threat of retaliation by which the paragraph begins.

WELLINGTON.

more desirous to substantiate the grounds of that violation of courtesy which has been practised towards the family of ————, in such a manner as shall prove that personal pique against the father had no share in producing the insult to his children.

I desire that your Excellency will find an immediate opportunity of renewing this subject with M. de Chateaubriand, and of earnestly conjuring him to set his government right upon a transaction so peculiarly calculated to excite disagreeable differences between the two countries; either by accounting (if that be possible) for the act which was done by the statement of the causes, whether of information or of suspicion, which led to it; or if that cannot be done, or the officers who did the act cannot be actually disavowed, by such an expression of regret for their over zeal in the execution of their duty, as both the British government and the individual aggrieved may accept as a sufficient atonement.

I am, &c.

P.S. Your Excellency has omitted to send home a copy of the note which you addressed to M. de Chateaubriand.

[354.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 14th Feb., 1824.

I can easily understand the conduct of the French government in respect to ———— daughters. The King's subjects think they carry with them abroad not only the real privileges of British subjects, but the right of waging war on their private account, that of being the carriers of treasonable correspondence, &c., &c., which they assume to themselves; and they presume upon the protection of their government to commit these acts almost without concealment.

However, it was quite impossible for you to pass over the outrage upon these young ladies without inquiry and remonstrance, and I think the French government have made a mistake in omitting to give a full answer, viz., that from what had occurred before, they had reason to believe that these young ladies or their attendants were the bearers of illicit correspondence; and that they are much concerned if in the mode of ascertaining the fact anything indecorous has occurred.

It would be very desirable for both governments that the matter should be amicably settled; and I think the French government will have the sense to see that antecedent facts do justify their suspicions and precautions; and that they must be strong at the same time that they will strengthen our hands by their explanation.

Your remonstrance upon the subject must be strong; but I

have made a few remarks in pencil in the margin, for which I ought to apologise, an attention to which, without weakening the remonstrance, will render it less irritating, and more likely to draw from the French government the wished for explanation.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [355.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 14th Feb., 1824.

I return the papers in the box, and have made two or three notes in pencil in the margin of your notes on M. de Chateaubriand's despatch.

I am very happy that you don't propose to continue the correspondence with M. de Chateaubriand.

I think it right to add that although in my observations on your notes, I extenuate and justify our measures, which I think it a duty to do in every case, I have not at all altered my opinion of these measures, whether adopted or to be adopted.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

OBSERVATIONS ON MR. CANNING'S NOTES ON THE DESPATCH ADDRESSED TO THE PRINCE DE POLIGNAC BY M. DE CHATEAUBRIAND.

	Observations.
On the third paragraph of the first note:— "While the power which deliberates and exercises between that State and its parent country a purely peaceful *arbitration*."	I don't think it is even an *arbitration*, unless it should be admitted that an acknowledgment of the independence of the colonies decides the question between the colonies and the mother country. It is a decision upon a question of facts, which any independent country not bound by engagements may take.

Towards the end of note the second it is stated:—

"It is no fault of ours that the time for this object is gone by."

In note the fifth it is stated:—

"We are far from denying the truth of M. de Chateaubriand's argument that the unrenounced sovereignty of Spain might be inconvenient to the New States, even after *the acknowledgment of their independence by other Powers.*"

Q. If it ever existed?

The words *acknowledgment* of *independence* and *recognition* are used throughout the paper.

The existence of these countries, their declarations of independence, their wars, are matters of fact, which must be *acknowledged* by every body; and their state of war, and their rights as belligerents, have long been recognised by us and other maritime Powers. The appointment of consuls, and the acceptation of the exequatur from the governments *de facto* of these States, both by France and this government, are additional *acknowledgment* and *recognition* of the existence of a government in those provinces not dependent upon the King of Spain; which we have contended, as I conclude France has, was necessary in consequence of our extended commercial relations with those provinces.

The appointment of diplomatic agents to reside with these governments *de facto*, and the reception by his Majesty of agents from these governments, do not go further in the *recognition or acknowledgment* of these governments, but it supposes this—that his Majesty has political interests to discuss with these governments.

The *recognition* of the existence *de facto* of these governments and of their rights of war, the appoint-

ment of consuls, and the appointment of political agents, whether each separately or the whole together, do not go to the *recognition and acknowledgment* of the right of these colonies to independence, or to question the title of the King of Spain to their dominion.

By each successive act which we contend has been rendered necessary by the interests of his Majesty's subjects, we have acknowledged and recognised the existence of facts, the truth of which nobody can dispute; and the two last suppose relations of commerce and of political interest. But none go to the question of right; nor has any power a right to call upon us to pronounce acknowledgment or recognition of such right.

Last paragraph of note the eighth:—

"There are, therefore, no such causes of war."

See the reasoning above on the effect of the different steps which we have taken.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 15th Feb., 1824.

Will you take the trouble to answer the questions which are stated in the enclosed paper, and to give me any other instances of the like spirit of jealousy on the part of the Spaniards in the Peninsular war?

I do not wish to use them unkindly: but we must be prepared at all points.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURE.]

1. At what period of the Peninsular Campaign did Ballasteros refuse to serve under the Duke of Wellington?

2. At what period did Arguelles refuse to agree to the Duke of Wellington's being made Captain-General?

3. How many Spanish troops went through the Peninsular War with the Duke of Wellington? and how many went with him into France?

[356.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 16th Feb., 1824.

I proceed to answer the questions to which you desired an answer yesterday. I was appointed to command the Spanish army in the year 1812, immediately after the battle of Salamanca; but I declined to accept and exercise the command till I should have an opportunity of personal conference with the Regency, and of ascertaining what command they proposed to give me, and in what manner it was to be exercised. In the mean time I promised to continue to communicate to the General Officers commanding the different Spanish armies my wishes and suggestions, as I had been in the habit of doing till that moment.

After the battle of Salamanca, Soult raised the siege of Cadiz, and evacuated the whole South of Spain, and marched into Valencia, where he joined the army of the King, which had retired before me from Madrid.

Ballasteros was in the kingdom of Granada. I was going to the northward to take Burgos, &c., and Lord Hill with his corps was to remain in the neighbourhood of Madrid.

My object was, if possible, to gain time for my operations to the northward, to keep possession of Madrid and the centre of Spain during the winter, and to prevent Soult from coming up from Valencia. I wrote to Ballasteros to press him to take a position in the mountains, which, by the assistance of a castle on his flank would have enabled him effectually to stop Soult. Contrary to his practice till that moment he gave me no answer; but did not take the position. In the mean time he had heard that *I was appointed* to command the army. He then wrote word to the Regency that he would not obey me, and he was removed from his command, and, I believe, banished to Ceuta. The consequence of the whole was, that the castle above mentioned surrendered almost without defence; Soult arrived at Madrid; Lord Hill was obliged to retire, and I to discontinue my operations at Burgos, &c.; and the French had possession of Madrid and the centre of Spain during the winter of 1812 and 1813.

I don't know that Arguelles objected to my being made Captain-General, which rank was conferred upon me in 1809, after the battle of Talavera, or to my being appointed to the

command in 1812. I believe that arrangement was made by the almost unanimous consent of the Cortes.

After the campaign of 1812, to which I have above referred, I went to Cadiz, to settle with the Regency the nature of the command which they intended to confer upon me, in which I experienced a good deal of difficulty. I settled it, however, to my satisfaction; but the Regency having been changed from the Duque del Infantado and others, to what was deemed a more republican party, they immediately broke their agreement with me,. and produced a good deal of inconvenience in the service. This was at the time of the Battle of Vittoria, in 1813. I immediately remonstrated, and intreated that they would accept my resignation of the command, unless they should carry into execution strictly the conditions agreed upon by their predecessors. I at the same time assured them that, if out of the command, I would continue to communicate as heretofore with their generals; and that the service should, if possible, suffer no inconvenience.

This matter occasioned much discussion in the Cortes, the liberal party, and I believe Arguelles, taking part against my keeping the command; but I am not certain respecting Arguelles. The discussions ended by a Report from the Council of State, drawn up by their secretary, Lugando, who was afterwards, and again lately, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, recommending that the agreement with me should be strictly carried into execution, which Report was adopted in the Cortes by a small majority, the liberal party being against it. Whether Arguelles was so or not I cannot tell at this distance of time.

In respect to Spanish troops, we never had any with us after the year 1809, excepting Morillo, with about 3000 men (infantry) with Lord Hill; and Don Julian Sanchez, with from one to five hundred cavalry; never less than the first number nor more than the last, with myself.

In the campaign of 1813 there was in the battle of Vittoria only Morillo's corps. Afterwards a corps under General Giron, now the Marquess de las Amarillas, from Gallicia, and another under the Conde del Abisbal, joined us, each about 10,000 men.

When we entered France in October and November, 1813, no Spanish troops entered excepting Morillo's corps and those above mentioned, one of which had been transferred to the

command of General Freyre, Abisbal having retired from his command under the pretence of ill health.

The troops, however, were in such bad order, and behaved so ill, that I was obliged to send them all, excepting Morillo's corps, back into Spain during the winter months of December and January. I afterwards brought forward Freyre's corps of about 8000 men in the month of March, and these, with Morillo's 3000, were present in the battle of Toulouse, in the month of April.

There was at the same time in France a small corps of 3000 or 4000 under Mina, engaged in the blockade of St. Jean Pied de Port, and there was a corps of 10,000 or 12,000 men, under the Prince of Anglona in March, in Spain to join the armies in France. There were other troops in operation in Catalonia, &c., but none in France.

But I must add that I might have brought into France as many as I pleased, even to the amount of the whole nation, but the reason for which I limited the numbers was, that they were not in a state of equipment, order, and discipline to be manageable; and that their disorder would have done me more mischief than their numbers would have done me good.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[357.] *To Lord Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, London, 16th Feb., 1824.

I enclose you two letters * from General Walpole, in answer to my inquiry. You will see that there is very little detail. I will, however, get a map of the island of Jamaica, and see him when he will come to town.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

General Walpole to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Harling, 15th Feb., 1824.

I believe that I apprized your Grace by Friday's post of my inability to give you the information that you wished for, owing to my having been

* See 15th Feb., 1824. Only one letter found.

absent from home during two days, and the lateness of the hour at which I had returned.

As to external war, invasion must, I conceive, be guarded against more effectually by the navy than by any other means. I take for granted that St. Domingo is now the quarter from whence this is to be apprehended; at all events the attack must be from the windward, and it is of the first importance not to allow an enemy of this description to reach the shore and lodge themselves in the woods. Here it is material to call your Grace's attention to one circumstance—that of establishing a depôt for the King's ships on the north side of the island, where they can get some necessary articles in case of accident for the vessels or crews. Port Antonio seems, from the goodness of its harbours, to be the most eligible, but the Admiralty will naturally advert to that. The necessity of something of the kind is obvious, when I inform your Grace that seven hours will suffice to bring down a fleet upon the north side, and that the King's ships, stationed as they are at Port Royal, or obliged to go thither for what they want, take frequently as many days in resuming their position.

Your Grace will perceive that, as far as I can be supposed to be a judge, the north or windward side of the island is the most vulnerable, and that the security of it must depend upon the navy. I have been here speaking of a native enemy, as of St. Domingo; an enemy from Europe would probably conduct his operations with different views, and aim at your dockyards and stores at Port Royal and Kingston.

As to internal war, that in which I was employed had been given up by the Governor and the Assembly, and it was at my earnest entreaty that they suspended a measure which must have placed Jamaica in the power of the Maroons.

No description can convey to your Grace any idea of the local peculiarities of the interior. It is impossible to secure your flanks or communications; and Lord Balcarres, far from a bad officer, and very brave, on getting into the Trelawny mountains declared any progress as impracticable. The system previously adopted to my command was that of detaching columns into the woods, which were, according to their strength or weakness, ambuscaded, or retired from, by an enemy neither seen nor heard. To this there could be no end; the war became interminable. I need not tell your Grace that in plain and open countries numbers are of consequence, but in those of a more impracticable nature it must depend upon disposition chiefly. It struck me that if I could reverse the system I should, by compelling the enemy to become the assailants and produce themselves, deprive them of all the advantages which could only result from concealment: and for that mode of warfare they had two points of discipline in very high perfection—extreme silence, and never throwing away their fire. I determined, therefore, to deprive them of their water, very scarce during the dry season, and absolutely necessary. It is not worth while in this letter to detail at length by what means I brought this about. I was right in my conjecture as to the ground where it was mostly to be found. The plan soon took effect, and the enemy were forced to go without water; in short, to starve, or to dislodge our posts; they made the attack and failed. The difficulty was in getting at the springs. We had, as far as the roads permitted, got up some artillery; it was taken to pieces and hauled up the rocks, on which

the trees had been previously felled: the ground was enfiladed between us and the enemy with shot and shells, and the column pushed forward under this protection secured from ambuscade. I hope my conduct will appear to your Grace to have been right. I mention it chiefly to draw your attention to the importance of occupying the springs, as the most likely mode of preventing insurrection. Those with which I am acquainted were in the Trelawny mountains, what others there are I am ignorant of, but the Trelawny mountains, and the springs beyond them, must be the most healthy parts of Jamaica, and a foreign enemy must have a precarious possession as long as our troops occupy them. As to insurrection, how the possession of them bears on that point I have already detailed.

I am inclined to suggest that it would be right to send out officers who are acquainted with the country; I do not say it through vanity, but the ablest may be staggered. Those next in command to me were the present General John Skinner, and Gore Browne. Both very good; particularly the first. In what state of health these gentlemen are I do not know.

North America is now closely to be attended to. She may be material to St. Domingo as well as to Jamaica. Our fleets in 1795 and 1796 were so long detained in the Channel, that if she had not supplied us we must have been starved.

There are some Maroon tribes now in the island: they may be very useful, and the reverse: to manage them may require some address.

I have detailed the commencement of our operations; the whole was conducted on the same principle. Your Grace will know how to appreciate my conduct, and to judge how far it may be judicious to follow it at present.

I remain, with all deference, your Grace's faithful servant,

GEORGE WALPOLE.

Lord Wellesley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Phœnix Park, 17th Feb., 1824.

You must be fully acquainted with the various considerations (almost of every description, and involving every public and private interest) which render an accurate survey of Ireland an object of primary importance to the government and to the nation. The matter has been attentively viewed and earnestly recommended by Committees of the House of Commons; and I believe that on this subject of Irish concern all parties are united. In the first notes which I sent to Lord Liverpool respecting the improvement of the system of valuing and collecting tithe, I adverted to the utility of an accurate general survey, to which all valuations might be referred, and which might serve as a permanent standard of reference not only for tithes, but for all charges on the land, and might operate as a perpetual corrective of the numberless abuses now existing in the local and municipal taxation in the provinces of Ireland.

I really consider that no greater practical benefit could be conferred on Ireland than the accomplishment of an accurate general survey of the country, and the present moment seems to me favourable to the commence-

ment of so great and useful an undertaking. I am, therefore, anxious that the attention of government and of Parliament should be directed to the subject, and that the mode of carrying the plan into execution, as well as the means of providing for the expense, should be soon determined.

It is too certain that such a plan cannot be executed by Irish engineers and Irish agents of any description. Neither science, nor skill, nor diligence, nor discipline, nor integrity, sufficient for such a work, can be found in Ireland. I am therefore satisfied that the only source from which the means of executing the survey can be derived is the Ordnance; and that you are the only authority capable of infusing the spirit which such an operation would require into the agency which must be employed. The inaccuracy of the Irish engineers has lately been exhibited most glaringly in the charts and maps of the Irish coast, executed under the direction of the Irish Commissioners for the Fisheries. At the Admiralty you will learn what enormous and dangerous errors have been discovered in those official charts.

I have mentioned this plan of an Irish survey to Mr. Goulburn, but I have not made it the subject of a despatch to government, thinking it would be more successful under your protection and countenance. If you should approve the general idea, it cannot be mentioned too soon in Parliament, and I should be glad if on any favourable occasion you could refer to it in the House of Lords.

Ever, dear Arthur, yours most affectionately,

WELLESLEY.

Lord Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Lisbon, 21st Feb., 1824.

The detention of the packet, from the strong gales which prevent its getting out, enables me to send this by the same opportunity as that I wrote two days since.

The King being most willing to keep me in the present unpleasant situation, and it being most difficult for his ministers or myself by viva voce to bring him to any declaration, I have wrote a letter on the subject, which I propose giving to him myself this night. I have shown it to Palmella. He begins now to see, what has to me been long visible, that the Count de Subserra has got a complete ascendency over the King, and, as I long since foretold Palmella, he begins to show himself not only indifferent, but supercilious to him. This Palmella has to thank himself for, from his want of resolution and firmness, which prevented him taking the manly part he ought, and which I am sure he desired.

They had a little disagreement on the day of the King's investiture of the Russian order of St. Andrew, and the insolence of the Count de Subserra was such that Palmella, who does not want proper pride when roused, in presence of the King declared he would resign his situation. The latter, however, interfered, and there was for the moment an end of it. My letter is to request an immediate decision of his Majesty, as I tell him that it does not become me to remain here in this doubtful and equivocal state; and I feel it to be really so, and am preparing to leave this. I have

arranged my claim respecting the estate I had here; they give me a pension to the amount. All the other claims are in a state to be settled in a few days, so that I could leave this now at a short notice, if you have not accepted of my resignation, which, however, I can see little probability of your not doing. I mentioned in my letter that you will receive with this, that I had spoke to Lord Bathurst respecting the situation lately held by poor Sir Thomas Maitland, and I would certainly like to have it, and would thank you to remind Lord Bathurst. I see, however, by the papers of the likelihood of Lord Hastings getting it. I would not put myself in competition with his Lordship, but I can scarcely think he would take it. His necessities, indeed, may induce him. However, as I said, I do not pretend to compete with him. The missing the winter in England has been of considerable service to my health.

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours very sincerely,

BERESFORD.

[358.] *To* ———— .

SIR, Ordnance Office, 23rd Feb., 1824.

Your letter of the 17th reached me this morning, and I avail myself of the earliest opportunity to inform you that I cannot possibly accept the present which you have thought proper to offer to me. I am unwilling to express to you the disagreeable feeling which your letter has excited, as I am convinced that an officer who has served with so much credit as you have obtained could not be actuated by an improper motive. A little consideration, however, would, I am sure, show you the impropriety of offering a present to an officer to whom you are a total stranger, and with whom, from being in the same department, you would probably be hereafter in the habit of communicating.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[359.] *To Lord Wellesley.*

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, London, 23rd Feb., 1824.

I have received your letter of the 17th instant, and I quite agree in your opinion of the importance of an accurate survey of Ireland. Before I had heard from you, I had had two conversations upon the subject with Mr. Goulburn, and had agreed to undertake the work, which I will endeavour to render as complete as possible. But Mr. Goulburn will most probably have informed you that owing to the want of persons properly

trained, I was apprehensive that I could not undertake to make much progress in the course of the year 1824; but we will make all our preparatory arrangements in this year, and commence next year with such force as will enable us to complete the survey of the whole of Ireland in five or six years. We should only mislead you if we were to promise to do more.

I was very happy to learn from Campbell that you were so well.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Sir Henry Wellesley. [360.]

MY DEAR HENRY, London, 24th Feb., 1824.

I have received your letter by Arbuthnot,* and I enclose my answer to Prince Metternich; and a copy of the answer for your own private information.

We are certainly not upon the most confidential terms with the Allies. But I really think that they should know that even their best friends think that they treat us very ill, and that they can do nothing with us as long as this continues.

I confess that I don't think the matter will be much improved by an alteration of this conduct; as we are radically defective in our diplomatic head-quarters here. But at least the Allies will not be in the wrong; and I shall not have their wrongs brought forward in every discussion.

Your son William is here in my house, and a very fine lad he is. I have got Sir George Cockburn to appoint him midshipman in the 'Medina,' going to the Mediterranean.

Give my best love to Lady Georgiana, and tell her that I will write to her by the first occasion.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Prince Metternich. [361.]

MON CHER PRINCE, London, 24th Feb., 1824.

Major Arbuthnot delivered me your letter on Friday morning, and the subject of it appears to me to be of such importance

* See pages 205, 207.

that I answer it immediately; and I write to you in English, as I am certain of expressing my meaning more clearly in that language, which you read with as much facility as you do French.

I feel as you do the *isolement* of the British government; and I am equally aware with you of the mischief which it does to us as well as to the world; probably more to the world than to us. It is positively true that, although by the use of force you may destroy an evil, such as the revolutions in Naples or in Spain; you can do no permanent good without the assistance of the counsels and of the authority of this country; and I am afraid that you will discover this truth even in the cases above referred to, in which the use of your military force has not been even resisted.

If this *isolement* is then an evil, let us look to the causes of it; and, if I have not mistaken them, it will not be very difficult for you to remove, or at least alleviate them, and in some degree to re-establish confidence.

The first manifest disunion was at Troppau. There had been at Aix-la-Chapelle a good deal of discussion between the Russian Cabinet and us respecting the *Casus Fœderis* of the Treaty of November 1815. But this dispute was brought before the public without the knowledge of our Plenipotentiary by the *Protocole Préliminaire*, and the Circular from Troppau; to the last of which we were obliged in our own defence to reply.

Then followed the Congress at Verona; and I beg leave to recall to your recollection the various occasions on which I ventured to foretell to your Highness the consequence to the Alliance in general of the state of *isolement* in which I was left.

Observe that I don't pretend that upon either occasion the Allies were bound to abandon their object to please the councils of this country; but I contended then as I do now, that as it was an object to the Allies upon both occasions to carry this government with them as far as it could go, it would have been wise to conduct these transactions in such manner as that at least it might not be apparent to the world that we were separated from the Allies; and that the well-meaning people of this country might not have been accustomed to consider that separation as a benefit, instead of an evil.

Along with these transactions has been carried on a system of calumny respecting the conduct and objects of this country which would have astonished me if I had not lived in the days

of the French Revolution, and if I had not known that it proceeded from the seat of that Revolution. But what is surprising is that these calumnies should be received and credited even by our best friends, and those most interested in the maintenance of our character, and circulated by them with almost as much activity as by our enemies.

Thus you will see that it is neither *les choses* themselves nor *les hommes* who have transacted them, that have occasioned the mischief; but the mode in which the transactions which have taken place have been carried on, the pains taken by some to disgust us with the Alliance, and the little pains taken by others to conciliate us towards it, and finally, the unmerited calumnies of which we have been the object, which have been circulated by the former, and have not been too liberally discouraged by the latter.

Under these circumstances comes the *affaire immense* to which you refer, in the solution of which it is very clear that if we have not a greater interest than other Powers, we have a preponderating influence. We might have expected, therefore, to be consulted respecting the mode and time of bringing it under consideration, if not allowed to have our fair share of influence in the final decision.

I'll just state what has occurred upon this question, and leave to you to decide whether any measures have been taken to induce this government to come out of its *isolement*.

The Allies in their Council decide that Spain shall demand their assistance, counsel, or mediation, no matter which, as it is the demand of Spain, not the nature of it, which is at present under consideration. I know that the first proposition came from the Allies, because M. de Talaru boasts that he improved the proposition drawn by General Pozzo di Borgo. But I would beg to ask, was Sir William A'Court, or the Ambassador at Paris, or this government, consulted either upon the proposition itself, or upon the mode of making it, or the time, or upon any one circumstance connected with the proposition? But that is not all. This government no doubt possesses a preponderating influence upon this *affaire*. A strong interest is likewise felt upon it in the country; and the opinions prevailing in the country, as is usual, have their influence in Parliament, and even in the Cabinet. Under these circumstances it would have been desirable to endeavour to conciliate this government

towards the councils of the Allies; and to take care that there should be nothing either in the proposition itself or in the mode of making it which should insult us, or remind us of our *isolement*.

Now, I request you to read the proposition sent to us from Madrid; and I think you will agree that we might have avoided altogether to give any answer by saying that it was not made to us; and that on the other hand we might, if so disposed, have thrown back the whole question upon the Allies, and have declared that, in consequence of that Note, we would have no communication with any Power upon that *affaire*. I intreat, then, that we may not be blamed for this *isolement*. It requires all the temper, moderation, and circumspection of our Councils to bear the manner in which we have been treated upon this and other questions.

I here quit that part of your letter which relates to our *isolement;* and I now refer to the *fond* of the *affaire immense* to which your letter relates.

I think you are all mistaken respecting the influence of this *affaire* upon your respective destinies. Its settlement is important to Spain; and in this view is more important to this country than to any other in Europe. But as long as Spain is governed as that country is, it appears impossible for us or the Allies collectively to effect any good; and most particularly not in the way in which the attempt has been made lately, that is by political intrigue.

Who directed, or rather who knew of the decree of the Council of the Indies at Madrid, almost of the same date with the note to the Allied Courts which I have just discussed? Who suggested the decree since issued to open the ports in America, in direct contradiction of that above mentioned; but of which, in reality, the last article renders the whole nugatory? Can any man in his senses believe that the Allies have, or can have, any real solid beneficial influence in a country in which such transactions occur on the very question which is under their consideration?

But the Spaniards with all their folly have some sense. They know well that all the Powers of Europe without this country can effect nothing in America; and the Allies may rely upon it, that intrigue with the *Camarilla* never settled any *affaire* either there or elsewhere.

I have already told you that the mode of originating and that of making the late proposition to us were sufficient reasons to induce us to take the line upon it which we did take, but I don't scruple to add that since the mediation at Paris in the affair of Monte Video, I have been quite convinced that a mediation by the Allies by means of a council of subordinate ministers was impracticable. Ask General Vincent how the settlement upon that subject was defeated which I had completed not less than twice.

Yet observe that the failure of this settlement was the cause of the loss of America, and of the revolution in Spain.

I beg your Highness will look at the proceedings of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle upon this subject of a mediation between Spain and her revolted colonies; and you will see that this opinion regarding the unfitness of a council of subordinate Allied ministers to mediate in this question was entertained by the late Lord Londonderry and myself, and even by others at that time. I therefore should have considered it my duty under any circumstances, as a member of this government, to advise the King to decline to become a party to a conference having for its object such a mediation; and I am certain that when your Highness will come to reflect with your usual sagacity upon the circumstances to which I have above referred regarding late and former negotiations at Madrid and Paris, and will look at the nature of our government and the opinions which prevail in England, upon this occasion you will agree with me in opinion that we ought not to risk, or rather render certain, the loss of the only influence which exists capable of bringing this *affaire* to a settlement, by placing that influence at the disposal of a conference of subordinate ministers, whose proceedings might be paralyzed or controlled by such transactions as those to which I have above referred.

I have already made this letter so long that I will not lengthen it farther by doing more than adverting to other topics. It is true that we have disagreeable discussions with France; some possibly not necessary, others, however necessary, aggravated by the mode of discussion adopted. Neither I nor anybody else can be answerable for the manner or the words of any other individual, any more than I can be for speeches in Parliament or at public meetings, or paragraphs in newspapers,

which are our daily food here, and which scarcely attract, and never occupy our attention for a moment.

But this I must say, that there is no act of this government, there is scarcely a word in any public document of which any Power can complain; and I earnestly intreat that you, *mon cher Prince,* who in many respects are placed in the centre of Europe and at the head of its councils, will do us justice; and that you will endeavour by your influence and example to prevail upon others to consider our real situation, and to conduct themselves towards us in the manner which is becoming on account of the station we fill, and the mode in which we have always conducted ourselves; and this for their own sakes as well as for the sake of the world at large.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Lisbon, 28th Feb., 1824.

The annexed did not, as I expected it would, go in the last packet. I gave, myself, the letter I therein mentioned this day week (Saturday) to the King. He said he would immediately read it, but on Sunday I stayed away, and, to avoid seeing me, he had also that night stayed out late, and had projected to go off early on Monday to Salvaterra, but was prevented by the weather, so that on that evening I saw him and requested his decision on what I had wrote to him. He was particularly attentive and kind, but said he had not read it all, and it required being perused with great attention, as the object was of great moment. By that one would have thought he had some doubt on the subject, at least any one that did not know the King. He had but a few hours before he gave me that answer, made the Count de Subserra one of his chamberlains, as a particular mark of his regard: and it is so indeed, as no such thing is recollected as a minister being made, whilst such, a chamberlain.

The next day early his Majesty set off for Salvaterra, and so leaves me. This, as you will have seen by my letters, was no matter of surprise to me, nor does it make any difference as to my plans or time. I am endeavouring to bring to a conclusion my other concerns, and so soon as those are settled I shall not stay here an hour longer than is my convenience, and, indeed, I have long since acted and taken things as if there was nothing else in question than these personal arrangements.

Since my last letter to you we have had no packet, the winds being quite contrary. I still propose, if there is no immediate necessity for my returning direct, to go by way of Spain, that is Cadiz and Madrid.

Believe me, my dear Duke, ever yours sincerely,

BERESFORD.

Lord Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Lisbon, 1st March, 1824.

Since last writing to you a packet has arrived, but, not having brought me any letter from you, I am in the same uncertainty about myself as before; nor should I have wrote to you by this packet, but for the extraordinary occurrence which has taken place in the death of the Marquis de Loulé. He was one of those that were with Massena's army, and remained with the French till the fall of Bonaparte; he then went to the Rio in an English packet, and threw himself on the King's mercy, and worked himself into the palace peu-à-peu, and at length became the King's great favourite (valido). He was the sworn friend and great supporter of the Count de Subserra, and equally detested by the nation. On Saturday last, after some rehearsal of a play, to be acted in the theatre at Salvaterra, belonging and adjoining to the palace, in which the Marquis was taking a part, this ended, all withdrew at about nine o'clock at night to the interior of the palace, which communicates by a corridor with the theatre. At the King's supper, where the Marquis de Loulé always assisted, he did not appear, and the King was uneasy and sent to look for him; but he was not to be found, and notwithstanding every search, he was only discovered at eight o'clock the next morning, and appeared to have been assassinated and thrown into a part of the old palace, which some few years since had been burnt down. We only heard of this shocking event yesterday, and we are not yet informed with any accuracy of any particular, other than that he was assassinated, and in the palace. It is a most singular circumstance how in that palace such a deed could have been perpetrated without some noise, or other indication of violence being perceived, as it does not appear that he was stabbed, or otherwise by a blow deprived immediately of life, as they say the only wound perceptible is in the inside of the mouth. His being estimated by the nation as a traitor, as a supporter and partisan of Pamplona, and being certainly the person who had the strongest influence over the King's mind, and the assassination being committed in the palace, and almost immediately close to the King, is what makes this a case of great importance. To-day there are pasquins in the town, saying that the traitor Loulé is dead, and that Pamplona will be so in eight days. The suspicions respecting the authors of this murder are various, but we are here at present too little acquainted with the case to judge, and it is therefore useless to say on whom those suspicions light. The national indignation against Pamplona is great. There has also been a very unpleasant thing at Coimbra, where, on one of the students calling out "Viva el Rey!" all the rest called out "Morra el Rey!" and when the superiors went to quell the disturbance three shots were fired at the Conservador; but he was missed; however, it is said two of the civil officers with him were killed. These threats against the Marquis de Loulé and the Count de Subserra have been of some standing, and against the latter they still continue, and I really think he runs a great risk, and he is not a very brave person. Your friend Sampayo, Count da Povoa, has been foolish enough to take to himself a wife; a young, and not bad-looking girl; but his vanity has induced him to go to one of the first families here—that of Angeja—for an alliance. He was yesterday married to the daughter of the

Count de Peniche, and general conjecture is far out if she makes him a happy man. He has settled on her 100,000*l.*, besides the third of all his fortune at his death, and that will be some hundred thousands more. I had omitted to say that the death of the Marquis de Loulé brings back the King to Lisbon much sooner than was expected: he is said to come the day after to-morrow.

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours most sincerely,

BERESFORD.

[362.] *To Sir H. Fane.*

MY DEAR FANE, London, 4th March, 1824.

I have received your letter, and I had yesterday an opportunity of speaking to Lord Bathurst about you.

I must first tell you that I did not apply, and would not do you and your claims to be G.C.B. the injury of applying for that honour for you. But I stated your claims in comparison with those of others, and although Lord Bathurst did not, and could not, promise me that you should have the next Cross that is vacant, I can assure you that there is not any disposition anywhere to pass you over. I intreat you then to be quiet, and to leave the affair in my hands. When I shall see you I will talk over with you the whole subject; and will not conceal from you what Lord Bathurst said to me. But it is now of no importance, as I assure you that he is as much inclined to do you justice as I could wish him to be.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[363.] *To Lord Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD, London, 5th March, 1824.

I see in the newspapers that Mr. Canning presented the papers on the Spanish colonies last night, and that you have given notice that you will present them this night. I understood that we were previously to have a discussion on the subject in the Cabinet; which probably did take place in one of our recent meetings before I arrived.

I certainly was not desirous of giving any further trouble on a subject on which I believe nobody was of the same opinion with me; but as I differ positively with the government on this proceeding, I trouble you with a few lines to state the grounds of that difference.

The moment the government lay papers before Parliament on any political question, the decision is no longer practically in their hands. Whatever may be the consequence in point of form, the decision of the government in point of fact cannot be independent.

Now, I contend that this question is not yet ripe for Parliament. Contingencies may occur which would have an influence on different parts of it.

First. An explanation has been made of the condition attached to our offer of aid and countenance to a Spanish negotiation with the colonies as held out in Mr. Canning's letter of the 30th of January, which even if the Spanish government had declined the first offer, which they have not, may occasion and may involve this government in such a negotiation.

Secondly. The result of the inquiry now making in New Spain may be, that it may not be deemed expedient by government to extend their relations with that part of the world; or Thirdly, there may exist reasons for not extending them, independently of any inquiry.

The consequence of producing these papers at present is, that Parliament must form a judgment upon the whole subject, which must have its influence hereafter, whatever form it may assume, and however disadvantageous whenever the final decision is to be made; and that the decision of the government cannot be independent as it ought to be.

But this is not all. Foreigners who have witnessed and are aware of the caution and reserve with which we are in the habit of communicating papers of this description to Parliament, will see in this act a desire to throw it out of our own hands. They will naturally believe, therefore, that it is our wish to see it settled one way; and that our offer of aid and countenance, our recent explanation of the condition of that offer, and all our professions of moderation and disinterestedness upon this subject, are insincere.

For all these reasons, and because I really cannot see what advantage is gained by the immediate production of these papers, I should have wished that the production of them had been delayed. But I feel no desire to give the Cabinet any further trouble upon the subject.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

[364.] *To Mr.* ———.

MY DEAR SIR, London, 11th March, 1824.

I am very sorry to hear of the death of Colonel Colebrooke, who is a great loss to the service, and I sincerely condole with Mrs. ———, to whom I beg to present my best compliments.

I believe it is true that in two or three years Sir Edward Paget will return from India, and I have already had no less than three applications that I will use my influence to have a successor appointed to him.

Having long commanded the armies of this country on foreign service, nearly all the General Officers, candidates for public employment, have served under my command; and I had, moreover, the good fortune to separate from all of them on the best and most cordial terms. It is natural therefore, that they should look up to me to forward their views and interests.

But these facts place me out of the ordinary line of a patron or friend. I cannot press the views of ———, for instance, upon this situation of Commander-in-Chief in succession to Sir Edward Paget, without adverting to the views of others, his seniors possibly, and their claims to public employment.

In short, without being the disposer of the patronage of the government, I am obliged to weigh the claims of different individuals to its favour, and, as an individual, to decide upon their respective merits and claims.

I think you will concur with me, that this is not a very enviable situation. But this is the one which I fill.

Now I must say in answer to your letter that, knowing what I do of the wishes and claims of others senior to ———, I cannot undertake to press them upon the Duke of York and government in order that he may succeed to the command in India. I cannot think that it would be right to urge them against those of others, who wish to obtain this situation, and who will not be well pleased, and with reason, if ——— should be preferred to them.

I assure you that one of the hardest tasks imposed upon me is the necessity of writing such a letter as this.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Sir H. Taylor. [365.]

MY DEAR GENERAL, London, 13th March, 1824.

I enclose a letter from Lord Combermere, which I beg you to lay before his Royal Highness.

I have told him that Sir E. Paget would not come home before 1826, even if he should come then; and that of course no arrangement, or promise of an arrangement, would be made till that period should approach; but that I should send his letter, with my opinion of his fitness for the situation. At the same time I have informed him that I know of others who will look to this situation.

Yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Combermere. [366.]

MY DEAR LORD COMBERMERE, London, 13th March, 1824.

I have received your letter regarding the command in India. I know that Sir E. Paget has no thought of quitting India before the year 1826, and of course no appointment to fill his situation will be made till the time of his coming away shall approach, nor any promise. I send your letter, however, to his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, with my opinion of your fitness for the situation. I can do no more, as you must be aware that every officer who has served looks to me to forward his objects in the service; and not a few are desirous of obtaining this very situation. Without having the power, therefore, I have all the disadvantages of the person who has the disposal of the situation.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Sir Frederick Adam. [367.]

MY DEAR GENERAL, London, 13th March, 1824.

I received only a few days ago your letter of 27th January.

I am happy to tell you that delay in its arrival was not injurious to your interests. It had long been thought by some

in this country that the attention of the Lord Commissioner of the Ionian Islands ought not to be diverted from his business by other objects; and it was determined upon the death of Sir Thomas Maitland to divide the command which he had held. This being done, nothing but your relative rank with others could prevent your being appointed the Lord Commissioner; and I assure you that there was no man who rejoiced more than I did to see you placed in a situation for which you had so eminently qualified yourself by frequently performing its duties during the long absences of Sir Thomas Maitland.

I beg leave to congratulate you most heartily, and that you will believe me,

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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[368] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 15th March, 1824.

I return Sir Charles's despatches, with a Memorandum on the French occupation of Spain.

I likewise enclose a curious letter from Lord Beresford.

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM ON THE OCCUPATION OF SPAIN.

15th March, 1824.

It appears to me upon a perusal of the despatches of Sir Charles Stuart,† particularly No. 103, which contains the distribution of the French army in Spain, that that army is not stronger than is necessary for the purpose intended, indeed not so strong as would be necessary if it were not quite certain that the great majority of the people were in favour of the order of things which renders the occupation necessary.

The distribution of the force likewise is by no means suspicious, considering the nature of preceding transactions.

Cadiz was the cradle of the Constitution, and the seat of the conspiracy which overturned the King's authority, and re-esta-

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* See page 227.

† Nos. 548, 630, of 1823; 97, 103, 129, 131, of 1824.

blished the Constitution in 1820. That Constitution was more firmly established in the large towns than elsewhere; and as the whole of the regular army was to be disbanded, and the royalist army, as it was called, to be dispersed, the Revolution might have broken out afresh, and, in fact, the King of Spain would have had no support for his authority in the large towns if these had not been occupied by the French troops.

The occupation must not be compared to the occupation of France by the Allies in 1815.

At Paris the Garde Nationale, to the amount of 30,000 men, always existed: and was loyally disposed, at least so far as to preserve the peace of the metropolis; and it must be observed that the new French Guards and other troops were formed before the last of the Allied Army withdrew from Paris in February, 1816. It must be observed likewise that above seven months had then elapsed since the entry into Paris by the Allies, during which time troops to be relied upon had been organized in many parts of the country.

It must likewise be observed that the Gendarmerie in France, a corps of not less than 30,000 horsemen, and always disposed to support the existing authority, were sufficient to preserve internal tranquillity against the efforts of individual disturbers, while the position of the Army of Occupation in the frontier departments would have enabled that army to move at once in case of any serious effort of insurrection.

In Spain there is nothing which can be relied upon excepting the French army.

As I have above observed, the nature of preceding transactions will account for the occupation of the large towns. But I think it necessary to observe, that I can account for the occupation of Badajos by other reasons. The occupation of Cadiz is absolutely necessary; but the communication with Cadiz is not satisfactory if Badajos is not in the possession of troops in whom those occupying Cadiz can confide.

It must be observed that the state of Portugal is not calculated to give much confidence to the Commander-in-Chief of the French army in Spain, and in his place I should not like to keep a large detachment at Cadiz without possessing Badajoz.

WELLINGTON.

[369.] *To Major-General Sir Herbert Taylor.*

MY DEAR GENERAL, London, 17th March, 1824.

I return the papers which you were so kind as to send me the day before yesterday. It is absolutely necessary that the maximum of the price of commissions should be fixed by regulation; and equally so that this regulation should be enforced by all the regulations which can be applied to the subject, and by the exercise of the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, and even if necessary of his Majesty's prerogative. It is my opinion that the prices fixed by the existing regulations are as high as they ought to be; and I was of opinion at the time the Board of which I was a member fixed those prices, as I am now, that it was a waste of time to make the alteration, and that the authority of his Royal Highness over the army would suffer if the new regulation should not be strictly enforced. Upon this point I believe we are all agreed, as likewise that the certificate upon honour is useless, that it is commonly signed whether the contents are known to be true or known to be otherwise, and that on this ground alone it ought to be discontinued.

I confess, however, that although it is very desirable to enforce the regulation strictly, and although we may be able to check the daily practice of breaking it, it will be impossible to attain the complete and universal enforcement of it. But still, whatever may be our hopes of complete success, it is absolutely necessary, for the sake of the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, that every effort should be made.

I confess that I do not like your propositions in No. 1 or No. 2. The plan detailed in No. 1 would be, in fact, to raise the price of commissions, which, in my opinion, is now as high as it ought to be. It would, besides, check, control, and diminish the patronage and power of choice of the Commander-in-Chief. The plan in No. 2 would destroy the connection between the regiment and its officers, and would force officers to look to patronage for promotion. The best plan is that in No. 3. But when the certificate should be abolished I would propose first to forbid army agents to interfere in any manner in army promotions, and I would not suffer money to be lodged in their hands for that purpose, and this on pain of his Royal Highness's displeasure.

I would forbid army brokers to interfere, and would declare the determination of the Commander-in-Chief to recommend to his Majesty to cancel the grant of any commission granted in consequence of any negotiation with them. I would likewise recommend to his Royal Highness to declare to the army his determination to recommend to his Majesty to cancel any commission granted, for which it shall appear that the officer appointed to it has paid more than the regulated price; and to dismiss from his Majesty's service any Colonel or Commanding officer of a regiment who may appear to have forwarded or recommended such appointment, knowing that more than the regulated price had been, or was to be, paid for it. I am aware that much of what I have above proposed is difficult to carry into execution, and, as I have aboye stated, it may be impossible to prevent the evil altogether. But these regulations will at least show the determination of his Royal Highness and the authorities of the army to attain their object, and I think you will find few Commanding Officers disposed to risk their commissions to put a little more money into the pocket of an officer about to retire. To this letter, already too long, I have to add my opinion that you must extend your regulations to the exchanges between full and half-pay; and that you must prevent the sale of half-pay commissions, and possibly even put an end to your arrangements with the Artillery and Marines.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

FIRST MEMORANDUM.

FIRST PLAN.

To stop all regimental promotion by purchase, and on the retirement of an officer the successor to be selected by the Commander-in-Chief from the general mass.

SECOND PLAN.

The certificate to be dispensed with, and an intimation given that the parties giving or receiving, as well as the Commanding Officer, if privy to the bargain, to be dismissed the service.

Both these being objectionable, the Commander-in-Chief proposes to raise the price of commissions in all cases where the promotion does not go in the regiment, and of the surplus to form a fund to be applied to special cases.

SECOND MEMORANDUM.

Proposition that in certain cases of inability an officer may be permitted to receive a certain proportion beyond the regulation to be paid by the officer purchasing.

THIRD MEMORANDUM.

Regulations which might enable the Commander-in-Chief to dispense with the certificate.

Sir H. Taylor to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

REGARDING THE DUKE'S SUGGESTIONS TO PREVENT THE SALE OF COMMISSIONS AT A PRICE BEYOND THE REGULATIONS.

Horse Guards, March, 1824.

The Duke of Wellington proposes, in addition to what is suggested in No. 3—

1. To forbid army agents to interfere in any manner in army promotions.

1. The regimental agents are so established by regulation and sanctioned by Act of Parliament; they are, in fact, the attorneys of the colonels of regiments, and their interference, so far as it is sanctioned, could not be dispensed with without serious inconvenience and embarrassment to the service.

The actual regulations direct the regimental agents to make regular communications to the commanding officers of regiments of all appointments, promotions, &c., &c., specifying the dates of the same.

Colonels when absent from England and Ireland, and if their regiments are also abroad, *may empower their regimental agents to recommend purchasers for vacant commissions, in which case they must sign the necessary certificates*, as well as the recommendations for the purchases.

The quarterly returns of purchasers must be forwarded to the regimental agents for the information of their respective colonels.

The 134th clause of the Mutiny Act directs that every person, *not being an authorized agent to some regiment, troop, or company*, &c., who shall *negotiate* or act as agent for, and in relation to, the *purchase, sale*, or *exchange*, of any commission, shall forfeit for every such offence the sum of one hundred pounds; and, &c., &c.

2. Not to suffer money to be lodged in their hands for that purpose (purchase of commissions).

2. The regulation directs that the quarterly returns shall particularly state where the money of each individual who is desirous of purchasing is lodged or to be obtained.

Officers are not *required* to lodge the purchase-money with the agents until the vacancy is reported, and the succession is approved, and this appears indispensable.

But they are frequently told that they need not lodge the money until so officially called for, and this might be enforced by General Order or regulation.

On the other hand, the regimental agent may, in many instances, be their private bankers, and responsible as such for the money being forthcoming.

3. To forbid any army brokers to interfere in the sale and purchase of commissions, and to declare the determination of the Commander-in-Chief to recommend to his Majesty to cancel the grant of any commission given in consequence of any negotiation through them.

3. This is already done by the Act of 49 George III. cap. 126, "for the further prevention of the Sale and Brokerage of Offices," clauses 4 and 5; by which "it is enacted that persons so acting will be guilty of a misdemeanour, shall forfeit for every such offence the sum of one hundred pounds, and treble the value of the sum paid or received above the regulation price."

4. To declare to the army, the Commander-in-Chief's determination to recommend to his Majesty to cancel any commission granted for which it shall appear that the officer appointed to it has paid more than the regulated price, and to dismiss from his Majesty's service any colonel or commanding officer of a regiment who may appear to have forwarded or recommended such appointment knowing that more than the regulation price had been or was to be paid for it.

4. This also is already done by the above Act of 49 George III., which directs that any officer concerned directly or indirectly, &c., &c., shall, "on being convicted thereof by a General Court Martial, *forfeit his commission and be cashiered*, or, if he shall have quitted the service, shall be deemed and adjudged guilty of a misdemeanour."

The extract of the Act and the clause in the Mutiny Act are inserted in the General Orders and Regulations of the Army, and are also published occasionally in the Monthly Army List.

The orders and declarations are therefore not wanting, if by these the practice could be checked, and they are, in fact, stronger than those suggested, and impose heavier penalties.

But in either case the difficulty is to establish the proof, without which the promotion could not be cancelled, nor the officer himself, or those parties to the transaction, dismissed the service.

In these respects, therefore, nothing would be gained by the proposed declarations.

But if the certificate is to be abolished, the opportunity might be taken of making a reference to the Act and the clause in the Mutiny Act, and to cancel, alter, and amend, some of the regulations.

The Duke of Wellington proposes that the sale of half-pay commissions should be prevented.

The sale of half-pay commissions is not now allowed in any case.

If a reduction is about to take place, and the regimental officer is permitted to sell his commission previously to such reduction, the purchaser is

placed on half-pay, and this is called the purchase of a half-pay commission subject to reduction.

The same rule applies to the sale of unattached commissions, namely, those of General Officers holding regimental commissions. The commission is a full-pay commission, but the successor is immediately placed on half-pay.

This applies equally to the sale of commissions in the Royal Artillery and Royal Marines, which are also full-pay commissions, and sold as such, although the purchaser is placed on half-pay.

In both the latter cases no private bargain can exist, the name of the seller is given in, and his successor is unknown to him until gazetted.

This may be strictly enforced in all sales of unattached commissions.

H. TAYLOR.

[370.] *To Lord Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, London, 20th March, 1824.

I have lately had a correspondence with your department regarding certain issues and removals of Ordnance stores in the island of Jamaica, and I beg to draw your attention particularly to the draft of an order from the Board of Ordnance, dated the 13th of February, to the respective officers in Jamaica, which I had desired might be submitted to your office before it should be sent, and to the letter from Mr. Wilmot Horton* of the 10th March, in answer to the communication of the order above mentioned.

From the long intercourse which I have had with your department I may safely appeal to you to certify that I am not a very difficult person to deal with, and by no means disposed to be unaccommodating. But I must fairly say that I cannot consent to allow the business of my department to be conducted as is proposed in Mr. Horton's letter of the 10th inst.

I enclose you the copy of the third article of the instructions to the storekeepers of the Ordnance, under the King's sign manual; from which you will see that I am not authorised to allow of the issue and removal of stores, unless under a warrant under the sign manual or an order in council. I believe I could appeal to your experience of a predecessor of mine, who never allowed of such issue excepting in consequence of a previous discussion in Cabinet!

I desire no such thing. All I desire is that this department

* Under-Secretary for the Colonies.

may not be exposed to the expense of these issues and removals merely in consequence of the caprice, or of the apprehensions of responsibility of the General Officers commanding in the several colonies; but that when a General Officer shall think proper to order such removal or issue, he should state the order in a warrant, and the service for which the stores are demanded or ordered to be removed.

I know enough of the character of General Officers in general, and of Sir John Keane in particular, to be very certain that if he is obliged to state the reason for incurring an expense in a public instrument, he will hesitate about giving the order for incurring it; but that if there should be no such check upon him there will be no end to his dislocation of stores and magazines; and, moreover, when he will really require them, he will not find them at his disposition, but scattered all over the country.

Very lately there was an insurrection of a few negroes upon a gentleman's estate, and Sir John Keane immediately ordered the Ordnance officers to hire, without loss of time, horses and mules to move a field train, and to be held in a constant state of readiness to take the field, with reserve horses, &c. He forgot, by-the-bye, to order that horses or drivers should be trained. But the expense for which this department, and not General Keane, is responsible was two pounds currency a day for each horse and mule. Two days after the order was given it was countermanded; but the expense incurred in the mean time was seventy-two pounds.

All that I wish is that General Officers, in the situation of General Keane, should be obliged to consider a little of the real necessity for such orders before they issue them; and that they should feel that there is a department interested in the review of the necessity for such orders after they have been carried into execution.

To conclude this long letter, I shall be very sorry to throw impediments in the way of the service; but I must declare that if some measure is not adopted which shall assure me that the conduct of General Officers in giving such orders to the officers of the Ordnance will be reviewed, I must act strictly upon the instructions in the King's warrant.

Ever, my dear Lord Bathurst, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

EXTRACT from his Majesty's Instructions to the Storekeeper of the Ordnance.

"3. To issue or deliver none of our stores under his charge without a warrant or proposition in writing agreed upon by our principal officers, and signed under the hands of three or more of them, grounded upon warrant under our Royal signet and sign manual, or order of our Council."

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[371] *To the Duke of* ——.

MY LORD DUKE, London, 25th March, 1824.

I have had the honour of receiving your Grace's letter, regarding the promotion of Lord Charles ——.

I have before now taken occasion to recommend Lord Charles —— to H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief for promotion; and I am ready to renew that recommendation when it may be necessary. But I beg leave to observe to your Grace that what Lord Charles is desirous of having is not promotion in the usual course by purchase or without purchase, but by brevet at my recommendation.

I have always objected and it is quite impossible for me to recommend any individual officer for such promotion. Hundreds have merited it by their services, and I should deservedly incur their reproaches for partiality if I were to select one individual to receive the promotion.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[372.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Windsor, 28th March, 1824.

I return the draft to Sir W. A'Court.

It is very unfortunate that the gentlemen in Mexico should have lost sight of their instructions. It is not practicable to keep from Spain and other Powers the information brought by Mr. Ward. But the communication of the despatches, as the foundation of our future proceedings, will be very injurious to us.

Our proceedings upon this subject hitherto have been founded upon the essential interests of the King's subjects; and we

have told Spain and the world that we should act according to our views of those interests. In this draft, however, we give the Spanish government to understand, that if they don't recognise Mexico as an independent State in a certain period of time, this government will establish a political relation with Mexico, whatever may be the nature of the communications made by the gentleman who is expected here on the part of the Mexican government, thus resting our case solely upon these despatches of Mr. Hervey.

The contents of these despatches become then of infinite importance. It is useless to observe upon the positive decision pronounced at the end of eight days' residence in the town of Mexico, on the relative strength of the different parties in that country, any more than upon the departure from instruction, or on the measures adopted respecting the Slave Trade, and the sending home Mr. Ward. I must, however, observe, these despatches are written in such a tone and temper as to do but little credit to the government, and to render it still more necessary to be cautious in the communication of them to other Powers.

Then with respect to the ulterior object which you have in view, you must, in consistency with your former declarations, be able to show that his Majesty's subjects have an interest in the extension of the political relations of this country with the State of New Spain. Now I beg you to observe, that Mr. Hervey states, in plain terms, first, that you will do nothing for this independent State unless you should take it under your protection, and clear the seas of its enemies; and, secondly, that if you don't take this step this independent State must apply to the United States for protection, who will grant it. But this is not all. Mr. Hervey states in great detail the proceedings on his own disembarkation; he besides sends the correspondence with Sir John Phillimore, in which he states in positive terms his apprehensions of the blockade of Vera Cruz and its neighbourhood by a Spanish naval force stationed under the guns of St. Juan de Ulloa; and as well as I recollect, for I read the despatches only once, he states in his Report the consequence of such a blockade. Well he may! for in fact the independent State of New Spain might as well be in the moon as where it is in relation to British interests if this blockade

were established, and we should, as we must, respect it. If then the government propose to found their future measures upon this subject on these despatches I earnestly recommend that they should be kept secret; and that you should state, merely on their authority, that there are three parties in the State of New Spain, all of them determined to have nothing to say to the mother country.

I have had no conversation with any member of the government upon this subject, and don't know what the opinions of others are. But my own opinion is that nothing should be done upon these despatches, excepting to give Spain the information above stated; and to defer any final decision, according to the original intention, till the gentleman shall arrive who it may be expected will be enabled to give the government the information on which it can found its decision.

Believe me, &c.

WELLINGTON.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, London, March, 1824.

I have received your letter. I certainly had supposed that it had been finally determined by the Cabinet, when you were present some days ago, that the correspondence respecting Spanish America should be laid before Parliament, subject to the consent of Prince Polignac, with regard to the Memorandum of October; and the day after this determination Mr. Canning announced to the Cabinet that Prince Polignac had not only no objection, but even wished that the Memorandum should be laid, provided the latter part relative to the Allies was left out.

I regret very much that we should differ on this important subject. If this was one of those pure diplomatic questions connected with a depending negotiation, upon which the Government could refuse any explanation, decline giving an answer to any questions which might be proposed in Parliament, and had abstained from any communication to other Foreign Powers, the case would be very different. But I do not see how it could be possible for Ministers to refuse fully to explain themselves as to what has been their conduct respecting South America, and as to what is the actual state of that question as far as this country is concerned; more particularly as the information which has been produced has been communicated to almost all the governments of Europe, as well as to that of the United States of America; and I sincerely believe that the production of these papers, so far from embarrassing our course in future, will give us a latitude both as to negotiation, if Spain should resist our good offices, and as to the time and

circumstances of recognition, of which we should find ourselves wholly deprived by any unwillingness, or even backwardness, to explain our past policy and our present position as to Spain and the American provinces.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

To Mr. Planta, Junr. [373.]

MEMORANDUM. — ANSWER TO HIS NOTE OF 11TH MARCH, RESPECTING M. LE DIEU'S REPRESENTATION OF THE COMTE GARAT'S CLAIM FOR DAMAGE TO HIS ESTATE NEAR BAYONNE BY THE ALLIED ARMIES.

Ordnance Office, 2nd April, 1824.

I must observe upon this case of M. Garat's that it has been under my consideration for more than ten years; and that I have made repeated Reports upon it, as well to the Treasury as to the Foreign Office.

When the British army entered France in the year 1813, I issued a proclamation and order, of which the enclosed is a copy.*

I had a right to exercise the rights of war as I pleased; and certainly a Frenchman of all other men, and above all a revolutionary Frenchman, had no right to complain of even the most extended exercise of those rights, particularly by the Commander-in-Chief of an Allied army invading France from Spain. But the exercise of these rights, as stated in the annexed Proclamation and General Order, was very limited; and was applied only to those who should absent themselves from their dwellings.

These rights were exercised in respect to a property belonging to Comte Garat, at Urdains, in the neighbourhood of Bayonne.

After the conclusion of the war Comte Garat applied to me himself, and through the medium of his friends, for compensation for the losses which he had sustained in his property near Bayonne.

I directed the Commissary-General to adopt the usual means of discovering the amount and value of these losses, and he

* See vol. viii., *Supplementary Despatches*, pp. 67 and 331.

reported them to be twelve thousand francs; which sum I directed should be paid to the Count.

The Count, however, was not satisfied with this sum; he claimed compensation for losses sustained in the Commune of Bassusarri, besides that for losses at Urdains and Urtaritz; and, moreover, for the damage done to his property in consequence of a fortified military post having been established upon it.

In respect to the losses claimed at Bassusarri I stated what was the fact, that that village had been for some days in possession of the French troops, after those of the Allies had been at Urdains and Urtaritz, and that when our troops took possession of Bassusarri, there was not a house in the commune which had not been plundered and destroyed; and many of them burnt; and that the village having been the scene of contest for some days, scarcely an inhabitant remained in it, or returned to it during the winter.

In respect to the fortified post at Urdains, I stated to Comte Garat the fact that the French army had never paid, nor indeed had our army, for the damage done to property by the construction of fortified military posts on such property. That that was the natural consequence of a country becoming the seat of war, and that there was no instance on record of such damage having been paid for by the hostile army engaged in the operations. This then is the case of Comte Garat, and I must protest against his being paid more than the Commissary-General could report was the value of the property taken and consumed by the troops on his property.

Wellington.

[374.] *To Sir J. Malcolm.*

My dear Malcolm, London, 3rd April, 1824.

I received yesterday your letter of the 1st.

When I wrote to you the first note to which you refer, in which I begged you not to be too sanguine, I was aware of the desire of Lord Liverpool to promote Mr. Lushington to one of the governments of India. I went to the Cabinet immediately afterwards, and I there found not only that my former intelligence upon the subject was confirmed, but that especial

objections existed to your appointment to the office which you particularly desired to fill. Of these objections I informed you, and I told you what I found to be the fact, that I was not considered a fair judge upon such a question in a case in which you were concerned, as I had taken the field so often, and upon every occasion in your favour.

So the matter rested.

The question then comes before me in this light. There is a vacancy in the government of India, and Lord Liverpool thinks proper to propose, not that Mr. Lushington should fill that vacancy, but that Mr. Elphinstone, to whose pretensions the directors were likely to look favourably, should be appointed to Fort St. George, and that Mr. Lushington should succeed to the government of Bombay. In this decision Lord Liverpool thinks proper to pass by your pretensions, and the opinion and wishes of others in their favour. But having thus decided, can I with honour or with any advantage to you take part against Lord Liverpool? Certainly not. In the contest between Lord Liverpool or the government on the one hand, and the Court of Directors on the other, whatever may be my opinion or wishes of or in favour of the individuals put forward by the parties, I can take the side of the government alone; and I certainly must and will (as it is my duty to do) encourage Lord Liverpool by every means in my power to carry his object, and to consent to nothing unless his object should be carried.

I am much concerned that his choice has not fallen upon you. But to tell you the truth, I suspect that if it had, he would not have been more successful in his negotiations with the Directors than he has been in favour of Mr. Lushington. You are become popular in Leadenhall-street, not because you deserve to be so, but because you happen to be the fittest instrument at the moment to be thrown in the face of the government, and to oppose to them. But if you had been proposed by the government then all the reasons against your appointment would have been urged as strongly as those in favour of it are at present.

I told you before, and I repeat it, you cannot succeed if Lord Liverpool does his duty firmly as he ought.

I shall regret exceedingly if you and Mr. Elphinstone should

have the King's negative put upon your appointments, but I do declare positively that if I were in Lord Liverpool's place, knowing both as I do, and appreciating as I have a right to do, the talents and fitness of both, I would recommend to the King, under the circumstances above stated, not to confirm the appointment of either.

Believe me, &c.,

Wellington.

[375.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

My dear Mr. Canning, London, 4th April, 1824.

I return the papers which you sent to me to peruse.

It appears to me that the French government are, as usual, playing a double game. They wish to have the merit in the eyes of their Allies and of the monarchical party in the world of discountenancing the revolutions in South America; at the same time they wish that their subjects should enjoy all the advantages of trading with those countries, and they countenance their revolutions sufficiently to attain that object. But I don't think we have reason to apprehend that they will outrun us.

I have not yet seen the corrected draft to Sir W. A'Court, but the more I reflect upon what was determined upon, the more convinced I am that the Cabinet has decided correctly in making Spain acquainted with the intelligence as far as it goes, and in making the offer which has been made respecting Cuba.

But I beg leave to suggest to you the expediency of sending Mr. Ward back to Mexico without loss of time.

Some mention was made in the Cabinet the other day of secret instructions to Mr. Hervey, of instructions to a Dr. Mackie and his Report, and of a report that Mr. Hervey and the Commissioners in Mexico had declined to have any communication with the persons composing the hierarchy in that country. Before the Cabinet can fairly decide this question, they must see everything that has passed; and if we are to found any further proceedings upon an inquiry, measures should be taken that that inquiry should be as full as possible; and, above all, that we should not be exposed to the imputation, that our commis-

sioners had refused to see persons so important in such an inquiry as that entrusted to them as those composing the hierarchy in Mexico.

If Mr. Ward should be sent away immediately we shall probably have an answer to any fresh instructions sent to Mr. Hervey before the Mexican agent shall arrive, considering the possible difficulty he may experience in procuring a passage to this country.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [376.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 6th April, 1824.

I wrote to you before on the subject of this Greek conference, and I would refer you to what I then said.

I don't think there is much objection to the Emperor's final object, provided the guarantees can be finally arranged.

The question is how we are to come at the mediation, neither party having asked it, or being willing to accept it? Is it to be forced, and by what Power or Powers upon each party? The first question for deliberation at the conference must be, shall there be a mediation, and how offered? Shall it be forced, and by what Power or Powers?

It might possibly be right to make Count Lieven feel these difficulties before he sends his answer.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Londonderry. [377.]

MY DEAR CHARLES, London, 9th April, 1824.

I have received your letter, and I took an opportunity yesterday of speaking to his Majesty on the subject to which it relates. The King had received your letter, and will write to you. He had not written before, because he could not with propriety deliver an opinion upon the transaction in question, excepting through the Commander-in-Chief.

The whole case is unfortunate. It is in every body's mouth, in all the newspapers, and on the theatres, and the Hussars are very ill-treated. I see that they now want to get them out of Dublin, but I have intreated his Royal Highness to keep them their full time, although I think it not impossible they may have to fight a duel or two. But that I consider of no consequence.

Your mistake is one which has crept into the service lately, and is very general. It is in supposing the mess any thing but a private society; and that you, as colonel or commanding officer of the regiment, had anything to say to it, excepting to notice anything ungentlemanlike or unmilitary which might occur there. If the mess is only a private society of officers, you might notice an officer resorting to it, who may have omitted his duty on account of sickness; but you would not notice one resorting to it who may have omitted his duty because he has leave of absence.

In truth, Mr. Battier was a member of the mess, as long as he was at the quarters of the regiment, and paid part of the expense of the very dinner given to you, not a member but a stranger; and unless you make the mess something more than a private society; I don't see what business you, as colonel, had to notice his presence there. The moment you consider the mess something more than a private society, which may be very convenient to some, it becomes an authority much more prejudicial to discipline and good order, and much more inconvenient to the commanding officer than many are aware of, who have not passed so many years of their lives as I have in the performance of regimental duty. I regret the occurrence of this affair for your sake, as well as for that of the regiment, and of the Hussars in general; but I confess that if it occasions correct notions of what a mess is, I think a great good will have been gained after the conversation *on this nine days' wonder* shall have ceased.

Pray remember me most kindly to Lady Londonderry.

WELLINGTON.

Le Prince de Metternich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MON CHER DUC, Vienne, le 15me Avril, 1824.

J'ai reçu votre lettre du 24me Février, en réponse à celle que j'avais eu l'honneur de vous adresser le 11me du même mois.

Ayant pris l'initiative dans cette correspondance, c'est à moi à vous remercier de l'attention que vous avez bien voulu donner à mes paroles, toutes dictées par cet abandon de confiance que depuis longtems j'ai voué tout particulièrement à votre personne. Quand le sentiment d'un mal m'oppresse, c'est envers mes amis que je crois devoir lui faire jour.

Dans votre lettre vous êtes entré dans la recherche de plus d'un erremont passé. Evitons ce terrain, car il ne saurait nous faire atteindre le but que je me propose. Personne, j'en suis sûr, n'est plus que vous persuadé que s'il a été commis des erreurs ou des fautes, je suis fort éloigné de vouloir me constituer le défenseur ni des unes ni des autres. Aussi pourrai-je avec un repos de conscience parfait m'en remettre à votre témoignage, si ce serait à moi à soutenir ce que plus d'une fois vous m'avez entendu combattre.

Mais, mon cher Duc, le passé porte ses récompenses et ses peines; il s'agit du présent et de l'avenir, et c'est faute de pouvoir me rendre un compte exact de ce que l'on veut réellement dans le moment actuel, que je ne sais me défendre d'entrevoir dans l'avenir plus d'un motif de mauvais préssentimens.

Vous m'avez entendu poser souvent en thèses que l'Angleterre pouvant tout ce que peuvent les puissances continentales, se trouvait néanmoins placée sous l'empire de considérations et de formes qui lui étaient particulières, et devaient pour cela même être consultées et respectées. Ce n'est donc pas contre ce terrain que j'ai jamais dirigé une attaque; mes regrets se portent dans une toute autre direction.

Les déceptions carbonniques ont été détruites en Europe. Vous en avez tiré autant de profit que nous, car si les gouvernemens réguliers du Continent avaient succombés dans cette lutte, la Grande Bretagne eut à son tour été immanquablement en butte aux mêmes attaques. Un bien positif a donc été atteint; mais ce bien n'est pas tout ce qu'il faut pour assurer la paix du monde. Afin d'y arriver, nous devons ne point voir une Puissance telle que la vôtre se placer en déhors des principes que cette même Puissance a longtems soutenus avec autant de persévérance que de succès. Vous tenez une replique toute prête à opposer à l'expression de ce regret. Vous me direz, que rien ne devrait m'autoriser à admettre que votre gouvernement aurait jamais dévié de ces principes. Dispensez-moi de contester cette assertion. Si tel était le cas, mes regrets ne porteraient que sur des apparences; et celles-ci au moins sont telles que malheureusement elles me rendent inattaquable!

L'objet qui vous a le plus occupé en dernier lieu est à nos yeux aussi d'un intérêt immense. Ce n'est pas seulement le sort définitif des colonies, mais la forme dans laquelle s'opérerait l'affranchissement de celles qui, en suite d'une force des choses démontrée, devront être regardées comme placées hors de tout rapport avec leurs anciennes métropoles. Est-ce l'Espagne livrée à ses seuls conseils qui saura régler et décider ce qu'il importe de voir réglé et décidé? Est-ce sur une ligne de rivalité entre les Puissances

maritimes que le but pourrait être atteint utilement? Je ne le crois pas, et vous le croyez tout aussi peu que moi. Pourquoi donc, dans une question aussi grave et aussi riche en conséquences, suivre une marche dont l'isolement des parties dans le moment actuel serait peut-être le moindre des nombreux inconvénients, tous faciles à prévoir?

Le cabinet Britannique a-t-il découvert un avantage réel à renvoyer loin de lui ce qui est conforme à un intérêt commun et général? Peut-il croire servir sa propre cause en donnant aux factieux des raisons de se persuader que leur entreprise n'offrirait rien qui serait contraire à ses propres intérêts? Placé, ainsi que je le suis, au milieu du continent, je ne puis dissimuler que ce préjugé s'y établit. Comment pourrait-il en être autrement quand tant d'apparences viennent à son appui, et que les raisonnemens les plus propres à réduire ces apparences à leur juste valeur, se trouvent sinon démentis, au moins paralysés, par le langage que nous entendons tenir par les organes du gouvernement à chaque séance parlementaire, et par des ménagemens envers des amateurs de bouleversemens; ménagemens poussés quelquefois au point, qu'on a de la peine à y démêler les véritables pensées du gouvernement Britannique, et la ligne de conduite dont il me paraît impossible qu'il veuille s'écarter.

Si au milieu de tant de conflits qui touchent aux intérêts généraux, je voulais descendre à des regrets qui seraient absolument directs à l'Autriche, que ne me sentirai-je pas en droit de vous dire sur la manière dont l'une des affaires les plus pénibles que j'ai eu à démêler dans ma longue et difficile carrière—celle de l'Austrian Loan—a fini par être placée par vos ministres? Le nom de l'Autriche ne peut-il plus être prononcé par eux sans que les bases de son antique et utile existence ne soient attaquées? Le sacrifice que l'Empereur a porté à la seule considération de ses relations et d'honneur et de politique envers un ancien allié, ne devait-il obtenir d'autre récompense qu'une défense dérisoire, et le ridicule jeté sur une transaction à laquelle on n'attribue d'autre valeur que celle d'un *God-send*? Et fallait-il que les justes hommages même rendus au caractère personnel de l'Empereur par quelques orateurs ministériels fussent accompagnés d'observations gratuitement offensives contre la forme du gouvernement et les institutions de la monarchie?

C'est à vous, mon cher Duc, et à vous seul que je puis toutefois me permettre de parler ainsi que je le fais; c'est-à-dire, avec une franchise qu'excuse une longue habitude de relations d'intimité personnelle, et que justifient pleinement l'amour du bien et la conviction, que si même nous pourrions différer dans un point de vue, nous ne saurions jamais différer dans nos principes.

Veuillez agréer l'hommage de mes sentimens inaltérables d'amitié et de ma haute considération.

METTERNICH.

The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR FRIEND, Windsor Castle, 30th April, 1824.

I have been very ill indeed, I am still *very very* weak, and therefore I need not tell you what a painful effort it has been to me to write the

enclosed, which I transmit to you, and to *our friend* Lord Bathurst, for the purpose of delivering it jointly to Lord Liverpool, on his arrival in town, that it may be submitted to the Cabinet. I really could not rest until I got this off my mind, for I cannot tell you, my dear friend, nor Bathurst, how much this has DISTURBED me. You and Lord Bathurst are of course to read the enclosed.

Ever your affectionate friend,

G. R.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Windsor Castle, 1st May, 1824.

The King very much regrets, that the conduct of some of the members of his government, compels the King to communicate to Lord Liverpool his feelings upon the subject.

The appearance, at the dinner of the Lord Mayor, at the Mansion House, of two of the members of the King's government, unquestionably calls for explanation.

The entertainment was that, which belongs to the Lord Mayor himself, and not to the Corporation.

The public life of the individual, filling the office of chief magistrate of the city of London, has been marked by a continued series of insults to the government, to the monarchy, and above all, personally to the King himself; this is not matter of opinion, for several of his acts are on record, and are notorious to the world.

Mr. Canning could not be ignorant of this, and had also long known, that his visit to the Mansion House would in the highest degree be offensive, and personally disagreeable, to the King. But as Mr. Canning was there, almost alone, his presence marked a difference of opinion and of conduct, between the other members of the Cabinet and himself.

The King therefore thinks he has just reason to complain that, in a case in which there was no official, or indeed any duty to be performed, and no necessity consequently existing, the King's expressed wishes and his known feelings should have been so entirely disregarded.

The King desires to remind Lord Liverpool, that when at his particular desire, and that of other members of the Cabinet, the King yielded to Mr. Canning's re-admission into the government, in the prominent situation which he now fills, the King consented to forget and to bury in oblivion all that had previously passed, and of which the King felt he had so much just reason to complain.

The King is quite satisfied that he has since acted with the most uniform, condescending conciliatory and confidential kindness, towards Mr. Canning; the King desires to observe, that the *return* is now before Lord Liverpool!

The King has always shewn, under all the fortuitous events that have happened, an honest, steady and sincere desire to preserve his present government. But the King owes it to himself, and his own honour, to state (that notwithstanding the same desire exists), the King will never consent that his government shall be degraded by such attempts to acquire popularity; and finally, whenever the King sees anything in the conduct of any member of his government calculated to be injurious to the King's service, or personally offensive to his honour and feelings, the King will always feel it his duty *frankly* to declare it *to his Minister*.

G. R.

To Mr. Griffin.

[378.] BARRACK ARRANGEMENTS, WEST INDIES—INTERFERENCE OF GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING.

Ordnance Office, 3rd May, 1824.

In consequence of the transfer of the foreign barracks to the Ordnance Department, under the Minute of the Treasury of the 24th May, 1822, the Master-General and Board wrote the annexed letter, with the annexed Minute of Regulations, on the 3rd December, 1823, regarding barracks and other public buildings in the Leeward Islands, containing instructions to their officers for carrying on the service entrusted to them.

The objects of these instructions were first to ascertain what were the barracks and other public buildings handed over to the Ordnance under the orders of the Treasury of the 24th May, 1822.

Secondly. In what state of repair were those buildings.

Thirdly. In what manner the Ordnance officers were to proceed in future in order to have the necessary repairs given to these buildings, how they were to account for stores, &c. &c.

It appeared to this department that to issue these orders was strictly within their authority. The Master-General and Board are responsible to Parliament for the care of those buildings, and for the expenditure of the money on their repair, and for the expenditure of the stores; and of course they must have before them periodically all the information, to enable them from time to time to form a judgment of the state of those buildings, and of the necessity for laying out money in their repair; and it was incumbent upon them to give the orders which they thought necessary for conducting the service. No other authority but the Master-General and Board could give these orders.

The Commander of the Forces in the Leeward Islands was officially informed of these orders. It appears upon the face of them that the respective officers of the Ordnance at the several islands were directed to lay them before the Governors and Commanding Generals in each island, and to request the assistance of the Staff and Regimental Officers in carrying these orders into execution.

The General Officer commanding the forces in the Leeward

Islands has thought proper to take upon himself to countermand these orders. In taking upon himself this authority he has stated no reason from himself; but has referred the Master-General to a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Charles Smith, of the Royal Engineers, which he has not transmitted to the Master-General. He has, however, transmitted the letter to the Treasury; and it is one of the enclosures in the communication of the 1st of April from Mr. Harrison. In respect to the system proposed by this department for the conduct of the business in the Leeward Islands, it is the same for each island as that which has successfully been carried into execution in the garrison of Gibraltar, making allowance for the difference of circumstances. That system was founded upon that in practice in the garrison of Gibraltar under the orders of the Treasury at the time the barracks and public buildings in that garrison were handed over to the Ordnance Department; and no alteration was made excepting those rendered necessary by the discontinuance of certain officers, and the substitution for them of the officers of the Ordnance.

In the West Indies there was no system. That fact is stated in the Treasury Minute above referred to. It is not known at this moment either at the Treasury or in this department in what manner the barracks and public buildings were heretofore or how they are at present managed; nor is it now known exactly what buildings, whether barracks or others, have been transferred to the Ordnance, much less their state of repair; and there exists no certain rule for the repair of these buildings; none for the care of the stores in the barracks, none for their issue to the troops, none for the allowances to the troops, or on any one point on which regulation is necessary for the conduct of such a department.

In the letter of the 3rd December, 1823, a survey is ordered to be held on all the buildings in each of the islands, to ascertain their state, to what purpose applied, &c.; and each building is then ordered to be delivered over to the officer who is to be in charge of it, with the return of its state. Copies of the reports of the buildings in each island are ordered to be delivered to the Governor or Commanding General Officer in the island; and copies to be sent to the respective officers of the Ordnance at Barbadoes, where are head-quarters; and the Commanding Engineer is one of those respective officers.

But, besides this, copies of the reports of the surveys ordered in this letter are ordered to be laid before the Commander of the Forces in the Leeward Islands and the Commanding Engineer.

The remainder of the letter of the 3rd December refers to forms of returns, to reports and accounts, with which the Commander of the Forces has nothing to do.

The Minute of the 3rd December, 1823, refers first to regulations for the repair of the barracks and other public buildings in each island.

Provision was to be made for those casualties to public buildings which have occurred and are likely to occur more frequently in the West Indies than elsewhere; and to which the necessities of the service, or the comfort and care of the troops, might render an immediate repair necessary.

The Master-General and Board have ordered that whenever alteration or repair is required to any building, the necessity for such repair should be reported to the Board of respective officers of the island or colony by the officer in charge of such building, and those respective officers are authorized to order the Engineer Officer to execute such repairs immediately if the expense should not exceed twenty pounds.

If the expense of such alteration or repair should exceed twenty pounds, the necessity must be reported to the Governor or the Commanding General in the island; and if he should approve of such repair or alteration, and the expense should not exceed two hundred pounds, the Board of respective officers may order the Officer of Engineers on the spot to have an estimate made of the expense, and may order its execution.

The object of these orders is to provide the means of giving an immediate repair to buildings injured by the weather or otherwise, and there is nothing in them which interferes in any manner with the authority of the Commander of the Forces in the Leeward Islands, or the Commanding Officer in any island, as stated in the Minute of the Treasury of the 24th May, 1822. Their object is to regulate that for which the Master-General and Board are responsible to Parliament; and the respective officers in each island are ordered to report their proceedings on all these points not only to the Master-General and Board in London, but to the Governor and Commanding General in the

island, to the respective officers in Barbadoes, to the Commander of the Forces in the Leeward Islands, and to the Commanding Engineer. It is obvious that there is no desire in these regulations to conceal anything. Every transaction is to be reported to superior authority, and is always open to inquiry, if inquiry should be deemed necessary; and no authority is given to inferior officers to incur expenses, excepting such as may be rendered necessary by casualties beyond human control, and this only under the approbation of the Governor or Commanding General on the spot, unless the expense to be incurred should not exceed twenty pounds.

The next object for regulation in the Minute is the annual survey of buildings and the mode of their repair; and it will be observed that copies of the reports of these surveys are ordered to be delivered to the persons in charge of the buildings, and to the Governor and Commanding General on the spot, and respective officers at Barbadoes, and to the Commander of the Forces in the Leeward Islands, and the Commanding Engineer.

Orders are given in this Minute that no alteration or repair shall be carried into execution, the expense of which shall exceed two hundred pounds, without the previous orders of the Master-General and Board; and the estimates for these repairs and alterations are to be referred to the Commanding Engineer, and by him transmitted to the Master-General and Board; and the Commander of the Forces having the reports of the surveys and the estimates of the repairs before him, would have it in his power to make such observations upon them, either to the Treasury or to the Master-General, as he might think proper.

The other articles in this Minute of a regulation refer to reports, accounts of stores, money, &c.

The Master-General and Board have thus gone through their letter and Minute of Regulations of the 3rd December last, which the Commander of the Forces in the West Indies has thought proper to countermand.

Since these orders of the 5th December, 1823, have been written, the Master-General and Board have received the Report of the Commission ordered to the West Indies, from which this department have received their first information regarding the barracks in the West Indies and West India colonies.

From this report it would appear to be unnecessary to give the respective officers in each island and colony the authority to order the immediate execution of repairs to barracks and public buildings, the expense of which should not exceed twenty pounds. It is likewise possible that the Master-General and Board may be mistaken; and that in the opinion of the Commander of the Forces it is not necessary to provide for casualties in these colonies; and that the Governors or General Officers commanding the troops ought not to be invested with the authority of approving of alterations or repairs rendered necessary by such casualties not exceeding in amount two hundred pounds.

If this should be the case, the Master-General and Board have no objection to order that every repair, however trivial, shall be the subject of estimate; and that no repair, however urgent, shall be undertaken till the Commanding Engineer shall have submitted to the Commander of the Forces the estimate of the expense of such repair; and shall have received by warrant his sanction for such repairs being undertaken.

All repairs costing above two hundred pounds will still be to be referred to this country, after the estimates will have been submitted by the Commanding Engineer to the Commander of the Forces and will have received his approbation.

The Master-General and Board beg to call the attention of the Secretary of State and of the Lords of the Treasury to the nature of this interference with the authority of the Master-General and Board; and to the inconveniences which must be the consequence of officers in command abroad interfering with the orders issued by the Master-General and Board for the transaction of business for which they alone are responsible, and this at the suggestion of an officer serving under their immediate orders.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Charles Smith is the Commanding Engineer, and the senior military officer of the corps under the Ordnance, to whom the Commander of the Forces would have to address himself in case his communication should relate to the Ordnance Department in the Leeward Islands in general. But he has no authority to suspend or countermand the orders of the Master-General and Board. It is quite obvious from the perusal of Sir C. Smith's letter to the Commander of the Forces, dated the 18th, and transmitted the 27th January,

1824, that he did not understand the papers upon which he took upon himself to comment.

It is true that Barrackmasters have not yet been sent out to the West Indies, because it was really not known in this department at what stations in the West Indies there were barracks, and how situated in relation to each other, till the Reports of the Commission were recently received; and it is not even now known to what barracks Barrackmasters are already appointed. But Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Charles Smith ought to have known that the Storekeeper or Deputy-Storekeeper of the Ordnance in each island is ordered to take charge of the barracks in each respectively till Barrackmasters will be appointed and sent out. It is likewise true that there is a want of engineer officers in the Leeward Islands. The appointment of these officers has been delayed till the Report of the Commissioners should be received. But there are acting engineers employed in the Leeward Islands who might have performed the duties required from officers of the corps of Engineers in the letter and Minute of the Master-General and Board of the 3rd December. Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Charles Smith's other objections are evidently founded in error, and the Master-General and Board will not discuss whether the Ordnance officers in the West Indies are the best calculated for the performance of this business, or whether it would be better done by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Charles Smith himself as Barrackmaster-General. Nor does it appear for what reason the question of the care of the stores is brought into discussion upon this occasion.

The Lords of the Treasury, upon full consideration of the subject, in concert with the Master-General of the Ordnance, have thought proper to place the stores heretofore in charge of the officer called the Commissary of Stores, in charge of the Storekeepers of the Ordnance in all parts of the empire. This system was founded not only upon views of economy, but likewise of convenience to the service; and those who adopted it had at least the merit of considering it well before they adopted it. Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Charles Smith, however, has discovered that the system cannot answer; and the Commander of the Forces in the Leeward Islands has adopted his opinion, although when they wrote on the 26th March and 7th of April, 1823, the system could scarcely have been carried into execution; and neither in those letters nor in those of January, 1824, have

either the Commander of the Forces or the Commanding Engineer proposed any other system for the management of either the barrack or the store department, excepting that Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Charles Smith should be appointed Barrackmaster-General.

The Master-General and Board were by no means desirous of charging themselves with the management of the foreign barracks and public buildings. This management has greatly increased their trouble and responsibility; and they undertook it solely with the view of rendering an additional service to the public.

It is vain to hope to be able to render this service if the Commander of the Forces in the Leeward Islands, if every General Officer commanding in an island or colony, is at the suggestion of one of their own officers to countermand their orders, and to prevent the execution of the system according to which they think proper to carry on the service.

The Master-General and Board certainly have it in their power by their own authority to enforce obedience, and to carry into execution their measures by means of their own officers; and to punish those who disobey or resist. But they prefer to call upon the Lords of the Treasury and the Secretary of State to set the Commander of the Forces in the Leeward Islands right upon this subject; and to make him sensible that the Master-General and Board alone are responsible for the conduct of the services discussed in this paper, which have been made over to them by the orders of the Lords of the Treasury and the Warrant of his Majesty.

The Master-General and Board feel no desire to interfere in any manner with the authority of the Commander of the Forces in the Leeward Islands, as the proof of which they beg leave to submit the copy of a Minute of a letter written by the Master-General and Board on the 28th January, 1824, in answer to the proposition from Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Charles Smith, discussed in one of the letters of the 27th January from the Commander of the Forces; and upon which the Commander of the Forces issued his General Order of the 2nd December, 1823.

WELLINGTON.

BARRACKS.

6th May, 1824.

Since the Minute of the 3rd May was written, the enclosed General Order has been received, which is submitted to the Treasury and the Secretary of State.

Their Lordships and the Secretary of State will see that it is impossible for this department to carry on the business entrusted to its management if the General Officers in Command abroad are permitted to take such authority upon themselves. The Master-General and Board wait, then, with anxiety to know what measures it is intended to adopt in order to call the attention of the Commander of the Forces in the Leeward Islands to the real nature of the relation in which he stands to the officers of the Ordnance Department in the Leeward Islands.

WELLINGTON.

To Sir W. Gordon. [379.]

MEMORANDUM RESPECTING PROJECT FOR A BARRACK AT GREAT RIVER BRIDGE, JAMAICA.

Ordnance Office, 3rd May, 1824.

Refer the Quartermaster-General to the Report of the Commissioners recently sent to the West Indies, or the Island of Jamaica generally, and particularly on the proposed barrack at Great River Bridge.

The barracks in the Island of Jamaica have been hitherto built at the expense of the colony, with the exception of a part of the expense of those at Up Park, and I should think it desirable to avoid to take any steps not absolutely necessary to incur any expense on this proposed barracks.

It appears from this Report, and indeed it is obvious, that the position is ill chosen in reference to defence against the attack of an enemy coming from abroad, and it is not necessary to post troops in this position for the preservation of internal tranquillity. It is to be hoped that the measures proposed will render the barracks at Up Park healthy; and at all events, if they should not be so, it is proposed to build additional barracks at Stoney Hill. I am afraid, therefore, that it would be difficult to justify a departure from the usual practice in the case of this barrack.

WELLINGTON.

[380.] *To Prince Metternich.*

MON CHER PRINCE, London, 4th May, 1824.

I have received your letter of the 15th of April,* and I assure you that I referred to former transactions solely with the view of fixing exactly upon the causes of our existing position in relation to the Alliance, and of tracing them to their sources, and this with the view of applying a remedy.

There is a growing disinclination in this country to connect its concerns with those of the Alliance to a greater degree than is rendered necessary by the exact terms of our treaties. This sentiment prevails among moderate well-judging men to as great a degree as among political adventurers and fanatics; and you may conceive the degree to which this known disinclination is taken advantage of by the latter in all public discussions. The Allies ought to be aware of these facts, and ought to shape their measures in such manner as to carry this country with them, which is at least as necessary for their interest and welfare as it is for ours.

In respect to Spain it is true that we stand alone, and we do so by choice. But I endeavoured to show you in my last letter that the choice was founded upon necessity, proved to exist by reference to past undisputed transactions in former negotiations, and to recent facts. The Allies neither singly nor collectively have any more influence over the councils of Madrid than we have. What the councils of Madrid want is, that the Allies, but principally this country, should conquer the colonies for Spain, and that the old monopolies should be there established for the benefit of Spain, and to the exclusion of the rest of the world. I am one of those who think that it will be very little difference to this country in what way the disputes between the colonies and the mother-country are terminated, provided foreign Powers do not interfere; but that is not the general opinion in this country. By far the majority think that the transactions of the last fifteen years have given the King's subjects an interest in these questions which must prevent the government from exposing the decision on them to hazard. At all events I, and those who may think with me, cannot expose those interests to the imputation and even to the risks of being bought and sold in conferences at Paris and at Madrid.

This is the truth; and if you will inquire from General Vin-

* See page 249.

cent he will tell you so. I must add, however, that though we stand alone, we have to this moment done nothing of which others can complain; and I hope that we shall continue this cautious conduct, if only because we do stand alone.

Upon other points referred to in your letter I confess I am ashamed to own that I agree with you. I am not in the habit of speaking in public, and have never been present when an opportunity has offered of saying anything upon the Austrian loan. But if I had, I assure you that I should have endeavoured to do justice to his Majesty the Emperor, and to his government, in that transaction. I am astonished that the language to which you refer should have fallen from the gentleman who uttered it; and that he should have betrayed such gross ignorance not only of that transaction, but of the constitution of the countries governed by his Imperial Majesty. The truth is, that the publication of our debates is a breach of the privilege of Parliament. We are understood as deliberating in secret, and those who read the debates should consider themselves as let into the secret. Such men, however, as those who fill the high offices of the State ought to be so cautious as not to pronounce such sentiments even in secret as those of which I think you complain most justly.

Croyez toujours, mon cher Prince, à la sincérité de mes sentimens pour vous.

WELLINGTON.

Sir W. Knighton to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Windsor Castle, 4th May, 1824.

I was very glad to receive your note this evening, as the King was very much displeased that Mr. Canning should have suffered this day to pass *sub silentio.*

Lord Liverpool's note of yesterday was anything but satisfactory to the King, for it was observed, that in reference to the just cause of complaint, which his Majesty had to make respecting the outrage offered to his feelings, that Lord Liverpool might with as much propriety have referred to the days of Adam as to those of Mr. Pitt, for the purpose of extenuating Mr. Canning's conduct.

I am commanded by his Majesty to send your Grace his most affectionate regards, and to thank you most sincerely for your acceptable and most kind attention.

I have the honour to be,

your Grace's devoted and sincere servant,

W. KNIGHTON.

[381.] *To Sir W. Knighton.*

MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM, London, 5th May, 1824.

I have received your note of last night.

It is impossible to expect that anything that can be said on the late dinner at the Mansion House will be quite satisfactory to the King's feelings. It can amount only to this, that the attendance at that dinner had public objects in view; and Lord Liverpool's letter tends to show, as will, indeed, that of Mr. Canning, that in all times, even those of the most violent party animosity, the King's ministers had attended these meetings, not out of compliment to the person filling the office of Lord Mayor, but with a view to obtain certain political objects and advantages.

Such conduct can be understood only in this country and by those engaged in party politics; but I am certain that there is no man in England so capable of understanding it as the King himself.

But although nothing can be expected to be quite satisfactory to his Majesty upon this subject, I think the letters which he will have received are calculated to enable him to put an end to the discussion on the subject with dignity.

The King was brought into the discussion. It was forced upon him by the mission of Lord F. Conyngham to Windsor; and Mr. Canning and Lord Liverpool have explained the part they each took in the transaction, have stated the public grounds of their conduct, and have submitted themselves to his Majesty, and expressed their concern that any part of their conduct should have occasioned his Majesty's displeasure. I think that the King may rely upon it that such cause for offence will not be given to his Majesty again, and I earnestly hope that, when his Majesty reflects how desirable it would have been for him not to have been under the necessity of taking the notice which his Majesty has taken of this affair, he will be satisfied that it has terminated as well as such an affair could.

I am the more anxious upon this subject, as I know that the King will not make the progress towards recovery which we all desire he should till his mind shall be satisfied on this point.

I am quite certain that nothing but the attendance upon Parliament and at the Cabinet prevented Mr. Canning from writing

his letter sooner, and I know that he was sincerely desirous of making it quite satisfactory to his Majesty.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Bathurst. [382.]

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, London, 6th May, 1824.

You will receive a Minute from this Department on the interference of Sir Henry Warde in our concerns in the Leeward Islands.

I really don't wish to have anything to say to the West Indies or any foreign settlement. If it is thought that the Governors and officers on the spot, contrary to all former precedent and practice, are the fittest persons to be entrusted with the management of the concerns heretofore transacted or lately made over to the Ordnance, I have not the smallest objection, and will make over to them the whole concern. But if the business is to be carried on by the Ordnance, the Governors and officers must be brought to their senses, or I must proceed in a manner which will certainly settle all these little questions, but which will be very disagreeable to me and to the officers on the spot.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Sir H. Douglas. [383.]

MY DEAR SIR HOWARD, London, 8th May, 1824.

I am very much obliged to you for the perusal of the enclosed Paper,* which is very satisfactory upon the points to which it relates.

It is quite obvious that the negotiators in 1783 intended to keep in the hands of Great Britain the whole course of the River St. John's.

Ever yours sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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* On the boundary of the British possessions in America.

MEMORANDUM FROM MR. HUSKISSON TO FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON ON THE CANADIAN BOUNDARY.

London, May, 1824.

It appears from the report of our Commissioner that a rectification, on just scientific principles, of the line thus designated, would have the effect of throwing the frontier in some places to a distance of one or two miles south of the course which it now follows according to the incorrect delineation made on a former occasion. There is reason to believe that the enlargement of territory, to which in strict right his Majesty is entitled, comprehends an additional portion of Lake Champlain, and particularly a tongue of land on one of its shores called Rouse's Point, on which the Americans had begun to erect fortifications before it was known that the possession of the site selected for that purpose would be brought into question by a fresh demarcation of the boundary.

It must be admitted that the claim now raised in favour of Great Britain derives from this circumstance a degree of importance which would not otherwise have belonged to it; and the expediency of insisting or not insisting on the demand of our Commissioner must of course be in a great measure decided by military opinions as to the nature and probable effect of the fortifications at Rouse's Point, in the event of the Americans being left at liberty to complete them. The information which we have hitherto received on this subject is not altogether as perfect as we could wish. On the whole, however, it is evident that the fortifications on Lake Champlain must either have been planned on defensive principles, as a check to those on the British side at *Isle aux Noix*, with a view to resisting any future invasion of the United States on what has hitherto been the customary line of operations from Canada, or in order to cover and support any American army destined, as occasion may require, to march into his Majesty's possessions by the natural opening of the Sorell.

On the former supposition it may well be doubted whether the possession of Rouse's Point by the Americans would be of any material advantage to them, inasmuch as it is the opinion of competent judges that, independent of artificial defences, the country on that side is of a nature not to admit of its being attacked by his Majesty's forces with any fair prospect of permanent or decisive success. For offensive purposes there is no reason to suppose that Rouse's point is the only position in that immediate neighbourhood on which the American government may construct fortifications capable of covering the formation of an invading army; and the protection of Canada in that quarter, where it is perhaps the most vulnerable, must be provided for rather by a strenuous system of defence, founded on our own resources, than by any advantage that may be derived from acquiring an inconsiderable addition of territory. It does not appear, as far as our information extends, that the disputed ground, if occupied by Great Britain, would afford any convenient position for the elevation of works on our side calculated to defend more completely the approaches to *Isle aux Noix*.

To Sir H. Hardinge. [384.]

MEMORANDUM ON COLONIAL ESTIMATES.

London, 8th May, 1824.

I have perused these papers, and I feel no objection to undertake that which it is proposed should be undertaken by the Ordnance Department. That is to say, to repair and build the necessary works of defence, and barracks and other public buildings in all the colonies, and to prepare and lay before Parliament estimates for the same. I must explain, however, that that which I meant by the words *local contributions* in the Minute of the 10th February, was contributions by the town or place for the payment of the expense of building or maintaining a barrack, by which the people of such town or place should be relieved from the expense and inconvenience of quartering troops, to which they would otherwise be liable.

It is quite obvious that if the expense of such barrack has been defrayed out of any colonial revenue, which, if not applicable to barracks, would be applicable to any other public service, it is the same to the public whether the barrack expense should continue to be defrayed out of that colonial revenue, or should be provided for by estimate and vote of Parliament.

It is my opinion that it is preferable in a constitutional view that the colonial revenue, whatever it may be, should be applied to defray civil, rather than military expenses, of whatever nature they may be. But if the Ordnance Officers are to go before Parliament with estimates of expenses for military services in colonies which have up to this moment defrayed these expenses out of their own revenues, it will be necessary that they should be able to explain to Parliament the reason for which these expenses now come before Parliament in the shape of estimate, instead of being defrayed as heretofore out of colonial resources.

WELLINGTON.

Sir H. Taylor to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Horse Guards, 8th May, 1824.

The Duke of York has just been here for the purpose of referring to my letter to Lord Londonderry, which conveys his Royal Highness's injunction "to him and to the officers of the 10th Hussars *not to take any notice of Mr. Battier's statement.*"

This letter was dated on 22nd March, after the publication of Mr. Battier's first statement. That statement was not noticed after the receipt of my letter, by his Lordship or any officer of the regiment, nor was Mr. Battier's published reply, which was yet more insulting to Lord Londonderry than the first statement. So far, therefore, his Lordship has not disregarded his Royal Highness's orders, and the acceptance of Mr. Battier's *recent* challenge may be considered an act which stands by itself, and which provoked Lord Londonderry to do that which it was apprehended he might be sufficiently imprudent to do in consequence of the insults offered to him in the two published statements, but which, in obedience to his Royal Highness's commands, he forbore to do.

But his Lordship's acceptance of the challenge, after the injunction generally given, appears to his Royal Highness to be, under any circumstances, a proceeding so objectionable, so prejudicial to discipline and subordination, and of such dangerous tendency in the service, that he does not see how he can pass it unnoticed; and yet, if he does notice it, he cannot stop short of bringing Lord Londonderry to trial before a general court-martial; nor, unless he adopts this course, can he notice Mr. Battier's proceeding, although in other instances, officers who had retired to half-pay, after a difference with their commanding officer, have been at once removed from the service for sending to their late commanding officer a challenge, *although it was not accepted.*

His Royal Highness feels so much embarrassed by this question that he wishes very much to have some further conversation with your Grace upon the subject after you have considered it.

I have the honour to be, with great regard, my dear Lord Duke,

your Grace's most obedient and faithful servant,

H. TAYLOR.

[ENCLOSURE.]

(Extract.)

22nd March, 1824.

"I am directed further to say, that his Royal Highness cannot sanction your Lordship, or the officers of your regiment, taking any notice of Mr. Battier's statement, and to repeat that you may make free use of this letter and the enclosure."

Lord Londonderry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Clarendon, 9th May, 1824.

It is with the deepest regret I learn from the conversation that has just passed between us that the Commander-in-Chief is disposed to consider the proceeding to which I have been forced by Mr. Battier as a serious breach of discipline, and one that calls for his Royal Highness's interference, and occasions his heavy displeasure.

I hope I may be permitted to approach his Royal Highness through your friendly medium, and to presume to urge some considerations which make my case a very peculiar one, and one that I will venture to say is un-

paralleled in military annals. I do not for a moment defend the accepting a challenge from an inferior officer, on points connected with military duty, where I am in command, and when the individual is still under my orders; but permit me to say, since the publication of Sir Herbert Taylor's letter, Mr. Battier has insulted me more grossly, calumniated me more violently, in *his reply* than any man with mortal feelings could bear.

To these additional insults, and some remarks affecting not only my judgment upon the military point at issue between us (I mean the affair at the Mess, which was truly the only concern I ever had with Mr. Battier), but attacking also my honour, my gentlemanly conduct, my spirit, my family, nay, everything that is most dear and vital to a man and a soldier to defend. I was condemned to remain wholly without redress. There was no shield within my reach for these new uncalled-for and unjustifiable calumnies; there was no protecting hand that relieved me from the sting of such malicious aspersions.

I enclose you, my dear Duke, the paper in which Mr. Battier's last reply is inserted, and I will entreat you to solicit his Royal Highness's attention to the parts I have underlined, and then let it be considered that the man who has had all this battery of malignant abuse opened upon him was merely acting as he conceived for the good of the King's service; and at least a very junior officer in the army ought not before the world thus to have renewed his vilifications—thus to appear triumphant amongst that band of hired scribblers of the day who defame everything that is loyal and defended by royal authority.

However, when in this same reply from an officer still in the army, I saw the Military Secretary's letter treated in a manner equally unjustifiable and improper, I dared not repine, or express the anguish of my feelings, because I conceived his Royal Highness's judgment determined to treat Mr. Battier with the sovereign contempt he deserved. Painful and galling, therefore, as it was to me, I submitted in silence to all these renewed insults after the expression of his Royal Highness's sentiments, and I determined to bear all the insults and injuries that had been heaped upon me, in obedience to the directions in Sir H. Taylor's letter, that his Royal Highness could *not sanction* the officers of the 10th or myself taking any notice of Mr. Battier's statements. I felt very deeply grateful to his Royal Highness for the whole tenor of Sir H. Taylor's letter to me, therefore I was the more bound to submit to any additional insults, although no motive but the discipline of the service guided my actions in the commencement of this affair.

When Mr. Battier sent me the challenge by Lieut.-Colonel Western, I felt convinced his object was that by sheltering myself under my military rank, &c., I should decline it, and then the changes would have been rung upon this during the next two months, as they had been during the last on everything connected with this business. It must be remembered here, I could not place Mr. Battier under an arrest. I had no means of defending myself, as I should have had if I had been in command, or he in the regiment. The simple consideration for me was immediately to accept the challenge, or run the risk of being insulted the next time I went out of my hotel with my family. I never for a moment can conceive that the Commander-in-Chief would think such an insult a bearable position for a General Officer. What, then, would have occurred? I must either have exhibited articles of the peace (after having been caned by such a fellow as

Mr. Battier), or I must have awaited his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief's proceedings upon this renewed and gross injury.

Now, when we remember all the libels of the press against the 10th, the caricatures, &c., the cant phrases—"The 10th don't fight," &c.—I will appeal to his Royal Highness's known candour how I should have appeared, with all the virulent attacks of the newspapers, either before a general court-martial, as prosecutor, or before the sitting magistrates at Bow Street, with the marks of Mr. Battier's cane over my shoulders. Mr. Battier's sole object would have been completely gained by my refusal to go out with him; and from the mode in which all this business has been worked, and from some little indiscretions of the officers in Dublin, it would not have been in his Royal Highness's power, with all his high authority, to have protected me against the public voice, nor from the virulence with which a conspiracy formed in Dublin is endeavouring by every possible means to run down the 10th Royal Hussars.

I have stated thus hastily, my dear Duke, the grounds upon which my acceptance of the challenge was founded, and I have only now to throw myself entirely on his Royal Highness's indulgence and mercy. I am well aware that in the strict sense of the articles of war I have offended, and it is for his Royal Highness and his Majesty to determine with their wisdom whether the very extraordinary and unparalleled circumstances under which I was placed left me any alternative but to pursue the line I have done, and throw myself on the Commander-in-Chief and my Sovereign's benign feelings and high sense of honour for pardon.

Believe me, my dear Duke,

yours ever most sincerely and faithfully,

VANE LONDONDERRY.

Colonel Meyrick Shawe to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Phœnix Park, 9th May, 1824.

I cannot address a letter to your Grace without expressing my sincere satisfaction at learning that your health is so much improved by your visit to Cheltenham, and by a little rest. I am anxious that you should save yourself for the next war, which will come sooner or later, and when I hope to see you at the head of the armies again.

I don't mean to threaten your Grace with another visitation. But I am now eligible to be a Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-General, or for any little post that would enable me to see *the thing* again.

Lord Wellesley has gone through a very hospitable and brilliant campaign at the Castle very well. But his health and spirits are jaded, principally by the perpetual efforts of the Press here to misrepresent everything he does, and to expel him from this country by torrents of abuse; for which he certainly gives no cause. For never did I see a man who devotes his time and thoughts so exclusively to the public business. He seldom, however, sees the Irish papers, and his calumniators are falling into contempt. The 'Mail' and 'Star' are sinking, and have failed in their object; yet they have worried him very much, and his mind wants some relief. A

visit of a month or six weeks to England would be the most effectual remedy. But the times are so unsettled with regard to this country that I do not know how such a project would be considered. I don't think any mischief would occur here, and he would be encouraged and invigorated by it.

I do not know that he has yet thought seriously about it, and for fear it might not be approved on the other side of the water, I do all I can to encourage the project of a visit to the South of Ireland, which would be beneficial in many respects.

Lord Wellesley is upon the best possible terms with the Chancellor, and indeed with every one in this country, if we can trust to appearances. Nothing is wanted to make Lord Wellesley quite happy and contented but a change of scene for a time; and (if his absence from hence was not deemed objectionable) a renewal of intercourse and an interchange of sentiments with his Majesty's Ministers. Not that I think he has anything particular to speak about, but, to borrow one of the fashionable continental diplomatic phrases, an "abouchement" with his friends in the Cabinet would inspire him with fresh courage.

I had no idea of mentioning this subject to your Grace when I began this note; and it is right I should say that I have done so without Lord Wellesley's knowledge. I am inclined to think he will decide upon visiting the South of Ireland.

Your Grace's most faithful servant,

M. SHAWE.

To his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief the Duke of York. [385.]

MEMORANDUM ON THE DUEL BETWEEN LORD LONDONDERRY AND LIEUT. BATTIER.

[Not sent.]

London, 10th May, 1824.

It appears upon the perusal of the annexed letters from Lord Londonderry and Colonel Sir Henry Hardinge that the duel between Lord Londonderry and Lieutenant Battier was not occasioned by any *statement* in Lieutenant Battier's letter referred to by Major-General Sir Herbert Taylor in his letter to Lord Londonderry of the 22nd March, and was not sought for by Lord Londonderry, but that he was challenged by Lieutenant Battier in consequence of the transactions in the mess-room in Dublin of the 25th November, 1823.

The following observations are suggested for his Royal Highness's consideration, as making a distinction between this case and others:—

First. There is no doubt that the short way of settling this matter, considering that the Press had made it a property, was

by fighting the duel. Accordingly it will be seen that since the duel not a word has been written; and the perusal of the transactions upon that occasion will show the reason.

Secondly. The letter of Sir Herbert Taylor of the 22nd March gave Lieutenant Battier a species of impunity, as it states that Lieutenant Battier would have been dismissed from the service if his statements had not contained comments which might be presumed personally offensive to his Royal Highness.

Thirdly. Lieutenant Battier's reply of the 7th April to this letter of the 22nd March contained additional personal insults to Lord Londonderry, accompanied by others to his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief; and upon the same principle no notice was taken of these statements.

Fourthly. Lord Londonderry, and those traduced in that and Lieutenant Battier's former statements, were without protection either of authority or law.

Fifthly. When the challenge was given Colonel Sir Henry Hardinge was informed that if not accepted Lord Londonderry would be assaulted in the streets; and it is well known, from former transactions of the same description in this town, the chances which exist that the person guilty will either escape with impunity, or receive a nominal punishment so inadequate to the offence as to add public ridicule to the insult already endured by the person unfortunately obliged to have recourse to proceedings at Common Law upon such an occasion.

Sixthly. This case unfortunately originated in acts of military irregularity. Lord Londonderry's conduct, which was the immediate subject of the duel, was to be attributed to his having been kept in ignorance by Sir George Quentin of former transactions, and of his Royal Highness's decision upon them; and his Royal Highness was induced, from the motives stated in Major-General Sir Herbert Taylor's letter of the 22nd March, to pass over the insults and improper proceedings of Lieutenant Battier, and to permit Sir Herbert Taylor's letter to be published.

Seventhly. The duel is an additional irregularity to the list already committed in these transactions; and it remains for his Royal Highness to consider whether all these irregularities, and all that has passed, do not sufficiently make this case an exception, as to render it unnecessary for his Royal Highness to take any further notice of it.

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Bathurst. [386.]

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, London, 13th May, 1824.

It would have been impossible to bring Lord Londonderry to trial excepting for a "disorder prejudicial to military discipline;" and he would have defended himself by allegations of provocation, want of protection, and threats of being assaulted, &c., &c., the second of which allegations would be proved by Sir Herbert Taylor's letter. The consequences would have been an acquittal, or such slight censure as would have been highly injurious to the service; and the conduct of the Horse Guards would not have stood very high.

The Duke of York wanted much to bring him to trial, and is very angry, and talks of altering the Article of War. But I believe it is much better for him that the matter should be terminated by a General Order.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Beresford. [387.]

MY DEAR BERESFORD, London, 28th May, 1824.

I have received your letter of the 5th May, and I cannot express to you with what satisfaction I perused your account of the transactions which had at that time taken place at Lisbon.

I quite understand your reason for not taking the command of the army when offered to you at that time, and those for which you were a party to the measures which the King then adopted. But I am still of the opinion, which I entertained when you first went to Portugal, viz., that the King of Portugal will not have his army at his own disposal, and that he will not be in a state of independence, or even of personal safety, till you are appointed to the efficient command. In what shape, or by what title does not signify, provided the command is efficient. Till that object shall be attained the army will not only be useless, but dangerous to the King as well as to the country.

Since the arrival of your letter, and the despatches from Mr. Thornton of the same date, the government have been a good deal occupied by the state of affairs in Portugal. I have

endeavoured to prevent them giving any positive opinion on your appointment, however much they may wish it. I have told them what is true, that you would be a better candidate for this command if you were a Portuguese; and it follows that the less the British government have to say to these appointments the better. I think they feel this truth, and that they will not interfere with it.

If you should be appointed I shall think Portugal out of the fire; and in that case allow me to recommend to you to cease all communication with this country, excepting on your private affairs. Let the business of the British government in Portugal be transacted by the usual diplomatic agents, and do you interfere no more in them than if they were those of France, Russia, or any other power.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Rev. Dr. Curtis to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Drogheda, 2nd June, 1824.

I beg leave to assure your Grace it was with the utmost pain I learned, by the public prints, that your very important health has, for some time back, been considerably impaired, and that my uneasiness will continue till I shall receive the desirable account of your Grace's perfect re-establishment, which I humbly and sincerely pray the Almighty to grant. Your immense labours, and continual exertions during the late war, could not fail to produce some such effects.

As I well know, your Grace has the true welfare and tranquillity of this country much at heart, and as my bounden duty and natural propensity oblige me to promote the same by every lawful and expedient means in my power, I take the liberty of addressing to your Grace a few reflections on some of the most prominent events that have latterly engaged my attention, as our Roman Catholic countrymen have been the chief actors in them.

I shall not trouble your Grace with any long detail of the unfortunate disturbances in the south and west of Ireland, that have, in a great measure, baffled all the investigations made for discovering their real cause and object. However, it is some consolation that the lawless and infatuated parties concerned do not appear to have been actuated by any inimical feeling towards our Most Gracious Sovereign, his government, the laws (at least in theory), or the established religion of the country; for their depredations and cruelties have been indiscriminately exercised on people of all denominations. But what is most interesting, though such ravages still appear, more or less, in certain quarters, they have subsided to a great degree, and are daily yielding fast to the vigorous and prudent means

employed to extirpate them. Believe me, my Lord, that nothing has been left untried by the Roman Catholic clergy for bringing those barbarians to a true sense and observance of their duty, and such exertions have very often been either totally or partially successful, but could not be expected to be always so, with miscreants that set all religion, as well as the laws, at defiance.

I have been now for some time a silent spectator of a Roman Catholic meeting held in Dublin, and calling itself the Catholic Association, but without being deputed or authorised by any to represent them. They have not been joined by the chief Catholic aristocracy, or by any one of our prelates, at least so far as to go to their assemblies. Their ostensible object, at the outset, was to prepare a petition to Parliament for obtaining Catholic Emancipation, and for holding such correspondence as that might require; and as the principal men among them were lawyers of some reputation, that circumstance, with the cause they had undertaken, procured them a degree of popularity. But they very soon began to introduce many other subjects of debate, on which they attempted to prove the necessity of petitioning Parliament also. In these meetings intemperate speeches were often made that disgusted moderate men, who thought them improper, and even ill calculated to obtain the reliefs they called for. They applied to me by letter to approve some of their proceedings, but my answer was the same it had been on some other similar occasions, namely, that in mere civil, or secular affairs, I could take no other part than to announce to all those under my care, according to my ministry, not only the great duty of faithfully obeying the laws and respecting those that administer them, but also that petitions, complaints, and claims, however true and just in themselves, may become illegal and criminal by the improper language and manner of preparing and presenting them to government or to the legislature. I pushed the caution no further, yet even thus much gave some offence, but was not without effect.

I am sorry to be obliged, in candour and fairness, not to conceal from your Grace another subject that gives me extreme pain. One of my own confreres, the Right Rev. Dr. Doyle, Roman Catholic Bishop of Kildare and Leighlin, has latterly surprised us all by a letter that unexpectedly appeared, first, in the London papers, and since, in all those of Ireland, addressed by him to Mr. Robertson, M.P., an excentric and wild production, tending mainly to injure the Roman Catholic body that it professes, and, I am sure, was meant to serve. It is in nothing analogous with his former writings, some of which were edifying and useful; and though others of them were not equally so, in the entire, yet they contained no passage so harsh, unreasonable, or reprehensible, as the last letter above mentioned, of that author.

It has caused an extraordinary sensation here, but in general, a feeling of deep regret and of irritation against the bishop, who, among many other absurdities, has clumsily placed the Roman Catholic prelates and clergy in a very awkward predicament, and even in an odious point of view, which they certainly do not deserve, as the author himself elsewhere abundantly proves, as he is their ultra-apologist. But what gives us most pain is that the letter in question must be offensive to government, if it condescends to mind it at all, though unworthy of its consideration.

It is possible your Grace may here exclaim, Why do you not yourselves disavow, silence, suspend, and put down, such a man at once? You may depend, my Lord Duke, it will end in that, and very soon, if the aggressor himself does not come forward and make speedy, full, and sincere atonement for his error, which I have every reason to expect he will do, and is actually preparing, and it will be the most effectual remedy for the evil.

I request your Grace will reserve this letter, and my name in particular; but not so far as that the whole may not be communicated to those whose duty it is to attend to such matters, should this be worth their notice.

I have the honour to remain most respectfully,

my Lord Duke, your faithful and most humble servant,

P. CURTIS.

[This is the Roman Catholic Primate. I knew him well during the war in Spain, in which he acted the part which an honest man ought.—WELLINGTON.]

To Mr Griffin.

MEMORANDUM ON UP PARK CAMP, JAMAICA.

Ordnance Office, 7th June, 1824.

The Master-General having had a communication with the Secretary of State on the subject of the barracks at Up Park in the island of Jamaica, begs to refer the Board to the Report on the island of Jamaica, on the subject of these barracks, from the Commissioners recently returned from the West Indies, from paragraph No. 1 to No. 8 inclusive. The Master-General has written to the Duke of Buckingham upon the subject of the water from the Hope Estate, and he recommends to the Board to direct Major-General Mann to send orders to Captain Raney by the mail which will leave London on Wednesday next, to prepare plans and estimates for the construction of privies to the barracks at Up Park, as recommended by the Commission.

If any time should be lost by sending these plans and estimates to England for approbation, Captain Raney may, with the approbation of the Commander of the Forces, commence their execution immediately, without such reference. But as materials will be to be collected, it may probably be no loss of time to refer the plans and estimates home according to the usual practice.

Orders will be given respecting the supply of water for these barracks as soon as the answer of the Duke of Buckingham will be received.

9th June, 1824.

In consequence of the communication with the Secretary of State, referred to in the minute of the Master-General of the 7th inst., the Master-General wrote to the Duke of Buckingham a letter, of which the annexed No. 1 is a copy; to which he has received the answer No. 2.

The Master-General recommends that this correspondence should be sent by the mail of this day to Captain Raney in Jamaica, with orders to the following effect: that he should lay the correspondence and the Report of the Commissioners before the Commander of the Forces, and with his Excellency's permission first estimate the quantity of water which will be required from the Hope River, in order to give an ample supply to the barracks at Up Park, in the manner pointed out in the Report of the Commissioners.

That he should then communicate with the Duke of Buckingham's agent, and proceed to fix a value upon the water and upon the land required, in the manner pointed out in the letter from the Duke of Buckingham.

That Captain Raney should at the same time estimate the expense of works, whether covered or otherwise, water-courses, pipes, &c., which it may be necessary to construct according to the plan of the Commissioners, in order to give the troops at Up Park the full benefit of an ample supply of water.

That he should send home, without loss of time, these last estimates, with a list of stores which it may be necessary to send out for the execution of the work; so that these stores and orders may be sent out upon the subject as soon as possible, and that the work may be commenced immediately at the opening of the season.

WELLINGTON.

[389.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MEMORANDUM.—QUESTION OF SENDING TROOPS TO PORTUGAL AND OF FINDING A COMMANDER FOR THEM.

8th June, 1824.

No 41 expresses only his own opinion.

No. 45 expresses the opinion of the ministry, particularly that of the Marquis de Palmella, and even of the Conde de Subserra, that English troops ought to be sent.

No. 51 expresses that of the King.

It is very extraordinary that there should be nothing from the Portuguese minister in London on this subject.

The great object in my opinion is to reform the Portuguese army. If that is done, the Portuguese monarchy is safe, and the country safe from invasion.

If Marshal Beresford should undertake it, I think he must feel confident that he would be able to attain his object, and in that case I should not think it necessary to send British troops. If the reform of the army should be undertaken by a Portuguese officer it will not be effected; and it is useless to send British troops unless it should be determined to leave them in Portugal for some years, say five or seven; that is, till the disposition and habit of mutiny shall have been worn out.

But there is another view of this question. If Lord Beresford cannot, or will not take the command of the Portuguese army, and we have no other officer whom we could recommend, and I declare I don't know of one, would it not be desirable to recommend to the King to take an officer from a foreign service, that is to say, the Austrian? Observe that the Portuguese army has almost invariably since the year 1760 been commanded by a foreigner. There are two officers in the Austrian service, either of whom would perform the service well. Colonel Walmoden, who is a Hanoverian, and *naturally* related to the King; and Prince Philip of Hesse Hombourg, the brother of the reigning Prince, married to the Princess Elizabeth. The latter has most skill and steadiness. If either of these should be appointed, we must give a body of troops for a time, to give the officer in command of the Portuguese troops time for his measures. I confess that I think very little of the advantage of appearing to possess an influence in Portugal or elsewhere, particularly as weighed against a real *advantage* such as that

which we might expect would result from the appointment of either of the officers above mentioned; viz., that of securing the Portuguese monarchy and its territory from invasion by effecting the reform of the Portuguese army.

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [390.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 12th June, 1824.

I return the papers which you sent me yesterday. I see that Mr. Hervey mentions the correspondence with Prince de Polignac, and states to what it points.

I should almost doubt the existence of such instructions as the other paper contains. But they are not worse than what Dr. Mackay's conduct afforded ground for belief that this government had given him.

Whatever France may do upon this subject I hope that we shall not depart from the line of conduct which has been adopted after mature deliberation.

We must view this question of the independence of the colonies, in relation to our own situation at home as well as abroad. The preservation of peace must be our object, and if we must have war we must not be forced into a continental contest single handed with France having all Europe for her well wishers if not for Allies.

Then considering what is passing in Ireland, and what all expect will occur in that country before long, the bad with hope, the good with apprehension and dread, we must take care not to give additional examples in these times of the encouragement of insurrection, and we must not be induced by clamour; by self-interested views, by stock-jobbing, or by faction, to give the sanction of our approbation to what are called the governments of these insurgent provinces, as far as such approbation is necessarily conveyed by the establishment of a diplomatic intercourse between his Majesty and those governments. There are some who doubt that such an intercourse will tend to the establishment of the independence of those provinces, seeing how little effect the measures of the United States have had; while others fear that it will. I believe much of the effect will

depend upon the degree of protection by which such intercourse will be accompanied.

It is very obvious that unless we extend our protection to some of these governments, their independence cannot exist; and I believe there are few in Parliament who would not think that the correspondence of our minister is conclusive upon the state of Mexico. Considering what an interest we have in the preservation of peace; the delicacy of our position in Portugal, and the chances, and even probability of a civil war in Ireland; and on the other hand, the interest which all European Powers feel on this question, and with what anxiety even our best friends view our conduct in relation to it; there ought to be a very strong and manifest interest, bordering upon, if not amounting to, an absolute necessity, which should induce us to take any further step.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Le Prince de Metternich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MON CHER DUC, Au Château de Johannisberg, ce 14me Juin, 1824.

C'est avec une bien véritable satisfaction que j'ai reçu votre lettre du* de Mai. Elle est digne de vous, pleine de la franchise d'un homme voulant le bien, et certes ne puis-je qu'être flatté de la préférence que vous m'accordez en me parlant ainsi que vous le faites. C'est m'encourager à m'expliquer ainsi que je regarde comme un devoir de le faire.

Je viens d'adresser à M. de Neumann une dépêche que je l'invite de lire à Mr. Canning. Cette dépêche n'est point diplomatique; elle ne renferme pas un passage qui pourrait être taxé de n'être qu'une phrase; il ne s'y trouve pas un mot que je ne pense en réalité. Je vais droit au fait, et ce fait est un appel à la loyauté du cabinet Britannique; et il est digne ainsi d'être prise en considération par vous.

Mr. Canning a rendu toute justice au dernier office de M. d'Offalia. Il a bien voulu, dans le cours d'une conversation avec M. de Neumann, me faire l'honneur de ne pas me croire étranger à sa rédaction. Mr. Canning est en ceci dans l'erreur. J'ai reçu et lu l'office espagnol sans l'avoir connu d'avance. Il a rempli mes vœux personnels, et je suis charmé d'avoir pu m'assurer que le jugement qu'en Angleterre on a porté sur son contenu ne diffère pas de celui que ma conscience m'a forcé d'en porter de mon côté.

Qu'arrivera-t-il d'une démarche aussi pure, claire, et correcte du cabinet de Madrid? Devra-t-elle rester confondue définitivement avec celles qui jusqu'à cette heure n'ont point pu provoquer un rapprochement entre les cours dans l'affaire qui sans nul contredit et par leur nature même, doit leur

* Blank in manuscript.

paraître d'un intérêt à la fois commun et immense? Je dis *commun*, car quel pourrait être un intérêt portant sur les principes vitaux de l'ordre social, qui pourrait ne point être commun aux premiers soutiens de cet ordre?

Croyez, mon cher Duc, qu'il n'est pas une considération, pas une crainte, rien qui n'aurait même que la valeur d'une simple scrupule de la part de votre conseil, que je ne pressente et ne devine. Vous devez trop me connaître pour ne point admettre que ce n'est pas un sentiment de présomption qui me fait avancer cette thèse. Je vais plus loin, et ce que je me reconnais de pratique dans le jugement me porte à vous assurer qu'il n'est pas une de ces considérations que je ne serais prêt à aborder et à scruter avec le cabinet Britannique dans cet esprit de bienveillance et d'intérêt qui rarement conserve ses droits sur un étranger. C'est que depuis longtems l'Europe a pris pour moi la valeur d'une patrie, et je dois ce bienfait dans ma situation, à l'abnégation éclairée que l'Empereur a su et sait faire de toute vue d'une politique isolée, dans un tems où les premiers des intérêts sont communs à tous les états.

On craint en Angleterre et le présent et l'avenir. On s'est isolé parce-qu'on a confondu ce qui ne devrait point l'être, et on s'est rapproché ainsi en peu de tems des derniers termes de l'isolement. Est-il encore possible d'arrêter ce que je déplore comme un mal positif, avant qu'il ne soit consommé en entier? C'est vers ce point que se dirigent toutes mes pensées, et certes avec les miennes celles de tous les hommes d'état voulant le bien et assez franchement éclairés pour sentir que ce n'est pas dans la poursuite d'un système d'isolement entre puissances que dans le tems de crise peut se trouver le bien-être du corps social. Aussi voyons-nous combien de pas a déjà fait en Angleterre et en France l'esprit de rivalité entre les deux états. Nous qui sommes placés sur une terre solide et tranquille, nous déplorons chaque symptôme d'un éloignement, qu'avec notre franchise habituelle nous signalons tour à tour à Londres et à Paris.

Le moment actuel est d'une valeur immense. Il décidera immanquablement de tout un avenir. Encore quelques pas, et l'Angleterre se trouvera conduite là, ou certes aucun des hommes éclairés et bienveillans qu'elle renferme n'aura voulu arriver.

Le plan de Mr. Canning me semble être celui de se tenir *en dehors des questions*, convaincu sans doute que la force se trouve dans ce qu'il appelle une attitude indépendante. D'après ma conviction—et je la crois justifiée par l'expérience des siècles—l'indépendance véritable d'un grand état ne diffère pas de celle de l'homme privé. Elle n'est l'appanage que de ceux qui s'assurent d'une attitude *dans* les affaires comme dans les relations sociales. Hors du cercle des unes comme des autres existe le vide, et c'est en lui que meurent les états et les individus.

L'Angleterre veut-elle, pourrait-elle même vouloir la perte de l'Espagne? Veut-elle le triomphe de la révolution dans une partie quelconque du monde? Certes, non. Eh bien! que dès lors elle ne se refuse pas à empêcher que ce qu'elle ne désire pas n'arrive, et que le champ de luttes interminables ne se prépare au milieu des décombres et des ruines des empires.

L'Angleterre propose à l'Espagne de s'entendre avec elle. Elle trouve donc qu'il doit y avoir moyen de s'entendre. L'Angleterre est-elle forte

quand elle propose ce que d'autres auraient le droit de proposer également à l'Espagne, et pour leur propre compte, mais ce qu'ils ne veulent pas; convaincu que ce n'est pas dans une forme qui exciterait toutes les jalousies et toutes les rivalités qui peut se trouver le salut de l'affaire? La paix politique, ce premier des bienfaits que tiennent en vue les Puissances, serait sans aucun doute bien vîte compromise si elles diviaient du principe sur lequel elles ont placé leur politique, et sur lequel il est si éminemment utile de les voir là maintenir.

Veuillez, mon cher Duc, prendre connaissance de ma dépêche à M. de Neumann. Interprétée dans le sens véritable dans lequel je l'ai rédigée, elle pourra conduire peut-être à des explications que ma conscience me fait désirer avec force. Je désire les faciliter, car je désire voir se rapprocher ceux qui sans des risques positifs ne sauraient se maintenir sur une ligne d'isolement. Le tems presse, car il marche avec célérité vers des solutions. Aussi souvent que les hommes chargés des grands intérêts du monde se soumettent à attendre que ce soit le sort qui les amène, les affaires se perdent comme le vaisseau qui n'attend sa direction que des chances du hasard.

C'est avec bien de la peine que j'ai appris que vous avez été incommodé. Conservez-vous, mon cher Duc, pour le bien et pour la gloire de votre pays, et pour satisfaire aux vœux les plus chers de vos amis. J'ose me flatter que vous me mettez bien sincèrement de leur nombre.

METTERNICH.

[391.] *To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

MY DEAR PEEL, London, 26th June, 1824.

I don't think I could get you a half-pay officer to become a foreign messenger, unless the relation on which he should stand towards the foreign ministers should be that of a gentleman, and dining at his table. At least I should object to his continuing a half-pay officer, or an officer at all, if he were to stand in the existing relation of a menial servant.

I know of one or two, or more, very clever fellows, who might answer your purpose, who are not in the King's service at present. One of them is a man of the name of Light, who served last year with Wilson at Corunna. But the worst of this sort of man is that he acquires in foreign services, such as that of the Spaniards, or of the independent powers of South America, very *loose* habits; and I confess that I should be sorry to see some despatches entrusted to their care. But if this Light would serve, and is at all like what he was, I think he would answer your purpose, and I will inquire about him if you like it.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the King. [392.]

HANOVERIAN FORCE RECOMMENDED TO BE SENT TO PORTUGAL.

London, 1st July, 1824.

Since I had the honour of attending your Majesty yesterday, it has occurred to me that it would add materially to the strength of the corps about to be sent to Lisbon, if it could have with it one regiment of light cavalry.

The composition which I would recommend would be as follows:

Six battalions of regular infantry, 800 strong . .	4800
One battalion of light infantry, 800 strong . . .	800
One regiment of light cavalry	400
Two batteries of six pieces of artillery each, twelve pieces of artillery	200
	6200

These might be commanded by Lieutenant-General Count Charles Alten, and the regular infantry be formed into two brigades, each commanded by a major-general or brigadier-general. The light cavalry and light infantry would be out of the Line, and each commanded by its own Commanding Officer, as well as the artillery.

It would be very desirable to send General Arentschildt with the artillery, as he understands the country well, and General Halkett the younger with the infantry, if his services should not be required in Hanover.

All which is submitted for your Majesty's consideration, by your Majesty's most devoted and faithful subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

To the King. [393.]

MEMORANDUM OF ARRANGEMENT RESPECTING THE HANOVERIAN TROOPS TO BE SENT TO PORTUGAL.

London, 2nd July, 1824.

It is desirable that his Majesty should transmit to his government in Hanover, any communication which he may receive from his servants in London, or from the King of Portugal,

regarding the proposition, that a detachment of his Majesty's Hanoverian troops should be sent to serve in Portugal.

His Majesty's Hanoverian government will then be able to consider, first, whether such a force can with convenience be detached from Hanover into Portugal? Secondly, upon what terms?

In respect to the first point, it is unnecessary to write anything in this paper. If it should be decided that troops are to be sent, the arrangements for sending them should be made immediately after that decision should be taken, and they should be sent without loss of time. And it must be observed that it is desirable that the whole detachment should go at the same time.

In the mean time his Majesty should name a gentleman to negociate for him, on the part of his Hanoverian government, the terms of the convention of service of his troops in Portugal, with the minister to be named by his Most Faithful Majesty. This negotiation might be carried on if thought convenient under the mediation of the British government. The terms should embrace the following points:—

1st. The payment by Portugal of the whole of the expense of these troops, from the day of their embarkation in Hanover to that of their return, including their transport, and that of their baggage and stores. This to be effected, first, by the advance of a sum of money to be carried to account, and next by a fixed monthly payment calculated upon the amount of the actual expense of the corps to his Majesty, or in lieu of the last, by the King of Portugal taking upon himself to pay the corps monthly. I would recommend the mode first mentioned.

2ndly. The nature of the service. It should be stipulated that the Hanoverian troops are to serve solely and exclusively under the command of their own officers. They are not to be detached from the head-quarters of their own corps, excepting by the consent of their own commander.

The commander will receive his orders from the King of Portugal, or from an officer of superior rank in the Portuguese army who may be appointed by his Most Faithful Majesty to command his own army, but from no other; nor is any order to be given to any Hanoverian detachment, excepting through the channel of the Hanoverian Commander-in-Chief.

The Hanoverian troops are not to be moved to a greater

distance from Lisbon than * miles, without the consent of the Hanoverian Commander-in-Chief.

The officers and troops are to receive in camp, barracks, and quarters, the same allowances as they would receive in Hanover, of which allowances a tariff should be attached to the convention. Each of the high contracting parties is to have the power of putting an end to this connexion by giving to the other * months' notice. That is to say, his Majesty is to have the power of withdrawing his troops when he may think proper, giving such notice; and on the other hand they are to be withdrawn in * months after notice received of the wish of his Most Faithful Majesty that they should be withdrawn.

The whole expense of their transport to Hanover is to be paid in either case by his Most Faithful Majesty.

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [394.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 4th July, 1824.

I send you with this a letter which I received last night from Lord Melville, regarding the Marines to be sent to Lisbon.

The objects in sending the Marines at all under existing circumstances are that by garrisoning the forts on the Tagus they may give security to our own fleet in that river, and that they may secure the disembarkation of the Hanoverians when they will arrive.

I see that the idea of sending Hanoverians to Lisbon has got out; and we may expect that it will not be well received by the Portuguese army. No man here can answer for what may happen in consequence. But this I think is very clear, that we ought to have on the spot as soon as possible the means of protecting the position of our squadron in the Tagus, and of enabling us to judge whether it is or not expedient to force the landing of the Hanoverians at the moment they will arrive there.

Indeed it is very possible that the presence of the Marines in the Tagus, and the knowledge that they may be employed in the manner above pointed out, will prevent all the mischief.

* Blanks in manuscript.

I therefore think that they ought to be sent without loss of time, and that Sir E. Thornton and the admiral in the Tagus ought to be instructed respecting the mode in which they should be employed.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[395.] *To Lord Bathurst.*

MEMORANDUM ON SUPPLIES SENT TO THE GOLD COAST.

12th July, 1824.

The annexed paper, No. 1, will show, first the nature of the requisitions for ordnance and military stores received from the coast of Africa since the month of August, 1821.

Secondly. The dates at which those requisitions were received at this office.

Thirdly. The dates at which the orders for the supply were issued at this office.

Fourthly. The names of the ships in which the stores were embarked.

Fifthly. The dates of their sailing.

Major Chisholme could not have known that under the regulations of government, the Navy Board, and not the Ordnance, are responsible for finding the ships for the transport of stores, and for the period of their sailing; but the Secretary of State's office are aware of this fact.

Upon the whole of this list of requisitions there are but two points which require explanation; and those are, First, the delay in the supply of the rockets, &c., required for Sierra Leone, on the 7th March, 1822.

Rockets are not an usual article of supply, particularly to a station at which there are no persons instructed in the use of them; and this demand was referred back to Mr. Donne, the storekeeper. The Board also referred the demand to the Secretary of State on the 15th of April, 1823; and his Lordship's answer was received on the 31st July, 1823. After all, the rockets required were not military, but signal rockets.

Secondly. The delay in sending ordnance and stores to Cape Coast Castle, in consequence of the Report of Captain Grant

of the Royal Engineers, of the state of the ordnance and stores in the forts on what is called the Gold Coast.

Captain Grant, in his Report on the subject, mentions the unfitness of Mr. Brandon for the office of which he was doing the duty, viz., that of Ordnance Storekeeper.

The Ordnance Department have no officer upon that coast; and when the Surveyor-General was, according to the usual official practice, considering the expediency of sending the ordnance and stores required, he adverted to the report of the unfitness of Mr. Brandon for the duty imposed upon him, and stated, as was his duty, that it would not be proper to send stores of such importance and value, without appointing proper persons to take care of them. His Report having been referred to the Secretary of State on the 15th April, his Lordship referred the case to the Treasury, and the Treasury replied on the 31st July, that as the ordnance and stores were to be paid for, it did not appear that this department had anything to say to the care of them; and on the 11th of August, 1823, that is to say five months before the action occurred on the Gold Coast, it appears by the Minute, of which the enclosed, No. 2, is a copy, that the Master-General ordered that these stores should be issued and sent.

But this defeat is attributed to the want of ammunition; musket ammunition it is supposed; and that the forts on the coast are endangered for the want of ordnance and stores; and the blame of both events is imputed to the Ordnance Department in this country. The annexed paper, No. 1, is a complete answer to these imputations. But in respect to the last-mentioned complaint, it must be observed that probably there is no ground whatever for it; as it appears that Captain Bowen, of his Majesty's ship *Driver*, having landed at Cape Coast Castle, with a party of his men, *put the whole of the guns in the best possible order:* and I conclude that the same object might have been effected by the application of the same industry, zeal, and talent, at the other forts; at least sufficiently to enable the garrison to defend themselves against the desultory and unskilful attacks of the Ashantees, without the aid of artillery.

In respect to the first ground of complaint, viz., the want of musket ammunition, it might have been expected that Brigadier-General Sir Charles Macarthy would have taken care to be supplied with that necessary article from Sierra Leone before

he took the field on the Cold Coast. It appears by the annexed Paper No. 1, that 300 barrels of powder, *i. e.*, sufficient to make 12 million rounds of musket ammunition, were ordered to be sent to Sierra Leone on the 14th September, 1821, and sailed in three different vessels in November, 1821, and January and February 1822, and there were in store there on the 30th September, 1823, 3900 rounds of musket ammunition, about 50,000 balls, and powder sufficient for 368,000 rounds.

There has been no war in that part of the world to consume this ammunition, and Brigadier-General Sir C. Macarthy had it at his command.

But it appears that not only there was musket ammunition at Sierra Leone, but in the field on the Gold Coast. Major Ricketts mentions, in his Report, that on the 14th January, on his arrival at Assamakow, *he found Mr. Brandon, the Acting Ordnance Storekeeper, on the ground with ammunition* of which the men had already a supply of twenty rounds per man; and he in a subsequent part of his Report mentions that *Mr. Brandon had received his Excellency's (Brigadier-General Macarthy) positive orders always to have forty rounds for each man packed up in kegs, and which was always to accompany him.* It is to be presumed that Sir Charles Macarthy, who was present in this same camp, knew whether Mr. Brandon had or not in the camp the means of obeying these orders; and if he had not the Brigadier-General would probably have deemed it expedient to avoid the impending battle.

But if he had the means of obeying these orders, there was then no want of ammunition, and this imputation is unfounded, whether the Ordnance Department in Pall Mall is or is not to be deemed responsible for it.

But it is obvious throughout these Reports that there was no want of ammunition.

The carriage of the ammunition is frequently mentioned; and the difficulty of moving it, and of passing it over the sloughs and waters by which the country was intersected, which was the scene of these operations, and the *loss of the ammunition*, not by the Ordnance Department in Pall Mall or by any body belonging to them, is more than once mentioned in these Reports.

The facts are clear from these Reports, and any person practised in military operations will see them, viz.: That Sir

Charles Macarthy took the field with a very undisciplined rabble, very ill equipped with the necessary means of transport for his ammunition and provisions; that he attempted to perform marches which, with such a force, would have been probably impracticable in any country, but were quite so by the paths through the sloughs, the *bush*, the rivers, &c., which intersected the country which was the scene of his operations; that those people who carried his ammunition and provisions deserted, throwing away their loads, or were incapacitated from following him by famine and fatigue; and that these were the real causes of the want of ammunition reported by Major Ricketts, at the critical moment of the action.

WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Count Munster. [396.]

MONSIEUR LE COMTE, London, 13th July, 1824.

His Majesty has commanded me to write to you on the questions likely to come under discussion here regarding the Hanoverian troops in Portugal; and I write in English because I can express myself with more facility, and I know that that language is as well understood by your Excellency as your own.

In respect to the first points of the discussion, viz., Whether it will be convenient to the kingdom of Hanover to detach these troops; whether it is consistent with the existing civil or military constitution of that country or with its engagements with its co-estates in Germany: these are questions upon which I cannot venture to give an opinion. His Majesty has very wisely referred them for the consideration of his servants in Germany, who will doubtless decide them according to their views of the interests of their own country, combined with views for the general benefit and tranquillity of Europe.

The other points refer to the detail of the negotiation with Portugal in the hypothesis that the Hanoverian government will be enabled to give the assistance of the troops.

The first to which I will refer is the sum to be demanded for the troops from Portugal, although it is the last mentioned in the paper delivered to Mr. Canning by the Hanoverian Chargé d'Affaires.

I earnestly recommend that his Majesty should not allow his officers and troops upon this occasion more than the war pay and allowances of Hanover.

It would not suit his Majesty's finances and would, in fact, in the long run limit and cramp the operations of his troops, if he were to put the officers and troops upon British pay and allowances on every occasion on which they should quit his country. This must be the case, unless his Majesty should receive from the British Treasury a subsidy to enable him to pay the increased pay and allowances, and I am sure that it is much more for the credit of the Hanoverian government to be without such subsidy, if possible, than with it. In whatever way this point may be settled, I earnestly recommend that no more may be required from Portugal upon this occasion than the troops will cost his Majesty. In these times it would be highly discreditable to his Majesty's Hanoverian government if any attempt were made to increase his Majesty's revenues by the hire of his troops.

In respect to the proposition of the Hanoverian Chargé d'Affaires that the treaty for the troops should be negotiated in the first instance between the British and Hanoverian governments and then between the British and Portuguese governments, Great Britain taking upon herself in the first instance the expense and recovering such expense from Portugal, I beg to remind you that the demand is made for the Hanoverian troops, because it is the opinion of the King's servants here that they could not incur such an expense not provided for by Parliament without calling Parliament together as soon as possible. If they could not incur such expenses for British troops in Portugal they could not incur them for Hanoverian troops, and therefore there must be an end to the proposition that Great Britain should make a treaty with Hanover for the troops with a view to defray the expense or to make any advance of money on that head.

The other proposition in the paper of the Chargé d'Affaires of Hanover, viz., the guarantee by Great Britain of the terms of the treaty to be negotiated with Portugal, has equally been rejected by the King's servants here. This proposition is founded on the notion that the Portuguese government is insolvent, which will probably be found not to be true. The object of the demand of the Hanoverian troops is to enable the Portuguese

government to disband and reform the Portuguese army; and if that object is persevered in steadily, the Portuguese government will have at its disposal ample funds to enable it to perform its engagements. I have no reason to believe that this government will utter its decision on this question; but it must be observed that this question stands on very different grounds from the others.

First, I believe it is not impossible to concur in it without immediately calling Parliament. The King's servants have it in their power, as I believe, to advise his Majesty to guarantee the treaty between Hanover and Portugal and to delay the communication of the treaty to Parliament till it will be convenient to make such communication. Secondly, if the Hanoverian government should consider this guarantee of sufficient importance to make it a *sine quâ non* of the transaction; the King's government here will then have to decide these questions: Is it or is it not absolutely necessary that the Hanoverian troops should go to Portugal? If it is, is it fitting that the burden of this expense should fall upon the kingdom of Hanover? Is it better for Great Britain to incur the risk of the expense, or of the loss of the kingdom of Portugal and of the House of Braganza for ever?

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Marquess of Chandos.

MY DEAR LORD, London, 15th July, 1824.

I return the book containing the correspondence regarding Captain ———.

It appears to me that it will be very difficult for the Admiralty to take any course upon this subject at present.

In consequence of the reports of the punishments on board the ———, Sir G. Moore was ordered to visit that ship and make inquiry into the circumstances connected with the punishments, and to supersede Captain ——— if he should not find that his conduct was excusable. The Admiral did visit the ship, and states in his letter of the 16th July that, without being able to investigate the circumstances connected with the punishments farther than he had the preceding day, and entirely on

the Captain's own statements of each particular case, he was very far from thinking such severity justifiable, and, according to the orders he had received, he superseded him in his command.

In his letter of the 18th July, in answer to one written to him by Captain ——— demanding a court-martial, he states that their Lordships having thought fit to decide in this case and to act upon their decision, the Admiral does not conceive that he can with propriety comply with this demand, but that he would transmit the letter and reply to the Admiralty.

The Admiralty cannot order a court-martial upon Captain ——— unless they pass a censure upon their former proceeding and upon that of the Admiral acting under their orders. It is clear that they did not originally intend that the Captain should be brought to a court-martial if the Admiral should see cause for blame, and they cannot now turn round upon him and say that he ought to have brought the Captain to trial; neither would a trial in this country be just, either towards the Admiral or Captain ———, any more than it would possibly at present on the station in which the ——— is, supposing it to be possible to assemble one.

Under these circumstances I confess that I think the best thing for Captain ——— to do is to write an account from his notes of each case of punishment, adding thereto such evidence as he may be able to procure, and that he should transmit this paper to the Admiralty. His justification will then be matter of record, and can be made such use of for his advantage as you may hereafter think expedient.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Clancarty to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Garbally, 16th July, 1824.

That this country is in a far worse state of disaffection than immediately prior to the Rebellion of 1798, can, I think, scarcely be doubted. At that time the feeling was republican, originating with the Presbyterians in the North; and although the Romanists were in the three other provinces considerably (though not universally) implicated in the rebellion, when it actually broke out in their quarters as in Wexford, it immediately assumed a religious cast; the Protestants were murdered, and this so disgusted the

Presbyterians, who formed the principal force in rebellion, that they immediately threw the game up, and thus facilitated the exertions of government to crush the insurrection. The object of disaffection is now exclusively religious, fostered and promoted to the utmost by the powerful influence of an unprincipled priesthood, operating upon the ignorance, superstition, and fears of a bigotted peasantry, who dare not disobey through terror not only of church censure, but of the temporal dereliction of their neighbourhood, and the injuries they would be open to from the zeal of others in the event of their resistance. In 1798, though strong, and partially successful, efforts were made by the United Irishmen to organize a system of government whereby the better to secure the success of their treasonable views, yet their endeavours to effect this object were made with an active and most vigilant administration hanging over them, upon the spot, supported not only by the British Cabinet, but by the Parliament of the country. Is that the case at present? On the contrary, under the system, if such it can be called, which has been adopted with respect to Ireland, the Popish Parliament have been enabled to organise a most complete system of internal government, whereby they may, and in case of insurrection will, convey their orders wherever they please, to the meanest peasant, and with scarcely a chance of disobedience. For my own part, I see little hope indeed of extricating ourselves from early rebellion and civil war. Thus circumstanced, it becomes a question, How is such an event, and with what force, to be met? In 1798 the government were in possession of an immense yeomanry force, well armed, and tolerably drilled in this country; they had besides the whole militia of Ireland in arms, a force which proved itself fully adequate to annihilate the rebellion as it actually then burst forth; they had also the means, of which they availed themselves, of procuring further assistance from the voluntary offers of the English militia. With an immense army on foot, for which there was abundant employment abroad, there was nevertheless a far greater force in Ireland at that time than there is at present. What is the state of things now? You have scarcely any regular troops; the British militia is disembodied, that of Ireland, as well as its yeomanry, can scarcely, without hazard, be now called out, unless its composition should be rendered solely *Protestant*, a limitation which is neither recommended, nor would it be politic, at the present moment, however requisite its adoption may possibly become in future. How to answer the main question therefore I confess my inability. If, however, drawing my information from the only sources of intelligence of which I am now master, viz. from the public journals, an application has been made to our government from Portugal for the aid of a British force; abstracted from all reference to continental or Portuguese interests, which, however, have, and ought to have, their weight, surely an opportunity of this kind, fully defensible upon its ostensible grounds, of increasing the regular establishment, and thereby enabling government eventually to put down rebellion at home, ought not to be neglected.

I shall say no more upon this subject.

The Popish Parliament still goes on flourishingly, their supplies already voted, and, on all future occasions, will be realised far better than the King's taxes. This assembly the Irish Attorney-General, nay, the law

officers of the Crown in England, as I understand, consider as not being a representative assembly, and consequently as not falling under the prohibition of the statute. That the Romanist association has not been chosen by any process of previous election by the Roman Catholics I freely admit. But do our learned lawyers therefore conclude that this is not a representative body? Does it not act for the whole? Does it not lay its proceedings first before aggregate county meetings of Romanists, and before general aggregate meetings in the second, and sometimes in the first, instance, with a view of obtaining their sanction and recommendation to proceed? Does it not obtain this sanction in every instance? And is it not upon this sanction that it bottoms and reinforces its authority? Where can there be found a more complete example of a representative body, or one of *apparently* a more popular nature?

I shall only add, that a speech of Lord Liverpool's in the last Session, wherein he taunts Ireland with the manifold financial advantages which she has received from the generosity of England, has created a considerable and unpleasant feeling here among the real loyalists of this miserable land. With every affection towards England, and the close union of every part of the empire, they think it a little severe, under late discouragements, to have it asserted that the generosity has been all on one side, and an insinuation thence produced that Ireland has proved ungrateful. If she has been so, it has arisen from the want of capacity in England rightly to govern her. But that it has not been so in the present instance, the view taken in the accompanying paper will sufficiently prove, as well as the fallacy of Lord Liverpool's reasoning thereon. I can have no objection to its being shown him, in the hope that he will be more tender towards us in future. The paper is not intended for publication, or even for circulation among friends.

I fear I have sufficiently trespassed upon your Grace. I shall not in future venture to do so.

Most sincerely and ever yours,

CLANCARTY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Great credit is taken by Lord Liverpool for England's liberality in taking upon herself, by the union of the two exchequers, the debt of Ireland, leaving Ireland at the same time by much less taxed than England. Always desirous to give to England praise for liberality, and to court an intimacy of acquaintance with her which shall wholly preclude distinction, it will be of use to investigate this claim for British generosity, because, should it stand upon unstable ground, the assumption will tend to irritate, and like too many other experiments of a similar cast, carry with it, under the name of *conciliation*, the bitter apple of discord.

At the commencement of the war, say 1793, the debt of Ireland amounted to 1,625,298*l*., that of Great Britain to 238,231,248*l*., or, in other words, the debt of Ireland stood to the debt of Great Britain as 1 to 146. From this time till the Union each country was taxed by its own legislature for the support of the war and the current expenses of the State. How then stood the debt of each country at this period? On the 5th of January, 1801, Ireland owed 27,792,975*l*., and Great Britain at the same time owed 464,609,488*l*. So that

within that period the proportion that the debt of Ireland bore to that of Great Britain had changed from being as 1 to 146 to being as 1 to not quite 17? Is there any want of Irish liberality here? And if in her struggle to uphold the independence of Britain she has made sacrifices beyond what her resources could meet and that consequent poverty has ensued, is it not rather too much for Great Britain to boast of generosity in not forcing Ireland to give what she had not, namely, the money she had to her last shilling expended under such amazing disproportion in a conflict surely not less in consequence to Great Britain than it was to Ireland?

But it may be said that this was the result of our own folly, that we have therefore no right to complain; that we taxed ourselves, and must therefore abide the consequences. Be it so: let us then look what financial benefits have resulted to Ireland from placing her purse-strings in British hands? This act of grace which united the Irish with the English exchequer took place on the 5th January, 1817, at which time the debt of Ireland amounted to 130,561,089*l.*, and that of Great Britain to 726,738,842*l.*, or in other words the proportion which the debt of Ireland bore at that period to that of Great Britain was as 1 to 5½! Now, did not the Act of Union profess to strike such a proportion of taxation for the two countries as should cause them to rise or fall by one common scale? Did it do so? If it did, why in 1817 did not the proportion between the debt of Ireland and that of Great Britain remain as it was at the Union, namely, as 1 to 17 nearly, and not, as it was, in the ruinous proportion of 1 to 5½. See what a difference this would have made to Ireland. Instead of her debt being, in 1817, 130,561,089*l.* it would have been about 43,396,403*l.*; and instead of Ireland being brought to a state of pure pauperism by an effort to produce a fund far beyond her means, and which in justice she should not have been called upon to provide, she would have been within her strength, and not obliged to seek from Great Britain an act of retributive justice, which Lord Liverpool is pleased to dignify with the name of bounty.

Put Ireland into the situation in which the war found her as regarded her debt and that of Great Britain, and let the proportion stand on the 5th of January, 1817, as 1 to 146. Then instead of being called upon to pay 130,561,089*l.*, the sum of 4,977,663*l.* would have answered. Let Ireland, then, be repaid this difference, and though it is not possible to bring at once into active operation the vast mass of circulating capital which has been destroyed in the effort made to advance it for Great Britain, yet she may be enabled to struggle on without eleemosinary assistance.

In the adjustment of the fair balance against Ireland, we cannot, however, leave out of mind the Irish incomes permanently spent in England, which will be much underrated if taken at 2,000,000*l.* annually. Capital is clearly the only taxable commodity; from it, and from it alone, the national income must be derived. This 2,000,000*l.*, then, is so much taken from the Irish and placed in the English national source of wealth. Viewing this as a political economist, I should consider it of no immediate financial concern where the parts and proportions of the national wealth were produced; but if it be sought to divide that which good policy should keep entire, and thereby to exalt one part of the empire at the expense of the other, self-defence then forces upon us a view of the subject that sound policy would keep asleep. As to this 2,000 000*l.* annually, then, I apprehend, that if in direct and indirect taxation I take that it produced annually 10 per cent., I shall much understate the fact. The annual income then derived from this sum would be 200,000*l.*, without saying anything of compound interest, further than observing that it forms part of the charge against Ireland; this taken for 24 years, viz. from 1793 to 1817, will produce 4,800,000*l.*, a sum nearly equal to what, without considering absentee

income, could fairly be called the just debt of Ireland; and towards payment of her current expenses since 1817, the before-mentioned annual sum of 200,000*l.* should be placed to her credit. Let not Ireland's poverty and British liberality be therefore cast into Ireland's teeth. She has suffered with Britain and for Britain beyond the share which Britain has taken in the conflict; she has been ruined to maintain British connexion: don't, then, deny her the consolation of acknowledgment; don't, because she has laid down her last mite in your cause, make now a boast that you take little from her in taxes, and that she owes you therefore great obligation. What can she do more than give her all for British protection? It might be asked, has she got what she has paid so dearly for? but that forms no part of the present inquiry.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Gloucester Lodge, 23rd July, 1824,
11 P.M.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

I do not think that the opinion of Messrs. Baring, or any other merchants, ought to guide our policy. But as you mentioned to-day Mr. Baring as UNFAVOURABLE to South American independence, I cannot resist the temptation to send you the enclosed, which, I think, will satisfy you that his doubts do not extend to *Buenos Ayres*.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S. I add another letter, just come to my hands, which will show you that I was not far wrong in my estimate of the activity of the French government on these matters.—G. C.

July 24.

Could you return these as soon as read to Planta at the Foreign Office? I am going out of town till Monday.

[398.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 26th July, 1824.

I return the papers which you sent me. I don't think the letter from the house of Baring at all disproves the existence of the opinion of Alexander Baring that no recognition of the South American States ought to be made by this country. It is a mere complimentary letter of business in return for a favour shown to their house. But whatever may be the degree of attention to be paid to the opinion of Alexander Baring (and considering what his opinions are in general, I should think that some might be paid), I am quite certain that he does entertain and has delivered the opinions on this subject which I

stated he had. I am very glad that the French government do attend to what we are doing in regard to these States. I hope they will follow our example, and we may then avoid many of the consequences which I apprehend from our measure.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Gloucester Lodge, 28th July, 1824.

I return Lord Beresford's most interesting letter. His views appear to me to be very just in most particulars, and well worth considering in all.

As to his staying or coming away I am greatly perplexed to form an opinion. That he should not have gone when he did, I am, as I always was, perfectly convinced. That he ought to have come away the instant that the King withdrew his confidence from him is also, I think, pretty clear. But I confess I see no chance of any settlement in Portugal but by Lord Beresford's being placed at the head of the army; and I should be afraid to throw away that chance by calling Lord Beresford hastily away. In fact, he has hitherto decided so entirely for himself, that I do not see with what propriety or advantage we can now step in to influence his last decision.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Downing Street, 2nd Aug., 1824.

In answer to your question I have to say that the King's subjects have not the right to hire their ships as transports (nor have they done so), but the Proclamation does not simply direct the capture of such ships, but directs that they should be forthwith burnt without being brought to a Greek port for adjudication, and also directs that the crew on board should be put to death, and gives the execution of all this, not only to ships having a commission from the Greek government, but to any armed ship whatever. Under this proclamation, on the pretence of finding stores or troops on board, any piratical vessel might burn and destroy any neutral vessel, and by destroying all her papers and putting her crew to death, escape detection. Let me know if you do not think that this is not to be tolerated.

Yours ever sincerely,

BATHURST.

[399.] *To Lord Bathurst.*

My dear Lord Bathurst, London, 2nd Aug., 1824.

The Greek Proclamation will certainly bear the construction you put upon it, but it is a forced construction. The meaning is, that vessels so employed, with their crews, shall be treated as enemies, which is, I believe, legitimate.

I have no objection to give a check to the Greeks, but I think this measure a little too strong and hasty, and that it might be made the precedent in other cases in which such a mode of proceeding would be very inconvenient.

In truth, if the last words of the Proclamation which I have marked were omitted, and they are, after all, mere surplusage, there would be nothing to complain of in the Proclamation. However, if you think there is nothing in these objections to the instruction, send it.

Ever yours most sincerely,

Wellington.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My dear Duke, Downing Street, 2nd Aug., 1824.

You will see by the enclosed despatch that the words you have marked are by no means considered as surplusage, and that the Turks will consider themselves authorised to adopt the same system if it be not stopped. The Proclamation also gives expressly this authority to all armed vessels, although they have no commission; and it is precisely this description of force against which we have been for some time complaining, and which this proclamation establishes. There are many representations made to the Admiralty of the depredations committed by them, and a whole Maltese crew was recently murdered by one of them. They will now consider themselves authorised to do this under the Proclamation.

I trust that when you see the impression it has made elsewhere, you will not feel the same objection which you now feel; but, to say the truth, I suspect that it will have been recalled long before the instructions will reach Corfu.

I am just on the point of setting off to Cirencester. Let me beg of you to take that care of your health which every well-wisher to his country as well as your friends are most solicitous you should do.

Yours ever sincerely,

Bathurst.

P.S. Be so good as to return the despatch addressed to A. Gordon, Esq., Colonial Office.

I ought to have added that I consulted Sir Christopher Robinson, who

said it was the most monstrous Proclamation he had ever seen; and on my proposing to explain in the instructions the reasons of its being so considered, he advised against it, as he said that they were too apparent, and that I might weaken the case by stating the objections to it, as I might not include all the objections which according to the law of nations are to be brought against it.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [400.]

My dear Mr. Canning, London, 7th Aug., 1824.

Since I saw you yesterday I have reflected upon your instruction to Mr. Parish, and as the only question now is the mode of executing your measure, I would earnestly recommend you to consider whether it is not advisable that you should call upon Mr. Parish to furnish you with the information required regarding the power of the State of Buenos Ayres to bind the other States on the Plata before you give him any instruction to treat. First, such a mode of proceeding is more consistent with the former determination and conduct of the government when they sent Commissioners to inquire, viz., to do nothing till fully informed by the Report of the Commissioners, to reserve every point to be decided upon by the government themselves, and to leave nothing to the Commissioners except to report facts.

Secondly, there is plenty of time, viz., six months from this time till the meeting of Parliament, to effect everything that it is desirable to do.

It is obvious that the public are not in a hurry on this subject, and, as far as I can learn, care very little about it.

Believe me, &c.,

Wellington.

To Lord Beresford.

My dear Beresford, Stratfieldsaye, 18th Aug., 1824.

I don't think the government can have any wish or opinion on the subject of the prosecution of the editor of the newspaper in which the supposed letter appears.

It is a question entirely for your own decision. I am, in general, for dealing harshly with these editors, who, in my

opinion, do a great deal of mischief. But I think it would be difficult to make out a charge in this case. It must be that he accuses you of abetting the acts of the Queen and of the Infante. He will contend that this is fair matter of inference from facts, some of which are true, others partially so, and others discoloured or false but connected with others which are true. I confess I should doubt your being able to make this out a libel.

If that should be doubtful, of which, however, your lawyer must be the best judge, the editor will know it as well as you, and your threats will be unavailing; and like other threats, if not realised, will tend to ridicule and injure the threatener.

I think the paper should be well considered by your lawyer, and you should well consider how you can prove what you might be obliged to prove before you undertake the business at all.

After all, this affair of Portugal is gone by, and is no longer matter of attention or discussion here; and it may be doubtful whether it is worth while to revive it by giving importance to these paragraphs. Your success should in this view be very decisive and complete.

Yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 19th Aug., 1824.

I have not sooner answered your letter of the week before last because I have been desirous of seeing how far it was possible to conform to your suggestion without losing so much time as would in effect annul altogether the decision of the Cabinet.

I enclose to you Mr. Freeling's report as to the length of Buenos Ayres voyages. The packet sails the end of this month. Twenty-one weeks from that time will carry us on the beginning of February, allowing only ten days at Buenos Ayres for the execution of Mr. Parish's instructions.

Now this would bring us to the meeting of Parliament, and if what we had sent out *now* was merely to make further inquiry, what would be our language at that time?

I cannot believe the public feeling on this subject to be so indifferent as you seem to suppose. The quiescence I apprehend to arise from the certainty that we are proceeding, though gradually, in the course which we have so often indicated.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn. [402.]

My dear Wynn, Stratfieldsaye, 21st Aug., 1824.

I have perused with great attention the papers in this box.

Before I give you my opinion on the point in question I must by definition endeavour to clear up a great deal of the confusion which appears in the discussion.

The military authority of the Governors of his Majesty's colonies abroad is quite different from that vested in the persons of the Governors of Fort William, Fort St George, and Bombay respectively. The military authority vested in the Governor by his commission is the same as that vested in every civil Governor acting under the British laws and constitution, and the same as that exercised by the Secretary of State.

That description of military authority is by the Act of Parliament vested in the *Governor-General in Council* in Bengal and in the *Governor in Council* in Fort St. George and Bombay respectively.

But besides this general military authority and control vested in the Governor-General *in Council* and in the Governors *in Council*, the Governor-General is at Fort William, and the Governors of Fort St. George and Bombay are, at Fort St. George and Bombay respectively, Governors and Commanders-in-Chief of those forts and garrisons respectively, and of all the forces which are or may be employed for the service of the Company within the said fort or garrison.

Having thus defined the peculiar nature of the command of the Governor, and shown how it differs from that of the Governor of one of his Majesty's colonies, the next question is, what are the nature and limit of the command of these Governors? There is no doubt that it includes all the officers and troops stationed within the limits locally of the fort itself. In my opinion, it does not give the Governor the power of assembling and confirming courts-martial. Upon this point I think the opinion of the Advocate-General at Bombay is conclusive. If General Courts-martial are required in the garrison they must be ordered and approved by him or by those who have the authority, whether from the Crown or the Legislature: that is to say, either the Commander-in-Chief of the army or the Governor *in Council*; or if Regimental or Garrison Courts-martial are necessary, they must be ordered by the military

Commanding Officer in the garrison under the Governor, in accordance with the power vested in him by the Act of Parliament. But I should think that the sentence of a Court, whether general or regimental, any more than any other military detail ordered by any other authority, could not be carried into execution without the consent of the Governor. Having now defined the local limit and the nature of the command of the Governor, as referable to the points in dispute, the next question is, what ought to be its limit, as referable to the local position of the cantonments of the troops? In discussing this point, the Governors and Commanders-in-Chief and Members of Council have considered the garrison as the troops, as the fort, and as the works of the fort indiscriminately, as it suited their argument at the moment.

The truth is, however, that the word *garrison* can have but one meaning. We talk of a strong or weak, a good or bad, a numerous or insufficient garrison, and always mean to express the troops destined by superior order to perform the duties of or to defend the fort. Of these troops the commission of the Governor intends to give him the command; and, as I before observed, nobody doubts that he has the command of them when they are within the local limits of the fort.

Local circumstances, considerations of health and convenience, and the absence of danger from attack by a foreign enemy, have rendered it desirable to remove the troops destined to form the garrisons of these forts to a certain distance, which varies according to circumstances; and it is pretended that the Governor ought to lose his command over these garrisons at the very moment they pass the local limits of the forts!

Let us examine this position and refer to the localities. The garrison of Fort St. George was cantoned in different places from three to five miles distant from the fort, and it was never contended that those troops were not under the exclusive command of the Governor when so stationed. But they are to be removed to the distance of nine or ten miles for greater convenience and salubrity; and notwithstanding that the details will by this arrangement become more complicated, they are then to be removed from under the exclusive command of the Governor, and every guard is to be the object of a correspondence between the Governor and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

Then at Bombay the cantonments of the troops composing the garrison are upon Colaba (commonly called Old Woman's Island). It is admitted that if they were within the local limits, that is to say, 1000 yards of the outworks, the Governor must command them; but when they come to be upon Old Woman's Island, which may be 2000 or 3000 yards from the outworks of the fort of Bombay, the garrison of Bombay is no longer under the exclusive orders of the Governor, but is placed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief; although it is admitted that the garrison of Fort St. George, although cantoned from three to five miles distant from Fort St. George, remained under the exclusive command of its Governor. The whole discussion, then, of local limits comes to be ridiculous. The truth is, that the Governor should command the garrison wherever it should be placed. That is the obvious meaning of his commission.

The next question is, what is the garrison? The Order of 1800, issued by the Governor in Council at Bombay, was certainly illegal. It extended the local limit of the Governor's authority from the works and their limits to the whole island of Bombay, whatever might be the number of troops stationed in the island. But, in my opinion, the proper authority, whether it is the Governor in Council or the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, should be called upon to state in Orders from time to time what are the corps composing these garrisons respectively; and upon every relief; and the corps so denominated as belonging to the garrisons, wherever stationed for convenience or health, should be exclusively under the orders of the Governor.

You will see from this reasoning that I am of opinion that the cantonment at Palaveram, under the Governor of Fort St. George, should, if occupied by the troops composing the garrison of Fort St. George, be under the command of the Governor.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Upon reading over this letter I observe that I have omitted to comment upon one point, that is, the necessity of leaving in the hands of the Governors of these forts any military power. Of this I entertain no doubt. The records of former times show

the necessity for it. But a reference to transactions of a more modern date, viz., those between Sir George Barlow and General Macdowall, will show that it will not answer to curtail the authority of the civil governors in these settlements.

I am likewise inclined to doubt the soundness of the opinion of the Advocate-General of Bombay of the 24th November, 1820, in respect to the power of the Governor to assemble courts-martial and to confirm their proceedings. There can be no doubt respecting General Courts-martial; but as the Governor, although not regularly trained in the military profession and promoted to his high station from the inferior ranks of the army, is an officer vested with command by authority of his legal superiors, I should think that under the words of the Act of Parliament he has authority to convene and to confirm the proceedings of Garrison Courts-martial.

Wellington.

[403.] *To Sir William Congreve.*

My dear Sir William, Stratfieldsaye, 22nd Aug., 1824.

I have received your letter of the 21st instant, and I most positively object to the trial on board cruisers, of any new invention, till such invention shall have been first submitted to a committee of officers of the Navy and of the Artillery, under the orders of the Boards of Admiralty and Ordnance, and shall have been approved of by such Committee, and till the Board of Admiralty shall desire that such newly-invented equipment shall be tried in one of his Majesty's ships.

If a life passed in the service and much practical experience had not taught me the value of most of these new inventions, the circumstances which have come to my knowledge since I have been Master-General, and some with which I became acquainted in my recent visit to Portsmouth, have proved how very cautious both Boards ought to be before they adopt them. You must pardon me, therefore, if I don't enter into the consideration of them with the same sanguine expectations of their success as their ingenious parent does, and if I consider them, as I ought, rather with a view to discover objections to them than to cover their defects.

Believe me, &c.,

Wellington.

To Mr. Fleming. [404.]

My dear Sir, Stratfieldsaye, 23rd Aug., 1824.

I have received your letter of the 19th August only this morning, and I don't lose a moment in answering it.

I am highly flattered by the desire of the Society that I should be their Patron, and I wish you to consider of my objections to the institution before I give my final answer.

The great object of us all ought to be to endeavour to prevail upon the lower classes to consider a little of their own affairs and situation and to provide in some degree for the future, and that the exertion to make such provision ought to be that of the individual himself, and not that of his Society, his fellow-traders, and above all of his parish.

I think your plan is not liable to much of the objection which I feel to the ordinary Benefit Societies, because the regulation of it is taken out of the hands of the parties interested, and the Society is extended beyond the limits of a club, a trade, or a parish. But what is to prevent a parish from assuring for their sick, their infirm, or their aged in this institution? If one may, all may; and should we not ruin the institution by not guarding against this evil? How is it to be effectually guarded against?

I understand the difference between member and honorary member, and it appears by the 17th article of the Rules that the honorary member cannot derive any benefit from the funds, the surplus of which it appears to be intended to divide among the ordinary members.

But will the law exempt me from liability to loss, if there should be any in the management of the funds of the Society? I mean beyond the amount of my subscription.

The reason I ask this question is, that I am entirely in the hands of trustees; and if it is not quite clear that I am not liable to loss beyond the amount of my subscription, I am quite certain that my trustees would object. Indeed, for this reason I cannot even insure my house, &c., at present, at any of those offices at which the insurers partake of the benefit of the concern.

I return the papers you sent me with the parts marked to

which I have referred, and I shall be glad to hear from you as soon as you will have considered the contents of this letter.

Believe me yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

If you are coming to Basingstoke Races, would you and Mrs. Fleming come here during their continuance.

405.] *To Lord Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, London, 30th Aug., 1824.

I received yesterday your official letter to the Master-General and Board of Ordnance, directing that certain ordnance and stores should be sent to Sierra Leone, upon which you will receive in the usual course the answer of the Master-General and Board. The ordnance, carriages, muskets, and accoutrements are already ordered, as will be the ammunition as soon as the Secretary of State's department will explain what they mean by the words necessary proportion. I must observe, however, upon this mode of conveying the King's pleasure to this department, that I know it was not the practice in Lord Chatham's time, and, I believe, not in the time of Lord Mulgrave, to convey the King's pleasure to the Master-General without first consulting with him, whether in the Cabinet or elsewhere, upon the necessity for the service and the means of executing it. As for my part, I am not at all disposed to create any delay by official disputes or by complaints, but I must protest against a novel mode of conducting the business between the two departments, from which, in my opinion, the service has suffered very materially already, and will suffer still more hereafter.

Very lately I was attacked by the Under-Secretary of State for the delay in sending ordnance and ammunition to the Gold Coast, and I was stated to be the cause of the military misfortunes in that part of the world. All I did was to protest against sending a very large quantity of valuable ordnance and stores to the Gold Coast without having proper persons to take charge of them. This objection was overruled; and as soon as the answer was received from the Secretary of State's department

the ordnance and stores were ordered, and were sent out as soon as the ships for their conveyance were prepared by the Navy Board.

What has happened in consequence? The ordnance and stores arrived upon the Coast, there was nobody to take charge of them, nor anybody who knew even how to land them. A boat or raft was wrecked, having some of them on board, and these were lost; and there being nobody capable of landing heavy guns, &c., the transport was allowed to quit the Coast, and went off to Barbadoes with the ordnance and stores on board! I don't believe there can be a more practical illustration of the necessity of attending to the advice of professional people on such points.

In respect to this requisition from Sierra Leone, I mention to you that only on the 9th of February, 1819, sixty-one wooden and some iron carriages were sent there from this country, quite new and in every respect serviceable and complete, some for garrison and others for the field; and I am very much mistaken if there are at Sierra Leone the means of placing the heavy guns, much less of making use of them, for which carriages were then provided; and I am quite certain that they have there ten times the number of field-carriages in proportion to the number of troops they have than I ever had in the field. Observe, likewise, that these carriages were sent out but little more than five years ago; and observe, likewise, that although all are returned unserviceable by the Committee of Civil Commissaries, &c., who have examined them, the greater number are returned serviceable in the last return which we have in the office from Sierra Leone, viz. in December, 1823.

I have, however, sent for Mr. Downie, the Clerk of Stores, who is sick at Gosport, and I shall get him to account for even one of these carriages being unserviceable.

In consequence of the wear and tear of wooden carriages in the colonies in the tropics, I determined to supply them with iron carriages, and some were sent to Sierra Leone. But I observe that even these are voted *unserviceable*, so that it appears that neither wood nor iron can serve in this colony for five years!

I am sure you will see that this is a subject that requires some professional inquiry, and that it will not answer to allow a parcel of commissaries in Sierra Leone or of clerks in London

to waste the public property, and to cover such waste by the use of the King's name.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

You have now called for 3000 muskets for Sierra Leone. There were in store there 213 serviceable on 25th December, 1823. There have since been sent there 300, but I believe these they gave away in presents, and 2573 with accoutrements consigned to Sir Charles Macarthy, besides the large consignment to the Gold Coast. To these you have now added an order for 3000, with accoutrements and ammunition; there having been sent already thousands of rounds of ammunition. But there is really no use in sending ordnance and stores if they cannot even disembark them.

[406.] *To Mr. Griffin.*

ARMS, ORDNANCE AND STORES FOR SIERRA LEONE.

Ordnance Office, 1st Sept., 1824.

I recommend that the Board should order immediately to be prepared to be sent to Sierra Leone, 3000 stand of arms, 3000 sets of accoutrements,* and iron carriages complete for the following description of iron ordnance:—32-prs., 10 feet long, 12; 24-prs., 9 feet long, 3; 18-prs., 9 feet long, 2; 12-prs., 7 feet 6 inches long, 1; 9-prs., 7 feet long, 1; 4-prs., 5 feet 6 inches long, 1; 3-prs., 4 feet long, 4.

Mortars: 13-inch, 2; 8-inch, 2.

And the following pieces of iron ordnance: 9-prs., 7 feet long, 1; 4-prs., 5 feet 6 inches long, 1; 3-prs., 4 feet long, 4.

Carriages are provided for these last in the preceding enumeration. Inform the Secretary of State that these orders have been given. State to his Lordship that these measures will carry into execution his Majesty's orders conveyed by his Lordship, and put the ordnance and their carriages at Sierra Leone in the most efficient state for service; every unserviceable piece of ordnance being replaced, and a new iron carriage

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* Ordered by Lord FitzRoy Somerset's letter of yesterday.

being ordered for every piece of iron ordnance that is or will be, in consequence of these orders, at Sierra Leone.

That iron carriages are preferred to wooden, as it appears that the wooden carriages sent to Sierra Leone in the year 1819 are now unserviceable, although not one round has been fired; and Mr. Downie, the Clerk of Stores, has stated to the Master-General that wooden carriages will not last in that climate more than two years.

That the Master-General and Board have not thought it necessary to take any measures to replace the carriages of the field-guns: first, because iron carriages are not applicable to this description of ordnance; and next, because Mr. Downie, the Clerk of Stores, has stated to the Master-General that it is quite impossible to make use of ordnance of this description in that country.

That the Master-General and Board therefore propose to desire, if the Secretary of State should approve, that the field-guns and their carriages at Sierra Leone, as well as the unserviceable wooden and iron carriages of the iron ordnance, and the unserviceable iron ordnance at Sierra Leone, should be sent to this country in the return transports.

That there remains to be ordered only what is termed in his Lordship's letter the necessary proportion of ball-cartridges, which the Master-General and Board will order as soon as they will learn from the Secretary of State what that proportion is.

WELLINGTON.

To the Rev. Dr. Curtis. [407]

MY DEAR SIR, Woodford, 12th Sept., 1824.

I have received your letters regarding your discussions with Mr. MacClintock, and I have perused the documents which you enclosed and others which have been sent to me from the Castle of Dublin, in answer to the communication which I had made to the Lord Lieutenant of your letters and papers.

I regret the existence of such discussions in Ireland. The object is to educate the people, and one would think that it would not be very difficult to discover a mode of engrafting education upon religion (by which, by-the-bye, the education of the people at large can alone be beneficial to them or to

their country) if the parties to the question are really and seriously in earnest in their desire to attain their object.

It is my lot to be well acquainted with both the gentlemen who are parties to this discussion, and I am very much mistaken in your character, as well as in that of Mr. MacClintock, if both are not seriously disposed to do all the good in their power, and this by every means in their power. But the mischief of all these discussions and questions in Ireland is that everything is an affair of party; that inferior men, in questions of this description and in the heat of party dispute, become of far greater importance than that to which their talents and situation entitle them; that they get possession of these questions, and force from those who are their superiors, as well in station as in talents and abilities, the decision upon them. The sufferers in this contest are the unfortunate people and the nation at large, and by no means those put forward in it, much less those who really conduct and decide it.

I am convinced that there is no more moderate man than yourself, and when I entreat you to set the example of moderation, to calm the zeal and irritation of those who surround you, and to endeavour to produce all the good you can in our unfortunate country, I am convinced that I am urging that to which your own inclination would lead you. But it cannot be too often repeated, and I hope you will excuse me if I have unnecessarily repeated this recommendation upon the present occasion.

I understand that the discussion between you and Mr. MacClintock has been referred to the Commission on Education in Ireland. In hopes that you will favour me with your letters whenever you think it can be of use to do so,

I remain, my dear Sir,

WELLINGTON.

[408.] *To Lord Strangford.*

MY DEAR LORD, Woodford, 13th Sept., 1824.

When I was in London two days ago Mr. Canning communicated to me the despatches from St. Petersburg, containing the ukase appointing M. de la Ribeaupierre to be the Emperor's plenipotentiary at the Porte, his Imperial Majesty's letter to

you, that to the King, &c., thus bringing to a termination the arduous and important negotiation with which I had been the means of charging you when I was at Verona. I have followed you with the utmost admiration and satisfaction, though I confess not without some anxiety, through all the interesting details of your negotiation; and I cannot avoid now to offer my cordial congratulations upon a result obtained by your rare abilities, firmness, and perseverance, so important to the world and to your own country.

You may rely upon it that the King and his ministers are sensible of the credit and advantage which this country has acquired by this exertion of your Lordship's talents.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Rev. Dr. Curtis (Tit. Arch.) to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Drogheda, 29th Sept., 1824.

I have been honoured by your Grace's letter of the 14th instant; and far from thinking it requires any apology, I consider every word it contains as perfectly just, and such as I should expect from your Grace, if you condescended to reply to what I thought it my duty to state, in a fair undisguised shape, for your information: but well aware your Grace would probably not acquiesce in all my sentiments. I could not, at least, doubt that your Grace being one of his Majesty's Ministers (instead of deciding the controversy between Mr. MacClintock and me) would declare us both wrong; and advise us to avoid all such discussions and employ any influence each may have, not to divide or encourage the people to strife and contention, but to repair and consolidate the breaches—but too wide and numerous already—and to sanctify education, and render it truly useful to the rising generation by the powerful aid of religion, seasonably and discreetly applied. For all which, your Grace justly observes, proper means could be easily devised.

Whoever refuses to submit to these general principles, must stand self-convicted, and be abandoned by all men of common sense. But none, except fools, will contradict them, while only enounced in this general and abstract theory; but we no sooner descend a little, and attempt to apply them to particular cases and circumstances, than the whole scene changes, and insuperable difficulties spring up where none were supposed to exist; and never were these more numerous, and obstinately adhered to than at this moment; though the above-mentioned general professions are still put forward, with seeming liberality and candour, but solely for the purpose of amusing—not to call it deceiving—superficial observers and such curious inquirers, as would wish, indeed, to know the truth, but with little trouble, and who generally acquiesce in a specious but evasive answer, if couched in

good language, and given with address and an air of sincerity; all which but too often furnish a mask for error.

I am very sure, my Lord Duke, that matters will be found just so by the Commissioners of Education Inquiry, appointed for this country; and God grant that, with all their talents, experience, and unbiassed intentions, they may be able always to discriminate and see their way through the wily maze prepared to misguide them. I do not regret, but am rather pleased, that the remonstrances I had submitted to your Grace have been referred to them, with three of whom—namely, Messrs. Frankland Lewis, Glasford, and Foster—I had the honour of a long conference on the 3rd instant, in the course of my Visitation of this Diocese, on which duty I was absent from Drogheda, when they visited it on the preceding day; but they found, at my residence here, the three ecclesiastics that co-operate here with me, and were accompanied by them to visit such of our twenty-two town schools as they wished to examine; of all which I had previously made to them the exact and minute returns demanded. Among many other things, these gentlemen told me it did not enter into their plan, nor were they sent, to decide such discussions as that which was pending between Mr. MacClintock and me; to which I respectfully replied, that I neither expected nor wanted any such decision to be made, much less promulgated to him, to me, or the public; but that, if they were sent, as plainly appeared, to investigate the real and true state of education in Ireland, it could only be done by discovering if the means hitherto and now employed in a great number, at least, if not in all the chief schools, were not calculated, rather totally to defeat than to promote, the education of the Roman Catholic poor, who would never consent, any more than their clergy, to have their children educated in schools where their religious principles are tampered with, and themselves perpetually exposed to proselytism. That I had asserted, and knew to a certainty; and it was notorious that such had long been the practice in Mr. MacClintock's schools, which he, however, attempted to deny, as is here the custom on such occasions; but that I could prove the fact by the affidavits of the children themselves so tampered with, and of their parents who were ready and willing so to depose, had they not been withheld by me; for they, being all servants and dependents of Mr. MacClintock, would bring ruin on themselves and families by such declarations. Wherefore I requested the Commissioners, then on the spot, if they really wished to know the truth, to call those poor people before them privately and have them examined and sworn, which would convince the Commissioners and not expose the poor people. This was too clear and palpable to be misunderstood, yet there was no answer given; but it was not done, nor could it be expected, because one of the Commissioners then present was Mr. L. Foster, a most worthy gentleman, but a near relative and intimate friend of Mr. MacClintock, who, however, was not the only object alluded to in my answers to him, but several other gentlemen, also of the neighbourhood, that had adopted the same system in their schools, and whose names I mentioned to the Commissioners.

Had this nucleus of proselytising schools, existing within a few miles of each other, been duly investigated and ascertained, it would serve as a clue for further discoveries of many more in this and the other dioceses, where, I much fear, the evil will be also glossed over or lightly touched upon, but

not removed or put down ; and without that, it is a useless loss of time to speak of general instruction and education, which would be eagerly embraced, as they are anxiously desired, when they come in a fair and proper shape; as is unanswerably evinced by the incredible number of Roman Catholic schools, many of them excellent, now flourishing in spite of our extreme poverty where the legislature was lately assured that no such asylums existed, unless for propagating the Memoirs of Moll Flanders, and such like ordures.

But then, it is said, that in Ireland everything becomes an affair of party. I really believe there is a great deal of that everywhere, and in all departments of life, and, perhaps, a necessary evil, if it can be called so at all, except when taken in an invidious and illiberal sense. But as I apprehend it is so understood, when applied to us, I should wish to know if Roman Catholics, merely as such, and acting according to their unalterable and well-known principles, admitted even in their oath of allegiance itself, can be justly called a party, in any odious sense of the word ? If not, I humbly conceive that no impartial man will ever be able to discover how we can deserve to be stigmatised with that unworthy epithet, for not consenting, and tacitly approving by our silence, that our religious principles should be attempted to be frittered away before our faces under the specious pretexts of instruction and education. For such is the undeniable fact, whatever glosses and evasions may be used to dissemble it, and these are many and sometimes very imposing.

Oh, well! but—it will be said—if you were all sincerely desirous of promoting useful education, could not means be easily devised for engrafting it on religion, without injury to any denomination? Nothing could be more easy than to devise such a benevolent and salutary plan of genuine and practical philanthropy, as a basis for general education, without prejudice or offence to any denomination of Christians, if the real sincerity and earnest endeavours, on all sides, concurred without despotic dictation or fanaticism for that purpose, as mentioned in the query. But where are these heaven-born dispositions to be found? Each pretender will call his own reveries by that name. Yet, as matters now stand, the very formation of such a plan would be found extremely difficult; but if it even were made, it would be absolutely impossible to carry it into effect amidst, not only so great a diversity of opinions and sentiments concerning the most essential points of the Christian religion, but such an unexampled and daily increasing rage, of virulence, calumny, and abuse, as are constantly poured out on the heads of Roman Catholics in general, by many public prints of the capital and provinces, avowedly salaried by the first characters of the nation, particularly ecclesiastics, for that infamous purpose; which I would not venture to mention to your Grace, were it not a well-known fact, that cannot have escaped your knowledge. Those vile calumnies and horrid charges are repeated, and even exaggerated by the English prints, and spread over the whole world, and will be believed by many; but those who know them to be false are astonished, and often ask why Roman Catholics do not constantly refute such alarming aggressions, but rather seem by their silence to acquiesce in them? And, indeed, all unprejudiced and well-meaning people will naturally suppose that government would not suffer the continuance of such treatment, incompatible with peace, pro-

tection, or good order, if they really thought it unfounded, and not, in some degree at least, merited by the aggrieved part of the community.

At all events, my Lord Duke, I must beg your Grace may rest assured that the very little I have been reluctantly obliged to say, on two or three occasions, during the five years that I occupy my present station, was wrung from me by unavoidable necessity—as apologies and refutations of the most injurious, gross, and unprovoked attacks made on the Roman Catholic body, and coming from respectable quarters that imperiously called for a reply. And that such as I gave were always, both in extent and energy, but a small part of what was expected and loudly demanded by a numerous and injured class of his Majesty's faithful and unoffending subjects, who, being under my spiritual care, naturally looked to me for such redress as I could lawfully and was bound to afford them, as well to vindicate their assailed and unjustly-reviled religion, as to preserve them from any rash attempt to seek redress by improper or undue means—which people, when abandoned by those who should direct them, are but too apt to do. So very far am I, and have ever been, from exciting the people to excess or disturbance of any kind, that I have made it my constant study to impress on their minds that no such lawless attempts can ever be warranted, under any pretext whatever; and I have happily succeeded in my endeavours with respect to all those within the sphere of my immediate inspection, who live in perfect peace. But I tremble for its continuance, if the above-mentioned grievances be not removed or restrained, as they are sorely felt, and may produce fatal effects, notwithstanding all our exertions to keep the people quiet.

I have the honour to remain, most respectfully,

my Lord Duke, your faithful and devoted humble servant,

P. Curtis, A.B.

[Private. To be kept among my papers.

Wellington.]

[409.] *To T. Muloch, Esq.*

Sir, Stratfieldsaye, 1st Oct., 1824.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 28th September.

The newspapers have, as usual, misrepresented not only my case, of which naturally enough the editors could have known nothing, but the state of my health. The truth is that I met with an accident in the treatment of a derangement in the ear about two years ago, by which the nerves of my head were affected and injured. My stomach became consequently deranged, and although but little remains of the affection of the head, and all the unpleasant symptoms have disappeared, my health is not yet entirely re-established. I don't feel any incon-

venience from the remains of this accident excepting that I don't sleep at night quite so well as I could wish, and I must add that the act of awaking is always attended by some feeling like a quickened circulation in the head, and a corresponding feel in the stomach. There is nothing like spasm in the case nor ever has been; and I really believe that time alone and attention to my diet will do me any good.

I have troubled you with this explanation in consequence of the interest which you are pleased to express about me; but I am so tired of being the subject of the comments of the newspapers of the day, that I request you will keep this communication to yourself.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

your most obedient humble servant,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 4th Oct., 1824.

I enclose for your perusal the copy of a private letter which I have written to Sir Charles Stuart, announcing the change in the embassy at Paris.

I propose sending him his letters of credence to the new King (for the reasons mentioned in my letter to him) to-morrow, and his letters of recall next week.

Granville is arrived. He will be ready to set out on the special mission of condolence and congratulation on Thursday.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [410.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Royal Lodge, 5th Oct., 1824.

I received your letter this morning, and I return the enclosure. I should think that Sir Charles Stuart must have expected his recall at this period.

I heard some days ago that you intended to go yourself to Paris upon this occasion; but I should not have adverted to the subject till I should have heard of it from yourself if I had not heard in the Equerrys' room here yesterday, on my arrival, that

you intended to go to Paris with your family on the 15th or 16th to pay a visit to Lord Granville.

Lord Granville will scarcely have been established at Paris at that time, and there is nobody who will not believe that this visit has in view the attainment of some political object of importance sufficient to induce you to take a step which will be canvassed and chronicled not only in every newspaper but in every society in Europe. I observed the effect which the report had upon some of the corps diplomatique here, and you may rely upon it that it will be felt in a tenfold degree in their respective courts.

There can be no reason why the Secretary of State should not have a vacation as well as everybody else, nor why he should not go to Paris or elsewhere for his amusement, if circumstances permit. But the motive of his visit to Paris should be quite clear. If it be amusement, it should be at a time and under circumstances which make it clear that that is his object. If his motive be business or political negotiation, he should be able to explain in some degree the cause of so extraordinary a circumstance as that a subject for negotiation had occurred which neither the old nor the new ambassador could undertake and which requires his own presence and exertions. If the motive be amusement only, I should think it very desirable that the visit should not be made at a moment at which the whole world will impute it to political objects and negotiations.

I declare I think that if you are to go to Paris at all at this particular time it would be much more fit and becoming that the King should send you to congratulate King Charles X. than that you should go now under the pretence of a visit to Lord Granville, who for some time at least can be only a visitor himself.

I hope you will excuse me for the frankness with which I write to you upon this subject, and will impute my doing so to the real motive, my conviction of the inconvenience to the public and annoyance to yourself which will result from it; and I am much mistaken indeed if these evils would be compensated by any benefit which can result from your personal communication with Charles X. or his ministers.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Bathurst. [411.]

My dear Lord Bathurst, London, 7th Oct., 1824.

There can be no question of instructions if Mr. Canning should go to Paris as a traveller or visitor, and I think you would be right regarding instructions even in the case of a mission, if the discussion of them was not calculated to draw from him and from the Cabinet in general some explanation of views respecting the existing European Alliance, which would bring the subject fairly to issue before he should set out upon this scheme of his.

I wrote to him on Tuesday, as I told you I had it in contemplation. The letter stated that I had heard from authority that he intended to go to Paris as a visitor, but that I should not have written to him till I should have heard the report from himself if I had not heard it in the Equerrys' room at the cottage, and that he was to go on the 15th or 16th. I informed him of the effect of the report upon the corps diplomatique there assembled; and pointed out to him how necessary it was that his visit, if he should make one to Paris, should be so timed as to be fully understood to be a visit only; or that, if the object was political negotiation, he should be able so far to explain himself as to show the reason for which his own interference was necessary, and that neither the old ambassador nor the new could be entrusted with the conduct of such negotiation. I added that if his object was business it would be much better that he should explain himself accordingly; and be sent by the King to congratulate King Charles. I have had no answer and don't think I shall have any.

Ever yours most sincerely,

Wellington.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Gloucester Lodge, Friday evening,

My dear Duke of Wellington, 8th Oct., 1824.

A pressure of business has prevented me from sooner answering your letter of Tuesday, which, I confess, surprised me exceedingly.

I cannot account for the reports of the "Equerrys' room." I recollect accurately the only persons to whom I have ever said a word upon the subject to which those rumours relate; and none of those persons *can*

possibly have fallen into the blunder of the Equerrys' room, upon which half your letter turns, of fixing my supposed visit to Granville for the 15th or 16th of this month.

Granville must be at Brussels the morning of the 18th. He must, therefore, leave Paris, I suppose, the 16th at latest.

The remainder of the month will not more than suffice for the arrangement of his affairs at the Hague, for taking leave of the King of the Netherlands, and for removing his family to Paris.

When Granville shall be established at Paris as ambassador, and when the novelty of the new reign shall be a little worn off, I thought—and I still think—that a visit to Granville there might be not only pleasant but useful; and that it would be entirely free from the consequences which you appear to apprehend.

I do not expect, indeed, that any Russian agent would approve of anything that had, or might be supposed to have, a tendency to bring the governments of England and France into habits of confidence. I know too, that Russia governs Continental Europe, through Pozzo, now, nearly as absolutely as she heretofore governed Poland through Poniatowski; but I hope it is not to be understood as our settled policy, that *we* are to square our most indifferent actions by the same rule of obedience.

I hope you do not take it amiss that I said nothing to you of the notion which I certainly entertained at one time, of carrying myself the King's letter of condolence to Charles X. In truth, I had neither opportunity nor occasion to mention it to you. I mentioned it to the King on the day when I took leave of his Majesty on setting out for Ireland, as a notion floating in my mind; but which it would be time enough to discuss when the occasion should arise. The occasion arising while I was in Ireland, I wrote to Lord Liverpool for his opinion, which I received before I saw the King again; and that opinion being *rather* against the measure, I gave it up at once, and at once proposed Granville for the mission. I had, therefore, nothing to tell you upon that head.

When I mentioned to his Majesty the other project, that of which the "Equerrys' room" had obtained so incorrect a version, his Majesty was pleased to express his entire approbation of it.

If his Majesty has changed his opinion, he will, no doubt, lay his commands upon me to give up all thoughts of it: which (like any other commands of his Majesty) I shall, of course, implicitly and cheerfully obey.

But I hope it will not be thought unreasonable if I, at the same time, humbly submit to his Majesty my request that a similar interdiction may be laid on others of his Majesty's ministers.

Upon this point I must be allowed to speak plainly. There is one great question upon a right understanding of which between England and France the harmony of the two countries essentially depends. That question has been the subject of strenuous discussion in the Cabinet. A member of the Cabinet, who holds, or held, most strongly the opinions *against* which the decision of the Cabinet was taken, goes to Paris at this critical period,—I will not say "under *pretence* of a visit" to his son at Florence (though you apply that phrase to *my* projected visit to Granville), but with a sincere intention of proceeding to Florence; from which purpose he is diverted only

by the "recollections of sea sickness, and by the fear of crossing the Alps." At Paris he waits the death of the King. He has an audience of Charles X., in which the litigated question forms the chief topic of conversation. He returns immediately after that audience, and arrives at the Royal Cottage, probably to report that audience to the King, about the same time that you are writing to me from the Royal Cottage to set forth the dangers of *my* going to Paris and seeing Charles X.

I ask whether this be fair to the person holding my situation: and I ask whether I have not a right humbly to request of his Majesty that the Lord Privy Seal may be directed to take the trouble of reporting to me, for his Majesty's regular information, and for that of his confidential servants, the substance of his conference with Charles X., in order that we may judge of the first impression, as to the policy of Great Britain, which has been made upon the mind of the King of France?

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

very sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [412.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Hatfield, 10th Oct., 1824.

I have received last night your letter of the 8th, and I regret much that I did not call upon you as I passed through town, as it is quite obvious to me that you have not considered my letter in the sense in which I wrote it.

First, I assure you that although I have seen Lord Westmorland three or four times since his return from Paris, I did not know till I received your letter that he had had an audience of King Charles. Secondly, the first time I saw him was on the road from Windsor to London after I had taken leave of the King, and before Lord Westmorland had seen him. I had written to you on the preceding day, and did not then know that Lord Westmorland was in England. Thirdly, I never take offence at anything not intended, or indeed not calculated to offend. Whenever you think proper to mention a subject to me, I understand that you wish to have my opinion upon it; and upon such occasions and upon others in which I may think the information I can give you can be useful, I give it unsolicited, and I assure you always with the desire of doing good and preventing evil. But I claim no right to confidence that is not common to every member of the government. Fourthly, I think I mentioned in my letter that I had heard the report that you intended to go

to Paris before I went to Windsor on Monday; but that on that day I had heard it in the Equerrys' room, and the day of your departure mentioned; and that others had heard it also. These are all facts. It appears, however, that a day was named which is not, nor could not be, that fixed for your departure; but still I repeated in my letter the fact stated before me; and the substance, viz., that you are going to Paris, is true. I am not so fond of discussions as to wish to carry on one on a subject on which there is a decided difference of opinion. The object of your journey is to defeat the influence of Pozzo di Borgo, not only in France, but throughout the south of Europe. Situated as we are in relation to other questions, acting as we do in direct opposition to what those courts consider their vital interest, we shall find it very difficult to defeat the influence of Pozzo, which is, in fact, founded upon his opposition to our views. As for my part, with every respect for your talents, I don't believe you will succeed in destroying his influence, even in France, to a greater degree than it will be destroyed by his own violence and intemperance, and by the sense of their own security of the head and members of the existing administration. You will involve yourself in great difficulties by the attempt; which, by-the-bye, cannot be entirely distinguished from an attempt to destroy a fair Russian influence in France; and the government will feel the consequences of the failure. However, you must be the best judge, and I don't wish to intrude my opinion upon you farther than is agreeable to yourself.

In respect to the word pretence, as well as I recollect, I used it hypothetically. I supposed you might be going for amusement or for the purpose of negotiation. In the latter case I think I said you ought not to go under *pretence* of a visit. In the former you should time your visit so as not to afford ground for the belief that your real object was negotiation. I certainly could not mean to use that or any other word invidiously.

Believe me, &c.,

Wellington.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My dear Duke of Wellington, Gloucester Lodge, 12th Oct., 1824.

I should not trouble you with any reply to your letter from Hatfield, if it were not for one part of it, which by silence I should appear to admit to be a correct understanding of my former letter—but which is not so.

In speaking of my supposed journey to Paris, you say, "The object of your journey is to defeat the influence of Pozzo di Borgo not only in France, but throughout the south of Europe."

That would be, in my opinion, a most admirable and praiseworthy object of any journey; but I have never stated it as *mine*, nor can I imagine whence you draw your information.

What I said of Russian influence and of Pozzo, in my last letter, was in reference to that part of yours from Windsor, in which you spoke of the effect produced upon *some* foreign Minister at the Cottage by the rumours of the Equerrys' room.

That foreign Minister, it appeared to me, could be no other than Lieven: for I knew that Esterhazy (the only other foreign Minister there) had spoken of his own accord to Planta, a few days before, of a declaration of Prince Metternich's of his intention to carry the letter of condolence from the Emperor of Austria to Paris; and *he*, therefore (I presumed), *could* not be surprised and horror-struck at the notion of another Secretary of State's going to Paris on the like occasion. Prince Esterhazy turns out to have been wrong in his belief of Prince Metternich's journey: but he *did* believe in it. Taking for granted, then, that Lieven was *the* foreign Minister in question, I said that, "though Pozzo, I knew, governed *the Continent* absolutely, for Russia, I hoped that *we* should not be equally subservient to the word of a Russian ambassador"—meaning, plainly, that Lieven's disapprobation would not prevent my going to Paris, if otherwise thought advisable. What has this to do with the destruction of Pozzo's influence in Europe?

My object in going to Paris would be to get at Villèle's real sentiments and intentions; of which, ever since Chateaubriand's dismissal, Polignac, on the one hand, and Stuart, on the other, have given me exactly opposite versions.

Take, for instance, the very case of Stuart's recall: Polignac has told me over and over again that, if I wished to be on a footing of confidence with his government and *nommément* with Villèle, I must change our ambassador at Paris. Stuart has written the longest despatch that he ever wrote in his life, to prove that he and Villèle are the best of friends. Here, then, is an *instance* of the sort of case, upon which, to use your own expression, "neither the old ambassador nor the new" could afford me any assistance; but upon which five minutes' conversation with Villèle himself would enlighten me.

This particular case, to be sure, is disposed of by Stuart's recall; but I give it not as the only case, but as an *instance*,—and there would still remain, even upon this case, the question whether Polignac or Granville would be the more acceptable channel of confidential communication. *This*, too, is a question which I cannot put either through Granville or through Polignac; but which five minutes' talk with Villèle would solve, and the solution of which would be exceedingly important.

All that relates to Spanish America is, in like manner, perplexed by discordant, if not contradictory, reports of Polignac and Stuart. If M. Villèle has any system, it might be learned in conversation; if *none* (as I rather suspect) it would be important to learn that he has none.

Upon this point, however, we have the satisfaction of knowing that the Lord Privy Seal has had a full and confidential communication with the King of France himself, for the report of which I look with great impatience.

My only object in this letter is to set you right as to the supposed object of my supposed journey. But I cannot conclude without assuring you that I neither mean, nor can take, anything amiss in our correspondence.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,

very sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[413.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Apethorpe, 12th Oct., 1824.

I write one line to tell you that upon my arrival here yesterday I asked Lord Westmorland whether King Charles had granted him a private audience previous to his leaving Paris. He answered immediately that he had not; that he had seen his Majesty frequently, indeed on all the occasions on which he had appeared in public; and that he had not asked for a private audience and had not had one granted to him.

It is quite impossible, therefore, that the object of Lord Westmorland's visit to the Lodge at Windsor can have been what you imagine; and I have thought it proper to give you this information, as it will probably remove from your mind the impression which you had received.

I know that Lord Westmorland doubted, before he left England, his being able to accomplish the whole journey which he had proposed to himself, and I believe that he remained at Paris, as he states; first on account of the effects of sea sickness; afterwards from a desire to see the result of the late King's illness and death; and for his amusement; and I am quite certain without any political object or motive whatever.

Of course I have not mentioned to Lord Westmorland that I had heard from you on this subject.

Believe me, &c.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 13th Oct., 1824.

I understand that the King of France has not given any private audiences; and that what passed between his Majesty and Lord W. on the subject of Spanish America passed in a sort of *aside*, at a public reception.

Lord W. repeated to me part (or it may be the whole) of what the King of France said to him; which was, of course, in a sense directly opposite to our settled policy on the subject. And I do not know what Lord W. answered to his Majesty; and I know that an apparent acquiescence, on the part of a Cabinet Minister, in what the King of France said, would tend to lead the King of France astray, and make all our discussions with France upon Spanish America infinitely more difficult.

Lord W. certainly asked an audience of the King (our King) to report, whether singly or among other things, this conversation.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [414.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Apethorpe, 16th Oct., 1824.

I have omitted to answer your letter of the 12th till I should receive back your letter of the 8th, to which it referred. It is quite obvious that I misunderstood the object of the allusion to Pozzo di Borgo, which it contained. I imagined that you intended to express that the destruction of his influence was the object of your intended visit to Paris; whereas it is quite obvious that you did not intend to state in that letter what the object of the visit was; and that the allusion to Pozzo di Borgo's influence was intended to illustrate the rejection of the opinion of any Russian agent upon the subject of your visit.

I feel as strong objections as any man can feel to the influence of foreign agents upon any question which affects the interests of this country; but I cannot but think that before a person in your station, personal as well as political, takes a step which must occasion discussion at home and jealousy abroad, the object ought to be well considered, and the chances of its attainment by other means as well as by those proposed; and the importance of its attainment in comparison with the inconveniences and risks attending the latter.

You will find it very difficult to convince the world that to reconcile the difference between Monsieur de Villèle's language and Prince de Polignac's was the sole object of your visit to

Paris at this time; or that this object could not be attained through Lord Granville. However upon all these points you must be a better judge than myself, and I shall not say another word on the subject.

I have likewise to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th. I have since asked Lord Westmorland whether he had any conversation either with King Charles or his ministers regarding the Spanish colonial question. With the latter he said none whatever. King Charles upon one occasion took him aside and said he hoped that we should not be in a hurry in adopting any measures we might have in contemplation regarding the Spanish colonies; that all the misfortunes they had suffered in France, and which the world had suffered, were to be attributed to the government of the day thinking that France might derive an advantage from the encouragement of insurrection in our colonies. This is the substance of what Lord Westmorland told me passed, if not the very words.

I did not ask Lord Westmorland what he had answered: first, because the conversation with King Charles not having been sought by him, it became of less importance in your view of it; secondly, you had not expressed a wish that I should let him know that you had any feeling respecting that conversation; and thirdly, because I did not think it quite fair towards him to try him in a manner without at least letting him know that he was upon his trial. I did enough to convince my own mind, as I hope this statement will yours, that nothing was done unfair towards you; and I thought it best there to leave the subject. But I really do not think that a conversation upon this theme could be very important.

There is not one member of the government who, from the commencement of these discussions up to the very last of them, has not disclaimed the idea of encouraging insurrection in these colonies; and I believe that in every communication with Spain an offer has been made to use our influence to reconcile the unfortunate differences between her and her colonies.

Our measures have always been founded upon the supposed fact that Spain had no chance. Some may have been of opinion that that fact was not in all cases quite clear; and others may have doubted the expediency of going certain lengths, even if the fact was clear. But all disclaimed the encouragement of insurrection.

I can't say the same with truth of those who have made these countries the seat of the operations of their private wars, nor even of our political agents, every one of whom has, in my opinion, mistaken in this respect the nature of his mission; but it would be admitted in relation to the government and all its members.

It is impossible that Lord Westmorland should not have recollected these facts and should not have stated them in his conversation with King Charles, if the occasion offered an opportunity; and for this reason, as well as for those above stated, I did not ask him any further question upon the subject. Indeed it is impossible that we should be the encouragers of insurrection; being, as we are, the ministers of a Power possessing the most extended conquests that exist or ever existed in the possession of any Power; and knowing, as we do, that in all parts of our dominions we are exposed to the dangers of successful insurrection.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I do not know whether Lord Westmorland reported to the King any part of his conversation with King Charles.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Lord Liverpool.

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL, Gloucester Lodge, Sunday, 17th Oct., 1824.

I am very glad to hear that Walmer has agreed with you so well, and that you are encouraged to pass the next month there instead of at Bath.

I see no occasion to give you the trouble of coming up to town. The main business which is at this moment upon my hands is a discussion with Lieven upon two pretty difficult matters; 1st, the convention respecting the Northern Pacific, and the N.W. coast of America, and 2ndly, the proposed conferences on Greece.

The convention has been returned from St. Petersburg unsigned, and with a contre-projet, which cannot be admitted, but which I am going to talk over with Lord St. Helens to-day, to see what can be made of it. The Greek question is full of peril and plague, and the more so as the whole brunt of the business is laid on our shoulders. France and Prussia have signified their complete *adhesion* to the Russian plan, which, when a plan consists of many and complicated parts, is absolutely foolish, and of very little help. Austria pretends to Russia a similar acquiescence, but confides to *us* her perfect conviction that the whole project will come to nothing.

We, who cannot take either of these courses, are placed in great em-

barrassment. If we refuse our co-operation, France and Prussia, and Austria too, will lay the failure upon us: if we engage in the discussion, they will endeavour to make us responsible for its success.

Lieven has the most pressing instructions to urge our co-operation; and he does not appear to have an atom of discretion, nor even liberty to listen to reason. At the end of a three-hours' conversation, after listening to all my arguments, he employs exactly the same words in winding up that he did in opening the subject.

The convention (with St. Helens' aid) I think I can manage.

Upon the Greek question I will send you the draft of my instructions to Stratford, as soon as I have prepared it.

By the next packet from Lisbon I expect to receive Palmella's observations upon the projet of reconciliation. At one time he intended to throw the whole question overboard, and start his expedition for Brazil; but I think he has become alarmed at his own rashness, or has been talked into better temper by A'Court, and he now promises a contre-projet.

Thornton's misdoings have been greater than I had even imagined. I have seen a person, an English medical man, whom I knew at Lisbon, and who is in constant professional attendance on the King of Portugal—by whose report it appears that the King's mind was so thoroughly poisoned against A'Court that he was actually *ill* with fright at the prospect of seeing him. My informant was with the King immediately after the first interview, and found him quite relieved, and full of A'Court's praises. Thornton had evidently lent himself to this delusion, as you will see from the enclosed letter.

If we get Subserra here (as seems not impossible) it will be still more clear that poor Thornton had ruined our cause, with his own. With a little exertion, or a little right sense of his duty, he certainly would have contrived to ship Subserra off to us from the Tagus, instead of letting Hyde de Neuville carry him from the cabin of the *Windsor Castle* back to his office in triumph.

With Spain there is nothing to be done till the King of Spain sends us a Minister.

With France nothing need be done till Granville is installed at Paris. The question of the occupation will become a serious one if an expedition against South America should be fitted out from Spain. But I hardly expect it.

With respect to South America itself, I see no step to be taken till we meet, or till we hear something more decisive.

Are you forward in your financial plans? and can you remit us any more taxes? If so, I am for *direct* ones this season.

Ever sincerely yours,

George Canning.

P.S. I propose to summon the first Cabinet for Monday, the 6th of December, if that will suit you.

G. C.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Lord Liverpool.

My dear Liverpool, Gloucester Lodge, 17th Oct., 1824.

I send for your perusal a correspondence with the Duke of Wellington upon the subject of my proposed visit to Granville at Paris.

I am not so bent upon that project as to insist upon executing it against grave and substantial reasons, but I did not choose to yield to representations of which I cannot at all acknowledge the justness.

I resisted the more because I knew that the whole truth was not told to me.

I *know* that the first letter in this series was written after a long conference with the King, which took place on Saturday, the 2nd, two days after my interview with his Majesty upon my return from Ireland. I *know* that in that conference the King repeated to the Duke of Wellington what had passed in my interview, because the Duke of Wellington repeated it to a person who repeated it to my informant. I know that the letter of the 5th was shown to the King before it was sent to me. And yet neither in that letter nor in any subsequent part of the correspondence is there any admission that the King was privy to it.

Now this I hold not to be fair.

I have the highest respect for the Duke of Wellington, and I do not presume to limit the confidences of the King. But when one finds that all that passes between the King and one's self is repeated as matter of course to a third person, and that third person one who thinks himself at liberty to repeat it to others, at the same time that he conceals the fact of his knowing it from one's self, it is high time to look about one, and to beware of what Burke calls "traps and mines."

I have a more immediate project of getting out of town for a few days to Ickworth. We were to have gone to-morrow. Mrs. C. and Harriet will still go, but I am detained by a Council at Windsor on Tuesday, on which occasion I have to present the new Prussian Minister and his credentials.

I hope to get away on Wednesday, and propose staying with Lord Bristol as far as I can into the following week.

Ever sincerely yours,

George Canning.

P.S. Westmorland did not ask nor have a private audience of Charles X. What passed was *aside*, at a public reception. He repeated to me Charles X.'s speech on S. America, but not his own answer.

G. C.

Lord Liverpool to the Right Hon. George Canning.

My dear Canning, Walmer Castle, 18th Oct., 1824.

I return your correspondence with the Duke of Wellington. I have never heard a wish on the subject to which it relates since I last left London. When I saw the King he never mentioned to me what had passed between you and him previous to your journey to Ireland, and I purposely abstained

from saying anything to his Majesty from which he might infer that you had opened the question as to your going to Paris to me.

The more I have considered the subject since my return here, the more strongly I am impressed with the objections to your going, unless (indeed, what was reported) Metternich had come to Paris at the same time. This would have entirely altered the question. I do not say that even in this case your going would not be subject to many inconveniences; but the great objection, as regards the French government, would have been removed, and so many advantages might have resulted from a full personal explanation with Metternich and Villèle *together* as might have more than counteracted the inconveniences of the measure.

My opinion is not so much founded on the jealousy which would be excited in the Allies (though this would certainly be the result, and ought not to be passed over), as on the jealousy of the French nation of any separate understanding between their own government and that of Great Britain. If we are to have such understanding, it must be without *appearing* to have it, or at least to *seek* it by any *unusual means*. And pray recollect that *failure*, or even *negative success*, in a Secretary of State is very different from the same result in a minister or ambassador.

I am persuaded likewise that the measure of your going would be very unpopular at home. The current of public opinion runs strongly, much too strongly, I think, in favour of our keeping ourselves as separate as possible from the continental powers. You may say that this objection would apply to your going to meet Metternich. I admit it; but in this case there would be *real advantages* to set off against the popular feeling.

I should have written to you some time ago upon this subject; but until I received your letters of this morning, I was not aware of the state of your intelligence as to Metternich.

Ever, &c.,

Liverpool.

Lord Liverpool to the Right Hon. George Canning.

My dear Canning, Walmer Castle, 18th Oct., 1824.

I have received this morning your several letters, and am glad to find you intend leaving town on Wednesday.

I shall be quite ready to attend the Cabinet meeting on Monday, Dec. 6th. As far as I am concerned personally, I should have preferred meeting on Wednesday, the 1st; but consult in this respect your own convenience. I am quite satisfied with the former day, and only wish that they should not be deferred later, unless there should be some very urgent reason for it.

I am glad you are likely to settle the American boundary question with Russia. I think it very desirable that we should not have any little national point of controversy of this sort with the Russian government when we have so many subjects of the greatest importance to discuss with them. I will confess to you, likewise, that upon the point on which the negotiation broke off with Bagot I was not satisfied that we had altogether the rights on our side.

As to the Grecian question, I feel all its difficulties. I do not see my way to any satisfactory result; but I should still be sorry that we excluded ourselves from the negotiations. My impression is, that the Turkish empire in Europe will fall to pieces sooner or later, and it would be highly inexpedient that Russia, Austria, and France should have a pretence to agree amongst themselves as to the arrangements incident to such a catastrophe (whether they be arrangements of partition or not) without reference to this country, and without our consent.

I am not surprised at your intelligence from Portugal. I think A'Court's despatches prove that he has taken a correct view of our situation and policy; and I am persuaded that Thornton had become placed in such a relation towards the King of Portugal and his government as rendered it quite impossible for him to discharge faithfully the duties of British minister or ambassador.

Ever, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

Le Prince de Metternich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MON CHER DUC, Vienne, ce 28me Oct., 1824.

Lord Ashley m'a remis la lettre dont vous avez bien voulu le charger pour moi. Recommandé par vous il eut acquis tous les titres à être bien accueilli par moi, si son individualité ne parlait déjà en sa faveur. Je m'empresserai à lui être utile et à lui rendre le séjour qu'il compte faire ici le plus agréable possible.

J'envoie aujourd'hui un courier au Prince Esterhazy, qui lui accorde la faculté de continuer son séjour à Londres jusqu'au printems prochain. C'est avec de véritables regrets que son déplacement aura lieu, mais il nous en va dans cette circonstance ainsi qu'il arrive souvent dans les affaires humaines. Ce sont les qualités mêmes qui lui ont valu le suffrage flatteur de S.M.B., votre amitié et celle des bons esprits en Angleterre, qui ont fixé les regards de l'Empereur sur lui pour le poste de Paris. Le Baron de Vincent commence à ressentir l'influence d'un âge avancé, influence qui devient peut-être plus saillante dans la mesure même du mouvement qui existe dans les esprits comme dans les affaires en France. Le Prince Esterhazy serait dans toute supposition un représentant que S.M.I. eut placé avec confiance à Paris; son long séjour, la connaissance qu'il a de l'Angleterre, la confiance qu'il a su y mériter, sont autant de motifs de plus en faveur de son emploi en France. A voir de près les affaires; en les dépouillant de tout préjugé et de toute vue secondaire, il est de fait que la nuance qui ne cesse d'influer sur la politique du gouvernement Français, et qui trop souvent s'étend au point de la fausser, c'est l'esprit de rivalité avec l'Angleterre; des souvenirs qui devraient n'être qu'historiques, et des prétentions que nous en notre particulier ne manquons jamais l'occasion de combattre. L'homme qui connaît l'Angleterre et les hommes qui la gouvernent, qui vous aime, et vous rend la justice que vous méritez, sera le meilleur interprète des sentimens du cabinet Autrichien à Paris.

Il se présente relativement au choix du moment que je vous ai indiqué

pour le départ du P. Esterhazy un calcul fort simple. L'attitude morale de l'Angleterre a besoin d'être déterminée ; elle le sera forcément, car il n'est pas dans la nature d'une grande puissance de pouvoir rester enveloppée de nuage ; les doutes finissent bientôt par faire place à des certitudes, et l'hiver que nous allons traverser suffira selon mes calculs à conduire au résultat. Celui-ci ne peut être que conforme à nos vœux et à notre espoir, ou bien les uns et l'autre se trouveront trompés ; dans le premier de ces cas, regardez l'Ambassadeur de l'Empereur à Paris comme l'interprète, comme le répondant le plus naturel de la vérité ; dans le second cas, que ferait à Londres l'homme que vous aimez, et qui vous êtes entièrement dévoué ?

Je vous parle ici, mon cher Duc, avec cette franchise et cette bonne foi que dans tous les tems j'ai mis dans mes relations personnelles avec vous et qu'il n'est pas moins dans mon caractère de consulter dans mes relations d'homme public. Vous devez me comprendre, car vous me connaissez, et que déjà si souvent vous m'avez compris. Vous savez quels sont les vues et les vœux de ma cour ; vous êtes aussi avancé sur ceux que je puis former en mon particulier. Je vous ai fourni par la dernière expédition au Prince Esterhazy des preuves nouvelles du prix que nous attachons à voir votre gouvernement ne pas rester en doute sur un seul de nos sentimens ; tout entre nous est donc clair et précis, et ce qui doit surtout vous paraître tel, c'est la confiance entière et l'amitié inaltérable que je vous ai voué. Si le Prince Paul a souvent été l'interprète bienveillant de ces sentimens, soyez certain que l'homme qui le remplacera ne le sera pas moins. Nous jouissons du bon privilège de n'avoir dans notre administration que des hommes forts d'un même principe et défenseurs d'une même cause ; l'individu qui par tempérament ou par calcul dévierait de la ligne qui est celle de l'Empereur, serait écrasé bien vîte sous des rouages qui ne suivent qu'une même direction, et contre laquelle il essayerait en vain d'aller.

Veuillez, mon cher Duc, si l'occasion s'en présente, servir d'interprète au texte de ma lettre près du Roi. S.M. honore de ses bontés particulières le Prince Esterhazy ; elle lui a rendu par ce fait les plus grands services dans l'esprit de l'Empereur.

Recevez les assurances de mes sentimens les plus sincères, et les moins sujets à varier.

METTERNICH.

Lord Liverpool to the Right Hon. George Canning.

MY DEAR CANNING, Walmer Castle, 2nd Nov., 1824.

I have read the enclosed paper of questions respecting Greece. These questions appear to me to relate to many contingencies, upon which it is quite impossible to give an answer or instructions at present. The only way I think of considering this question is to consider it as a *whole*, and to endeavour to see what we *can* do, and what we would, under all the circumstances, wish to be done.

I assume then that neither party can be satisfied by any terms likely to be proposed. The Greeks will be satisfied with nothing but independence. The Turks will be satisfied with nothing but submission, and that the

Greeks shall receive any new privileges (if any such are to be granted) as a boon or favour from them.

The only basis of mediation in the present state of the contest is something like what (as far as I recollect) was suggested in the Russian Memoir —that the Greeks should acknowledge a nominal sovereignty, with some advantages (such as a reasonable tribute, perhaps limited garrisons in some of the places, &c.) on the part of the Porte, and that the Porte shall concede to the Greeks (with such qualifications) the right of governing themselves.

Such an arrangement would at no very great distance of time end in the real and entire independence of the Greeks. It is what in fact it would mean; but it might let the Porte down easily.

It were vain, however, to expect that either Turks or Greeks would agree to such terms, and there is no result therefore, in my judgment, but that the parties should fight it out.

I would agree, however, to a mediation on the above terms, if proposed by others, and I should not object to propose it, even, if this is judged more advisable. But if it fails (and fail it will) I am not prepared to take part with either power, and I should declare it as my opinion to the Allies that we *all* ought to be neutral, that the contest ought to be allowed to take its course (a clear stage and no favour); but that we should speak explicitly to both parties—to the Greeks that we could not interfere further in their favour, and to the Turks that they must not expect that if the Greeks should make a successful resistance, and that all the efforts to subdue them should prove ineffectual, we should not feel ourselves at liberty, as circumstances might render it just and necessary, to acknowledge the Greeks as an independent power.

I am persuaded that when two countries or two individuals get into a certain relation to each other, it is idle to say we will *force* them to be reconciled, there shall be no contest. You cannot *force* them to be reconciled. You may propose what you think reasonable terms of accommodation, if you think proper; but if those terms should be refused, the contest must proceed.

Supposing, however, one party to agree to the terms, and the other to refuse them (a supposition I think highly improbable), are we prepared to take part with the one which agrees?

I answer decidedly on this case in the negative. I am not prepared to say that either party is *so wrong*—the Turks in enforcing their sovereign rights, and the Greeks in struggling for their independence—as would warrant third parties in interfering by force in the contest.

The conclusion, then, will be mediation on the principles above stated to be tried; neutrality if mediation fails. Is this to be explicitly stated?

So many things occur in the course of a negotiation that I think it neither prudent nor necessary to commit ourselves irrevocably as to what would be our course under every possible contingency; but I should think it both fair and expedient to apprize our Allies that this was our present opinion. It would take from them all expectation that they might reckon upon our support and assistance in the event of their being engaged in hostilities; and it might make them pause before they committed themselves too deeply.

With respect to all minor questions which may arise in the progress of negotiation, I really do not see how these can be answered at present. Whatever creates delay may be advantageous, and a reference home, when the case is of sufficient importance to admit of it, may be enjoined.

I have thus stated to you the best opinion I can form on this very embarrassing question. I feel deeply all the difficulties of the subject. My solution of them may not be satisfactory, but it is the best at which I have been able to arrive. It does not grow out of the communication which I have received from you this day, but is the result of the consideration which I have been able to give to the question since it was first forced upon our attention.

Ever sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

[415.] *To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

MY DEAR PEEL, Apethorpe, 3rd Nov., 1824.

I return the enclosed papers. It appears to me that unless the Catholic Association should transgress the line of legality in their proceedings on some new point, we cannot with consistency attack them at law, either on the principle of their existence, or on those proceedings which were notorious during the last session of Parliament, and which we had under our consideration. At the same time I concur in all the opinions respecting the mischief which this Association does, not only at the present moment, but permanently; and I confess that I am very much afraid that even if we could now put it down by legal or other measures, some of the mischief would still remain, such as the organisation adopted for the purpose of collecting the Catholic rent, and which is so easily applicable to other purposes. This would undoubtedly remain, and the management still be in the hands of the factious in Ireland. However we must turn our minds to this evil with a view to find a remedy.

Have you looked at the case of the volunteers in the time of Lord Westmorland's government as a precedent? Both are political cases not to be dealt with by the usual measures of law; and I am very much mistaken if we should not find the Parliament of this day as well disposed to support the government in the measures which it should think proper to adopt to disperse the Catholic Association as the Parliament of that day was to support Lord Westmorland's government in its measures

respecting the volunteers. At all events this precedent might be looked at and well considered.

If we can't get rid of the Catholic Association, we must look to a civil war in Ireland sooner or later. Although all concerns of that description are matters of risk and doubt, I should think there could be none of the military result. But should we be better situated afterwards? I think not. We should find the same enemies blasting the prosperity of the country, and ready to take advantage of the weakness of this country at any moment to do us all the harm in their power.

Pray write me a line to my house in London to let me know when the King is likely to have the Recorder's report.

Believe me, &c.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Lord Liverpool.

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL, Gloucester Lodge, 5th Nov., 1824.

You will see by the draft of instructions to Stratford how entirely my opinions agree with yours upon the Greek question.

But since those instructions were drawn I have received, most unexpectedly, the accompanying letter from the Greek government.

I have also received this morning from Sir H. Wellesley the copy of a despatch from the Internuncio to Prince Metternich, giving the same account of the Turkish feelings upon the Russian projet as is given in the despatch from Lord Strangford, which (though you have already seen it) I send herewith to refresh your memory; the same account in substance, but in degree and in detail still more unfavourable.

Under these circumstances I have written the draft to Count Lieven, which I send for your consideration. I will not repeat the substance of it in another form in this letter, but I must add to what I have there said, 1st, that it would be an enormous responsibility to go forward in the proposed conferences, after this loud warning from Greece, without some previous explanation with the Greek government: 2nd, that as this declaration of the Greek government relieves us from all apprehension of a separate understanding between it and Russia, we may pause a little without risk of any mischief. Let me know what you think.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S. Pray let me have your answer to this by to-morrow night's mail, as I promised to see Count Lieven again on Monday; and if I write to him, as I propose, I should wish to write the day before.

G. C.

[416.] *To Sir W. Knighton.*

MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM, Woodford, 6th Nov., 1824.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset has communicated to me your wishes respecting Captain ———, of the corps of Engineers, and I have sent orders that if his embarkation is to take place before I go to town, he may be stopped. But I must observe that this is quite a novel and irregular proceeding. The officers throughout the service, and particularly of the corps of Artillery and of Engineers, perform the duty by what is called in the army a Roster, which is not kept by the commanding officer, but in the orderly room, and is never, to my knowledge or belief, broken in upon or interfered with by the commanding officer. To interfere in any case to prevent an officer from performing an unpleasant duty, or one in an unhealthy climate, is to interfere to throw that duty upon another, upon whom it would not otherwise be thrown, and is, in fact, to incur a responsibility respecting individuals which no person in military command can be called upon to undertake.

Unless, therefore, Captain ——— can be employed upon some other duty, it is impossible for me to interfere and prevent him from going to the West Indies.

Then you desire that he may be employed on the survey in Ireland. This survey in Ireland stands on very peculiar grounds, and, as you will see, cannot be interfered with from a view to patronage or favour.

It has been undertaken in consequence of discussions in Parliament, and has been the subject of inquiry in a Committee of the House of Commons; towards which Committee I was obliged to hold very strong language, stating my determination to have nothing to say to it if not allowed to perform the service in my own way, and by the *qualified* officers of the Ordnance. I positively refused to employ any surveyor in Ireland upon this service. With what face, then, can I refuse any man in Ireland, duly qualified, to employ him upon the service, if such employments are made matters of patronage and private favour in the corps of Engineers?

But this is not all. Major Colby is at the head of the service, and is responsible to me for the due conduct of its details; and accordingly I have allowed him to select every individual who

is to be employed under him. I have not named one nor even suggested one.

Would it answer, would it be fitting, that Major Colby should have it in his power to say: It is true that such and such parts of the survey are not so accurate as they ought to be, as the Master-General, upon the recommendation of Sir W. Knighton, desired me to employ Captain ———; and Captain ——— was employed in those parts.

All that I can do is to refer Captain ———'s desire to be employed upon the survey to Major Colby; and if Major Colby thinks that Captain ——— can be of use to him, let him be employed. I can do no more; and in the mean time I have desired that Captain ——— may be detained in England for the present.

I must say that I cannot approve of officers running about to look for influence to obtain their regimental objects, instead of confiding in their own claims for employment, founded on their qualifications. I never entertain a very high opinion of these qualifications when I have such a case before me, as there is not one of them who does not know that I am well acquainted with his character and acquirements, and that if he deserves it he is quite certain of being employed as opportunities occur.

I intend to go to town as soon as I shall hear of the time fixed for the Recorder's report. In the mean time believe me ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Liverpool to the Right Hon. George Canning.

MY DEAR CANNING, Walmer Castle, 6th Nov., 1824.

I entirely concur in the general purport of your letter to Count Lieven. If I was writing *my own* sentiments, I should not have expressed as strongly as you have done an expectation that the Greeks would have been pleased with an offer of mediation from the Allied Powers. You will perhaps have drawn from my former letter that this was not my opinion, and I submit to you whether you would not (as this may become a public document) a little modify this part of your letter.

I agree with you, however, most completely that it is one thing to go on with the mediation in *ignorance* of what may be the feelings of the Greeks upon it, and another to persevere in it after so direct and unqualified a rejection of any notion of this kind.

I do not think it is necessary to say now whether we will or will not go

to a conference upon the principle of mediation, but I think we may most properly call the attention of all the Allies, and particularly of Russia, to the declaration of the existing sentiments of the Porte and of the Greeks on the subject of mediation, and submit it as a point for consideration, whether in the present temper of both parties any good can result from the interference of the Allies, and whether (dreadful as the continuance of the struggle may appear) it is not better to let it take its course, till by the exhaustion of both parties, or of one of them, an opening may present itself for our coming forward with a better chance of success.

Any idea of an armistice must now be considered as illusory, and a premature effort to accomplish reconciliation has generally the effect of increasing the exasperation of the parties, and of placing the object we have at heart at a greater distance.

I have thus stated to you what occurs to me on reading these papers, and I return them by this night's mail, as you desire.

Ever sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

[417.] *To Colonel Ponsonby.*

MY DEAR PONSONBY, Woodford, 7th Nov., 1824.

I received in due course your letter of the 1st instant. I had already heard from Lord William on the same subject, and had written him a few lines in reply, containing nearly the substance of your observations, in which I entirely concur. In reply, however, he has observed very naturally, "I command a regiment of Hussars, and they ought to be trained in a particular manner to perform the peculiar service of Hussars," meaning light duties of all descriptions. He then observes that if this is not the case, the only difference between those which he commands and others consists in the expensive dress, of which he very reasonably complains.

I think this is one of the mistakes of our service. We have a cavalry by no means proportionate to our own small army; but certainly not so to the part that small army entitles us to play in war. What do we then? Instead of having it all cavalry of the best description, as with our men, horses, and equipments, we ought, we form *five* descriptions of cavalry; that is to say, as many descriptions, as far as dress and armament go, as any other army whatever possesses; and the consequence is that we have nothing perfect.

My opinion is that all our cavalry ought to be the best, that is to say, cavalry of the Line; because, in point of fact, when the

day comes they must be so employed, be they dressed and armed how they may. This cavalry would do the duties of the outposts very well, when necessary; witness the Royals and the heavy Germans in the Peninsula, and the 4th Dragoons and 3rd Dragoon Guards; and, on the other hand, the 1st Hussars, the 7th, 10th, and 15th in Line. And we ought to trust to the foreign cavalry with the army for the ordinary outpost duty, when the employment of our own excellent cavalry on such service should not be necessary.

However, I admit that this is a question of dress and equipments, and armament, more than of principle, considering the manner in which we employ our cavalry, which, however important on account of the effect which dresses, &c., have upon the minds and actions of those who wear them, are trifling in the general scale.

I quite agree with you as to pace. It is impossible to preserve order and go quiet in large bodies. It is equally so to traverse the spaces which the manœuvre of large bodies requires should be traversed, and keep the horse in a state to do anything, if the pace be not slow.

But the great object of all in the cavalry, and most particularly in that of the Line, is order; and, as I have told Lord W. Russell, no officer or man should ever be allowed to move at any pace other than that ordered, or out of his place in the ranks. This is the most essential point to be attended to in the training of a regiment.

I entirely agree with you respecting the supports. I have frequently reflected upon the system adopted in my reviews in France, and I am certain it is right. It ought to be adopted in every regimental practice, in order that the officers might thoroughly understand the principle and object of such a system.

Unfortunately I have not got a copy of my Memorandum upon this subject; but I am certain it is right.

As for compactness, I believe our files are not sufficiently close; but that is a matter of general regulation with which we cannot interfere. Steadiness may be acquired by adhering with strictness to the rule respecting paces.

The officers of the cavalry certainly do not possess the same knowledge of their service as those of the infantry do. This deficiency is to be attributed possibly to two causes: first, that to understand it well and all its details is much more difficult;

secondly, that their minds have never been fairly brought to a contemplation of the true principles on which the cavalry service should be conducted. Let them once understand that the undue celerity of the movements, the dust, and the noise and confusion, go for nothing, and are injurious to their solid utility and reputation, and they will very soon be as good and as useful in their line of service as the officers of the infantry are in theirs.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Liverpool to the Right Hon. George Canning.

MY DEAR CANNING, Walmer Castle, 8th Nov., 1824.

I have reflected very much on Palmella's letter to you, and I confess this question of Portugal and the Brazils puzzles me much more than the Greek question.

I think there is a great deal of truth in what Palmella says in the beginning of his letter, that the question between Portugal and the Brazils differs very materially from all the other colonial questions. That from the very circumstance of the King of Portugal having been led to make the Brazils for some years the seat of government, there can be no danger of these provinces ever being reduced again to the state of colonies. That Portugal and the Brazils are become by the course of events distinct kingdoms, and that the only question can be whether they shall be distinct kingdoms indissolubly united under the same head (though with different legislatures) or whether the two kingdoms are to be wholly independent, governed for the present at least by different princes, though of the same family.

If the question was really an open question, I should be inclined to think that Palmella was right. That the Brazils could lose little or nothing by acceding to the terms which Portugal might be induced to offer them, and that on the other hand the King of Portugal, and even Portugal itself, lose not a little in character and general estimation by renouncing all necessary connexion, nominal as well as real, with the Brazils.

But the real difficulty appears to me to be this—Have not the Prince Royal, now Emperor, and the Brazilians, gone too far to retract? Is it possible for them to retrace their steps? One must surely know very little of the history of the world to believe that this can be done except through the operation of *force*; and the danger undoubtedly is that in attempting it, monarchy in the Brazils will be sacrificed altogether, and the establishment of a republic in that country, as well as in the Spanish colonies, will be the result.

We come now to the line of policy which this country must adopt.

We have advised, and must I think continue to advise, the Portuguese government against all measures of subjection.

We can be no party to such measures, directly or indirectly. And we must take the course which our own commercial interests at least render necessary with respect to the Brazils. But if Portugal is determined to try the effect of force, can we prevent her? We do not profess we have any right to prevent Spain from employing force in the subjection of her colonies, provided it is *bonâ fide* Spanish force.

Upon what ground then can we prevent Portugal? More particularly as she will offer, and can offer to the Brazilians terms and securities which Spain cannot offer to her colonies, and upon the fulfilment of which, even if she did offer them, the colonies could have no reliance.

There comes then a most important question. Supposing Portugal determined to employ force against our advice in the subjection of the Brazils, are we in consequence to abandon altogether Portugal and Portuguese politics to their fate? I feel all the difficulties of this question; but as at present advised, I should answer that we ought not.

I am not certain whether anything has passed between us and the Brazilian government to make the course which I am about to propose objectionable or impracticable.

But assuming that I am right, that nothing of this nature has occurred, I should state fairly to the Portuguese government that we had given them our opinion as to the course they ought to adopt with respect to the Brazils. That if they had recourse to force it was at their own peril, and that we must wash our hands of the consequences. That as to Portugal itself, we should act as if the Brazils did not exist, or as if Portugal was in the ill-advised exercise of what, nevertheless, was an undoubted right on her part, as far as foreign powers are concerned.

Recollect that something like this must have been our course last year if we had followed the advice of the opposition respecting Spain. Supposing we had determined at that time to support the constitutional party in Spain against the invasion of France backed by the Holy Alliance, we should surely not have thought that it ought in any way to have altered our course as to the Spanish colonies.

Though the constitutional party might have been as adverse to their independence as the highest Royalist could have been, the very embarrassment of such a state of things might be some reason, though certainly a very subordinate one, for our neutrality. But we had no obligations of the same nature with respect to Spain as we have with respect to Portugal; and though I think we cannot assist Portugal physically or morally in her attempt to recover the Brazils by force, it does not appear to me that such an attempt, if made, would be a sufficient reason, either in policy or justice, for casting her off, and thereby of throwing her into the hands of France and the Allies.

I have thus communicated to you what has occurred to me on this perplexing subject.

It is one of so much importance that I do not see how you can take your line till we have had Cabinet meetings upon it; and before this can occur I shall be glad to have an opportunity of fully discussing with you the whole question.

Ever sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

[418.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, 10th Nov., 1824.

I am very much obliged to you for permitting me to peruse the enclosed papers. I had not seen anything on the subject since the Russian memoir; but I think these papers make it quite clear. I never expected that either Turks or Greeks would accept the proposed mediation, and I thought it might be desirable for all parties that we should keep out of it; and assume the character of mediators between the mediators and the Porte.

But it is clear that that part could not be played usefully, or at all without creating great jealousy, and without placing the new Greek States in a system entirely adverse to this country.

I confess that I have always considered it impossible for the Turks to re-establish their authority in the Morea and the Archipelago. They may render the establishment of an independent government in those countries very difficult and expensive, and may protract the contest; but the want of seamen will render the reconquest by the Porte impossible.

We should, in my opinion, found our measures upon this view of this warfare, and take care that what is established in those countries on the ruins of the Turkish government shall not be on a system hostile to that country, and above all, if possible, not so far under the influence of Russia as to bring Russian power and resources in fact into the Mediterranean.

I think your paper No. 1 foresees all the difficulties of the mediation. Your query No. 5 goes precisely to that which is now certain; viz., that both parties will refuse the mediation, and to suspend hostilities. To this query Count Lieven did not return a precise answer; but it must not be considered that his answer is without its value. First he says that the mediation is to be offered to both parties, without the menace of war towards either; and secondly he says, in answer to all the queries of your paper, which suppose the rejection of the proffered mediation by either or both parties, that the measures to be carried into execution will be adopted by common accord; and he assures you, in the name of the Emperor, that his Imperial Majesty will submit to the wisdom of his Allies the line of conduct to be

adopted, and that he will adopt no measure which shall not be advised by them.

I think you have admitted in your despatch to Mr. S. Canning the right of Russian interference in the Morea and the Island to a greater degree than it really exists by treaty. But it does exist; and words cannot be stronger than those by which Count Lieven binds his government not to use that right without the consent of his Imperial Majesty's Allies.

This is a great point gained. But there is another view of this question which induces me to think it would be advisable that we should enter into it. If we don't we leave the two Imperial Courts to settle it between them, with the aid of France; and we may be certain that France will take the Russian rather than the Austrian side of it, that is, the side least friendly and beneficial to this country. We may feel some inconvenience from the great intimacy of these powers; but I believe we should feel much more from their disunion and quarrels; and as I see that the Jacobins all over Europe are for promoting a quarrel between them, I confess that I should be inclined to endeavour to keep them well together by embarking in this question with them, more particularly as by so doing the best chance would be afforded of carrying it through its course to a termination which will be least injurious to the interests of this country.

For these reasons I would let Mr. S. Canning go with his instruction; at the same time informing the other courts of the intelligence received from Greece and Constantinople.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 10th Nov., 1824.

You have not seen anything since the Russian measure, because nothing has passed upon the subject since January, except repeated invitations on Count Lieven's part to enter upon it, followed with repeated refusals on my part to do so, until the Russian mission at Constantinople should be re-established.

It was the appointment of M. De la Ribeaupierre that drove me to the wall; and the apprehension, which I cannot but *still* entertain, that there is a desire to retain De la Ribeaupierre at St. Petersburg until the conferences on Greece are actually begun, is one reason which weighs with me for delaying the instruction to Stratford Canning.

Bagot, you know, *did* attend a conference—indeed two—at Petersburg, not only without but against instructions; and I am persuaded that his compliance (for which I *snubbed* him well) led the Russian government to think their point gained, and to hope to get us into the middle of the conferences, without actually sending De la Ribeaupierre.

I will write to you again upon this matter next week.

Yours sincerely,

GEORGE CANNING.

I am going into the country to-morrow for about a week.

[419.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 11th Nov., 1824.

I did not see the protocols of the conferences which Bagot attended at St. Petersburg; but I write to Planta to beg he will let me see everything connected with this subject.

It appears to me that you can do nothing in concert with Russia in the Greek case till the Emperor will *bonâ fide* place himself on the same footing at Constantinople with his Allies. It appears by Lord Strangford's despatch which you sent me that the Porte suspect that it is not intended to send Monsieur De la Ribeaupierre; and it would really be desirable to explain to Monsieur de Lieven that it is expected that they will send their real minister if they propose that we should embark with them in this new course.

I have to write to you about Cuba, respecting which island I have had some intelligence. But I am going home this afternoon, where I shall see Alava; and I will let you know exactly what he will say.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[420.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Stratfieldsaye, 14th Nov., 1824.

I received some days ago a letter from Alava, in which he informed me that he had heard from some of his friends in London of a serious design on the part of the governments of Colombia and Mexico to attack the island of Cuba; and having since seen him here and had an opportunity of conversing with him upon the subject, I find that the design is really entertained, and is to be carried into execution by the government of

Colombia by means of the squadron under Commodore Daniels, as soon as it shall be relieved from the duty on which it is now employed, that of conveying troops to the Isthmus of Panama, and by the government of Mexico by means of certain frigates said to be fitting out in the Thames for that government, and which frigates Alava says that Michelena, the Mexican envoy, visited some days ago.

The Colombian government, being composed principally of people of colour, are disposed to revolutionise the island of Cuba and to establish there a government of people of colour. The government of Mexico are for a revolution which shall get rid of the Spaniards, and would prefer Creole successors of the white race; but provided the Spaniards are driven away, they don't care much what succeeds.

It is difficult to say what can be done to prevent this mischief; but I certainly think it ought to be prevented if possible. If there is an active revolutionary government on the island of Cuba, particularly one of colour, we may find our communication from Jamaica so difficult as to be almost impossible; and between the examples of St. Domingo, Colombia, and Cuba, we shall find the difficulties and expense of governing our own slave population augment every day.

In a despatch which I saw at Windsor on Friday I observe that Messrs. Barclay and Herring have engaged to supply the Mexican government with two frigates. This is, I believe, directly contrary to the Foreign Enlistment Act and the articles of the Treaty with Spain and all our provinces. We might, at least, prevent this house from performing its engagement.

But the question is whether this country has not such an interest in retaining possession of the island of Cuba for Spain that we ought not now to speak out to those who intend to adopt such means of depriving Spain of that possession. I wish you would turn this subject over in your mind.

I am aware that we have no encouragement from Spain to take this or any other step in her favour; but I look not to the consequences to Spain but to ourselves of the execution of those plans.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Charles Wynn to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, East India Office, 18th Nov., 1824.

The enclosed letter from Sir Herbert Taylor was addressed to me during the time of my absence abroad, and, before I return any answer, I am particularly desirous to be favoured with your Grace's opinion, from which I have already derived so much advantage on this subject.

The arrangement which his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief proposes to establish on this subject seems to me perfectly satisfactory except on the single head of courts-martial.

The object of vesting the command of the forces, within the garrison, in the Governor is to secure his person and authority from any attack like that which was made on Lord Pigot. Can it be said that this object is attained, if he cannot punish any officer or soldier of the King's troops, when forming a part of the garrison, for disobedience of his orders, or even for personal outrage, except by the authority of the Commander-in-Chief?

I also send two private letters,* which I have lately received from Lord Amherst, written with a degree of uneasiness, which I am afraid shows that he is not exempt from the alarms which have been so prevalent at Calcutta. I shall be much obliged to you to return them when read.

Believe me, my dear Duke,
ever most faithfully yours,
C. W. WILLIAMS WYNN.

[421.] *To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn:*

MY DEAR WYNN, London, 20th Nov, 1824.

I return your box. It is quite clear to me that neither his Royal Highness nor the gentlemen about him are sensible of the distinction between the Governors of his Majesty's colonies and the Governors of the three settlements in India.

The latter is, by his commission, granted by the only authority which could by law grant such a commission, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the troops within such fort or garrison; which the Governors of his Majesty's colonies are not. There can be no comparison, therefore, between the situations of the one and the other; and it is not necessary to invest the Governors of his Majesty's colonies with the power and authority with which it is necessary to invest the Governors of the three settlements in India.

In my opinion the law has invested these latter with the power of ordering garrison courts-martial, and of confirming the sentence of the same.

* Letters not found.—E.

Upon this point I differ in opinion with the Advocate-General at Bombay. But I believe I am right; and at all events I would recommend you to take a legal opinion upon the question.

With great deference to the opinions of his Royal Highness and of the gentlemen at the Horse Guards, I believe it will be found that if the Governor and Commander-in-Chief in one of these Indian settlements can order and confirm the sentence of a garrison court-martial on the Company's troops composing the garrison, he can equally upon the King's troops in the same situation. He would do both by virtue of his commission of Governor and Commander-in-Chief, or neither.

At all events I am very well convinced, both from what passed in Lord Pigot's time, and again within these few years between General Macdowall and Sir G. Barlow, that no Governor would be safe if he had not such powers; and if it is to be understood that he has them in respect to the Company's troops and not to the King's, it is in my opinion reason sufficient for never allowing any of the latter to enter any of these garrisons. I believe it is perfectly well known that I have no objection to give my opinion upon any subject, or under any circumstances in which it is my duty to give such opinion. But I am quite certain that it would not be for the benefit of the public, and it would certainly be very disagreeable to me, to be brought into collision unnecessarily with his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, or the officers at the Horse Guards. The letters and papers enclosed show the temper with which the discussions on this subject are entered upon; and I don't wish, nor is it right or necessary, that I should involve myself in them.

The question between your office and the Horse Guards is one of law. Refer it to the law officers of the Crown and of the Company; and if the decision should be contrary to what you should think ought to be the rule, it will be time enough for you to endeavour to prevail upon his Royal Highness to make an alteration which I think it will not be difficult to convince his judgment ought to be made.

Unfortunately he now stands with a legal opinion, that of the Advocate-General at Bombay, in favour of his view of the case.

In respect to the Burmese war, I have seen some letters from persons in authority at Calcutta, which, for the sake of these

persons themselves, ought never to have been written. It was their duty to apply a remedy in time to many of the evils which are the object of their complaints and ridicule.

War, in all parts of the world, is a state of crisis and risk; but in India to a greater degree than in any other part of the world, on account of the immensity of the empire, and the smallness of the force and resources in proportion to its extent, and the difficulty and tediousness from various causes of moving them from one part to the other, so as to apply them with vigour where required. But this state of crisis and risk disappears at last; and all become ashamed of their terrors; and the most terrified are not unwilling to undertake fresh operations in a fresh scene under increased difficulties, and to give fresh ground for the apprehensions, even their own, which may have been just allayed.

There is a very easy remedy for the new difficulties started by Lord Amherst, and that is, not to have the whole army upon the extreme northern frontier. Why should not a reserve be kept at Dinapore, near Patna, or even at Moorshedabad? I should prefer the former, as, after all, the north-west frontier is the post of real danger; and the river will always give great facilities for collecting a body of troops on the south-east frontier.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Charles Wynn to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Whitehall Place, 23rd Nov., 1824.

I feel deeply impressed with the value of your suggestions on both the subjects to which your letter relates.

It is unfortunate that the doubt of the power of the Governors to command the King's troops within their respective garrisons, to direct or to approve the sentence of courts-martial, rests not on the opinion only of the Advocate-General at Bombay, but on that of Serjeant Bosanquet, which, from his character and long experience in all questions respecting the India Company, is entitled to great weight.

It is true that the question has never been raised in India; but it is highly improbable that it should for any long time escape the notice of those who are so actively and so constantly employed in taking every opportunity to dispute the authority of the public functionaries, and it would be in the highest degree unjust to allow those functionaries to proceed in a course which may subject them to actions and indictments, without informing them that we have reason to doubt its legality.

One of three consequences must then result:—Either the Governors must receive a commission to command the King's troops within the forts; or a clause to that effect must be introduced in the Mutiny Act; or 3rdly, the Governors will never admit those troops to form a part of their garrisons, which would be highly prejudicial both to the individuals and to the public service.

If the question were now a new one, I own that neither of the cases which have occurred at former periods would convince me that it was desirable to give to a civil Governor the specific command of the garrison, which appears to me only to weaken that general supreme authority which he is entitled to exercise in Council over all functionaries, military as well as civil, either within or without the garrison; but this question is now decided, and I cannot conceive that it can be expedient that the garrison shall be composed of troops not amenable to the same authority.

The military letters from India to which you refer have been communicated to me, and certainly have much diminished the regret which I was disposed to feel for the resignation which they announce; for they appear to evince a disposition rather to complain of grievances than to remedy them.

It is extraordinary that the writer of one of them should not have felt that a little activity, on his part, must have discovered and removed those deficiencies of which he speaks with so much ridicule and surprise. When it is stated that Sir Edward Paget asked for twenty battalions, only eight of which have been raised, it is forgot to be added that orders have, at the same time, been sent out to give up the posts of Mhow, Nagpore, and Asseerghur to the Bombay and Madras armies; and thus to add to the disposable Bengal force, 1 regiment of European infantry, 8 battalions of Native infantry, and 1 regiment of cavalry, besides artillery. I will certainly communicate to Lord Amherst your valuable suggestion of establishing a reserve at Dinapore; but, before I write, I will, with your permission, send you the last map which exhibits the manner in which the armies of the three Presidencies were posted last year, as that may suggest to you some further observations.

Believe me, my dear Duke,
ever most faithfully yours,
C. W. Williams Wynn.

P.S.—I am sorry to say that Sir Charles Stuart still hesitates in accepting the government of Madras, and has desired to defer his answer till he has an opportunity of seeing and consulting Robinson. He seems to me strongly disposed to take it.

To Sir W. Knighton. [422.]

My dear Sir William, Woodford, 23rd Nov., 1824.

Lord Liverpool will be in town; and I confess that I think Peel must communicate to him the letter from the King.

The King desired him to communicate it to the Chancellor

and me; and left to his discretion to communicate it to others.

Now, considering Lord Liverpool's station, and what his opinions are and his conduct has been on the Catholic question, it appears to me that it will be impossible to keep this letter from Lord Liverpool, and to deal fairly by him. The existence of the letter is already known to many persons; its contents will become the subject of conversation; and it is more than probable that Lord Liverpool will hear of it, and that it will be represented to him in the most invidious light possible. I am convinced, therefore, that the only mode of preventing the mischief that might result from this letter to the King's service is for Mr. Peel to show it to Lord Liverpool.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[423.] *To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

MY DEAR PEEL, Woodford, 23rd Nov., 1824.

I don't think it very probable that Mr. Fauntleroy's case will be ripe for decision to-morrow; and at all events, as I am going to Lord Bathurst's, I don't propose to attend the Recorder's Report. I have a letter from Lord Liverpool, in which he tells me that he will be in town, and I think it best to write and tell you that, upon reflection, I am convinced that what you suggested, and I at first concurred in, would be the proper thing to do with the letter from the King; that is, to show it to Lord Liverpool. When shown to Lord Liverpool it becomes of no importance; as long as it is concealed from him it is of importance; and the concealment gives it the air of an intrigue. As well as I recollect, the King in the letter desires you to show it to the Chancellor and to me; and permits you to show it to any others to whom you may think proper to show it. But whether he does or not, such a letter ought not to be kept from his Prime Minister.

On the other hand, we may rely upon it that the existence of such a letter is known to so many people that it will be talked of; and I am certain that we should all regret that we had kept its existence a secret.

In communicating this letter to Lord Liverpool, I recom-

mend to you to tell him what you said to the King respecting it; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will tell him what passed upon the subject between the King and me.

The King told me that he had given or sent such a letter *after* it had reached you, but *before* I had seen it. I told his Majesty that it appeared to me that there never was a moment in which the Catholic question, as a Parliamentary question, was so little to be apprehended as at present; and that it would be most unfortunate if he was at this moment to involve himself and his authority in it. That his Majesty's intention not to allow this question any longer to be considered open went to destroy the principle on which his government was founded; and that I really believed that many of those most opposed to the Catholics considered a government thus formed better able to defeat the Catholics than if formed exclusively of persons opposed to what was called the Catholic question.

I don't think the King intends what his letter states; at all events his intention is founded upon an hypothesis; and I am certain that we shall find him very little disposed to carry such an intention into execution.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel. [424.]

MY DEAR PEEL, Woodford, 24th Nov., 1824.

I have just received your note of yesterday, and I am very happy to find that our minds were travelling the same course on the subject to which it relates. You must have received mine of yesterday morning an hour or two after you wrote to me.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn. [425.]

MY DEAR WYNN, Woodford, 24th Nov., 1824.

I have received your letter of yesterday, and I should be very much obliged to you if you would let me see the copy of the opinion of Serjeant Bosanquet, and of the case submitted to him. I entertain a very high opinion of Serjeant Bosanquet,

but I cannot help thinking that there must be a mistake in the statement of the case.

The Governor of Bombay Castle is to all intents and purposes a military officer under the East India Company in the Castle of Bombay. It is true that he has not been educated in the military profession, or risen regularly through the subordinate ranks. But it is curious enough that those who make most noise upon that point forget that his Royal Highness the Duke of York's first commission was that of Colonel of the Coldstream Guards. There is nothing, therefore, in that point. An officer, however educated, and to whatever rank first appointed, whether by the Crown or the East India Company, must perform the duties and exercise the authority vested in him by his commission and by the law.

I consider the Governor of the Castle of Bombay as any other military Governor appointed by the East India Company, and as such according to law obliged to maintain discipline, and vested with the power of ordering garrison courts-martial on the Company's troops. I likewise contend that he has the same power and authority over the King's troops composing part of his garrison as any other Company's officer.

To this I am answered he has not, because he has not a commission from his Majesty. Before the year 1796 no Company's officer had a King's commission; yet the King's troops must have been in camps and garrisons commanded by Company's officers. At all events the Mutiny Acts and Articles of War of those times must have provided for the case of disorder by the King's troops in a camp or garrison commanded by a Company's officer. They have not been changed since that I know of; and the present rule in respect to the Governor of Bombay Castle must be the same as it was at that time in respect to every Company's officer.

It is perfectly true that since 1796 every Company's officer, excepting the Governors of the three forts, has had a King's commission of the same rank and date with that which he holds for the Company. But this measure was adopted not with a view to settle this question of discipline, but to give the Company's officers the faculty of taking rank with the King's officers according to the date of their several commissions.

No argument can be drawn, therefore, from this concession against the authority claimed under the Articles of War for the

Governors holding military commissions as such from the Company, and none from the King.

Neither in my opinion is it true, as stated in the papers from the Horse Guards, that these Governors are not liable to trial by court-martial. In my opinion, as military officers they are so liable for their acts as Governors of those forts or garrisons. But even if they were not, it does not follow that no officer can order or confirm the sentence of a court-martial who is not himself liable to trial by court-martial,

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn. [426.]

MY DEAR WYNN, Cirencester, 26th Nov., 1824.

I write you a line to tell you that I think you have not grounds to recall Sir E. Paget; at least none of an official nature that I have seen.

I don't think you would easily get an officer away before the spring who would be fit to take the command, and it won't be worth while to involve yourself in all the consequences of prematurely recalling Sir E. Paget for the sake of withdrawing him from his command two or three months sooner, in the rainy season of 1825, when all operations must cease.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel. [427.]

MY DEAR PEEL, Cirencester, 26th Nov., 1824.

I have received your letter regarding the Spanish refugees, which is one of the most difficult questions I have ever considered.

We cannot allow any persons in this country to starve; but, on the other hand, we must not pension generally, even for a limited time, the King of Spain's rebellious subjects.

If such a measure was politically right or just in relation to the King of Spain, it would be greatly inconvenient to our-

selves; as I know enough of the case, and of Spaniards in general, to be able to assure you that if hopes of provision here were held out, and the report circulated in Spain, we should have from one to five hundred thousand people to provide for immediately.

To tell you the truth, I very strongly suspect that the recent influx of Spaniards *from* Spain is to be attributed to the allowances paid by the Foreign Office, in addition to the list made by me, and to the injudicious measures of the Committee, and to that most injudicious of all, that of aiding the Committee by the funds of the government.

I have no objection to the meeting in the City for the purpose exclusively of charity, provided the object proposed should be to enable the Spaniards to whom the charity should be extended to remove from this country in a reasonable time, and in the mean time to subsist. I doubt the removal to Colombia or Mexico. First. Would it be fair to the King of Spain to send to his rebellious colonies so many officers and soldiers? I should think certainly not without giving him previous notice that we should find ourselves under the necessity of taking this step.

But there is another objection to this measure of an opposite description. Would the Mexican or Colombian governments receive these Spaniards? These governments have hitherto been acting on the contrary principle; that is to say, they have been putting Spaniards to death and sending them away only because they were Spaniards; and as all Spaniards of every faction and description agree in one principle, viz., that the colonies ought and must submit to the mother country, I should doubt these governments agreeing to receive the present which we are disposed to offer him.

Then, lastly, there may be another question upon this subject, and that is, whether these individuals themselves, some of them having property in Spain, and all entertaining the opinion to which I have above referred, would much like to be sent to the colonies under the risk of a bad reception?

Upon the whole, I am convinced that the best thing to do is to confine the meeting in the City to charity alone.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn. [428.]

MY DEAR WYNN, Cirencester, 27th Nov., 1824.

I have received your letter of the 20th, and I return the papers which you inclosed. As well as I can judge of the position of things as known at Calcutta on the 2nd of June, I should say there was an end of the immediate danger. The rains set in about that time, and it will be impossible for the Burmese, as for our troops, to keep the field in that part of India.

It is impossible to form a judgment of what they propose, or will be able to effect, after the rains shall have ceased.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn. [429.]

MY DEAR WYNN, Cirencester, 28th Nov. 1824.

I confess that I am not sorry that Sir Charles Stuart does not go to India. The greatest possible misfortunes will be the consequence of making the offices of Governors and Commanders-in-Chief in that country the means of political arrangements. There is but one danger to our settlements in the East Indies; and that is the imbecility, inexperience, and want of character, of the persons selected to be Governors and Commanders-in-Chief. You should select and recommend to the Court of Directors the fittest man you can find.

In respect to the removal of Sir E. Paget, I confess that I have seen no symptom of his disagreement with the Governor-General excepting in his own letter, which certainly does afford ground for removing him, not so much on account of that disagreement as because he did not return to the Presidency the moment he found the war inevitable; and because it is obvious from that document that he did not understand what were his own duties, and did not perform them. I have seen no trace of a disagreement in the records. On the contrary, indeed, it appears that the Governor-General has, for the purpose of equipping the flotilla as the Commander-in-Chief chooses, placed the Marine Board under his direction, which I am pretty certain was never done before in any instance.

I don't think, therefore, that you can found upon these differences his premature removal.

There is one ground, however, for his early removal arising from the state of the war and the seasons. The rains prevail in those countries from May and June till September. The former must be the season for preparation, October for the commencement of action. If the war should not be concluded in this campaign, the officer who is to carry on the service in the season of 1825-1826 should be on the spot to make the preparations in the rains of 1825.

However, if it should turn out, which I think very probable, that Sir E. Paget should put an end to the contest in the season of 1824-1825, his removal in May or June, 1825, will be very awkward; and, on the other hand, the position of his successor will be very awkward if Sir E. Paget be allowed to stay with his successor in Calcutta till it should suit the convenience of the former to come away at the time fixed by himself.

Then, I assure you that, unless you have ostensible cause for the removal of Sir E. Paget, you will find that measure one of the most difficult that you could undertake, and that it will be followed by very disagreeable consequences.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[430.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Cirencester, 28th Nov., 1824.

I return your drafts, having made one or two notes upon them; and I am very much obliged to you for the perusal of them; I quite concur in them.

As the ostensible despatch will go to Russia, would it not be desirable to state our reason for thinking that M. Minciacky's mission is not the same thing as M. De la Ribeaupierre's.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

OBSERVATION on the following paragraph in MR. CANNING'S proposed confidential despatch to SIR HENRY WELLESLEY:—

"The difference of our views upon this subject is easily traceable to a still wider and well-known difference in our principles. Prince Metternich,

who considers the alliance of the great Powers of Europe as a tutelary Providence watching over the interests of the world, and authorized by that very character to interfere in the concerns of independent States without the sanction of specific obligation, undervalues the minor claim of treaty as derogating from the grandeur of his systematic scheme of protection; we who deny the general abstract right of interference, but admit the possibility of interfering in cases of specific interest or specific obligation, naturally consider treaty as the most authentic title by which one State can claim to busy itself in the concerns of another."

All this is not necessary to the argument, and would be considered by Prince Metternich, who must see this despatch, as *quizzing* the Holy Alliance.

WELLINGTON.

OBSERVATION on the second paragraph of proposed letter to the Provisional Government of Greece, commencing:—

"It is due to the Court of St. Petersburg to begin with observing that the plan of pacification which emanated from that Court was drawn up (as the British government sincerely believe) in anything but an unfriendly disposition towards Greece; that this plan, far from being (as your letter appears to assume) definitively settled and intended to be imposed either upon Greece or Turkey, was submitted by the Emperor of Russia to several of the Powers of Europe, his Imperial Majesty's Allies, for the purpose of receiving their comments upon it, before any proposition founded thereupon should be made to the contending parties."

This is certainly an official paper. Would you give such strong official recognition to the Russian Paper? Its existence cannot be denied, but it need not be admitted.

WELLINGTON.

OBSERVATION on the thirteenth paragraph, commencing:—

"The like neutrality has been observed by Great Britain in the contest now raging in Greece, and observed, if not with the strictest *impartiality*, *certainly with no deviation in any degree unfavourable to the Greeks.* Their belligerent rights have been uniformly respected, and it has been with the greatest regret that the British government has found itself compelled on a recent occasion to repress certain excesses to which the exercise of those rights was attempted to be carried, but which the British government is satisfied will not occur again."

This paper will be published. Will not the government of the Porte make use of this admission?

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 30th Nov., 1824.

The subject of the enclosed Memorandum is that which I shall bring first before the Cabinet to-morrow. Lord L. only has seen it; but I will send another copy in circulation.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

MEMORANDUM on our relations with the Spanish American Provinces.

The period is now arrived when it appears to be necessary to review the state of our relations with the provinces of Spanish America, and to consider the language which it may be proper to recommend to the King to hold in his speech to parliament, as well as the explanations which the ministers may be authorised to give whenever the question of the Spanish colonies shall become matter of debate in the Houses of Lords and Commons.

The first step towards political recognition has already been taken with respect to the State of Buenos Ayres. The result of it depends upon circumstances upon which we have not as yet sufficient information; but a discretion has been vested in our agent, Mr. Parish, to act according to contingencies specified in his instructions.

Before we enter upon the question, How far the time and circumstances are such as to make the recognition of the other States of Spanish America (but more particularly those of Mexico and Colombia) expedient and necessary, it may be desirable to make some general observations upon the past and present condition of those countries.

It is material to begin with remarking that there was nothing of a revolutionary character in the measures which were first taken in the Spanish American provinces in 1808, and which have led to the separation of the greater part of them from the mother country.

When Napoleon Buonaparte attempted to impose his brother Joseph upon the Spanish monarchy, he looked to that monarchy in all its parts as well in America as in Europe.

It cannot be denied that in some parts of the Spanish American colonies a disposition to independence had manifested itself previous to the above period. As these colonies increased in population, in wealth, in knowledge, and in consequence, the bondage and monopoly imposed upon them by the mother country became more and more grievous; and it is probable that in any case Spain must have made up her mind to lose them as dependencies unless her government had been disposed to adopt towards them a more enlightened policy, both commercial and political, in the place of one no longer applicable to their situation.

Far, however, from taking an ungenerous advantage of the difficulties in which Spain was involved, to extort concessions long solicited in vain, the provinces of America generally speaking, with the exception, perhaps, of some portion of the territory now constituting the State of Colombia, professed to preserve their allegiance to Ferdinand VII., and were almost

as enthusiastic in upholding his rights as the inhabitants of the mother country itself.

Even when the local governments established in Spain during the war and the captivity of the King, under the names of "Supreme Junta," "Cortes," &c., could not be persuaded to act towards the colonies upon any other principles than those of the old system, they nevertheless considered the cause of the King as separate from that of the local and provisional governments; and upon his Majesty's restoration (and most of them for some years afterwards), not only carried on the government in his name, but were desirous of coming to a cordial and sincere understanding with him. It could hardly be expected that they would submit again to the restrictions and oppressions to which they had formerly been subject, and from which they had been delivered, not by rebellion, but by the course of events and through the assertion of the rights of their sovereign.

Upon this occasion it was that the government of Great Britain offered its mediation, an offer since repeated many times, but never accepted by Spain otherwise than for the purpose of defeating or evading it.

There can be little doubt that at that period the connection between the King of Spain and all the South American provinces might have been re-established and secured;* and even at a subsequent period, when matters had gone too far in some of the provinces to make a reconciliation easy, Mr. Rush, the minister of the United States, gave it as his opinion, and it is presumed, as the opinion of his government, to the late Lord Londonderry, that by prudent concessions and arrangements the King of Spain might still secure the possession of more than two-thirds of his American dominions. It is, therefore, to the injustice and to the rigid and inflexible obstinacy of the Spanish court and nation that the loss of these dominions is to be ascribed.

The inhabitants had no desire in the first instance but to reconcile their allegiance to their King with their vital and essential interests. The greater part of them have been driven by circumstances into a situation in which they had no alternative but the declaration of their independence; and it would be surely impossible to place ourselves in their situation, and to say that we should have acted substantially otherwise than they have done.

Except, perhaps, in the single instance of Colombia, it is manifestly not by choice that these States have adopted republican forms of government. Mexico has always been inclined to monarchy, and the others appear to have been driven to adopt the form of a commonwealth rather

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* Periods at which the several states of Spanish America ceased to acknowledge the nominal sovereignty of Ferdinand VII.:—

Colombia ..	Venezuela	5 July, 1811.
	New Granada	17 Dec., 1819.
	Colombia (generally)	30 Aug., 1811.
Buenos Ayres		19 July, 1816.
Chili		1 Jan., 1818.
Peru		15 July, 1821.
Mexico		18 May, 1822.

by circumstances than by any abstract preference for that sort of government.

Such being the character of the revolution which has separated these provinces from Spain, the question which forces itself upon our consideration is this: Are there any circumstances extrinsic to this internal character which should longer delay the recognition of the independence of such of those States as have established their independence *de facto*, and have constituted governments capable of maintaining relations of peace and amity with other Powers?

First. Let it be considered that the provinces of Spanish America (combined with the Brazils), constitute more than one-fourth of the habitable globe. Is it possible to leave so large a part of the world for any length of time in a state of *outlawry*?

If we were of opinion that it was practicable that Spain should reconquer her colonies (an opinion which it is utterly impossible to maintain), still unless this be done soon, their independence must be acknowledged by those who are in a state to have communication with them.

Let any one reflect on the numerous questions in peace, and the still more numerous questions in war, in which foreign states have a right to expect redress, but on which redress can only be obtained upon the acknowledgment of the authority from which it is demanded, and he will find that he must infallibly be brought to this conclusion.

But, secondly, let us consider that these States can in fact *force* their recognition by Great Britain whenever they may deem it expedient. The government of the United States of America have already acknowledged them. Suppose the New States were to impose high and exclusive duties upon the ships and commerce of all Powers resorting to their ports which did not acknowledge them. Will any one say that they would not be perfectly justified, after a reasonable interval, in taking such a measure? Will it be pretended that the government of this country could in such case long delay their recognition, considering the great interests we have at stake in that quarter, and considering that in fact not only the great bulk of external commerce, but even the internal operations of mining and even of agriculture are carried on principally by British enterprise and British capital.

The consequences of our procrastination would then be felt too late when we had thrown the wealth, the power, and the influence of these great dominions into the hands of the people of the United States.

Acknowledge, therefore, we must at no distant period; but our acknowledgment when these consequences had begun to be felt would be so obviously the effect of compulsion, as to make it a measure of disgrace to us and of triumph to our rivals.

Thirdly. Is there any weight in the argument that we ought to delay the recognition because the other great powers of Europe, and specifically Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France, are not prepared to adopt the same measure?

The first objection to this argument is that the principle of it is eternal. Austria, Russia, and Prussia object to the recognition of the Spanish American States upon the ground of its being at variance with the principle of legitimacy.

Will not that reason be as good twenty years hence as it is at this day? It certainly will be so, till Spain shall think fit to set the example of recognition; and Spain (in this particular of her policy altogether unchanged) was sixty years in admitting the fact that the Netherlands had thrown off her authority.

Have Austria, Russia, and Prussia any interest which should induce them to consider this question even impartially? Have they ever had a ship in the seas contiguous to Spanish America, or are they likely to have one?

They have positively no national interest, not the slightest, in the matter.

As to France, she has an interest in the question, though, comparatively with ours, a very small one; and accordingly she has been, and is still tampering with the agents of the several American States, and endeavouring to cajole them with fair words, her whole object and effort being in truth, first, to thwart our views, and secondly, to profit by them when accomplished.

Fourthly. Can the British government shut its eyes to what is the interest of Great Britain in this question?

That interest is immense; and are we to sacrifice the advantage and prosperity of the people of this country to the extravagant principles or prejudices of governments which have proved to us that in their own concerns in Europe they are not disposed to sacrifice a tittle of their views and their policy to the views and policy of the British government when a difference of opinion arises between us?

Fifthly. The principle once decided, the mode in which the recognition is to be effected is a question of very subordinate importance. If it should be thought better to come to it through the medium of commercial treaties, and that the recognition should be the result of such treaties, there can be no objection to such a course. But it is time that the principle should be decided. We can no longer creditably evade the question either in parliament or with foreign powers.

Sixthly. If there be any chance of the Spanish government being ever willing to enter into any arrangement with the colonies, of this we may be sure that so long as Great Britain hesitates whether she will acknowledge their independence or not, that chance will never occur.

The *pierre de touche* is the recognition of Great Britain. That step taken, the fate of the colonies, or at least of the greater part of them, will be considered in Spain as decided; and we may then again offer (what we have so often offered in vain) to make ourselves the channel of any reasonable proposal from the mother country, with a better hope of our good offices being accepted.

Seventhly. What has been hitherto stated relates to the question between England, the Spanish American colonies, and Spain. But there are other and wider considerations which must not be overlooked.

At the beginning of the last century the great object of the policy of this country was to prevent Spain *and its dependencies* from becoming French in their external relations. We resisted, therefore, the succession of a prince of the House of Bourbon to the throne of Spain.

A resolution passed the House of Lords in 1711, that no peace could be

safe or honourable to Great Britain or Europe if Spain and the West Indies (meaning *Spanish America*) were allotted to any branch of the House of Bourbon.

We were unsuccessful in our endeavours to prevent this succession, and during the greater part of the last century Spain followed France in her external policy.

The deliverance of Spain by the British arms under the Duke of Wellington led us to entertain hopes that a new era had arrived; that Spain would at least cease to be *French* in her external policy; that she would, indeed, be rather English than French.

By the course of events, which were, perhaps, not within our control, our expectations have again been disappointed.

Now we can hardly expect such an explanation from France on the subject of the Army of Occupation as will leave Spain in any other situation than that of a virtual, if not actual, subjection to France, so far at least as respects her foreign policy.

Surely, then, it is of the utmost importance to the best interests of this country that we should prevent the American dependencies of this power from being involved in that same subjection.

Lastly. We have spoken of the United States of North America as our rivals in commerce and influence with the New States; but there is another and more formidable light in which they should be viewed.

The great and favourite object of the policy of this country for more than four centuries has been to foster and encourage our navigation, as the sure basis of our maritime power. In this branch of national industry the people of the United States are become more formidable rivals to us than any nation which has ever yet existed; more so even than the Dutch, whose rivalry in this respect occasioned several successive wars between the two countries.

The views and policy of the North Americans seem mainly directed towards supplanting us in navigation in every quarter of the globe, but more particularly in the seas contiguous to America.

Let us recollect that as their commercial marine is augmented their military marine must proportionally increase. And it cannot be doubted that if we provoke the New States of America to give a decided preference in their ports to the people of the United States over ourselves, the navigation of these extensive dominions will be lost to us, and will in a great measure be transferred to our rivals.

Let us remember, then, that peace, however desirable, and however cherished by us, cannot last for ever. Sooner or later we shall probably have to contend with the combined maritime power of France and of the United States. The disposition of the New States is at present highly favourable to England. If we take advantage of that disposition, we may establish through our influence with them a fair counterpoise to that combined maritime power. Let us not, then, throw the present golden opportunity away, which, once lost, may never be recovered.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 30th Nov., 1824.

I am much obliged to you for your suggestions on the drafts to Austria and Greece. I have adopted your last suggestion in the Greek draft—that of omitting the passage which might be construed by the Turks into partiality. As to the question of addressing the Greek government *at all* —that was decided by the Russians, who *proposed* to us to propose an armistice to the Greeks. I asked Lieven if he was aware that such a communication would *set them up*. But my observation made no difference in his execution of his instructions, which were evidently positive upon this point; and we were actually discussing the mode of communication *to* the Greek government, when the letter *from* the Greek government arrived.

If we and Russia were prepared to write *first* to the Greeks, surely there can be no doubt about *answering* their letter.

Our answer may be sent through the Ionian Islands, and I propose sending a copy of it at the same time to Constantinople.

As to that part of the despatch to Sir H. Wellesley, which you say Prince Metternich will consider as a "quiz upon the Holy Alliance," I certainly will alter any expression that gives it a *quizzing* character; but the sentiment is *most serious*, for I have no doubt in my own mind that Mett. *does* undervalue treaty, *because* he prefers authoritative interference.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [431.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 1st Dec., 1824.

I return the Memorandum on the continued occupation of Spain. It appears to me that there are some points in this case which are not considered in this Memorandum. I am afraid that I did not explain myself clearly in my first note on the despatch to the Greek government. I don't object to your answering the government. It appears to me that it is desirable that you should give an answer. But in this answer you recognize the existence of the Russian Memoir, upon which the Greek government addressed you. The knowledge which the Greek government have obtained of this Memoir is from the newspapers alone; and it may be a question whether it is expedient that in your letter you should recognise its existence. It is not difficult to reason upon the contents of the paper without saying positively whether it did or did not proceed from the Russian Cabinet.

In respect to the answer to Prince Metternich, it appears to me that it will not be difficult to extract from the passage in question all those parts which might offend, and leave the argument. But when I knew more of these matters than I do at present, as well as I can recollect, the Porte, not having signed the Treaty of Paris, was not considered as in the European system thereby established. Although, therefore, the *Holy Alliance*, properly so called, would be applicable to transactions with the Porte, the system of the *Holy Alliance* supposed to be established by the treaties of Paris and Aix-la-Chapelle, was never considered applicable to those transactions. I should think that Metternich would give this answer to your argument.

In fact, the interference between Greeks and Turks must be founded upon the peculiar circumstances of the contest, upon the inconveniences with which it is, and the dangers by which it may be, attended to all the Powers of Europe, and upon the interest which all the great Powers must feel to prevent Russia, which Power has alone a right of interference by treaty, though very limited, from settling the matter exclusively according to her own views of her own interests.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[432.] *Au Prince Frédéric d'Orange.*

MONSEIGNEUR, À Londres, ce 3me Déc., 1824.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre de votre Altesse Royale du 15me Novembre, et j'ai à présent celui de faire passer à votre Altesse Royale les réponses aux questions que vous m'aviez transmises.

V.A.R. y verra que l'expérience a été parfaite, et que la position des murs à la Carnot une fois connue, leur destruction est certaine.

Pour ce qui regarde les *plateformes*, j'étais indisposé le jour qu'on a fait le feu sur le mur, et je n'y ai pas assisté. Mais ayant été à Woolwich le lendemain pour en voir l'effet, j'ai ordonné qu'on retirât les pièces des plateformes, et qu'on les plaçat sur le terrain. Après cette opération on a recommencé le feu ; et comme V.A.R. aura vu par les desseins, on a brêché le mur

encore plus près de ses fondemens après que la position des pièces a été changée qu'auparavant.

V.A.R. a bien jugé l'effet de cette expérience. Il n'y a pas de doute qu'on pourrait brêcher des murs de revêtement ordinaire en se servant des mêmes moyens. Mais il faut observer que la contrescarpe resterait toujours un obstacle important dans les anciens systèmes de fortification; au lieu que, dans celui de Carnot, le glacis en contrepente offrirait des facilités aux assaillans.

Mais il y a une autre conséquence très importante à tirer de cette expérience, et elle regarde les feux cachés des flancs et des faces des bastions, &c., &c. Il est clair que leur position une fois connue avec précision, leur destruction devient inévitable, avant même de placer les batteries sur la crête du glacis.

Je vous avoue, Monseigneur, que je regrette les résultats de cette expérience. Elle a augmenté les avantages déjà considérables de l'attaque sur la défense des places; et elle rend nécessaire de nouveaux efforts du génie pour en éviter les effets, et elle augmentera considérablement les dépenses d'un système de défense quelconque.

J'aurai sûrement l'honneur de faire ma cour à votre Altesse Royale à Bruxelles l'été prochaine; et s'il y a quelque chose de vos ordres que je puisse exécuter dans ce pays-ci, je prie V.A.R. de m'en charger; ayant l'honneur d'être, avec le dévouement le plus respectueux, de V.A.R. le très obéissant et très fidèle serviteur,

WELLINGTON, PRINCE DE WATERLOO.

Rev. Dr. Curtis to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Drogheda, 6th Dec., 1824.

In my reply to the last letter your Grace condescended to honour me with, I strictly adhered to truth, and, as well from inclination as duty, I endeavoured to make my statement, with the deference and respect so justly due to your high character.

I was not vain enough to expect that everything I then said would be so happy as I could wish to meet your Grace's approbation or assent, and much less your answer to that effect. But I certainly did flatter myself that if anything I advanced should unfortunately happen to displease, or appear improper to your Grace, you would vouchsafe to advise or reprehend me for it yourself, and not depute any other to do so; nay, I still think the contrary hardly possible or compatible with your former goodness to me.

And yet I have received a few days back an anonymous letter from

London, neither franked nor post paid, but upbraiding me in the most severe and harsh terms, manifestly alluding to almost the whole purport of my said reply to your Grace, which has given me more pain than I can well express; as the awkward reprimand, after so much useless invective, does not tell me explicitly what specific charge or complaint your Grace has against me, which I am unable to guess, nor can it be clearly inferred from the general terms of the extraordinary and unexpected piece in question. I should have sent the original to your Grace, but that I apprehended it might appear too bold an obtrusion.

I am led to suspect, though my stern Frondeur does not expressly say, that his wrath was excited against me for having become a member of the Catholic Association, merely by contributing my mite (as almost all Catholics, and many others have done) to the voluntary subscription called the Catholic Rent; as he inveighs bitterly against both. I am truly astonished at the vast importance given to these things, that in my mind do not deserve half the noise made about them, and without which they would remain or sink into their primitive nothingness.

When the Catholic Association first began to meet in the course of last year, the Catholic nobility, gentry, prelates, and principal people refused to join them or frequent their meetings, that were long neither numerous nor respectable; their views were little known or minded, and very few imagined they could be of any real use for obtaining the popular measure of Catholic emancipation, or any other redress—for the speeches of their orators were little attended to or believed, and, when intemperate, were much more offensive than pleasing to all sensible people. Thus they would have immediately subsided and dispersed, were it not for the Orange Faction, who having first, by their violence, forced them to meet by their daily increasing enormities and avowed inimical principles, gave them a consistency and importance that they could never otherwise have acquired, or even now retain for a moment. The very illiberal, highly impolitic, and alarming speeches made, since the above period, in both Houses of Parliament, chiefly by Irish members of the Orange faction, or intimately connected with them, bearding Parliament itself, and openly attempting to overrule the executive government of this kingdom. These and similar outrageous abuses, known and severely felt by all, afforded the Catholic Association a fair pretext, or, as they will call it, a just and imperious necessity for calling the attention of the people to the perilous situation in which their lives, property, and liberty were placed, at the mercy of a lawless, bigotted, unrelenting faction, having no other religion among themselves, but a professed hatred to all Catholics. As the alleged motives were and are notorious, the appeal founded on them could not be despised, and was accordingly attended to, and Catholics of all ranks placed their eyes on the Association, as the only existing place of meeting. But for what purpose? Evidently for considering the nature and extent of their grievances, and to represent such as should be found undeniably true to the legislature, supporting and proving their claims by fair legal means; which could not be done, nor even attempted without considerable expense, equal or superior to what the free contribution called Catholic Rent can ever be expected to supply, the receipt and expenditure of which is publicly announced and known to all.

But if I were asked what I, or other Catholics, would say or do in case the Catholic Association, and the Rent it proposed, they appearing unexceptionable, should both happen to be suppressed as unwarrantable by the legislature or by government; my answer would be that I should instantly bow to and obey such legitimate order, and I have every reason to believe that the whole Association, and those any way connected with it, would act in the same manner, without any necessity of coercion; and that it would be highly criminal to do otherwise, under any pretext or circumstance. But I am not the less persuaded that they (not I) would complain loudly and remonstrate against such treatment as exceedingly severe and partial, unless it were equally employed towards all other societies, associations, and assemblies, that on their own bare authority hold their public and private meetings, discuss important matters, collect large contributions, march even armed, with colours flying, and music playing irritating airs, shouts, and threats, in public but unlicensed processions, generally accompanied by tumult, disorder, and violence; who finally have their Grand Masters, Grand Deputies, Grand Secretaries, Grand Chaplains, and all the rest of their grandeur, arrayed for the despatch of business, that is, for arranging their bacchanalian orgies, insulting toasts and infuriate speeches, &c. If all this, and much more, be suffered to proceed, not only with impunity, but applause, it is vain to expect that Catholics can feel themselves impartially ruled, or that it is even meant they should enjoy equal laws, should their Association alone (where the above atrocities, excesses, and scandals, are certainly not known) be marked out for proscription. No,-they are not quite so dull and besotted as our neighbours are pleased to think and call them; and I can assure your Grace they are much more talented and better instructed than those proselyting mountebanks that are sent over, or come of their own accord, to civilize and convert them, as has been demonstratively proved, wherever the rashness and evil genius of those fanatics led them to try the experiment.

It is to your Grace alone I would venture to express my sentiments so clearly on these subjects, on which I never speak at all to others, or with the greatest precaution and reserve, lest I might seem to approve, or at least not to disapprove, of even the most remote tendency to anything intemperate, in substance or manner. For this reason I remained silent much longer than almost any other, with respect to the Catholic Association, which fastidious and sullen apathy gave great offence to many worthy characters, who prayed and anxiously urged me to write a complimentary letter to that assembly; which I at length did a few days back; where, however, I took good care to lay down my principles of unshaken and undivided absolute allegiance to our beloved sovereign, of submission to the existing laws, and of profound respect for government—and to declare it was only because I was persuaded that the Catholic Association had adopted these same principles, and would always in future inviolably adhere to and follow them in all its operations, that I assured them of my respect and esteem—my letter was published and will speak for itself. But even this I should certainly not have done, if I knew or had the least motive to suspect or fear that said Association, or its principal conductors, had any intention, design, or even wish, publicly, or occultly to adopt or

pursue any other measures or means of promoting them, than such as loyal, good, and peaceable subjects may safely avow and lawfully follow. But I solemnly protest that after the most scrupulous investigation, made by myself and others of undoubted integrity, we could discover no such criminal project or intention; but on the contrary, that the Roman Catholic body were totally averse from all revolutionary or seditious dispositions, so far, that if the Association or any of its leaders, how popular soever, should be rash enough to propose such a mad scheme, they would be instantly opposed and abandoned, with execration, by all Roman Catholics of the least respectability, and consequently, even by the rabble themselves, as well through fear and for public tranquillity, as for conscience sake. However, the very supposition itself just made is visionary, and nearly impossible.

I must beg your Grace's indulgence for detaining your attention so long. I thought it necessary and hope it will prove, at least, the sincerity with which I have the honour to remain, my Lord Duke,

your devoted and obedient servant,

P. Curtis, R. C. Abp.

[433.] *To Lord Liverpool.*

My dear Lord, London, 7th Dec., 1824.

I have perused with attention the paper in the box, and I sincerely wish that I could agree with your opinion on the subject to which it relates. I have likewise read with attention the papers on the subject of the Spanish colonies now on the Cabinet table, and although I admit that we must at some time or other establish some relation with those countries which shall tend to recognise their existence as independent States, I am convinced that, in a view to our own internal situation, to our relations with foreign Powers, to our former and to our existing relations with Spain, considering the mode in which the contests with these States has been carried on, and to our own honour and good name, the longer the establishment of such relation is delayed the better; I am farther convinced that the reasons for the decision of July last exist at present in a still stronger degree than they did at that time. Nay, more, I believe that if the Cabinet had then known the real situation of what is called the State of Buenos Ayres, that the limited measure then determined upon was to be left at the discretion of Mr. Parish, and that that discretion would be exercised in signing a treaty of commerce with the city of Buenos Ayres alone, even that measure would not have been adopted.

I will not now enter into the discussion of the question. But before you decide that you will pledge your government in the King's Speech to Parliament to a substantial recognition of these States, the existence of each of which is now acknowledged even by these reporters to depend upon the result of a depending contest, I earnestly intreat you to ascertain the real opinions of your colleagues, and that of the public. Excepting one, I believe the former are either disinclined to stir farther in the question, or are indifferent about the matter. All that they wish for is that the peace should be uninterrupted.

As far as the opinion of the public can be judged of in society I should say that it is decidedly in favour of continued peace; and particularly that no step should be taken in this question which can lead to discussions with other States. The opinion of many intelligent men is, that the moment you will formally recognise the independent existence of these States your influence over their conduct will be at an end. But has it never occurred to you that we lost the best fruits of the late war by our connivance at the private wars of the King's subjects in those countries? and that the state in which we find ourselves in Europe at present is to be attributed in a great degree to our conduct in this question?

Is it quite clear that we do not by further measures expose ourselves to the risk of war, and that the worst of all wars for us; one with a Power whose only strength is its nakedness; to which, putting the Havannah out of the question, we can do no mischief after we shall have established these independent States?

Will such war not be followed by other contests?

But there is another opinion which it is desirable that you should reconcile to your measure before you go farther into it, and that is that of the King. Such measures are inconsistent with all his opinions, and with everything which he feels a pride in having done since the establishment of the Regency; and you will find it most difficult to obtain his consent to pledge his government in his speech to Parliament to any measures for finally separating these States from the mother country.

As for my part, I came into the government to support yourself and the principles on which you had been acting, and for which we had struggled in the field for such length of time. I should wish to go on as I have done, and nothing makes me so

unhappy as to differ in opinion with you. But, as you know, I am not inclined to carry these differences farther than is necessary; and I have advised, and shall invariably advise, his Majesty to follow the advice of his Cabinet.

But I can easily conceive that it must be equally irksome to you to have a colleague whose opinion upon any subject is so decidedly different from yours; and I can only assure you that I am ready whenever you wish it to ask the King's leave to retire from his service.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Fife House, 8th Dec., 1824.

I did not receive your letter till just before I was going out yesterday.

In answer to the latter part of it, I can only assure you most truly that nothing could give me more sincere pain, *privately* or *publicly*, than your separation from any cause from the government.

It is with the deepest regret that I differ with you on the subject of Spanish America; but I can most truly say that my opinion has not been hastily formed, and that I am conscientiously convinced, that if we allow these new States to consolidate their system and their policy with the United States of America, it will in a very few years prove fatal to our greatness, if not endanger our safety.

I am quite aware that the King has strong prejudices on this subject; I am very sorry for it; but I am satisfied that they originate partly in mistake as to the origin of the separation of the colonies from the mother country. I think he should be set right upon this point, as well as made to feel that the opinions which he sometimes avows on the subject of legitimacy would carry him to the full length of the principle of the Emperor of Russia and Prince Metternich.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Gloucester Lodge, 16th Dec., 1824.

I send you a copy of a despatch from Prince Metternich to Prince Esterhazy, which Prince Esterhazy has communicated to me.

So far as I understand it (and I confess Prince Metternich's performances sometimes leave me in doubt whether I exactly understand him or not), he is very angry that we have paid any attention to the Greek letter;—very much shocked to find that we were disposed to consider an interven-

tion between Turks and Greeks as anything like a "Mediation;" and very well prepared to have dealt with the Greeks as with the Constitutional Spaniards, after a Congress, in which he would either have persuaded us to do the same, or have gone on without us, if we declined doing so.

I expect Lord Strangford every hour.

The evacuation of Moldavia is completed.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [434.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 16th Dec., 1824.

I return the despatch from Prince Metternich. As well as I recollect the despatches carried by Mr. S. Canning, particularly those to Prince Metternich himself, he will be better satisfied with them than he appears to have been with Prince Esterhazy's report of his communication with you.

I don't think you have viewed the Greek letter or the report of the conference with the Reis Effendi as more than impediments at the moment to entering into the conference, to which there is already an insurmountable impediment in the absence of Monsieur de la Ribeaupierre from Constantinople.

Even those who are disposed to consider the first-mentioned as nothing, must admit that they show that no time has yet been thrown away, and that there is time still to wait till the Emperor of Russia will have sent his ambassador to Constantinople—a condition *sine quâ non* of our entering into any discussions upon this subject.

In respect to other points in Prince Metternich's despatch, such as the result of the conference and the establishment of a Greek independent power, I have no hesitation in saying that I believe and fear that no power in Europe, excepting ourselves and France, can prevent the occurrence of that event. It is very desirable that if it is to take place it should not be attended by a general war, or by the extension of the mischiefs of war to the neighbouring powers; and this is evidently the view with which Prince Metternich wants to embark in the conference.

But it is obvious that we cannot embark in it till the Russian ambassador will be in his place.

Believe me, &c.

WELLINGTON.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Fife House, 16th Dec., 1824.

I am just returned from Windsor. The King wishes to see you, and I recommend to you to go to-morrow morning; the Cabinet will be put off till three o'clock.

My conversation with his Majesty passed off upon the whole very satisfactorily, he *began* by asking me whether we were *unanimous* and I told him the strict truth as to opinions. Some of the reasoning, in the papers which were sent to him, had made a considerable impression upon him, and he is certainly not disposed to make serious difficulties.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

Will you recollect a reinforcement of Horse Artillery for Ireland?

The King to Lord Liverpool.

Royal Lodge, 17th Dec., 1824.

The King cannot allow to pass unnoticed the Minute of Cabinet transmitted by Mr. Canning on the 15th instant.

The King always wishes to concur with the opinion of his Cabinet.

It is, therefore, with deep regret that the King finds himself under the necessity of differing from the majority of the Cabinet upon the present occasion.

The King considers that the system of policy of his government upon this subject has been erroneous, and that instead of seeking for opportunities to promote even that policy, such as it is, the measures now recommended should have been forced upon us by circumstances not to be avoided or controled.

However, the King will not oppose himself to the measures considered for the benefit of his subjects and for the promotion of the navigation of the country, by those to whom the King has given his confidence.

The King wishes that these measures should stand on the ground of the interests of his subjects, and not as measures of war or retaliation against other Powers; and that they should not be put forth to the world as having any other objects in view than those which the King has stated as his motive for assenting to them.

The King wishes that his Allies and the King of Spain should be informed of the present intention previous to its being carried into effect, and in such language and manner as may make the communication as little obnoxious to their feelings as possible.

The King desires that Lord Liverpool will communicate these, the King's sentiments, to the Cabinet.

G. R.

Lord Liverpool to the King.

London, 17th Dec., 1824.

Lord Liverpool has communicated to your Majesty's confidential servants your Majesty's answer to the Minute of Cabinet transmitted by Mr. Canning on the 15th instant.

Your Majesty's servants do certainly rest the measures now recommended to your Majesty respecting the New States of America upon the advantages to accrue to the commerce and navigation of your Majesty's subjects, and not on any principle of retaliation or hostility.

In reference to the last paragraph in your Majesty's answer, Lord Liverpool begs leave most humbly to inform your Majesty that it is intended, so soon as the instructions shall have been sent out to Mexico and Colombia, and certainly before the meeting of Parliament, that communications should be made to your Majesty's Allies, and also to the court of Madrid, of the steps now about to be taken by your Majesty's government.

This course is in exact conformity with the principles of the instructions given upon this subject to the Duke of Wellington when he went to Verona, and with the declarations made at that time in consequence thereof to your Majesty's Allies.

NOTE.—The instructions drawn up by the Marquess of Londonderry for the British Minister at the Congress of Verona are printed in this Correspondence, Vol. I. p. 284. The following supplemental instructions were added by Mr. Canning.—ED.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Foreign Office, 27th Sept., 1822.

In furnishing your Grace with such supplemental instructions as either the change or progress of affairs since the Memorandum of Heads of Instruction under which your Grace is commissioned to act was prepared, or, as your Grace's wish for a more particular exposition of some of those heads may require, it will be most expedient to follow the order of arrangement in which the original Memorandum was drawn.

To begin with the affairs of Turkey.

It is with regard to these affairs that the greatest variation has been produced, both by change and by progress, since the time for the meeting of the Congress was determined; change in respect to the balance of advantages in the war between the Turkish government and its Greek subjects, and progress in respect to the negotiation for an arrangement of differences between that government and the Emperor of Russia.

It cannot be denied that all that part of the original instruction which turned upon the apparent triumph of the Greek cause in the Morea and by sea, and upon the tardiness and inefficacy of the preparations of the Divan for retrieving the disgraces of the Ottoman arms, and re-establishing the contested dominion of the Sultan, has, whether by fortune or by the efforts of the Turkish government, been rendered inapplicable to the present state of things; and that the Sultan now comes to treat with his powerful neighbour

as a conqueror in the internal war, and as undisputed master of his own territories.

On the other hand, it must be admitted that the successes of the war have not arrested the progress of the Turkish negotiations. The main points stipulated for in the Russian ultimatum appear to have been all conceded in principle by the divan; and what yet was wanting to complete the carrying into effect of those concessions is probably by this time accomplished, through the judicious and indefatigable exertions of his Majesty's ambassador at Constantinople.

The Principalities are evacuated; the newly chosen Hospodars have set out to take possession of their governments; the Greek churches are (as we are informed) actually rebuilding. In addition to these concessions, we have required, and I trust obtained, a general amnesty for the Greeks who have been in arms against the Porte, the publication of which instrument on the part of the Turkish government will absolve, perhaps, all that either the letter or the spirit of existing treaties entitle Russia to require from the Turks, or the Allies of Russia to countenance her in exacting.

There would be, therefore, apparently little more to do than to reduce to diplomatic form the reconcilement between the Russian and Ottoman governments, if it were not thought probable that the Emperor of Russia, though having in substance nothing more to require, may feel himself under the necessity of endeavouring to obtain some more signal manifestation of the success wherewith he has pursued the object for which he menaced hostilities, and of the deference with which he has been treated by the Turkish court.

It is only with this view that the attempt to obtain the mission of a Turkish plenipotentiary to the frontiers, after almost all the points of dispute were already adjusted, can have been so earnestly insisted upon by the Emperor of Russia. That attempt has failed; and it could hardly be expected to be renewed with advantage, unless the Emperor should be disposed to admit the bringing into discussion, under the mediation of the Allies, his Imperial Majesty's disputes with Turkey on the Adriatic frontiers of their respective dominions, an admission altogether improbable, and one which it is by no means our business to suggest.

Failing this attempt, therefore, nothing seems to remain which can be required by the Emperor with any probability of its being conceded by the Turks; except the addition to the proposed Act of Amnesty for the Greeks, which must be itself of the most liberal and comprehensive character, some solemn and recorded promise and obligation on the part of the Turkish government, for the future good government of their Greek subjects.

That such an addition to the proposed Act would be highly desirable cannot be doubted. Nor can we expect or wish that the Emperor of Russia should not be most anxious to obtain it. But as this demand is not within the limits of his ultimatum, nor in the letter of his treaties, a question arises whether his Imperial Majesty should be allowed to seek it in his own way, and through his own means, at the risk (it must be owned) of the refusal leading to a renewal of angry discussions, and possibly to war;—or whether the Allies should join with him in a common demand, at the risk of compromising the dignity of the Alliance, if the Turks should refuse to yield, and the Allies should acquiesce in the refusal;—or of being drawn into a joint war, of which no human foresight can anticipate the issue.

It is almost needless to say, that before we are driven to this alternative, every amicable effort should have been exhausted by his Majesty's embassy at the Porte, in the same strain of friendly mediation in which it has already

achieved so much for the pacification of Eastern Europe, to prevail upon the Turkish government to consent to what the Emperor of Russia may require, not as a concession to Russia, but in prevention of Russian demands; and for the honour and safety of the Turkish empire itself, as well as for the preservation of the good opinion and good will of England, to which Lord Strangford represents the Turkish ministers as being so sensibly alive.

But supposing those efforts exhausted, and exhausted in vain, the alternative to which I have referred may come upon us for decision. In making this decision we must revert to the principles which have governed our conduct, not in respect to the differences between Turkey and Russia only; but in the general course of our policy, since the conclusion of the war.

Our object, in common with our Allies, has been, and is, to maintain peace among nations; aware that a new war, on whatever pretext, or in whatever quarter it might be kindled, might presently involve all Europe in its flames.

Our object, as with respect to ourselves, has been to avoid all interference in the internal concerns of any nation,—an interference not authorised, in our case, by the positive rights or obligations of treaty, nor justified, as we think (except where treaty or some very special circumstances authorise it), by the principles of international law.

The questions respecting Turkey presented themselves to us under a double aspect. So far as they related to the struggle between the Porte and its Greek subjects, we had neither the right to interfere, nor the means of effectual interference. Whatever might be our wishes, our prejudices, or our sympathies, we were bound in political justice to respect, in this case, that national independence which, in case of civil commotion, we should expect to be respected in our own; nor was it for a Christian government which rules, in its distant dependencies, over a population of millions of Mahomedans, to proclaim a war of religion.

The discussions between Russia and Turkey, on the other hand, presented a case which called for our mediation. It was impossible to view the hazard to which the peace of the world was exposed by the conflict of two such powers, without feeling ourselves bound to interpose with the utmost exertion of our good offices, for the purpose of preventing a collision so formidable in its probable results.

Accordingly, to this object our unremitting efforts have been directed (in concert with those of our Allies), and happily not without effect.

The quarrel of the Emperor of Russia with the Porte was founded upon treaties, which gave to the Emperor a right of interference, to a certain extent, in the internal affairs of the Turkish government; a right to which we had no pretension.

Through our mediation, the infractions of treaty justly complained of by Russia have been redressed.

The rights which treaties give, treaties must be held to limit. Should the Emperor of Russia determine upon pushing his demands beyond that limitation, is it our policy, or is it consistent with the principles upon which we have all along been acting, to make common cause with him in such demands?

The Emperor of Russia may have motives of policy exclusively Russian, if not for regretting the loss of an opportunity to aggrandize himself at the expense of Turkey, at least for not appearing to throw such an opportunity away so hastily, as to embitter the regrets, and possibly excite the indignation, of his army and of his people. In such a temper of mind, the advisers of the Emperor of Russia may wish that the terms of reconciliation exacted from Turkey had been originally higher; may feel disappointed at the concession

of them by Turkey; and may seek to mend their error by new and unattainable requisitions.

In such requisitions we surely can never join. Respect for the Emperor of Russia, consideration for the difficulty of his position, and gratitude for the magnanimity with which he has foregone the indulgence of personal and national ambition for the sake of general peace, and the obvious and incalculable importance of postponing an appeal to arms in any quarter of Europe to the latest possible period, may induce us again to undertake, however hopelessly, and to prolong, however unprofitably, the task of friendly mediation. But to make ourselves party to any new call upon Turkey, which, however morally reasonable and equitable, we have not the right to enforce; and to do this at the instigation of counsels which are in effect directed to war, would be a step at once so adverse to our professions, so destructive of our just influence, and so ruinous to our plainest interests, that in the event (most earnestly to be deprecated) of the Emperor of Russia's finding himself obliged to adopt such a course of policy, and in the event of the alternative being thus presented to our choice, of either concurring in a combined effort to extort concessions from Turkey, beyond those which we are warranted in demanding, or which the Emperor of Russia himself has hitherto demanded and obtained, as the price of peace,—by the threat, and at the hazard, of combined war, or of leaving the Emperor of Russia to urge such demands, and urge them to the extremity of war, single-handed,—we must, in conformity with all the principles which we have hitherto maintained, and which alone can guide us safely through the intricate and thickening difficulties of the world, prefer the latter branch of that alternative, and withdraw ourselves altogether from any concern in a contest, to prevent which we shall have left nothing unessayed.

The reasoning which applies to the relations of Turkey and Russia applies still more clearly and forcibly to the discussions between the Porte and the Greeks.

In those discussions we have not the pretence of a right to interference. It is our right, our duty, and our inclination, to employ our utmost endeavours to induce the Porte, with a view to its own interests (especially to that public opinion of England which, upon our remonstrances against the atrocities committed at Scio, the Porte acknowledged itself to consider among its best interests to conciliate), not only to grant the fullest amnesty, and proclaim the most liberal indulgence, but really and in good truth to govern their Christian subjects with a mild and equitable sway. But what if the Greeks themselves look to nothing but political independence? What if they reject all terms short of that consummation as insult and injury? What if the Turkish government were to put to us (as it would have a right to do—a right exactly proportioned to the extent and peremptoriness of our demands on behalf of the Greeks) this question? "If we agree to grant all that you require, and if the effect of the offer of such a concession shall be only to raise the demands and exasperate the resistance of the Greeks, will you *then* make common cause with *us*; to chastise those who reject at once *our* authority and your mediation?"

Are we prepared to answer such an appeal in the affirmative? Would it be for the interest of the Greeks that we should interfere in the quarrel on such a condition? Even if all that we could ask for the Greeks were granted, and for the time accepted, under our guarantee; and if the Greeks—not the Turks—should hereafter be the first to violate the arrangement, would we pledge ourselves in that case to take part against the Greeks? Undoubtedly not. And if we are not prepared to do this, with what pretence of justice, or with what show of impartiality, can we be prepared to push our interference in their behalf to the extremity of war?

Neither, therefore, in respect to the external discussions of the Porte with Russia, nor in respect to its internal discussions with its own subjects can we justly and reasonably be expected to take any other part, than that which we have hitherto taken.

No exertion is to be spared on our part to preserve external peace, and to restore and preserve internal tranquillity, by good offices, by friendly counsel, by forcible representation and remonstrance. But no case can be foreseen, or, I think, can arise, in which we should be justified in incurring, either as between Russia and the Porte, or as between the Porte and its Greek subjects, the risk of hostilities on the responsibility of a guarantee.

I am, my Lord Duke, with great truth and respect,
your Grace's most obedient humble servant,
GEORGE CANNING.

To the King. [435.]

London, 18th Dec., 1824.

I have received your Majesty's commands, and I don't lose a moment in writing to your Majesty. The question in the Cabinet was on the word *previous* in your Majesty's answer, as applicable to the mode of execution of the measure in question.

Lord Liverpool said that in the conversation with which your Majesty had honoured him the subject had been discussed, and that his Lordship imagined that your Majesty had not intended that the question should be discussed with the Allies previous to its execution. I said that your Majesty had not discussed that point with me; and that I thought that your Majesty would be satisfied if the mode adopted upon the former occasion at Verona were adhered to as far as was possible.

Upon that occasion the instructions drawn by Lord Londonderry stated that the line to be taken by this country was to be considered independent of any discussion with the Allies, but that they were to be informed. They were informed accordingly.

Upon this occasion the measure is to conclude a treaty of commerce, for which instructions are to be sent to your Majesty's agents in Mexico and Colombia; but the treaty will not, in fact, be concluded till it will be ratified by your Majesty in London. The Allies will be informed according to the mode of proceeding proposed as soon as they could be consistently with the principle of preserving the independence of this country on this question; which has always been considered important.

It was at my desire that the last paragraph of the letter was inserted; in order that your Majesty might be satisfied that the mode proposed of carrying into execution your Majesty's com-

mands was consistent with former practice; and it was thought more respectful to state to your Majesty in what manner it was intended to carry those commands into execution, than to trouble your Majesty with a question upon the subject.

Indeed, to do Mr. Canning justice, I must say that in the original draft of the Minute laid before your Majesty there was a proposition that the measure should be communicated to your Majesty's Allies, and it was struck out at the desire of Lord Westmorland principally, who was anxious to keep the measure secret as long as possible.

I can assure your Majesty that your Majesty's answer was received as your Majesty could wish it should; and I think your Majesty might approve of Lord Liverpool's answer to your Majesty.

All of which is submitted by your Majesty's most devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

[436.] *To Lord Beresford.*

MY DEAR BERESFORD, London, 18th Dec, 1824.

You mentioned to me some time ago your wish to go to India as Commander-in-Chief, and I should be very much obliged to you if you will let me know if you still have that wish. If you should still have it, and it should be possible to gratify it, I would wish you to tell me how soon you would be able to sail.

I put these questions from myself, and without any authority from anybody, and only that I may be prepared to take advantage of an opening for your appointment to the command in India, if there should be a prospect of one.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[437.] *To Sir Herbert Taylor.*

MY DEAR GENERAL, Sudbourn, 20th Dec., 1824.

I return your Memorandum on the sale of half-pay commissions. That part applicable to those put upon half-pay by the usual course of service, or who may have purchased a half-pay commission, which is, in fact, the same thing, appears very just and proper.

I doubt the expediency of allowing an officer to sell his half-pay, even for the reduced price, who has taken the difference, or him who has been put on half-pay in consequence of his conduct. The latter certainly can never be called to serve again; nor, indeed, can the former without paying a sum of money to get on full pay. That which each of these classes has, then, is an annuity for the life of the individual, and, in my opinion, he ought not to be allowed to sell it for more than the value of such annuity, and that only to the public.

But there must be a very important supplement to this regulation or it will do more harm than good, and that relates to the purchasers of these half-pay commissions. They should invariably be officers on full pay, and no officer should be allowed to purchase two steps on half-pay without having served in the intermediate time* years on full pay. Excuse these observations, and

Believe me ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Sir Herbert Taylor. [438.]

MY DEAR GENERAL, Sudbourn, 20th Dec., 1824.

I did not receive your letter of the 17th till it was so late on the 18th that I could not answer it, and I came down here yesterday.

I think your plan is now likely to meet with general concurrence, and to be adopted. I must say that I am very much in favour of adopting every possible measure to render the army efficient at the smallest expense. It is not expense, it is not Staff employments, which render the army respectable; but it is service, and we can have no service if the army should be so expensive in its ordinary establishments as to put its employment out of the question.

It is with reluctance, therefore, that I propose to you an amendment which goes to an immediate augmentation of expense, and that is to recruit immediately for the whole number of your depôt companies. First, by taking the veterans, you will deprive yourself immediately of 3500 serviceable men in Ireland. Secondly. I do think that there is nothing harder

* Blank in manuscript.

and more unjust towards the veterans than to call for their services, and send them back to their houses upon all these sudden calls in time of peace. They are now in general employed in some country work or other; they would lose that employment upon going to serve, and upon returning to their homes they would not get it again. No other class of his Majesty's subjects is so ill treated; and *we* ought not to propose such a measure.

Besides, the difference of expense is trifling, and you will have the advantage of keeping in an organized state your 3500 men till your measure shall be complete. They might then be sent to their homes.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[439.] *To the Rev. Dr. Curtis.*

DEAR SIR, Sudbourn, 21st Dec., 1824.

I have received your letter of the 6th instant, and I really do not understand what you can mean by supposing that I employed a person to answer a former letter of yours anonymously. To write, or cause to be written, an anonymous letter, is understood by gentlemen to be the dirtiest trick of which a person in that class can be guilty. I hope you know enough of me to be convinced that I am incapable of committing an act of that description in any case. But really in this case it would have been useless, as if I had thought proper to carry further with you the discussion respecting Mr. McClintock and his school, I could have felt no delicacy about writing to you whatever I might think proper, as you have to me. But having heard that this subject, among others, had been referred to the Commission on Schools in Ireland, I did not think it necessary to continue the correspondence.

I must likewise take this opportunity of doing justice to others who might be supposed to have seen your letter, by declaring to you positively that your letter of the 29th September never was out of my box, nor has it been seen by anybody till this day. I recommend you, therefore, to look in some other quarter for the anonymous letter-writer.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel. [440.]

MY DEAR PEEL, King's Lodge, Windsor, 26th Dec., 1824.

I came here yesterday, and the King asked me at dinner whether I had seen the despatch from Lord Wellesley referring to the prosecution of Mr. O'Connell. I told him that I had not, but that I had observed in the newspapers that he was bound over to appear at the Sessions for seditious language. The King said that he did not see how Mr. O'Connell could be prosecuted for this language, considering the line the government were about to take respecting these South American colonies. I told his Majesty that I had not considered the subject in that view; and a few minutes afterwards I told the King that his government had never intended to pronounce any opinion upon the title of Bolivar, or upon the mode by which it had been acquired. The King answered, that may be; but it is an inconsistency to prosecute and punish Mr. O'Connell for holding up the insurrection of the people of South America and the conduct of Bolivar to the imitation of the people of Ireland, at the very moment at which we are going to make a treaty with Bolivar, by which his authority will be recognised, and, in fact, established.

The answer to this statement can be found; but not without splitting hairs, which, for a great country like this, and in great questions, is the worst of all systems. I confess that this unexpected view of O'Connell's case has only tended to confirm all my objections to our unfortunate decisions on these colonies; but I don't mention the subject in order to renew these discussions, but to apprize you that you will probably hear from the King upon this subject, and that you may be prepared with an answer.

I am to see him this morning before I go, and if anything further of importance should be said I will let you know it by adding a line to this letter.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The King told me yesterday that he considered his answers to the Cabinet Ministers of July and last week as his solemn protests against the measures of his servants.

I have seen the King, who is very anxious that O'Connell

should be prosecuted. But his Majesty is determined to write to you to point out the inconsistency of trying O'Connell, and at the same time making a treaty with Bolivar.

I told him that his servants would point out to him that nothing he was about to do would tend to approve or encourage the conduct of Bolivar. But he would not hear of my answer, and said we ought to be in earnest in the prosecution or not prosecute at all; and that we could not prosecute O'Connell if we intended to countenance Bolivar in any manner. We shall have some difficulty with this question yet.

[441.] *To Lord Bathurst.*

Royal Lodge, Windsor,
26th Dec., 1824.

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST,

The Duke of York has given me to peruse your letter to him of the 22nd December, and his Royal Highness's answer, and I trouble you with a few observations upon the subject.

It appears to me that we are all nearly of the same opinion. You don't object to an augmentation of ten or twelve thousand men, and the utmost his Royal Highness proposes is 14,288; but your objection is to the form of the proposition, which I confess I felt, and stated the same objections to Sir Herbert Taylor, and I understood from him that his Royal Highness intended to modify the form accordingly.

The history of his Royal Highness's sentiments upon this subject, however interesting to you and me and others who are to discuss it with him, cannot be so to the Cabinet in general; and many who might not think the ultimate proposition unreasonable would be startled, as you were, at the original one for raising 36,000 men. However, the plan is to raise 14,288 by a mode which will add no field officers, and only half the usual number of captains and subalterns. I say no field officers, because I put the Guards, in this view, out of the consideration.

In respect to the number of men to be raised, it cannot well be smaller. First. I would observe that the battalions for service cannot be reduced any further in strength. They must remain between 500 and 600 men. Then, secondly, the depôt companies, of which there will be four to each regiment, will form a sort of second battalion. They will serve in the garrisons in England, Ireland, the islands, and even Gibraltar. But they

must be of a certain strength in order to be of any service, even in the way of discipline, for the battalion of the regiment abroad; and they could not well be made of smaller strength than they will be.

Thirdly. The number of regiments to which these depôt companies should be added could not be diminished after the regiments serving in India should be shut out. The army must be formed upon an uniform plan, otherwise the government would be involved in perpetual difficulties, and every relief would become a matter of discussion.

But I trust I can show that 14,000 men are not more than we require at the present moment. I confess that I agree with his Royal Highness in not considering these demands as temporary. I know from experience that our military establishments are too low for the performance of the service required from them. In India, for instance, I considered twenty years ago the European and Native establishments necessary for that country in time of peace; and, as well as I recollect, I was the lowest of all those who considered the subject; yet I think I fixed them at 20,000 British infantry in the King's service. This estimate was founded on the territory then existing, and on a system of defence recommended to be adopted; neither of which now exist, nor would the latter possibly be applicable. But this is quite certain, that what does exist does require more British infantry than when I recommended 20,000 infantry twenty years ago.

I know very well likewise that your demands for the West Indies, for Ireland, for Gibraltar and the Mediterranean, and for North America, are not temporary. I know that every demand, even of a battalion to put an end to a riot in a colliery or a manufacturing town, much more for a reinforcement abroad, puts us to the most miserable shifts to comply with it; shifts which are not only disgraceful to a country like this, but injurious to the service, and expose the public service to risks.

But I look at this augmentation of 14,000 men in another view. There are 5000 men required for India, and 3500 to replace the veterans in Ireland, making in the whole 8500 men. Now, then, let us recollect one transaction of last year. We then raised six regiments, or 3600 men in round numbers, upon a review of our situation, particularly in the West Indies. Has that situation materially improved? Are we not certain of dis-

content, at least in that quarter, as long as the saints and the sinners in England choose to discuss the question of Negro Emancipation? But we must find the troops to answer that demand from our establishment, reduced since that augmentation by the difference between 5000 and 3600 men.

Then let us look at Ireland; and let the most sanguine amongst us of the preservation of peace in that country, say what his expectations are of the prospect of future tranquillity, whatever may be done with Catholic associations, emancipation, &c. &c.

I declare then that, considering the whole subject in a view to the wants of the service, to the permanence of those wants, to the small comparative cost of the plan, to its advantage to the service permanently, and to the impossibility of making the augmentation smaller without injury to the system, it appears to me absolutely impossible that this plan should not be adopted. It will really and effectually put you at your ease in peace when nothing else can, and will enable this country, by means of its local force, to take its proper station in case of war in a much shorter period of time than it could do by the adoption of any other; and all this by incurring an expense little greater than that of the pay of the private men.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[442.] *A S.A.S. le Prince de Metternich.*

MON CHER PRINCE, A Londres, ce 27me Déc., 1824.

J'ai toujours à accuser la réception de votre lettre du 28me Octobre; mais vous aurez cru que je n'ai pas manqué un moment de faire connaître à S.M. les bonnes raisons que vous aviez pour placer le Prince Esterhazy à Paris, et de persévérer dans cet arrangement malgré le désir très naturel de S.M. de le garder auprès de sa personne. S.M. a été satisfait de vos raisons. Il regrettera le Prince Paul; mais vous pouvez vous assurer que son successeur sera parfaitement bien reçu ici.

Envoyez-le nous bientôt. Il est à désirer qu'il puisse arriver à peu près au moment du départ du Prince.

Je sais que vous avez de bons correspondans ici, et je ne vous donne pas de nouvelles. Vous voyez que je n'avais pas tort

quand je vous ai assuré à Vérone, que si les troupes françaises entraient en Espagne, il serait diablement difficile de les en retirer. Les y voilà fixées, et le gouvernement a eu le tort envers nous et envers vous autres aussi, de ne pas faire nommer un temps quelconque pour les en faire sortir.

Nous avons fait la guerre pendant cinq ans avec Napoléon seulement pour l'indépendance de l'Espagne; et vous pouvez vous assurer que l'indépendance de ce pays et son état de possession nous sont aussi importantes au moment actuel qu'elles nous ont jamais été. Je ne dispute pas la nécessité de l'occupation par les troupes françaises, ni je ne désire pas qu'elle puisse cesser un moment plus tôt que ne convient au repos du pays. Mais dans les affaires de cette espèce il faut avoir égard aux opinions et à la situation des autres, et surtout de ses voisins; et ne pas choquer avec violence l'opinion publique dans un pays comme celui-ci.

Je vous l'ai toujours dit, mon cher Prince, vous êtes pour le moins aussi intéressé à la conservation de l'indépendance de l'Espagne que nous autres; et je vous prie d'y donner un peu de votre attention.

Croyez-moi toujours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Sir Herbert Taylor. [443.]

MY DEAR GENERAL, Stratfieldsaye, 27th Dec., 1824.

I return the papers on the defence of the country, which I have perused with great interest and attention.

I should be glad to have a copy of No. 2, which I see is lithographed. I wish to have an opportunity of examining all its details, which I have not yet had. There is nothing so necessary as to look forward to future wars, and to our early preparation for them. Our wars have always been long and ruinous in expense, because we were unable to prepare for the operations which must have brought them to a close, for years after they were commenced. But this system will no longer answer. We cannot venture upon any great augmentation of our debt, if we did we should find the payment of the interest impossible, together with the expense of our peace esta-

blishments. We must, therefore, first take great care to keep ourselves out of disputes if possible, and, above all, to keep our neighbours quiet; and next to put our resources for war on such a footing as that we may apply them hereafter at a much earlier period of the contest than we have ever done hitherto.

Among others, it is for this reason that I am so earnest for the adoption of the proposed system for the infantry of the army; and I quite agree with you that we ought in time of peace to regulate our local force in war so highly as to be able to avail ourselves of all our resources at the earliest possible period.

I confess that I am one of those who do not much apprehend invasion. I think steam navigation has in some degree altered that question to our disadvantage, particularly at the commencement of a contest, and in relation to a coup-de-main upon one or other of our naval arsenals. In this view of the subject I have the officers of engineers now employed in the consideration of a plan for the security of Sheerness, which I will afterwards apply to Portsmouth and Plymouth if I should find the government and Parliament disposed to adopt it. But I confess that I think a solid invasion of the country, with a view even to the plunder of the capital or of Woolwich, or even to take possession of, or to do more than bombard, one of our naval arsenals is out of the question.

It is not necessary to discuss this question, nor would I even hint to anybody that I entertained this opinion. I want to improve our local resources, because by these means I shall set at liberty those that are disposable, so as to be able at an earlier period of the supposed contest to bring it to a termination. But if I profess that to be my opinion I know I shall fail. I shall succeed if the object held out is the permanent security against invasion. I will not enter upon the details of the plan in No. 2 for the local force. I like it because it is founded on what exists, and it does not occasion an enormous expense which ought to be laid out elsewhere, and not at home where there is no danger. It tends to organize and prepare a great force without incurring the expense of calling it out till the moment at which it is wanted. I think that if these Constable Acts succeed in Ireland, a great deal may be done to enforce a ballot there, not for a force disposable for foreign service, because to form such a force in an island by compulsion is

inconsistent with every principle of government, but to form a force for local defence, including this part of the United Kingdom.

I will not trouble you further upon this subject at present.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The infantry of the army is composed of 110 battalions:—

Battalions of Guards	7
Battalions of the Line	103
	110

56 Depôts at home.
54 „ with the service companies either at home or abroad.

In India or on that establishment	20	of 10 companies each.
Ceylon, besides local corps	4	
Mauritius	3	
The Cape	3	
New South Wales	2	of 10 companies each.
„ on passage	1	of 6 „
Gibraltar	6	
Malta	5	
Ionian Islands	6	or 7.
Jamaica	5	
West Indies, besides local corps	8	
North America and Bermuda	10	
In England	13	
„ Ireland	19	
On passage	5	or 4
	110	Battalions.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Whitehall, 29th Dec., 1824.

I did not get your letter of the 26th December until last night near seven o'clock. I have received nothing from the King, and I am glad that I have not. I might have been puzzled to determine whether I should or should not make any communication to the Irish Government had the King written to me in terms similar to those which he made use of in speaking to you.

Probably I should not have made any. I do not feel the difficulty which the King suggests to the extent to which his Majesty feels it.

Goulburn says, that the words used by O'Connell were these: "If Parliament will not attend to the Roman Catholic claims, I hope that some Bolivar will arise to vindicate their rights." I wish they may be able to prove that these were the words. If they were, can there be a doubt that they were seditious?

The meaning is, I hope the people will rise in arms against their lawful Government.

Now I do not think (if this be the meaning) that it is a matter of great consequence who is proposed by this speaker to be the leader of the revolt. Suppose he had said Washington or Cromwell, nay, if he had said Wellington, would that circumstance have lessened the evil intention or dangerous effect of the speech?

It is prosecuted for its seditious tendency, and supposing the prosecution to succeed, and O'Connell to be convicted, it appears to me that the British Government may, without any additional embarrassment from that cause, form a Treaty with Colombia and act towards it, as they before intended to act.

Nothing would be more fatal policy than to abandon the prosecution, on the ground that O'Connell had appealed to Bolivar's example, that the British Government was about to recognise the independence of the country for which Bolivar had fought, and therefore that it is quite safe to hold up Bolivar's example in Ireland.

Supposing the Treaty to be formed with Colombia, suppose Bolivar to be the head of the Government of Colombia, and actually recognised as such by England, and suppose a year hence that Mr. Hunt or Mr. Cobbett should make a speech in Spa fields, and declare that if Parliament does not repeal the Corn Laws, they will act the part of Bolivar and vindicate the rights of the people, would it be any answer to a prosecution for sedition, that Bolivar had been recognised by England?

It seems to me that it would be none whatever. I will send you Goulburn's and Lord Wellesley's private letters on the subject of the prosecution, and my answers, as soon as I get them back from Lord Liverpool.

Ever, my dear Duke, most truly yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

Without shewing your letter, I thought it right to tell Canning that the King felt additional difficulty as to the recognition of Colombia, from the circumstance of the Irish prosecution. He said, that he had this morning received from the King the draft of the communication to the Allies respecting South America, and that it was returned approved.

[444.] *To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

MY DEAR PEEL, Apethorpe, 30th Dec., 1824.

I have two letters from you; one of the 28th, the other of the 29th.

It is certainly desirable that the new Commander-in-Chief

should arrive in India about the month of May or June, in order to superintend his preparations for the next campaign, which will commence in November or December next. But that is I am afraid now impossible, as Lord Beresford has declined the command, and I think it probable that Lord Hill, whose inclinations have been sounded, will do the same. If he should decline, or should be unable to go away for two or three months, which is quite certain even if he should accept, I don't see why Lord Combermere should not have the command in India after remaining in Ireland for the three or four months longer, which it may be desirable that he should remain, as we are in that happy state in Ireland that it depends upon the prudence and discretion of the leaders of the Roman Catholic Association whether we shall have a rebellion there or not within the next six months.

In respect to your other letter, I wrote to you to tell you what was passing in the King's mind, to prepare you for a communication from his Majesty, and that you might have time to communicate with Lord Liverpool if you should have seen any difficulty in the case. I confess that I see more than you do. Mr. O'Connell is charged with sedition, by exciting the people of Ireland to rebel, after the example of those of Colombia, and holding out hopes of their finding a Bolivar. The King says you must prosecute this man in earnest. If you hold that the people of Colombia have been guilty of no crime, and that Bolivar is a hero and no rebel, then you ought not to prosecute O'Connell. If the contrary, then you ought not to make any arrangement with that country which shall involve his Majesty in a recognition of that State beyond what is necessary.

The whole question is then open again. The reference to the example of Cromwell or Washington will not hold in this view of the case. Cromwell and Washington were equally with Bolivar rebels, and the reference to them as examples by O'Connell would have been equally seditious. But their cases are now matters of history, and the other part is wanting to the case, that we are going to bring the rebel Bolivar and the rebel state of Colombia into diplomatic relation with his Majesty, at the very moment in which we prosecute Mr. O'Connell for holding them up as examples to the people of Ireland.

This is what the King calls two half-measures; and I say we cannot get out of the difficulty excepting by an explanation of

what we mean very nicely worded, which in my opinion is not right.

However, *Liberavi animam meam*, we know what the King thinks, or rather thought, when I saw him last Sunday; and I shall be satisfied with what you may determine to do.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Rev. Dr. Curtis to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My Lord Duke, Drogheda, 30th Dec., 1824.

I have been honoured with your Grace's letters of the 21st and 22nd insts., and feel exceedingly happy in the kind assurance they afford me, not only that your Grace had not ordered the anonymous letter (I had complained of) to be addressed to me, which I neither did, nor could suspect, but also, of your being an entire stranger to that matter altogether, that gave me so much unmerited pain and no small trouble to its officious author; who is not more firmly and conscientiously attached to Government, than I am, from principle, as I deem it my bounden duty, to contribute, by every means in my power, to make it duly respected and obeyed, by all those directly or indirectly under my care, who are all well aware of my sentiments, and that I do not acknowledge, as belonging to my flock, but absolutely disown, such as attempt to resist the existing laws, or otherwise disturb the peace and good order of society, by word or work, whatever cause, or specious pretext, they may allege. And, I thank God, my endeavours have had the desired effect on the great multitude, though some few occasional exceptions do still unfortunately occur, arising chiefly from the excessive use of spirituous liquors, a fatal propensity but too common and deeply radicated in this country.

Your Grace insinuates, that I should employ my authority to discredit and put down, the prophecies of Pastorini, among those who believe them. Indeed, my Lord Duke, I have repeatedly done so, as well as my confreres, and even published pastoral instructions, for that and similar effects, and shall again enforce the same. But it is chiefly in the course of our ecclesiastical visitations, that such things can be most effectually done, among the clergy, and laity, as some of the latter are too apt to suspect, that our instructions, if printed and published (on any other than spiritual affairs) are given in consequence of orders from Government. This consideration often obliges us to address them in a more private manner, that, we find, to be more efficacious, and better received. But we have convinced all classes, that Pastorini's prophecies, are abusively so called, not even by their wretched author, but by the vulgar alone; that they deserve no such name, have no sort of connexion with religion, and are but so many vague and ideal guesses, or vain conjectures, formed on some obscure passages of the Apocalypse, that have long engaged restless spirits, and flighty imaginations, of all sects, to lose their centre of gravity, in abortive attempts at interpretation; nay, even Sir Isaac Newton, with all

his philosophical ballast, could not resist the temptation, but rendered himself as completely ridiculous, as others had before, and have since done. But the visionary stuff in question, how contemptible soever, only speaks of what may happen, but does not insinuate, that it will, or ought to be, effected or accelerated, by any insurrection, or other criminal means.

Hence, I was exceedingly shocked, and moved to compassion, on finding that some protestant families, and orangemen particularly, of this town, and its vicinity, were, or pretended to be, labouring under the apprehension that they were to be massacred, in their houses, on Christmas day last, or on the preceding night. I made every possible enquiry, without delay, but could discover no sort of grounds for such a report, nor the least vestige of anything, that could have given rise to it. I then, to calm their fears, offered to take upon myself the responsibility of their safety, at the expense of my own life to go, and send some of my clergy to remain in the houses considered most exposed, and to get the chief Catholic inhabitants to rally round and protect all their Protestant brethren; their fears then vanished, nothing that had been offered was deemed necessary, and I have never known this town to enjoy more perfect tranquillity. But I am apprehensive the horrid report was industriously spread by designing people, in order to excite their party to a reaction, or rather, to anticipate on their supposed enemies, the massacre they pretended to fear from them. If that has really been the case, I hope it will serve, at least, to render them more cautious in future.

I did not mean to request, as your Grace seems to have understood me, that my letters should not be communicated, to such as you may think proper, if deserving of any attention. I wished, on the contrary, they should be transmitted whenever your Grace might think them at all useful to your illustrious brother at the head of the Irish Government, who may require to be made acquainted, even from lowly quarters, with the real sentiments of the community at large, and of every order in it. If nothing else worthy of notice should be found in my letters, they will, at least, always contain sincerity and truth.

I have no doubt the arrest of Mr. O'Connell will be a salutary measure, for himself, and the Catholic Association, as it will afford the Attorney General a seasonable opportunity of explaining, on the trial, whatever he thinks most objectionable in both; which cannot fail of correcting the harshness, and intemperance, that I observed with great pain in some of their speeches, that, while applauded for their eloquence, were generally disapproved, and by none more loudly than by myself, who have often upbraided them on that score, and deprecated such a vain and petulant display.

Cordially wishing your Grace the compliments of the season, with many happy years, I have the honour to remain,

My Lord Duke, your faithful and obedient servant,

P. CURTIS, A.B.

[445] *To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

MY DEAR PEEL, Apethorpe, 31st Dec., 1824.

I return Lord Wellesley's and Mr. Goulburn's letters, for which I am much obliged to you. I have shown them to Lord Westmorland.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[446.] *To the King.*

[Not presented.]

London, January, 1825.

Since the year 1814, even before I became one of your Majesty's servants, I had the misfortune of differing in opinion from my colleagues upon the subject of the Spanish Colonies in America. I then thought that they ought to have taken earlier measures to prevent the interference of your Majesty's subjects in the wars in America; and I confess that no step has been since adopted even to the last of which I did not disapprove.

I will not trouble your Majesty with the grounds of my objections, as the measures being irrevocably decided by your Majesty's consent to them, and by the steps taken in consequence, I hope that the occasion for difference has passed by.

But I never considered any of the measures of the government upon this subject inconsistent with the treaties and engagements between your Majesty and your Allies. Nor, in fact, were they so considered by your Majesty's Allies themselves.

When employed as your Majesty's Plenipotentiary at Verona, I had more than one occasion of discussing those measures with your Majesty's Allies and their ministers; and although all lamented the separation of your Majesty's policy upon this subject from that of your Allies, there was no complaint of breach of treaty either in fact or in principle; nor is there, I believe, on record any complaint of such breach.

Your Majesty's policy upon this subject was the natural consequence of some circumstances which had occurred during the war; and of the usual and natural pursuits of your people. Your Majesty has relations with that part of the world which none of the Allies could have. Your Majesty's subjects had,

by their industry, their capital, and their enterprize, and by the events of the war between Spain and her colonies, established interests in those countries which did not belong to the people of any other country; and it was not reasonable to expect from your Majesty that your Majesty should relinquish those relations, and entirely abandon the interests of your subjects, because it suited your Majesty's Allies, who had certainly but a remote interest in the subject, to follow another course.

Upon the other and principal question upon which your Majesty has desired to have the opinion of your Majesty's servants I beg leave to submit the opinion which I have always entertained, that the alliance of your Majesty with the great military Powers of the Continent and with France afforded the best means which the circumstances of the times would admit to preserve the peace of Europe.

Your Majesty's Government have found it necessary upon two occasions to separate your Majesty from the councils of your Allies; first at the Congress of Troppau and Laybach; and secondly at the Congress of Verona.

But these separations were no breach of treaty, or departure even from the principles of the Alliance. In truth, the Allies upon both occasions extended the principle of the treaties farther than the letter or spirit of your Majesty's engagements would warrant; and measures were adopted upon both occasions unnecessary in the opinion of your Majesty's Government, and inconsistent with the policy and interests of the British Government at all times.

There is another instance of separation in the joint mediation of all the Allies proposed between Spain and her colonies. But recent experience had shown that no benefit could result from such joint mediation; and as, in fact, no mediation on the part of the other Allied Courts has since taken place, it is quite obvious that the proposed mediation was intended to be founded upon the exclusive separate influence which your Majesty possessed in this question; which influence would have been gratuitously and unnecessarily placed at the disposition of your Majesty's Allies.

But the separation of your Majesty upon these occasions from the policy adopted or recommended by your Allies, and the existing separation of your Majesty from the councils of

the Allies on the questions affecting Spain and Naples, do not affect your treaties and engagements, which are still binding upon all parties.

It must be admitted that the separation upon the occasions above referred to, however unavoidable, may have occasioned an uneasiness and coldness which I should wish to see removed; as I am convinced that the best security for the permanence of the general tranquillity is the continuance of the Alliance of your Majesty with the three great military Powers of the Continent and with France.

It is unnecessary then that I should assure your Majesty of my earnest desire to maintain the existing treaties and engagements in their letter, spirit, and principle.

WELLINGTON.

[447.] MEMORANDUM TO THE CABINET.—RECOMMENDING THE INCREASE OF FORCE PROPOSED BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

1st January, 1825.

The demand for an increase of force may be considered in two points of view; first its amount; and next the mode of raising the force.

In respect to the amount I would remind the Cabinet that in the last session of Parliament an additional force of six regiments was added to the Infantry of the army; principally on account of the demands for force in the West Indies.

Since that period the East India Company have demanded an increase of force to the amount of five regiments. These five regiments are to be 5000 men, and the six regiments raised in the last session were about 3500. But leaving numbers for the present out of the question, and referring only to regiments, it is obvious that when the East India Company have twenty regiments of Infantry instead of fifteen, some additional measures must be taken for the relief of the troops in that country; more particularly as the mode in which that augmentation to the establishment in the East Indies has been made has been by detaining there both the relieving and the relieved troops. We may safely calculate then that this fresh demand from the East Indies has absorbed the whole of the military force resulting from the augmentation of last session

of Parliament. It has left the remainder of the empire with six regiments of recruits, instead of with six regiments of veterans.

Some may imagine that the want of troops in the East Indies will not be permanent. Above twenty years ago I was called upon among others to give an opinion upon a peace establishment for the East Indies; and as well as I can recollect I calculated twenty regiments of the King's Infantry to be necessary for the then existing state of territory, if a certain system of defence were adopted.

That system was not adopted; and is not probably now applicable; and the territory has since been vastly increased. I should think, therefore, that twenty regiments, or 20,000 infantry must be necessary at present.

At all events it is very obvious, from what is now passing in the East Indies, that we are always liable to have this demand renewed, even if it should now be stated only to be temporary; and if we cannot persuade the East India Company to look at their situation fairly, and to provide fairly for their wants, we ought to look at that of the public; and in forming our military establishment to make provision for these probably recurring demands for the East Indies.

It appears then that the augmentation of the infantry of the army which was made last year, principally with a view to supply the demands for additional force in the West Indies, has been absorbed by the demands for and retention of the force in the East Indies.

Has the necessity for additional force in the West Indies been diminished? Can any man hope that it will be diminished as long as the discussions continue in England upon Negro Emancipation? Admitting, which I do not, that there is no political or military danger to be apprehended in this part of the empire from the changes in progress in the Gulf of Mexico, and particularly from the probable conquest of, or revolution in Cuba, and from the state of the Black Empire in St. Domingo, it must be considered impossible for this government not to protect the lives and properties of the King's subjects in the West Indies, exposed as they are to the consequences of the daily excitation of the negro population.

Then in Ireland we have in prospect a rebellion; and unless we send the King's Guards from London, and adopt the most

miserable shifts to protect the Tower, and others of the King's naval and military arsenals, even in the way of police, we cannot send to Ireland 2500 men if a reinforcement should be called for.

Lord Bathurst tells us truly, we must look to put down this rebellion by the employment of the general force; and not by that of the yeomanry. I say that we must look to the employment of our whole force of all descriptions. We cannot afford to adopt half measures, or to have in Ireland only doubtful success, or even a protracted contest. We must get the better of this rebellion immediately, or we shall have the whole world in arms against us; whether secretly or otherwise will not much signify.

If there was no other ground for an augmentation of the infantry of the army, I should say that the state of Ireland was sufficient.

It must be observed likewise that this state is not likely to be temporary. The organisation of the Roman Catholic people exists; and let the Roman Catholic Association be put down to-morrow, the organisation will still exist in the hands of Mr. O'Connell and his associates.

Then we must not suppose that the year 1825 is the last year of danger. The priests begin now to discover that Pastorini's prophecy is folly and falsehood; and that its existence is announced by the Orangemen only to create alarm in Ireland, and to excite the English public against them. Archbishop Curtis has written this to me!

Then it is quite obvious that we must take care to have a garrison in Gibraltar sufficiently respectable to resist an attack by *coup de main*.

I leave out of the question the other parts, such as Canada, Malta, &c., all of them occupied by the smallest force that can be deemed capable of performing even the duties of police in time of peace; and I consider the force now absolutely required to be 3500 men to make good the augmentation of last session of Parliament; 3500 to replace the veterans still on duty in Ireland.

A force to be enabled still further to reinforce Ireland if necessary of not less than 5000 men; and to provide means to relieve or reinforce with facility other parts of the empire.

The augmentation proposed by his Royal Highness the Com-

mander is 14,800 men. This augmentation is unattended by the usual, much less by any extensive augmentation of officers. There will be no field-officers added to the regiments of the line; and only the officers of two companies.

The mode of augmentation is as follows:—Each regiment not stationed in India will be composed of a battalion of six companies for service; and five companies as a depôt.

The officers for the depôt companies will roll with the others; those of two of the depôt companies will now be taken from the battalion; and the battalion of 540 men will be divided into six companies instead of as hitherto into eight. The companies of the battalion are to be ninety men each.

The depôt companies are to be each sixty-five men, and the force under the command of a field officer of the regiment, 260 men. Many of the home duties may be performed by these depôts. I don't think that it would be possible to make this augmentation of a smaller number than that proposed.

The battalions for service cannot well be less than 540 men. It is obvious that a smaller number than 260 men in the depôt companies would scarcely form an organised body for even garrison service, or answer the purpose of disciplining recruits for the battalion for service; and on the other hand it would be impossible to add these depôt companies to some of the regiments and not to others, and thus to place the regiments of the line not serving in the East Indies upon establishments differing from each other. The consequence of such difference would be great difficulty and discussion for every relief or reinforcement required in any part of the world.

In case of the occurrence of war the system of organisation which will thus have been given to the army will prove of the utmost advantage.

The whole of the regular battalions of the line will become disposable immediately, and each, wherever situated, can be reinforced to any extent that may be deemed proper.

The depôt companies may be added to the regular battalions, or may be formed into second battalions, or any other arrangement may be adopted which may at the time be thought proper to bring forth the disposable resources of the country, and all at the least possible expense.

Upon the whole then, reviewing our wants either pressing upon us immediately or highly probable, and the advantages

resulting to the service permanently from this particular mode of augmentation, and its cheapness comparatively with any other, I strongly recommend it to the Cabinet.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Whitehall, 1st Jan., 1825.

Pray read these, and having shown them to Lord Westmorland, return them to me.

I think whatever difference there may be between us as to the effect of the prosecution of O'Connell upon the measure of treating with Colombia (and that there should be the slightest difference is to me a matter of the sincerest regret), you will agree with me in thinking that there is no alternative but to give the Irish government a decided support; and that it would be useless and unadvisable to disturb their minds by expressing any regret that they selected for prosecution the passage about Bolivar.

The step was actually taken when I heard anything of the matter; and I thought it but fair (before the issue could be known) to commit myself personally to the support of what was well intended at least.

Believe me ever, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

[448.] *To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

MY DEAR PEEL, Apethorpe, 2nd Jan., 1825.

I have received your letter and return the enclosures.

You are quite mistaken if you suppose that I think O'Connell ought not to be prosecuted. I think he ought and must be prosecuted. But I confess that I agree with the King that the moment to recognise the rebel Bolivar is not luckily chosen.

I have always been of the same opinion on this subject. Bolivar is now engaged in a rebellion in Peru; and at the moment at which we are going to prosecute Mr. O'Connell for exciting the people of Ireland to rebel, we have authorised our agent in Colombia to decide whether he will or not recognise Bolivar in the name of the King; and we are in this hurry, not from any cause appertaining to the case itself, but because we did not choose to take the measures which we ought to have taken to draw from France at first the explanation which the King of France has since given in his speech to the Legislature, of the nature of the French occupation of Spain.

We are all right in Ireland; but the mischief is that we are wrong elsewhere. All references to Washington and Cromwell are out of the question. But I am well convinced that if the late King, pressed as he was by war, had had in prospect a rebellion in Ireland when he recognised the United States, he would have hesitated a little more than he did.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Bath, 10th Jan., 1825.

I send you the despatches (received this morning) from Vienna, which contain the reports of the discussions with Prince Metternich upon the Greek question.

He is very angry, as was to be expected. The only *new* point in all that he states is one which, if it had been stated earlier, might have been well worth taking into account. It is this—that not only is Austria averse from the employment of *force* in the proposed intervention between Turks and Greeks (this we knew before); but *so* averse, that if the Conference at St. Petersburg were to show an inclination to determine upon employing force, Austria would *withdraw from the conference.*

Would it be worth while to ascertain whether Metternich would come to a positive agreement with us to this effect? If he would, undoubtedly such an agreement would in the first place probably effect its object; but at least it would save us from what was most to be dreaded and deprecated, the being reduced to protest and withdraw, as at Verona, *alone.*

It has struck both Lord Liverpool and me that this question is a matter for consideration. Pray let me know what you think of it. I doubt, however, whether Prince Metternich would venture to come to such an agreement.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [449.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, 13th Jan., 1825.

I return the papers in the box.

I can write on the Greek question only from recollection of the former papers, and I know nothing that has been passing since the Cabinet separated. It appears to me, however, that you cannot hope that Prince Metternich will bind himself by treaty to withdraw from the Conference in case it should be determined to proceed to hostilities.

Is this treaty secret or patent? If secret it is then intended only to bind the Austrian Government more firmly to its declaration not to consent to hostilities. The proposition implies a suspicion of a breach of promise on their part; in the justice of which Prince Metternich will not acquiesce. If the treaty is to be patent, the Prince will contend that the treaty will tend to deprive the Allies of all power and influence over the belligerents, equally with the declaration on the part of the five Powers of a determination not to enforce the mediation by arms.

Let us see how such a proposition will affect the other Allies. The Emperor of Russia's minister Count Lieven has stated, in answer to your question whether his Imperial Majesty intended to enforce the mediation by arms, that his Imperial Majesty would put himself entirely in the hands of the Allies in the Conference.

Count Lieven must have understood the decision of his Imperial Majesty's Allies after free deliberation in Conference; and not in consequence of a previous treaty between two of those Allies. His Imperial Majesty might then, in consequence of this treaty, think it proper to depart from the engagement entered into by Count Lieven's letter; and he would be justified in so doing. The other two Allies would certainly consider such a treaty inconsistent with the principles on which a Congress of five Powers could be called to deliberate on any question.

These are not the only objections to such a treaty.

You declined to enter into the Conference at present principally because both the belligerent parties had declared their determination not to allow of the mediation which was its proposed object and result. There were other reasons; but this was the principal one.

I don't think it would be advisable to relinquish that ground in a month after it had been stated, there having in the intermediate time been no change of circumstances, and to consent to enter into the Conferences only because the Emperor of Austria should have consented to bind himself by previous treaty to withdraw from them if it should be intended to proceed to hostilities.

I have always thought the strong ground for not entering into these Conferences was that the Russian mission was not re-established at Constantinople, and that till that is done the Russian Government is not on the same friendly footing as the other

Allies with the Porte. But as soon as the Russian mission is effectually re-established I do think it desirable that we should become parties to this Conference.

I have not always been of this opinion. But I have wished it since I saw Count Lieven's letter; and most particularly because it is quite obvious that the Porte cannot re-establish its authority in the Morea and the Islands.

It is desirable that we should not allow other Powers to establish a maritime power in the Mediterranean without our participation in the arrangement.

I believe that it is not impossible that these Conferences may lead to discussion between the Imperial Courts, of which it is very desirable that we should be on the spot to prevent the consequences. However we may dislike their intimacy, we should find their disputes much more dangerous.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Oxford, 16th Jan., 1825.

You partly misunderstood my meaning. I had no thought of a treaty, either secret or patent, with Austria. I should have been contented with an exchange of official notes: with the same security, in short, from Austria that she would withdraw with us if force should not be disclaimed that Count Lieven's letter (which you quote) gives us that Russia would, in the event of failure in mediation, be guided by the Allies.

Generally, my mind has been travelling in the same direction with yours. I cannot say, since that letter of Count Lieven's; but since Prince Metternich's declaration as to force. But the delay in the evacuation of Moldavia; and the possibility, so long as that measure continued in suspense, that some new difficulty might arise to prevent its accomplishment, seemed to render it inexpedient to hold out any hope of our relenting, as to the Conference. I agree with you in thinking that we must not relent too quickly; but I agree with you also in thinking that, though there are great advantages in being no party to the Conference, there are some disadvantages also. The advantages I rather believe we have obtained. And I should not now be disinclined to find a *proper* route for avoiding the disadvantages.

Do the last communications from Prince Metternich (which I desire Planta to send to you, if you have not yet seen them), appear to afford any opening? or are they to be implicitly believed?

I have returned no other answer to them yet, than that I will answer them by a messenger, before the end of this month.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, very sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[450.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR CANNING, Woburn Abbey, 18th Jan., 1825.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 16th. In my opinion you will not prevail upon Prince Metternich to express in an official note what he stated in conference to Sir Henry Wellesley and Mr. S. Canning. There would be the same objections as to a treaty.

I think there is some difference between the two cases of Russia and Austria. Russia has qualified rights of interference between Greeks of the Morea and Turks; which might be carried to the extent of war or menace of war; and it was a great point gained to have an engagement that the Emperor would do nothing excepting by the advice of his Allies.

The point on which we desire to have an official engagement on the part of Austria is referrible entirely to our own conduct, and the inconvenience which may or may not result from our finding ourselves under the necessity of withdrawing from the Conference alone. If Russia had remained unfettered it would have been of very little use to enter into the Conference at all. Austria remaining unfettered can be attended by no public inconvenience, excepting to those Powers which should think proper to act without your consent after your minister should have withdrawn from the Conference.

But is Austria unfettered? As well as I recollect Mr. S. Canning recites in his Memorandum of the Conferences, Prince Metternich's declaration of his instructions to withdraw from the Conference in case hostilities should be determined upon; and he communicated that Memorandum to Prince Metternich, and the Prince admitted its accuracy and truth. Surely then we have all that you can wish in the way of engagement on this subject. I don't think you can well propose to go farther. In my opinion you will be refused, and it would not look well afterwards to enter upon these Conferences.

The despatches in the box in some degree alter the state of the case. First the Turks appear not indisposed to attend to advice upon this Greek question. It is a remarkable circumstance that they have gone to the Internuncio upon this occasion, and not to the British minister; as they suspect us of *dabbling* in Greek politics. Secondly, they appear to be satisfied with the re-establishment of the Russian mission in the person of M. Minciacky.

They have acted more wisely than usual in giving as much splendour as possible to his reception. They suspect the truth, viz., that De la Ribeaupierre will never come; and they are determined to make the most of the minister they have got. In truth, the only object to the Turks in restoring the Russian mission at Constantinople is the effect it will produce in the Morea and the Islands, in convincing the Greeks that they cannot reckon upon Russian assistance.

But if we can rely upon what the Internuncio says respecting the disposition of the Turks to listen to advice, surely the ground is altered; and if it be true that the Turks are tolerably satisfied with the restoration of the Russian mission in the person of M. Minciacky, we ought not to dispute about the mode of carrying that measure into execution.

The great object is that we should see them satisfied upon that point before we move upon anything else.

I think then upon the whole that you may safely proceed another step in advance.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 21st Jan., 1825.

You will see by the accompanying despatches (which I was not able to send you sooner), that the "step in advance" towards the Greek Conference must be delayed till after I have received Lieven's angry communication.

I expect to receive it to-morrow.

I have very little doubt but that the Emperor's anger will pass away, after Stratford Canning's arrival; but I hear that his Imperial Majesty's mind has received a considerable shock from the various successive misfortunes of the last few months; the death of his daughter; of a favourite aide-de-camp; and lastly, the inundation; and that he is in a state of unusual irritability.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Stratfieldsaye, 23rd Jan., 1825.

I return the box which I received yesterday morning.

I think it unfortunate that you had not taken your line before

you should receive this Russian message; which is moderate enough in manner and expression, although the resolution itself is strong.

Count Lieven would be disposed to soften it as much as possible; but I don't think he can; as the harsh part of the communication is the resolution that we shall have nothing to say to any question between the Emperor and the Turks or the Greeks.

It is really very difficult to make any suggestion without first knowing what the policy of the government is to be on the whole question.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[452.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 27th Jan., 1825.

I return the box. I think it will be necessary that you should illustrate a little your refusal to send a minister to the Conference, founded as it was principally on the new event in the case, the refusal of the Greek Government to listen to the mediators.

The Russian ministers charge you first with having promised to send a minister to take part on certain conditions which they say they have fulfilled, and next, with having broken this promise, not on account of any alleged failure on their part, but because you received the letter in question from the Secretary of the Greek Government.

It will not be a complete answer to the Russian despatch to prove that they have misquoted your letters and despatches, and misstated the conditions on which you had promised to send a minister, and that they had not performed till lately those conditions; but it will be necessary that you should show that the refusal of both parties to listen to the mediation did afford a fair ground for you to decline to send a minister to the Conference.

It appears from the papers in the box that all the reasoning upon this subject is to be found in a despatch to Sir Henry Wellesley. But I think it should be carefully revised and inserted in this proposed letter.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The King to Lord Liverpool.

Carlton House, 27th Jan., 1825.

The King thinks it right to draw the attention of his Cabinet to the sentiments and opinions contained in the accompanying paper. The King therefore desires that Lord Liverpool will lay the paper before the Cabinet for the purposes required.

G. R.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Carlton House, 27th Jan., 1825.

The line of policy pursued by the King's government under the King's direction at the close of the late war, which terminated under such happy circumstances, was, unanimity of cooperation with the great Continental Powers, not only for the purpose of putting an end to the then existing hostilities, but for preserving the future tranquillity and peace of Europe.

The late Lord Londonderry, in conjunction with the Duke of Wellington, so effectually accomplished this great and desirable object, that this country took a position that she had never before held.

The King supposes it will not be denied, that the anarchy produced throughout the world by the French Revolution, has left us a record so instructive, that the councils of the British government should never fail to be regulated by the wholesome remembrance of that terrible event.

That we should, therefore, regard with the most anxious suspicion every attempt to revive the example of British America, which ended, unhappily for Great Britain, in a separation from the mother country. France *treacherously* assisted that rebellious successful enterprize, and by *her* fatal policy, gave the first impulse to that revolution which entailed for a quarter of a century such complicated misery on the whole of Europe.

The revolutionary spirit of passed years, although lulled and suspended, is by no means extinguished; and it would be wisdom to look to the ultimate consequences, which the result of our intended recognition of the independence of the South American provinces may probably produce on the evil and discontented, who are controled, even at this moment, with difficulty by the established power of regular governments.

Let us also look at home, and observe the dangerous attempts which the active firebrands of Ireland are at this time pursuing under the deceptive pretence of Catholic emancipation.

The rebellious and organised schemes, so actively afloat in that unhappy country, are only a part of the same system promoted by the same evil spirit, which gave rise to the calamities of the French Revolution.

The liberalism of late adopted by the King's government, appears to the King to be a substantial part of that creed, which was hailed in the House of Commons, in those revolutionary days, when it required all the talent and firmness of the late Mr. Pitt to put it down; and the support which that great statesman received from the King's revered and excellent father, gave him the opportunity of using his great ability with such effect, as enabled him successfully to resist the desolating storm.

The King has been long aware, that the principles promulgated by the King's early friends, were at that period the bane which threatened the destruction of our happy constitution, and with it our internal peace and happiness; and if the King withdrew himself from his early friends for the good of

the country, can the present government suppose that the King will permit any individuals to force upon him at this time a line of policy, of which he so entirely disapproves, and which is in direct opposition to those wise principles, that the King's government has for so many years supported, and uniformly acted upon.

The King would wish to ask Lord Liverpool whether he supposes the great abettors of this Spanish American question connected with the Opposition give their support to a recognition of the Spanish provinces, in relation to the great mercantile advantages which this measure may offer to this country, or, from their love of democracy, in opposition to a monarchical aristocracy.

The King has no difficulty in answering this question, and let the opportunity arise, the same line of conduct would be as promptly applied, by these gentlemen, to the emancipation of our own colonial possessions, or, to any other of the remote settlements, at present under the dominion of the British crown.

The King cannot but be aware that this, as well as every other kingdom, must have its own latent sources of wealth and power, peculiar to itself, the cultivation of which becomes essential to the maintenance of its individual prosperity; but the King desires to observe that the policy or wisdom, which is to balance the interest of kingdoms, is not to be found in party divisions.

The King has too much reason to apprehend that the separation from our Allies, so justly and so honestly referred to by the Emperor of Austria, will very soon lead to consequences that will end in disturbing the tranquillity of Europe.

Why was the Quadruple Alliance formed? To carry into execution, not only the maintenance of the treaties of peace connected with the settlement of Europe (just then concluded), but also for the purposes of controling the ambition and jealousies of the great Allied Powers themselves, in relation to each other.

The Jacobins of the world (now calling themselves the Liberals) saw the peace of Europe secured by this great measure, and have therefore never ceased to vilify the principle of the Quadruple Alliance.

The late policy of Great Britain has loosened these beneficial ties, by demonstrating a restless desire of self interest in direct opposition to those wise and comprehensive principles, in which the peace and general interests of Europe were bound together.

The King desires, therefore, distinctly to know from his Cabinet, individually (seriatim), whether the great principles of policy established by his government in the years, 1814, 1815, and 1818, *are, or are not, to be abandoned.*

The answer to this question will enable the King to satisfy himself of the steps necessary to be taken, for the purpose of preventing this country from being again involved in a ruinous and disastrous war.

G. R.

CABINET MINUTE in regard to an adherence to the principles of Policy laid down in 1814, 1815, and 1818.

Jan., 1825.

Lord Liverpool has, in obedience to your Majesty's commands, communicated to your Majesty's confidential servants the paper which your Majesty has transmitted to him for that purpose.

Your Majesty is graciously pleased to propose at the conclusion of this paper, the following question to your confidential servants, and to desire them to submit their opinions to your Majesty individually.

"Whether the great principles of policy established by your Majesty's government in the years 1814, 1815, and 1818, *are, or are not, to be abandoned.*"

Upon communicating freely with each other their respective individual opinions, your Majesty's servants have found so entire an agreement to subsist between them, as to the substance of the answer to be returned to your Majesty's question, that they humbly request your Majesty's permission to give that answer generally and collectively.

Your Majesty's servants think it their duty to remind your Majesty, that a divergence of opinion between your Majesty and your Allies, as to the nature of their engagements for the maintenance of the peace of Europe, began to appear even in the negotiations of 1815; and your Majesty's plenipotentiary upon that occasion declared to your Majesty's Allies, the extent to which alone your Majesty could be a party to such engagements.

This divergence became still more apparent in the Conferences at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818; and after several intermediate explanations, the Allied governments still persisting in their own interpretation of the principles of those treaties, and even in representing your Majesty as concurring in such interpretation, your Majesty found it necessary to proclaim to the world by the circular note of the late Lord Londonderry of the 19th of January, 1821, your Majesty's dissent from that interpretation.

Your Majesty's servants feel it to be their duty therefore to state that they fully recognise the principles of policy laid down in 1814, 1815, and 1818, in the sense given to them repeatedly by your Majesty's plenipotentiaries, and specially in the circular so issued by your Majesty's command in 1821, and in no other.

With respect to the future application of these principles, your Majesty's servants are deeply impressed with the obligation of preserving your Majesty's engagements in the sense in which they have been declared on the part of your Majesty, and with the advantages which may result from maintaining the system of confidence and reciprocal communication established with your Majesty's Allies at the periods to which your Majesty refers.

Your Majesty's servants having thus answered the question which your Majesty has been pleased to propose to them, must humbly request your Majesty's permission to advert to that part of your Majesty's paper which respects the New States of Spanish America.

It was not their wish to conceal from your Majesty that there existed amongst them some difference of opinion, as to the advice to be tendered to your Majesty upon this subject.

The decision of your Majesty's Cabinet was not submitted to your Majesty till after as long and as continued a deliberation as ever has been given to any great question of national policy.

Your Majesty's servants deeply regretted that your Majesty's feelings and sentiments appeared to be adverse to the opinion of a great majority of your cabinet, and nothing but an overruling sense of duty could have induced them, under such circumstances, to press their decision upon your Majesty.

Your Majesty was graciously pleased to consent that this decision should be acted upon, and it was by your Majesty's special directions that com-

munication was made to all the great powers of Europe of the decision adopted by your Majesty's government.

Whatever difference, or shades of difference of opinion, may have hitherto existed amongst your Majesty's servants on the subject of Spanish America, they humbly submit now to your Majesty their unanimous opinion that the measures in progress respecting Spanish America are in no way inconsistent with any engagement between your Majesty and your Allies; that those measures are now irrevocable, and that the faith and honour of the country are pledged to all their necessary consequences.

Your Majesty's servants cannot conclude without assuring your Majesty that in the advice which they have humbly submitted to your Majesty upon this, and upon all former occasions, the object nearest all their hearts has been to uphold your Majesty's honour and dignity, and to promote the interests and prosperity of your people.

The King to Lord Liverpool.

Carlton House, 30th Jan., 1825.

The King has received from Lord Liverpool the declaration of the Cabinet, in reply to the King's paper.

The King has only to observe that if an earnest desire of "*maintaining the system of confidence and reciprocal communication with the Allies*," be fully and faithfully acted upon, it is all that the King can require.

The King readily admits Lord Liverpool's statement, that the recognition, *at this time*, of the South American provinces was certainly in opposition to the King's own judgment; but, the King hopes, as the step has been taken, that it will prove a measure full of the beneficial results which are anticipated, by adding to the prosperity of this country without interfering with the general peace and tranquillity of Europe.

G. R.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 7th Feb., 1825.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will take the trouble to read over this draft (the first part of which you have already seen), and will make any observations that may occur to you upon it.

It is drawn as for a letter to Count Lieven. But upon talking with Count Lieven upon the matter yesterday, I found that he would be greatly relieved if I would address the answer to Count Nesselrode's despatch, either to Mr. Ward (Secretary of Embassy at St. Petersburg), or to Mr. Stratford Canning, to be communicated to Count Nesselrode; rather than to him Count Lieven, and I promised to do so. This will, of course, occasion some verbal changes, but nothing more.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [453.]

MEMORANDUM ON THE PROPOSED DRAFT OF A NOTE TO COUNT LIEVEN OF FEB., 1825.

To the sentence beginning "this favourable opinion," the words interlined on the other side added after "out of which"

[As containing the elements out of which *in the then existing state of the war and of the prospects of the Turks.*]

Towards the end of the paragraph commencing in the 4th sheet and continued in the 5th are the words *distrust and indignation.* Upon which the Duke enquires:

[Are these their expressions?]

On the following paragraph, commencing "That this opinion of the British government," he observes:

[I would omit this, excepting the fact in the last few words of the sentence, viz., that our opinion of the Memoir was not that of H. I. M.'s other Allies.]

On the paragraph in the 10th sheet, commencing "after so many explanations," the Duke says:

[I should think it desirable to insert here the reason for which the restoration of the diplomatic relations with the Porte was indispensable, viz., that the mediation was to be joint. The mediating Powers must, therefore, be on the same footing of friendly relation with the Porte. See sheet 16.]

On the 12th sheet, in the paragraph, commencing, "it was now too late, therefore"

[I would omit this.]

At the commencement of the 14th sheet, on the sentence concluding with the word "erroneous"

[See the note sheet 16; what is there proposed might be inserted here.]

On the second page of sheet 18, the sentence concluding "of a singular nature"

[Some other expression.]

The third page of the 19th sheet, on the sentence commencing "There is but one other argument"

[This might be urged in a milder tone.]

On the second page of 20th sheet, on the paragraph commencing, "It is quite obvious"

[Here is the argument which is sufficient.]

On the last paragraph of the 20th sheet, continued in the 21st and commencing "It is unnecessary"

[This last paragraph is quite unnecessary, and closes the door upon the whole subject.

The fact is, that the Emperor of Russia has a certain right of intervention in this question, which right he offers to forego if his Allies will co-operate with him; and he has promised to take no step which shall not be counselled by his Allies.

We are now excluded from this Council, and there may be many reasons which would render it desirable that we did not become parties to it hereafter. But, although it may be true that we have no right to interfere by force in a case between a Sovereign and his subjects, and will not countenance interference in such a case by other Powers, there is no occasion for saying so at present; and particularly not in an address to a Power which possesses a certain limited right of interference between the parties whose interests are under discussion. Nor is there any occasion for referring in a discussion on this case to the case of Verona. First, these Turkish questions are not cases of the Alliance; the Turks were not parties to the Treaties of Paris and of Vienna. Secondly, we might, by the King's engagements, to which only last week we declared our adherence, find ourselves under the necessity of becoming parties to a mediation, not between parties in a State, but between two States, of which the result should be a compulsion by force of the one to do justice to the other. I should think, then, that you cannot make use of the unqualified expressions in the text.

WELLINGTON.]

[154.] MEMORANDUM TO THE CABINET REGARDING THE PROPOSED AUGMENTATION.

Feb. 3rd, 1825.

I have perused the letter of his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief to the Earl Bathurst of the 2nd inst.

I have already stated it as my opinion that if these depôts of regiments are reduced too low they will answer none of the purposes, either of discipline or of service, expected from them. One hundred and ninety-seven men each is an establishment too low for any purpose. All the money expended upon this augmentation will then be thrown away.

On the other hand, to reduce the battalions on service lower

than 540 men each, in order to augment the depôts, will not answer.

It would be desirable that the government should revise their decision on this subject.

It is admitted on all hands that an effective augmentation of 7000 men is necessary, besides 2300 to make up for the deficiency of the battalions going to India, and 3200 instead of the veterans; making altogether 12,500 men. His Royal Highness has, in the close of this letter, proposed a plan for raising these 12,500 men; and it would be desirable to have an estimate formed of the immediate and permanent expense of this plan.

It is quite obvious that this plan, instead of remedying the defects of the organisation of the army, would tend to augment them; and to render more difficult the adoption in future of the plan of depôts proposed to remedy them.

The government have stated their consent to allow of a farther augmentation of 1000 men; that is to say, of 8000 instead of 7000, in consideration of the adoption of the plan of depôts.

I would beg leave to ask the question; Is that decision justice to the plan or to the public interests? Would it not be fair to call for an estimate of the comparative expense of the army, after augmentation, upon the plan of increasing the number of regiments, as proposed by his Royal Highness's letter; and upon the plan of depôts of the strength of 197 each? Would it not then be fair to augment these depôts still farther by the number of men of which the difference of expense in the modes of executing this augmentation would cover all the expense?

I have not by me the means of calculating the difference of expense of the two modes of augmentation. But I entertain no doubt that the saving would do more than pay the expense of the 1000 men allowed. If that be true, and if we can put the army upon a good footing at the same expense of money that we shall incur by augmenting it in the old mode, shall we do our duty by the public if we omit to adopt this new mode of making the augmentation only to avoid the clamour which will be raised against us on account of the numbers of the augmentation?

WELLINGTON.

[455.] *To Lord Melville.*

DEFENCES OF BERMUDAS.

London, 4th Feb., 1825.

These papers must be laid before Lord Melville, with this my opinion upon them.

First, I approve of the plans for the defence of the Harbour, pages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 of Major Blanchard's report.

Secondly, I approve of the plans for the improvement of the defence of the Navy, pages 5, 6, 7, 8, 9.

Lord Melville will see, pages 8, 9, that it is proposed by Major Blanchard that the Ropewalk should form part of this system of defence; and that the works of defence should form the enclosure of the Yard. On this ground he claims, pages 17 and 18, that the Naval Department should defray the expense. I don't think it signifies much which department defrays the expense. The Engineers should define the direction and profile of the walls which they require for their system of defence; and the Naval Department will see whether the walls as thus directed will answer their purpose of police and security; or the two departments might act in concert.

Thirdly, Major Blanchard proposes that the entrance by Castle Harbour should be destroyed, so as to admit only vessels drawing fourteen feet water. If destroyed at all, it should be destroyed effectually; and in that case the works on Fortified Island might be destroyed likewise. If left in a state practicable for vessels drawing fourteen feet water, it is my opinion that the works on Fortified Island ought to be kept up, pages 10 and 11. I beg Lord Melville will consider and decide whether this entrance can be and ought to be destroyed effectually.

Fourthly, Major Blanchard proposes that the magazine should be built in the Navy Yard; for which Lord Melville's consent is requested, page 12.

It will be absolutely necessary that the number of convicts at the Bermudas should be increased; or we shall not have the smallest chance of carrying on these works.

WELLINGTON.

Le Prince de Metternich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MON CHER DUC, Vienne, ce 9me Février, 1825.

J'ai reçu par le dernier courier du Prince Paul la lettre que vous avez bien voulu m'écrire le* Janvier. Je suis charmé que sa Majesté Bri-

* Blank in manuscript.

tannique ait bien voulu juger les raisons qui ont motivé le changement de fonctions de notre ambassadeur. Son successeur sera rendu à Londres au mois de Mai. Il saura mériter le suffrage du Roi, je n'en forme pas le doute.

Ce n'est pas quand les partis sont pris, que je me permettrai, mon cher Duc, de vous parler d'affaires qui ne présentent plus que des côtés affligeans, et ce qui pis est fort dangereux. Je le désire plus que je ne saurais le croire, que les décisions de votre Cabinet ne tournent pas à la ruine de l'Europe et de l'Angleterre. C'est un mauvais mariage à faire que celui avec le mal; il en naît de là bien mauvaise progéniture. Nous prononcerions notre arrêt de mort si nous nous livrions à pareille fantaisie: il nous faut donc séparer nos marches, malheur que je déplore déjà à lui seul.

Je ne partage pas vos inquiétudes sur la prépotence qui résulte pour la France de la prolongation de ses garnisonnemens au delà des Pyrénées. Si les conquêtes sont de mauvais moyens pour se faire aimer, les occupations militaires emportent le sentiment contraire. Je ne sache pas que de part et d'autre on puisse les aimer, et si les partis cèdent à la nécessité, ils le font toujours à leur corps défendant. Vous même admettez que la présence d'une force étrangère régulière est encore nécessaire en Espagne. Je vous réponds que le jour où elle aura fait place à un ordre de choses plus régulier, la France évacuera l'Espagne avec grand plaisir. Je désirerais ne point avoir un autre sujet de crainte pour l'avenir.

La reconnaissance des colonies Espagnoles est bien un autre moyen de subordonner la Péninsule à la prépotence de la Puissance voisine, que les 20 mille hommes qu'elle y maintient encore.

Il en va des orages politiques comme de ceux dans la nature physique. Ils passent. Malheureusement sont ils encore plus dévastateurs que les seconds. Le tems viendra, et j'espère que nous l'atteindrons encore tous les deux, où ce qui est erreur sera reconnu comme tel, et pourra être nommé par le nom qui lui convient. Si je n'avais cet espoir je tirerai la clef de la porte de mon cabinet, et j'irais la déposer entre les mains de l'Empereur. Le jour où je croirai ne plus pouvoir faire le bien, je serais si sûr de faire le mal, que ma conscience me forcerait de ne plus me mêler de rien.

Adieu, mon cher Duc. Conservez-moi souvenir et amitié, et mettez-moi aux pieds du Roi que j'aime, et que je vénère comme s'il était mon propre Souverain. Vous connaissez de même toute l'étendue de mon amitié pour vous.

METTERNICH.

To Sir Herbert Taylor. [456.]

OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSAL OF FORMING THE DEPÔTS INTO PROVISIONAL BATTALIONS.

London, 12th Feb., 1825.

The whole question of distribution is quite out of my line, and I venture to give an opinion upon it with much hesitation and reluctance.

I confess that I would keep the depôts of each regiment as a separate command, excepting in cases in which two or more of

them should be required to act together. I think that some advantages would attend their being separate, and some disadvantages be avoided.

The advantages would be these. First, I would try the experiment, upon a small scale, of having one officer to perform the duty of Adjutant and Quartermaster; and one noncommissioned to be Sergeant-Major and Quartermaster-Sergeant for each depôt; and likewise that of paying these depôts direct from the house of agency through the Captains of companies, instead of according to the existing system through Paymasters.

Secondly, according to this system the depôts would always be disposable at least for interior service.

Thirdly, there is a great advantage in home service, particularly in Ireland, in having the disposal of a large number of organised bodies of troops; and this is one of the great advantages of the system. This advantage would be diminished by the formal organisation of three or four of the depôts in provisional battalions.

Fourthly, the organisation of the depôts as separate corps would afford great facilities in subsequently forming them into second battalions.

In respect to the disadvantages to be avoided by keeping the depôts separate, it must be observed:

That these depôts, if formed permanently in provisional battalions, must necessarily be classed in battalions according to the foreign stations in which their service battalions are employed, and must be quartered in the home stations accordingly.

The relief of any of these service battalions by others from another foreign station, such as the relief of a battalion in the West Indies by one from Gibraltar, will occasion an immediate corresponding dislocation of the depôt of the relieving battalion; it must remove from one part of the country to another, and must come under the care and superintendence of a new Commanding Officer and Staff, and this whatever may be the inconvenience.

This inconvenience may have the effect of limiting the discrétion of the Commander-in-Chief respecting the reliefs; upon which he is now and ought to be entirely unfettered. If such be the effect, the arrangement will tend to localise the whole of the infantry of the line.

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [457.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 18th Feb., 1825.

I return the papers in the box. Those supposed to be written by Subserra and circulated in Portugal are very entertaining. I have no recollection of what passed before on the subject of this discussion between France and Prussia, and before I give an opinion I should like to look over the former papers with these.

It is true that the *Atlas National* was the map to which the negotiators of the Treaty referred. But if the decree to alter the boundaries of the Department of the Moselle was published, I should think that the Prussians, who are sharp enough in negotiation, ought to have known it, and ought to have taken care to draw the article accordingly.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I have not had an opportunity of wishing you joy upon Miss Canning's marriage, which I do most sincerely.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 19th Feb., 1825.

The accompanying draft is the subject of the Cabinet, which I have summoned for to-day.

The question which it involves is one of immense importance.

The dispute out of which it grows is one which is of five or six years' standing, but which unfortunately was not thoroughly considered and examined *upon principle* when it first broke out, but patched up from time to time by temporary agreements, in the hope that it might die away. Instead of that, these temporary agreements have emboldened the French to maintain, as matter of right, pretensions adverse to all received notions of maritime law; and the time is come at which we *must* speak decisively. There are now half-a-dozen of our boats seized, and their crews imprisoned at Granville.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

This business has given me more trouble than half the correspondence of my office.—G. C.

The Right Hon. Charles Wynn to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, East India Office, 21st Feb., 1825.

Enclosed is a copy of a letter from Sir S. Whittingham to the Horse Guards. Whatever the talent of his Commander-in-Chief towards *conciliation* may be, I do not think that it is shared by the Quartermaster-General.

I also send the last despatches from India, which show that they have at length obtained more accurate information as to the composition, equipment, and arms of what they call the Burmese army than they have hitherto possessed.

Everything which I read tends to prove the justice of the view of the subject taken by Sir Thomas Munro, but it also serves to account for the direction of the expedition to Rangoon, without waiting till the rains were over, as being the point to the loss of which the government of Ava would be most sensible, and which would most easily oblige them to recall their forces from the northern frontier.

The accounts of the wealth deposited in the great Pagoda will sharpen the zeal of the Rangoon force to reach Ummerapoora, before the expedition from Bengal can come up to share with them, and I can entertain little doubt that by this time the war is over.

I think that you and Arbuthnot will be obliged to undertake another prize commission.

Sir Archibald Campbell seems to be in luck in obtaining the appointment of Political Agent in addition to his military allowances.

I also send back the Oude papers, with Lord Hastings' account of the second loan, which is about as accurate as that of the first.

Believe me, my dear Duke,

ever most faithfully yours,

CH. WILLIAMS WYNN.

Mr. Woodham to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Winchester, 22nd Feb., 1825.

It being necessary that the certificate to entitle the winner of his Majesty's Plate at the Winchester Races should be signed by your Grace, as Lord Lieutenant of the county, the clerk of the course has requested me to transmit it to your Grace for that purpose. On your Grace's returning it I will deliver it to Mr. Dilley.

If it be the intention of his Majesty's government to call out the militia for training and exercise in the present year, it will be necessary to procure new lists, and to proceed to a ballot to fill up the vacancies in the militia of this county without loss of time. I shall therefore be much obliged to your Grace for any directions on this subject, as also to inform me when your Grace will be pleased to fix a general meeting of the Lieutenancy for the purpose of procuring the necessary orders.

I have the honour to remain, with the utmost deference and respect,

my Lord Duke,

your Grace's much obliged and very faithful humble servant,

T. WOODHAM.

Count Munster to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Grosvenor Place, 23rd Feb., 1825.

I have the honour of sending your Grace the Papal Bulla Circumscriptianis for the kingdom of Hanover, with the King's patent, expressing his Majesty's *consent* to this transaction, and his *command* to the *Catholic Roman Church* to obey this statute.

I request that this paper may be hereafter returned, as I have but this copy of it.

It is with the sincerest and highest esteem that I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,

your Grace's most humble and most obedient servant,

MUNSTER.

ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE KING OF HANOVER AND THE POPE.

LEO, &c. &c.

The care with which the Roman Pontiffs watch over the welfare of the Universal Catholic Church calls upon them to provide those things which may tend to the advantage of a faithful people, so that, regard being had to time and place, attention may be more readily given to the promotion of Divine worship, and the eternal salvation of souls. With this view the Pontiffs have constantly endeavoured that Pastors shall never be wanting to the Christian flock, to give them wholesome advice, and keep them in the right path.

This was the principle of our predecessor Pius VII. of revered memory, when, with that care with which his whole mind was occupied with the interests of religion (the very existence of which appeared to be endangered after the signal calamities of the late times), he gave his attention to provide in a fit manner for the episcopal sees throughout Germany; and equally turned his thoughts to the two churches remarkable for their antiquity and dignity—viz., Hildesheim and Osnaburgh, which trace their origin from the time of Charlemagne, and which now form part of the kingdom of Hanover.

Having therefore conferred with his excellent Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and also of Hanover, and Duke of Brunswick and Luneburgh, the revered Pontiff, with the advice also of some of our venerable brothers, the Cardinals of the holy Roman Church, considered it an object for deliberation, in so great a change of affairs, to take measures for preserving those two episcopal sees with their chapters, and for apportioning their revenues and dioceses.

And since we, although with unequal deserts, have been called by the Divine will to the Pontificate, it is our duty to give our strenuous endeavours that we should not appear less solicitous with respect to that part of the Catholic flock. We have perceived, indeed, that no slight relaxation has taken place from the strictness of the sacred canons; and that much is to be attributed to the state of the places, times, and persons, and other peculiar circumstances of that nature. But since it is, in the first place, necessary to follow the footsteps of our predecessors, and to bring to a conclusion those matters which Pius VII. was prevented by his decease from confirming with the Apostolic authority, we have deemed it requisite to reform the churches and chapters in the kingdom of Hanover, and to assign new limits to the

dioceses according to the plan which our revered predecessor was of opinion ought to be adopted.

Assuming, therefore, as expressed and as detailed, word for word, all those things which relate to the former rights, privileges, and prerogatives of the aforesaid churches and chapters; and supplying from the plenitude of the Apostolic authority, to the acknowledgment of all those matters which it may concern, by the previous suppression, extinction, and cessation of what nature soever, of the former state of those churches and chapters; we decree that henceforward the Chapter of the Cathedral Church of Hildesheim shall consist of the dignity of one deanery only, with six canonries, and four vicarships or prebendships.

The annual revenue of the Episcopal table shall be 4000 rix dollars (4 mille thalerorum monetæ conventionalis) as hereafter stated; a decent residence also, if there is none at present, shall be again (noviter) assigned for the bishop.

The Dean of the Cathedral Chapter shall have an annual revenue of 1500 rix dollars; the two senior Canons, 1400; the third and fourth Canon, 1000; the two last Canons, 800; and the four Vicars or Prebends, 400. The dean also, each of the canons, and the two first vicars shall have prebendal houses assigned for each.

To provide for this revenue the aforesaid King George engages within four years from the present date to assign to the bishop and chapter, according to the respective rank of the parties, so much land, actual possessions, tithes, and royal imposts as may provide for the aforesaid annual revenues, free from all deduction whatsoever; with this proviso, however, that they must be previously submitted for consideration by the undersigned Minister of the Apostolic Chair, in order that everything that is necessary for approval may be obtained.

In the mean time, however, and before the aforesaid assignment of lands, possessions, tithes, and imposts takes places, the said sums shall annually be paid from the royal treasury in money to the bishop and chapter.

With respect, however, to the Church of Osnaburgh, as present circumstances do not admit of the endowment of both churches, the new endowment of the Episcopal table, chapter, and seminary is suspended, until the requisite means can be supplied for that purpose, when the endowment shall be made in lands, possessions, tithes, and royal imposts. When that time shall arrive, the Bishop of Osnaburgh, in like manner with the Bishop of Hildesheim, shall have a revenue of 4000 rix dollars, to be provided in the same manner; the chapter and the number of vicars shall consist of the same number as at Hildesheim, with the same annual revenues to each individual. Such an annual sum shall also be paid to the Episcopal seminary, as may correspond with the necessities and convenience of the diocese.

As long, however, as the endowment of the see of Osnaburgh shall remain suspended, an augmentation of 2000 rix dollars, to be derived from ecclesiastical possessions in Osnaburgh, shall be paid to the Episcopal table at Hildesheim; to the dean also of the chapter of Hildesheim shall be assigned an augmentation of 300 dollars annually, from the same source; to be continued, however, only so long as the see of Osnaburgh shall remain unendowed.

And, in the mean time, that the diocese of Osnaburgh (to which, on account of the circumstances alluded to, a prelate cannot at present be appointed, may not be in want of a lawful government of its sacred affairs, we ordain that the Venerable Brother Charles de Gruben, Bishop of * , in the Protestant territories (Episcopus Parensis in partibus infidelium), and suffragan of the Church of Osnaburgh, may preside over the diocese during his life;

* Blank in manuscript.

and on his decease, that the Bishop of Hildesheim, for the time being, authority for that purpose being on every change specially given to him from the Apostolic See, may administer to the diocese and appoint his vicar-general for spiritual concerns, who is to reside in the city of Osnaburgh. Which vicar, provided that he shall be deemed a truly worthy and fit person, shall for this purpose be invested by the Roman Pontiff with the title of some Episcopal church in the Protestant territories, so that he may exercise and have power to exercise the Pontifical authority in the city itself and diocese of Osnaburgh. (Ut Pontificalia in ipsâ civitate et diocesi Osnabrugensi exercere potuit et valeat.) Wherefore to the said Vicar-General of Osnaburgh, for his own and for the endowment of the Episcopal court (curiæ), there shall be paid the annual sum of 3000 rix dollars, which has been promised by the munificence of his most excellent Majesty. This sum shall be paid as an annual stipend, proper and corresponding to the charge of the vicar-general, and for such ecclesiastics as may render him their assistance in it.

Whenever a vacancy shall occur at either of the aforesaid Episcopal seats, Hildesheim and Osnaburgh, both which shall for ever hereafter be rendered immediately subject to the Apostolic see, the chapter of that cathedral church shall, within a month from the day of the vacancy occurring, take care to inform the King's ministers of the names of the candidates selected from the clergy of the whole kingdom, every one of whom must have at least completed his thirtieth year; must be a native, (or have the rights of naturalization granted to him indigenatu præditus sit), have completed with credit his courses in theology and the canon law, have filled the office of a clergyman or that of professor in the seminaries in an exemplary manner, or have excelled in the conduct of ecclesiastical business; he must bear the best of reputations, be of sound doctrine, and of irreproachable morals. And if any of the candidates shall not be held in good estimation by the government, the chapter shall strike his name from the list; leaving, however, a sufficient number of candidates from whom to select a new bishop. The chapter shall then proceed to elect, according to the canons and the usual forms, a bishop from one of the remaining candidates; and shall transmit, within the space of one month, a document of the election, in the form authorised, to the high Pontiff.

The carrying into effect of the supposed process respecting the qualifications of those who are to be promoted to the government of the episcopal churches of the kingdom of Hanover, should be assigned either to the bishop of another see which is not vacant, or to some dignified ecclesiastical personage of that kingdom, named by the Roman Pontiff; and it shall be executed according to the form of instruction which will, in every instance, be transmitted from the Apostolic see. On the receipt of the document, if the Pontiff should find the proposed person to be possessed of those qualifications which the holy canons require, he shall, with a view to greater dispatch, confirm him by letters apostolic according to the regular forms.

If, however, the election should have been proceeded with in an uncanonical manner, or the person proposed should prove unqualified in the aforesaid respects, we grant as a matter of indulgence, out of our special favour, that the chapter may proceed to a new election according to the canon rule.

The new bishop shall be consecrated by another bishop of the kingdom, who has himself received consecration, and who has obtained the Apostolic authority to that effect; two other bishops shall also be applied to, to assist in the consecration, in defect of whom, two Pontifical prelates accustomed to such service shall assist; in defect of these also, two dignified presbyters shall be nominated out of the clergy of the kingdom.

No person shall be received into the chapter who is not qualified by being a native (or having letters of naturalization, qy. indigenatu) and by the

requisites laid down by the sacred canons; he must be at least thirty years of age, be in priest's orders, and have either performed the duty of a clergyman or some other ecclesiastical office with credit, or that of a professor at the college or seminary.

Whenever a vacancy shall occur of a deanery or canonry or vicarship in the cathedral, the bishop and chapter alternately, within six weeks from the falling of the vacancy, shall propose four candidates with the aforesaid qualifications. If any of the candidates shall be obnoxious to the government, or a suspected person, the circumstance must be communicated as soon as possible to the dean and chapter according as the case may be, that such person may be struck off. The bishop then, or the chapter respectively, shall proceed within four weeks to elect to the deanery, or canonry, or vicarage, one of the persons who are not obnoxious or suspected, on whom the bishop shall confer the canonical ordination.

In proceeding now to the new limitation of the dioceses of the bishopric of Hildesheim, which is now filled by the modern bishop the venerable brother Francis Egonea de Furstenburg, and of Osnaburg, which, deprived for many years of its pastor, has been administered to, with the apostolic permission, by the aforesaid Charles Bishop of * (Parensi), and suffragan of the church of Osnaburgh, we decree them to consist, as was settled by our predecessor Pius VII., with every previous dismembering, separation, and change, by the jurisdiction, power, and authority of whomsoever of the metropolitans, bishops, ordinaries, and vicars apostolic, of all and each of the cities, territories, and parishes comprehended within the limits of the kingdom of Hanover; so that the kingdom itself, separated as it is by the river Weser, may be divided into two dioceses, the parishes on the right bank being assigned to the diocese of Hildesheim; those on the left to the diocese of Osnaburgh, as follows, viz.:—

The diocese of Hildesheim shall consist of the following 55 parish churches which already appertain to it, viz., &c., &c., &c.; and moreover by 20 parishes and 13 chapels of ease, styled churches, situated in the territory of Eichsfeldt, and formerly subject to the ancient metropolitan church of * (Moguntinæ) or of Ratisbon, and which at present are administered to by the venerable brother Charles Frederick de Wendt, Bishop of * (Basinopolitans), in the Protestant territories, and suffragan of the church of Hildesheim, in lieu of the apostolic vicar, viz. the parishes of &c., &c., &c., and &c., &c., &c., which have hitherto been superintended by the aforesaid Bishop of Hildesheim, apostolic vicar of the northern missions (Missionum).

The diocese of Osnaburgh shall consist of the following deaneries, viz. of the deanery of the cathedral church and city of Osnaburgh, containing seven parishes, two of which are in the city itself and the rest in its territories. Their names are Bellin, &c., &c., &c. To these are added three parishes situated in East Friezland, now subject to the diocese and dependent in their temporal concerns upon the kingdom of Hanover, and which have hitherto been under the superintendence of the said bishop, namely, Bentheim, &c., &c., &c.

We assign moreover in perpetuity, and commit wholly to the spiritual government of the Bishops of Hildesheim and Osnaburgh respectively, according to their dioceses, the aforesaid deaneries, parishes, and places, with their inhabitants of both sexes, as well clergy as laity, to which end plenary writings shall immediately be executed. Every kind of jurisdiction of the ancient metropolitans, ordinaries, vicars apostolic, or administrators shall cease; and we decree that their local power in the parts withdrawn from their jurisdiction shall hereafter be of none effect.

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* Blank in manuscript.

For the convenience of the subjects of the respective bishops, we decree that all and each of the documents respecting the churches, and the places as above dismembered and assigned anew, shall be extracted from the records of their former ecclesiastical courts and incorporated with those of the new, to be kept there in a convenient form.

With respect now to the revenues (habitâ modo ratione reddituum of the episcopal table of Hildesheim, we ordain that it shall according to custom (de more) be taxed in 756 golden florins,* and that this tax shall be inscribed in the books of our apostolic chamber. With regard to the episcopal table of Osnaburgh, when the endowment before adverted to shall have taken place, we ordain that that church shall be taxed as is customary with 666 golden florins, and that the same shall be inscribed likewise in our books.

Lastly, in order that the aforesaid arrangements may be carried into effect, we appoint the before-named Francis Egonea Bishop of Hildesheim to be the apostolic executor of this decree. We invest him with every requisite authority for establishing in form the respective endowments, the new establishment of each church with its chapter, and the limits of their respective diocesan territories; and to enable the said Francis Egonea to fulfil this enactment in the places remote from his residence, we grant him permission to delegate a person or persons of, or hereafter to be invested with, ecclesiastical rank to act for him; and we protect such person from all opposition in the execution of such delegated charge, he performing his duty in a lawful manner.

Moreover we expressly enjoin the said Francis Egonea that within four months from the carrying into execution of this decree he transmit copies in the form authorised of the several acts performed by himself or deputies, which writings will be preserved as usual in the consistorial archives.

We declare that the present decrees their contents and ordinations shall for ever remain firm and valid, in contravention to all rights which any persons may have, or pretend to have, of whatsoever state, order, condition, and pre-eminence whatever, by whatever specific, express, and individual mention they may be distinguished. Whether also any of such persons should not have been called upon or heard on the subject of any detriment, or on any other judicial, privileged, or most privileged reason, cause, pretext, or clause, to what time soever they may relate. We pronounce them valid notwithstanding any defect of what magnitude soever, and not contemplated, that may occur with regard to the fulfilment of the solemnities heretofore laid down. We forbid these acts to be censured, impugned, or otherwise infringed, suspended, restrained, &c., &c.. &c. [Here follows a suite of repetitions which would be ludicrous in a translation.]

And we command that this decree shall be inviolably observed, and that assistance may be given to all whom it does or may hereafter concern, to the bishops, chapters, and others, and all others exercising any authority; that they may sustain no molestation, disturbance, or impediment, nor be called into a court of law to produce their proofs and verifications of anything relating thereto; and we pronounce null and void any act which may either wilfully or through ignorance be committed by any authority whatever in opposition to it.

Non obstantibus to ordinationibus. The following sentence connected with it:—

We will also that to the printed copies of these our letters, subscribed by some public notary, and bearing the seal of an ecclesiastical person of rank, the same credit may be paid which would be to the original if it were produced or shown.

Lastly, we forbid all men to infringe or with daring attempt to contravene this our act of suppression, extinction, annulment, dismembering, separation

* Florenis auri de Camerâ.

union, limitation, assignment, indulgence, subjection, supplement, declaration, deputation, commission, command, decree, derogation, and will. And if any person should presume to attempt this, he will incur the indignation of the omnipotent God and of the blessed Apostles Peter and Paul.

Given at Rome, at St. Mary the Great, in the year of our Lord's incarnation 1824, 1st April, in the first year of our Pontificate.

A. G. CARD.
I. CARD. ALBANUS.

Seen by the Court, DE TESTA.
Place of the seal. †

The King to Lord Liverpool.

King's Lodge, 25th Feb., 1825.

The King sends his very kind regards to Lord Liverpool, and is more distressed than can well be expressed at the absurd note which has been lately published in Germany relative to the Catholic Declaration, in reference to the *local circumstances of that country*. The King had no knowledge of such an intention, or it would *most certainly not have happened*.

The King desires that Lord Liverpool would send for Count Munster, that he may explain the details of this affair. The King is afraid that whatever inconvenience may arise from this late declaration has its origin in the line of policy and original stipulations entered into by our much-regretted friend poor Lord Londonderry, so long since, at the Congress held at Vienna. The King wishes, however, distinctly to state to Lord Liverpool that on the subject of Catholic Emancipation, the King's revered father's opinions are ever before him, and ever will be to the King's latest existence.

G. R.

Lord Liverpool to the King.

25th Feb., 1825.

Lord Liverpool presents his most humble duty to your Majesty, and begs to assure your Majesty that he never entertained the least doubt that the declaration relative to the Roman Catholics in the kingdom of Hanover had been issued either without any communication having been made to your Majesty, or that your Majesty's attention had never been called to it.

Lord Liverpool is quite aware that the principle adopted in this Declaration had in fact been settled at the Congress at Vienna, but it was certainly most unfortunate that such an official paper as that to which your Majesty refers should have been sent forth to the world at a moment when it might be subject to so much misapprehension in this country; more particularly as the object might have been rendered equally effectual without the necessity of any such formal declaration.

Lord Liverpool never supposed that this paper was connected with any alteration in your Majesty's sentiments as to the Roman Catholic question, in its relation to your Majesty's British dominions.

He will obey your Majesty's commands by desiring to see Count Munster upon the subject.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [458.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 28th Feb., 1825.

I enclose you a Memorandum on the frontier question between Prussia and France. I hope that you have recovered entirely.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM.

27th Feb., 1825.

It appears to me to be impossible for this government to act alone on the subject of the frontier between France and Prussia. The question must be considered in concert with the other Allies.

The spirit of the treaty, and the letter as well as spirit of the protocol of the * October, 1815, are clearly in favour of the Prussian claim.

The letter of the treaty gives the French government a ground for resisting it.

The treaty itself, being a completion of all the preceding acts, ought, perhaps, to be considered binding.

It must, however, be admitted that the maps of the *Atlas National* were the authority referred to in all these negotiations, as well at Paris in 1814 and 1815 as at Vienna; and that if no alteration had been made in the departmental division of the territory of France subsequent to the Treaty of 1814, there could have been no mistake in the terms of the treaty. But subsequently to the Treaty of 1814, that is, in October, 1814, those parts of the Department of La Sarre not ceded by the Treaty of 1814 were joined to the Department of La Moselle. This arrangement must, I should think, have been published at the time, and the Allies ought to have known of it; but the maps were not altered, and the difference between the then frontier of the Department of the Moselle, as fixed by law, and the ancient frontier of Germany was not adverted to.

It appears to me that the equitable claim is on the side of Prussia; the strictly legal one possibly on the side of France.

WELLINGTON.

* Blank in manuscript.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 3rd March, 1825.

I wish you would take the trouble to read the enclosed letter. It is from R. Marechal (at Rio de Janeiro) to M. Neumann. It is written in the full effusion of private confidence, and contains the writer's sincere opinions. No man—not any one—has had so good opportunity of forming just opinions upon the state of things in Brazil.

We see from this how hopeless it would be to press anything upon Brazil, or rather upon the P. R. or Emperor of Brazil, like a return to the ancient order of things.

The only chance of bringing the two countries together again is under a new reign; and that chance appears likely to be the better in proportion as the future reunion is less put forward in stipulation.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[459.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 3rd March, 1825.

I return the paper in the box. I am perfectly well acquainted with the writer. He was for three years at my head-quarters, and he is very capable of forming an opinion to be relied upon.

The more I reflect upon the subject, the more convinced I am that the proposal which I made in the Cabinet on the last day we met affords the best prospect of settlement. It is too late, and there is no use in endeavouring to retain any portion or even the appearance of the sovereignty over Brazil; and by far the most dignified proceeding will be for the King to review past transactions in a *Carta Regia*, and to approve and confirm what has taken place in relation to his son; reserving only his private property in the Brazils and securing to the son the succession to the throne of Portugal after the father's death. A Treaty of Commerce would have to be negotiated; and the Carta Regia might be delivered when the treaty should be ratified by Don Pedro.

If this or some other arrangement is not made, this appears to me to be the course which things will take. Don Pedro will force this country to a new Treaty of Commerce. He will then commence the war in earnest, will blockade Lisbon and Oporto, and probably attack some of the Portuguese colonies on the Coast of Africa or the Islands. Our guarantee would not oblige us to go to war in such case, particularly if Portugal

should have refused to follow our advice to avoid this course of hostilities. All that we should be bound to do is to see that the dominion of Portugal is entire at the termination of the hostilities. I think that if the Portuguese government were made to feel this state of things they would alter their proceedings.

I was sorry to see that you had been unwell again, but I hope you are better.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 3rd March, 1825.

I am much obliged to you for your note, and for your kind inquiries.

I was thrown sadly back by Tuesday, and was very unwell yesterday; but my complaint (which is *now* pure *gout*) appears to be on the wane to-day, and I am otherwise quite free from inconvenience.

I entirely adopt your principle as to the best way out of the difficulty with Portugal. My only doubt as to your view of the subject is as to the extent of our obligations to Portugal—SUPPOSING Brazil independent against the will of the mother country.

In that case I confess I think that Brazil being, as to Portugal, a FOREIGN power, Portugal would have a claim upon *us* for active defensive assistance.

Pray consider this point. I send you an abstract (which I have had made, and which I believe may be relied on) of all our engagements with Portugal.

I send you also a despatch to Mr. Chamberlain, in which I have laid down the doctrine, as I feel it. This will do no harm, in any event, as the only effect that it can have is to make Brazil more cautious.

I propose to have a Cabinet on Saturday or Sunday, for Sir C. Stuart's instructions. I will trouble you with these (so much as you have not seen of them) before.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [460.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 5th March, 1825.

I have never seen or considered the treaties with Portugal, and had taken a view only of our acts under them. I don't think we have treated Portugal very handsomely. I send you a Memorandum which contains my opinion upon them.

It is quite clear to me that we shall not be able to avoid to renew the Treaty of Commerce with the Brazils. This treaty will set up the Brazilian empire, and the *casus fœderis* with Portugal will then occur.

If the King of Portugal had not by his own acts separated Brazil from his dominion of Portugal, it would be doubtful whether we could even treat with Brazil. But I think we may consider that point as settled.

It comes then to be considered what we shall do after the Brazilian empire is established. If Portugal by her own act has brought the relations between the two countries to the state in which they are, and can neither attack Brazil nor defend her own possessions, she must follow our advice to get out of her difficulties, and must be left to her fate if our advice is not followed. At the same time your despatch to Mr. Chamberlain is well calculated to keep the Emperor of Brazil quiet and to induce him to refrain from hostilities, even though the King of Portugal should not recognise his title and make peace. I hope you continue better.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The restoration of Portuguese property captured or confiscated, or under sequestration, is a great object, and should be required in the Carta Regia.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM ON BRITISH RELATIONS WITH PORTUGAL.

The Treaty of the year 1661 appears to be the only one which applies to the circumstances which may probably exist between Portugal and Brazil.

The others of 1703 are applicable to an attack upon Portugal by Spain or France.

These last treaties have been hitherto acted upon very much in the manner of a guarantee of possession; and, indeed, the terms of the treaty do not bind Great Britain to send troops to Portugal; but to employ them in the common cause. We have not in latter times, at least since the year 1800, considered ourselves bound to protect Portugal from invasion, notwithstanding the engagement in the Treaty of 1793 *to make common cause* with Portugal should France attack the dominions of Portugal. If

the engagement had been considered of that description, probably the defence of Portugal would, in 1800 and 1801, have been preferred to the attack upon Egypt.

Portugal was at that time attacked by a combined French and Spanish army; and was forced to submit to ignominious terms of peace, which, by-the-bye, were in breach of our treaties, even considered only as guarantees.

Portugal was again invaded in 1807, and conquered. There was then no imperious necessity to prevent the sending assistance to Portugal.

Assistance was sent in the following year, 1808, but not in execution of a treaty. It was sent in furtherance of a plan for attacking the French in Spain.

The case of 1801 was peculiarly strong. Portugal was in a state of war with France at our requisition, and we had even successfully remonstrated against and prevented her making peace with France in the year 1797. Yet with the means in our power of assisting our ally we left him to his fate.

In 1807 Portugal was neutral. But it must be observed that we had consented to the neutrality of Portugal; and that the war which followed the peace of Amiens, however provoked by France, and justifiable on our parts, could not fairly be classed as one within the *casus fœderis* of 1703. When Portugal was aggressively attacked then in 1807, and we had the means of defending that kingdom, we ought to have defended it equally as in the case of the year 1801, if the meaning of the treaty was that we should make *common cause and defend*, at all risks and in preference to all other operations for the common good, rather than that we should guarantee possession.

But there is a great difference in the terms of these treaties and those of the Treaty of 1661. In the last-mentioned the engagement of the 15th Article is, that the King of Great Britain will take the interest of Portugal and all its dominions at heart, DEFENDING *the same with his utmost power by sea and land, even as England itself.* The particular services are then specified by sea and land in that and the 16th Article. By the 17th Article the King obliges himself to afford timely assistance of men and shipping in case Lisbon, Oporto, or any other sea-town should be besieged or blocked up by the Power of Castile *or any other enemy.* By the 18th Article the King engages that he will never make a peace with Castile which

may be the least impediment to him in his giving full and entire assistance to Portugal in order to its necessary *defence*. By the Secret Article of the Treaty the King engages *to defend and protect* all conquest or colonies belonging to the Crown of Portugal against all his enemies, as well future as present.

It is quite obvious that these engagements are much more pointed than those in the subsequent treaties; and it will be impossible to omit to attend to them in case the course of events should oblige this country to make a treaty with Don Pedro which will recognise the independent existence of the empire of the Brazils.

I should doubt, however, whether any nation can be bound by a defensive treaty in all times and under all circumstances. If a nation were to be considered as so bound, it would, in fact, place the questions of peace and war not in its own councils, but in those of its ally. It would not be difficult to make any case of war, one of aggression on the part of the adversary; and the ally would be under the necessity of following the fortune of the supposed defending Power.

Reason points out that in all these cases the ally ought to have the right to advise in the negotiations previous to the commencement of hostilities; and this appears particularly reasonable when, as in this case, the ally is in reality a protecting Power.

I think, then, that Portugal should be informed of the light in which the ancient treaties are considered in this country; and that we intend to act upon them in respect to Brazil, if the King of Portugal will follow our advice and take the measures which are necessary to put an end to the state of hostilities with the Brazils; but that if he should persevere in pretensions which he cannot enforce, and in carrying on hostilities which are founded upon civil dissensions in which we can have no concern, we must leave him to his fate.

I think Mr. Canning's despatch to Mr. Chamberlain is quite consistent with this mode of proceeding; and even if, according to this proceeding, we should fail in obtaining an arrangement of the questions between Portugal and the Brazils, we may eventually obtain an armistice between the parties without limitation of time.

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn. [461.]

MY DEAR WYNN, London, 7th March, 1825.

I enclose a list of General Officers fit to be employed in command in India.

I should say the two first are the best of all, and next Lord Edward. Brisbane has been employed in New South Wales, and has lately been removed from that situation, I believe on account of disputes with his Secretary. He is, however, a very respectable officer, and very fit for the situation. General Bradford commands in Scotland, and Power at Malta. They are both very good, but not so good as Brisbane. Lord Aylmer is very fit.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I doubt Fane's going.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Lieutenant-General Sir H. Fane.
„ Sir G. Walker.
Major-General Byng.
„ Brisbane.
„ Lord E. Somerset.
„ Bradford.
„ Lambert.
„ Power.
„ Lord Aylmer.

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*To the Right Hon. F. Robinson.** [462.]

MY DEAR ROBINSON, London, 14th March, 1825.

Lord FitzRoy has shown me your note regarding the Spaniards, upon which I have only to request you to recollect what passed at the different Cabinets. The first proposition was to go to Parliament for a vote, which was objected to by nearly every Minister of the Cabinet. It was then settled that the lists of the applicants should be made over to me; and that I should select from them those who had rendered any service to our army, diplomacy, or other transactions in any manner or at any

* Then Chancellor of the Exchequer—afterwards Earl of Ripon.

time. I did so, and made out a list in six classes: the highest to receive 25*s.* a week, the lowest 10*s.* a-week; and there remained many who were still supported by the Spanish Committee, aided, I believe, by the funds of the Foreign Office.

At last subscriptions failed altogether, and Mr. Canning found that he could not with safety have any communication with Mr. Smith; and the Lord-Mayor having corresponded with Peel upon the subject, the latter brought it again under the consideration of the Cabinet, I think at our meeting in December.

It was then determined not to discourage the meeting which the Lord-Mayor proposed to call together in the City, and to aid the subscription expected to be entered into at that meeting by a contribution of 4000*l.* or more, provided that those who should receive relief should have it only for a limited time, say two or three months; and should then be assisted by a sum of money to take them away. At the same meeting of the Cabinet you consented to add to the funds at my disposition a sum sufficient to enable me to increase that list to the amount of from twenty-five to thirty persons. I have, in consequence, increased my list to the amount of twenty-three persons. This is what has passed. I will now tell you where the error has been in the transaction.

When I was desired to make out the list of those to be provided for by government, it was intended that the funds of the Foreign Office which should be disposable should be applicable to this charity, (which it was then understood and stated to be), as well as what the Treasury should supply. Instead of confining them to this object, Mr. Canning, pestered to death—as, indeed, I was—by applications, allowed the funds of the Foreign Office to go in aid of the funds of the Spanish Committee. The consequences were, first that my list fell entirely upon the funds of the Treasury; and secondly, that Spaniards, finding that there was money to be still obtained here, flocked to this country even after my first list was closed. The demand, consequently, as is usual upon such occasions, increased; and I believe that there are at this moment, in consequence of these measures and of the last subscription, more foreigners in this country requiring aid than there have been at any former period. In all this transaction I have been only the instrument of government, and I am perfectly ready to discontinue my payments whenever it may be thought proper.

I think you ought to bring the subject under the consideration of government.

As for my part, well as I wish to many of these Spaniards, and determined as I am that some of them at least shall not want as long as I can assist them, I must object to bring the subject under the consideration of Parliament.

Yours, &c., &c.,

WELLINGTON.

P.S. My list amounts to about 10,000*l.* a year, and for this sum we provide for * persons. Upon the revolution in Spain, in the year 1814, the funds of the Foreign Office provided for the whole.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Gloucester Lodge, 17th March, 1825.

I send you the draft of an answer to the Spanish note, which I propose to be delivered by Lamb on his arrival at Madrid,—or perhaps by the chargé d'affaires just before his arrival.

I add a letter received to-day from Lord Granville, which I think upon the whole tolerably satisfactory as to the Emperor of Russia's feelings about Spain and her Americas.

I enclose in a separate case a secret paper upon Brazil, which is *highly* satisfactory, as showing that P. M. is *playing fair* upon that subject.

Be so good as to let me have your observations upon the note to Spain.

Very sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Gloucester Lodge, 18th March, 1825.

I return the draft of answer to M. Zea, with M. Zea's note; which you must have seen (I should think) at the time of its arrival, but which ought to have been sent to you with my draft.

You will see that the two points upon which you principally remark *do* arise directly out of M. Zea's note—

1st. The credibility of the evidence of our agents.

2nd. Declarations about legitimacy.

I do not mean that I therefore adhere to passages which you have marked; but you may have supposed that they were uncalled-for, and that is not so.

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* Blank in manuscript.

They may be passed over, but there they are, in M. Zea's note, very much at length.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S. I am getting strength daily, and should have gone to the House to-day had it been necessary. But I believe I do more wisely in availing myself of a respite, which Lushington gives me till Monday.

I propose a Cabinet on Sunday at 3.

G. C.

[463.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 19th March, 1825.

I have read M. de Zea's note, which I return with the draft.

I never saw it till last night, when Mr. Planta sent me another copy of it. It has never been on the Cabinet table when I have gone to the office to read the papers intended to be communicated to the Cabinet.

In respect to the draft, I still think it is not necessary to enter into details respecting Bolivar's victory, &c., calculated to humiliate the governments which you are addressing, more particularly as it is impossible for us to justify our own actions, those of the King's subjects, and those of the gentlemen employed in the Spanish colonies to *inquire* or under other instructions for specific objects in detail against the charges which the Spanish note contains.

The mention of the fact of the victory is sufficient. Neither do I think the argument upon legitimacy touches the Spanish case.

Our grounds are these. We had long, by consent of Spain, traded with these colonies; we had admitted their rights as belligerents; we had recognised their flags in British ports by Act of Parliament; we had established consuls in the several countries, having apprised Spain and all Europe of each step taken, and having upon taking each step offered Spain our mediation and our advice for a settlement.

We had at last taken another step, that of making treaties of commerce with those States, which we had considered equally necessary for our interest and equally justifiable with the former.

In taking this step we had not questioned the *right* of the King of Spain. The step taken certainly went to question his power permanently to conquer these territories; as those

taken before did to question its existence *de facto* at the moment.

In respect to other Powers, they have not, and never had, the interest involved in these questions which his Majesty has had; and his Majesty's conduct cannot, with justice, be compared with theirs. But it must be observed that when necessity or even interest has been the promoter of their measures, they have not scrupled to decide by their acts not only upon questions of fact but upon questions of right. As their notes are circulated all over Europe, I would earnestly recommend that yours should be limited to a defence of your own case, and that you should touch as little as possible upon that of others, if you wish to put an end to the discussion.

Believe me, &c,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn.

MY DEAR WYNN, London, 24th March, 1825.

I return the box, having perused the papers last night.

There is nothing in them, except want of information of the nature of the country, climate, &c., of the proposed theatre of the war. The only paper which shows in the writer any knowledge of his subject is Sir Thomas Munro's Minute of the 21th August; and it is curious how all appear to have chimed in with his simple proposal; just as a pack of hounds do to the voice of the experienced dog. They appear to me to have given up all thoughts of any attempt on a large scale in this season, and that their efforts will be confined to recovering Cachar by means of the defensive force already on the frontier.

I cannot say they are wrong, not knowing the state of Arracan. It is quite clear to me, however, that there is a road from Arracan to the rivers communicating with Rangoon. The question is, then, how to get an army, with its equipments, from Chittagong to Arracan. This question ought to have been clearly brought out long ago at Chittagong, or even at Calcutta. If they can equip Sir Archibald Campbell at all, he will find his way up the river, and you may yet be able to bring the war to a close by the operations of his corps. But I hope that he will not have divided it until he shall have known more

than he appears to me to have known, according to the last accounts, of the real nature of the enemy's force in his front.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Le Prince de Metternich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MON CHER DUC, Paris, ce 27me Mars, 1825.

Le Prince Esterhazy m'a remis la lettre que vous avez bien voulu lui confier pour moi. Le désir de me voir mettre à profit la courte distance qui me sépare de Londres pour faire ma cour au Roi m'a été exprimé directement par sa Majesté. Je vous avouerai avec sincérité que jamais je n'ai été combattu davantage par mes sentimens d'homme public et d'homme privé.

Ces deux conditions se trouvent malheureusement reunis en moi, sans que dans certaines circonstances il pourrait m'être possible de les séparer. L'une d'entre elles est la position des choses du moment. Ce n'est pas dans l'état d'isolement complet dans lequel s'est placé l'Angleterre dans l'attitude spéciale d'intérêts opposés à d'autres intérêts, qu'il me serait possible de me rendre à Londres. Un motif déplorable m'a conduit à Paris; il n'a été que trop vite justifié. Il n'a point suffi cependant pour détourner de moi les regards de la tourbe politique. Chaque pas que je ferais hors de la direction précise de mon voyage prêterait à une foule de suppositions et de calculs, faux sans doute, mais pas moins pernicieux. Je me sentirais la force de les braver si je pouvais m'abandonner à la conviction d'opérer le bien; mais ce sentiment malheureusement est loin de moi. Le mal qui existe déjà est immense; il est plus; il est incalculable dans ses suites. Serait-ce à moi, mon cher Duc, à l'augmenter, et ne le ferai-je pas par une démarche qui jetterait dans les esprits plus de vague encore que déjà il en existe? Certes, non. Que le corps social, si rudement attaqué, et qui a tant besoin de soutien, trouve un point de repos dans la garantie de la solidarité des pensées et dans la force de l'union entre les Puissances continentales! Combien ce but ne serait-il point mis en risque par le préjugé qui s'attacherait à mon voyage, comme quoi l'Autriche pourrait viser à s'isoler dans sa marche dans un moment de crise aussi positif que l'est le présent?

Le Prince Paul vous développera davantage ma pensée que je ne puis le faire par une simple lettre. Il ne vous exprimera jamais assez l'étendue de mes regrets. Il n'est pas un côté qui, dans la privation que je m'impose, pourrait me paraître flatteur ou consolant. C'est de toutes les besognes les plus décourageantes que celle qui vous restreint au simple soin d'éviter du mal.

Veuillez agréer, mon cher Duc, l'assurance de ma haute considération et de mes sentimens inviolables d'amitié.

METTERNICH.

To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn. [465.]

MY DEAR WYNN, London, 30th March, 1825.

I enclose a Memorandum upon the operations in Bengal, founded upon what I suppose will have been the result of the campaign as intended by the Commander-in-Chief's Minute of the *

There is a good deal of it which it will not be easy for you, or indeed for anybody who is not intimately acquainted with the service in the East Indies, to understand; and most particularly the service in Bengal.

But I think an officer who has served in Bengal would understand it; and I think I should not fail in executing this plan myself.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM RESPECTING THE MODE OF CARRYING ON THE WAR WITH THE BURMESE.

29th March, 1825.

It appears from the recent communications from Fort William that it was not intended, when they were sent off, to make any serious effort to force the Burmese government to peace in the course of the season 24-25. It was intended to confine the operations to those calculated to restore the Rajah of Cachar to his territories as a feudatory of the Company; and others of the same description, in different parts of the frontier, which it might be possible to carry on by means of the defensive force on the frontier, without bringing forward the army stated to be on its march from the northern frontiers of the Bengal provinces into Bengal.

These operations, however, will not answer the wished-for purpose. They will not reduce the Burmese government to the necessity of making and, above all, of preserving peace with the British government, from a sense of the impossibility of resistance. In all probability, peace will not be made after such a system of operations; but if made it will be precarious. The Burmese government will connect themselves with the

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politics of Hindostan, and their assistance and co-operation will be looked for by those Powers who wish to disturb the tranquillity of that part of the world; and we shall have to renew this inconvenient contest at a moment at which it will be much more inconvenient and difficult to carry it on than it is at present.

However questionable the cause of war, it is quite clear to me that, having entered into the war, we shall not be able to make peace; nor would it be wise to attempt it till the enemy shall have experienced the extent of our power and the hopelessness of resisting it.

If, then, the authorities in India should have decided that they will not carry on the war on an extended scale in this campaign, we must consider what ought to be done in the next.

I conclude that this campaign will leave Sir Archibald Campbell well established at Rangoon and in the southern parts of the Burmese empire; and that he will be better supplied and altogether in a better situation during the rainy season, which will commence in May and June next, than he was in the last; that the limited operations, as designated in the Minute of the Commander-in-Chief of ,* will all have been successful; and that the Rajah of Cachar will have been replaced, and that by his means and those of other tributaries the enemy will have been expelled even from Munnypoor.

The question is what shall be done after the next rainy season, which is stated to commence in May in the Burmese territories, commences in June in Bengal, and lasts till the close of September; and then leaves the country which has been liable to its influence in a state unfit for military operations for some time afterwards.

The operations in Cachar will have given us some knowledge of that country, possibly as far as even Munnypoor, and it may be possible to open a road to that place.

But I confess that I have always doubted the expediency of adopting that line of operations. The distance is immense. That of the two corps of operation from Munnypoor and Rangoon will not decrease till the former shall commence its march

* Blank in manuscript.

from Munnypoor. The enemy must to the last be between them.

I believe the whole country is in all parts equally unhealthy, and the only chance of preservation for the troops employed on this service is that they shall be well supplied with camp-equipage and provisions, not overworked or overmarched, or kept out too long; and care, as far as is possible, should be taken in the selection of the ground for the camps.

As far as I can form a judgment here from the information before me, and taking into consideration the position already occupied by Sir Archibald Campbell, and which I conclude he will maintain, I should prefer the line of operations by Chittagong, Ramoo, Arracan, and thence to the valley of the river Irrawady.

We know that there is a road practicable for troops from Chittagong to Ramoo.

Mr. * states positively that there is a practicable road from Arracan into the valley of the Irrawady. At all events, we know that large bodies of the Burmese have marched from Arracan into the valley of the Irrawady; and although it may be admitted that small bodies of Burmese might march by roads in which more numerous and better-equipped armies could not, yet I believe it is generally found that where large bodies of one sort can march, all others can follow. Indeed, the march of a large body of troops of itself makes a road.

The only question then is from Ramoo to Arracan, a distance of about 100 miles, respecting which it must be observed that the enemy, stated to be 20,000 men, attacked our post at Ramoo, and it is probable they came from Arracan; at all events, it is supposed that information might be obtained. Even if the road is to be made, it is more easy to make a road for 100 miles than it is one for 500 miles, or even 250 miles, from Munnypoor. But there are other reasons why the road by Arracan is preferable. Every movement of the corps from Arracan towards the valley of the Irrawady would tend to the relief of Sir A. Campbell, and the arrival of that corps would put it in immediate communication with Sir Archibald Campbell in that part of the Burmese empire said to be the source and seat of its resources. The resources which this part of the

* Blank in manuscript.

army might bring with it would serve to equip the corps under Sir Archibald Campbell with all the means of movement which it appears he wants, and I am afraid will still want, in the next campaign.

The two corps, thus united, would threaten the Burmese seat of government with a disaster to be avoided only by submission to terms of peace.

But there are other reasons why I prefer the line of Chittagong and Arracan to that by Silhet and Munnypoor, the principal of which is that it enables the British government, throughout the operation, to avail itself of all its resources, naval as well as military; and by sea, to withdraw from the country and to bring to Calcutta in a few days at least the European part of the army, if their services should not be required in the Burmese territory, or should be required in another part of the country.

If this line should be adopted, I would make Arracan the great depôt of the army. I would send with the troops by Chittagong all the cattle to enable both armies to move. The ordnance and stores (except a few light pieces necessary to enable the troops which should march to reach Arracan) and the grain and provisions should be sent by sea to Arracan, together, probably, with the European troops. The troops should march in small detachments, not more than two battalions in each, by easy marches from Chittagong to Arracan; and the army would then start quite fresh from Arracan with all its equipments in the highest order and its means of movement unfatigued and fresh, and fit for their work.

The army ought to be attended by two bridges.

From Arracan the army might proceed in one, two, or three columns, or by detachments in echelon as before, according to the information there received of the nature of the road and country, of the positions and force of the enemy, &c. &c.

The communication with the army from Calcutta would then be by sea to Arracan, and thence by land. The time and distance would, in that season, be about of as many days as by the road of Munnypoor it would be weeks; and it is obvious that, by securing Arracan, it is always in the power of the Government to withdraw in a few days as many of the troops as can be withdrawn by sea.

The hospitals might be at Arracan and thence removed to

sea; a great object for the recovery of health suffering under the effects of climate in those countries.

I would form this army by volunteers to the amount of two companies from each battalion of sepoys in the Bengal service.

These companies to be formed into provisional battalions, each of six companies or six hundred men. The vacancies thus made in the regular battalions to be immediately filled up by recruiting. These companies to have the usual proportion of Native officers to volunteer, and of European officers to be posted to them. Each battalion to be commanded by a field-officer.

Ten thousand men might, I should think, be got for this service by this mode of proceeding, without materially weakening the Native army on the frontier.

To these ought to be added two regiments of Europeans, eight squadrons of cavalry, and thirty or forty pieces of cannon.

WELLINGTON.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Fife House, 1st April, 1825.

I wish you seriously to consider the enclosed papers, but as Bathurst is out of town, not to show them to any one.

Nothing need be determined till after the 19th, the day appointed for the second reading, but my own impression is that the majority on that day will be so considerable as to leave no doubt as to the opinion of the House of Commons for a fixed and settled opinion. We may still be able by a small majority to throw the bill out in the House of Lords; but this will be in the nature of an expiring effort, and it remains to be considered how far such a proceeding would or would not be expedient.

The more I reflect upon the question, the more impossible it appears to me that I should be a party to the *new system*, much less the *instrument* of carrying it into effect.

As to the *time* and *mode* of acting, I have no strong opinion upon them, and shall be ready to be guided in a great measure by the opinion of my friends.

I cannot, however, overlook what may be Peel's course of conduct upon this occasion. If he resigns, I shall be called upon to fill up his office, which, under the circumstances, would be the most important office in the State; and how could I fill it up when I had it in contemplation not to remain myself in the government many weeks.

I am going to Coombe for ten days to-morrow.

Have the goodness to return the papers when you have done with them.

Ever sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

[466.] *To Mr. Griffin.*

DRAFT OF INSTRUCTIONS TO ORDNANCE COMMISSION IN NORTH AMERICA.

Ordnance Office, 11th April, 1825.

Draft of Instructions to Colonel Sir James Carmichael Smyth, Major Sir George Charles Hoste, and Captain John B. Harris, of the Corps of Royal Engineers, forming a Commission appointed by the Master-General and Board of Ordnance to proceed to his Majesty's Colonies, on the Continent of North America, to examine and report upon the state of the fortifications and public buildings, and upon the system of defence for those colonies:—

1. As it is very desirable that this department should acquire an accurate knowledge of the state of the fortifications and public buildings in his Majesty's dominions on the Continent of North America, and of the system and state of defence of those dominions; and as it appears impossible to acquire all the information which it is necessary that this department should possess from the documents in the office, or communicated by the Treasury, or the Secretary of State's Department; the Master-General and Board have therefore considered it proper to send a Commission to his Majesty's dominions in North America, to inquire into and report upon the several matters hereinafter referred to, and they have appointed you, Colonel Sir J. C. Smyth, Major Sir G. C. Hoste, and Captain J. B. Harris, to be the members of such Commission.

2. You will take your departure from England by the packet which will sail from Liverpool on the 15th instant.

3. On your arrival in North America you will report yourself to the Commander of the Forces in Canada. You will lay before him your instructions, and request from him the necessary assistance to enable you to prosecute your inquiries, and such instructions as he may think proper to give you. You will also communicate with his Excellency constantly, and keep him informed of the progress of your inquiries.

4. Upon your arrival in Upper Canada, and also in Nova Scotia, you will wait on the Governor, or Lieutenant-Governor, to apprise them of the object of your mission; circular communications having been made to them by the Secretary of State notifying the request of the Master-General and Board that they should give every assistance that you may require.

5. It appears to the Master-General and Board that it will be desirable that you should commence your investigations at Quebec, if the navigation of the river St. Lawrence should be open when you shall arrive in North America. If the navigation of that river should not be open, you will then commence your inquiries in Nova Scotia, and proceed from thence to Quebec.

The annexed letter from the Master-General to the Secretary of State, dated the 1st of March, 1819,* explains the system of defence to which the Master-General had directed at that time the attention of the government, and it appears that it was intended to carry that system into execution. It appears to the Master-General and Board that, supposing it to be practicable, it is upon the whole the best for his Majesty's extended dominions in that part of the world; and it is desirable that this department should be informed how far the execution of this system has been found practicable, and has been persevered in since the month of March, 1819; what has been the progress made, and what the difficulties which impede the progress, or prevent the execution of the plan altogether.

It is impossible to expect accurate estimates of expense upon such an occasion as that on which the Commission will be employed; but it is desirable that, as far as possible, this department should have some general report of the expense which the execution of this plan will occasion.

The Commission will observe that the foundation of this plan is to throw the communication from the river St. Lawrence above Montreal into what is called the Great river, and thence into the river Rideau; and thence by the Irish creek through the lakes to Kingston in Upper Canada.

It is very desirable that this department should know exactly what progress has been made in carrying into execution this part of the plan; what remains to be done; what are the obstacles; what the means of overcoming them; what will be the probable expense, what part of it will be incurred in each year, and what part of the funds will be found by the Colonial government.

You will observe in the Master-General's letter a doubt expressed as to the practicability of completing the water com-

* See vol. i. p. 36.

munication at Huntley's bridge, between the rivers which fall into Great river and those which fall into lake Ontario. You are particularly desired to attend to that point; and to ascertain, first, if it should be practicable to establish a communication by water from Huntley's bridge, or elsewhere in that neighbourhood, with Kingston; and if that should not be found practicable, secondly, if it should be practicable to establish a communication by railway between the navigable head of the waters which fall into the Great river, and the navigable head of the waters which fall into lake Ontario.

If it should not be practicable to establish a communication by water from Huntley's bridge; or elsewhere in that part of the country, with lake Ontario, you are then to consider of the means of establishing a communication by railroad between the head of the waters falling into the Great river and lake Ontario.

The next points of the communications to be considered are those with lake Simcoe.

You will observe that two of these are suggested in the Master-General's letter to the Secretary of State, the one direct from the head of the *Rideau* by the Black river, which is supposed to originate not far from the *Rideau*. It is very desirable to ascertain this point; and if the communication should not be practicable by water, to see whether it could not be completed by railroad.

The other is from Kingston by the Bay of Quinté, at the back of Prince Edward's Island; and thence by the river *Soggettewedgewam*, or the Trent, into the Rice lake; and thence by Talbot's river into lake Simcoe.

There is likewise a report of a communication by water used by the Indians between the Great river, or the Ottawa, and Talbot's river. If such a communication should exist, it should be examined; and rendered perfect as well along the Great river to its junction with this communication as along the communication itself.

Of course wherever railroads show to be necessary, or should be deemed preferable or less expensive than the improvements of the communication by water, such recommendations must be reported.

The next points for consideration are the navigation of the Hollands river, which falls into lake Simcoe; of the Wellands,

or the Chippeway river, which falls into the Niagara above the falls of Niagara; of the Grand river, which falls into lake Erie; and of the Thames, which falls into lake St. Clair.

It is obvious that the more extensive the easy navigation of these several rivers can be made, the more easy will be the defence of that distant frontier.

It is desirable to ascertain the means of connecting the navigation of all these rivers by their tributary streams if possible, or by a canal; or, if that should not be practicable, by a railroad.

It is understood that the communication by water already exists between Lake Simcoe and Pentengashene, or Gloucester Bay; but this point must be ascertained.

This is all that occurs on the subject of the defensive communications with Upper Canada arising out of the Master-General's letter to the Secretary of State of the 1st of March.

The Master-General and Board, however, cannot avoid to draw your attention to the observations of the Master-General, in his letter to Lord Bathurst of the 1st March, 1819, upon the communication by the river St. Lawrence, above the island of St. Regis, in time of war.

It is quite obvious that if the lines of communication proposed by the Master-General, and above referred for your consideration and report, cannot be carried into execution, or some other distinct from the St. Lawrence discovered, the defence of these distant provinces will become so difficult as to be almost impossible. It is therefore highly desirable that you should direct your inquiries particularly to this point, as being most essential to the maintenance of his Majesty's sovereignty over these distant dominions and the protection of his subjects.

The next point for consideration is the state of the works in the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada. It is understood here that the works of the citadel of Quebec have been continued, as well as those of the intrenched camp. We desire to draw your attention particularly to those works, and to the estimates of their expense. How much of the sum originally estimated has been expended; how much of each work remains to be completed in comparison with the estimated sum of money unexpended.

You will likewise report your opinion of the probable efficiency of those works when completed.

The next subject for consideration is the defences of river Richelieu; and particularly the works on the *Isle aux Noix.*

You will observe the Master-General's opinion that that work ought to occupy nearly the whole island, particularly the northern and western extremity, with a view to command by its fire the communication between the river Richelieu and the South river.

It is desirable, likewise, that you should report whether any advantage would be derived from the proposed occupation of the small Island, situated in the Richelieu, off the mouth of South river.

The government of the United States have constructed a work upon a spot called *Rouse's Point*, on the left of the Richelieu; which spot of ground it is supposed will belong to his Majesty upon the final settlement of the frontier under the Treaty of Ghent.

It is very desirable that this spot should be looked at in the following views of it:—

Does a fortress upon it give to the government of the United States any *peculiar* advantage with a view to offensive or defensive operations against his Majesty?

Does a fortress in this position protect any particular pass in the Richelieu important for the enemy to hold in war, or for his Majesty to possess?

Would it be important for his Majesty to possess a fortress on this particular spot of land in order to cover and protect the inhabitants of the district?

If a fortress in that part of the country were necessary for such a purpose, could not one be constructed on another spot of the frontier as formerly defined?

In the hypothesis of the government of the United States being deprived of this fortress upon Rouse's Point, could not another be constructed by them upon some other point of the river Richelieu, within the frontier as it will be newly defined, possessing all the advantages, whether for offensive or defensive purposes, supposed to be possessed by this work on Rouse's Point?

While discussing the frontier of the river Richelieu the Master-General and Board desire to draw your attention to Misisqui Bay, in lake Champlain, which you will observe is adverted to in the Master-General's letter to Lord Bathurst of the 1st March, 1819.

It is desirable to know—

1st. Whether the head of Misisqui will be within his Majesty's frontier according to the new demarcation of the frontier?

Secondly. If it should be so, Whether it would not be possible, by a system of works or towers, or a system combined of both, to prevent a landing of an enemy in that bay?

In order to be able to decide this point, it is very desirable to know the nature of the country, and the distance from the head of Misisqui bay to the navigable point in the South river; the nature of the country through which the South river runs to its junction with the Richelieu; and whether that point can be commanded by the fire of the works on the Isle aux Noix; or by that of the works proposed to be constructed on the small island in the Richelieu immediately in the neighbourhood of that junction; or by the fire of a work which might be constructed opposite that junction on the left bank of the Richelieu.

The next points to be examined in the Richelieu are Fort St. John and Chambly; and the Master-General and Board are desirous of having an accurate report of the present state of those forts respectively; your opinion whether it is desirable that they should still be maintained as armed forts and their defences improved; and, if so, they desire you will suggest a plan for their improvement respectively.

The next point for consideration is Montreal.

You will observe that the Master-General, in his letter to Lord Bathurst, of the 1st of March, 1819, has suggested that the island of St. Helen's should be fortified upon the same principles as had been suggested for the Isle aux Noix.

The Master-General and Board are desirous that you should report the exact state of the island of St. Helen's in relation to the removal of the ordnance stores and other magazines to that island; and its security against attack.

In case no measures should have been considered or adopted for fortifying that island, the Master-General and Board are desirous that you should consider of, and report upon, a plan for that purpose, upon the principles recommended by the Master-General in his letter to Lord Bathurst of 1st March, 1819.

The Master-General and Board likewise desire to draw your attention to the observations of the Master-General, in the same letter, on the island of St. Regis, in lake François.

They desire you to report particularly whether any system of works upon that island would impede the navigation of the river St. Lawrence by the enemy, and protect Montreal from an attack by that river.

The next point for consideration is Fort Wellington, at Prescott, on the river St. Lawrence.

This point is not adverted to by the Master-General in his letter to Lord Bathurst; and it does not appear, by any report in possession of the Master-General and Board, with what view, and for what object it was constructed or is maintained.

If the communication with Kingston and the provinces of Upper Canada can be established by the river Rideau, it does not appear that the possession of Fort Wellington can be more important than any other point on the river St. Lawrence.

The Master-General and Board, however, request to have a report of your opinion on the utility of Fort Wellington, on its works, &c.

The next point for consideration is Kingston, on lake Ontario.

The Master-General and Board here refer you to the Master-General's observations, in his letter to Lord Bathurst, of 1st March, 1819; and they desire you to report in detail your opinion on the works proposed to be constructed by the Master-General; and on the further measures which it may be necessary to adopt for the security of Kingston.

The Master-General and Board likewise refer for your consideration the Master-General's observations on York; and they desire you to report whether any, and what measures could be adopted to add to the security of York.

The next point for consideration is the Niagara frontier, upon which the Master-General and Board desire to draw your attention to the observations in the Master-General's letter to Lord Bathurst, of March, 1819.

The Master-General and Board desire to know the exact state of the works upon the river Niagara, at Fort George, Fort Erie, &c.

They desire you likewise to examine the banks of the river Chippeway, and to fix upon a station for a fort upon that river, to be constructed with a view to support the operations of his Majesty's troops upon that line of the Niagara, and to give confidence to the inhabitants of the country in the efficiency of his Majesty's protection.

It is understood that a canal is now in the course of construction from the Grand river to the river Chippeway; and thence to the Forty-Mile Creek on lake Ontario. Probably the junction of this canal with the Chippeway, or somewhere in that neighbourhood, would be the most eligible position for this fort.

At all events, it does not appear to the Master-General and Board to be desirable that it should be too near the extreme frontier of the Niagara.

The next point for consideration is Pentengashene, in Gloucester Bay, in lake Huron. If the communication can be established, as proposed, with lake Simcoe and this point, whether by navigation or railroad, or both, it is essentially necessary that this point should be fortified; and the Master-General and Board desire that you will look at it with this object in view, and report upon it accordingly.

There is a work on Drummond's island, in lake Huron, and another at Amherstburg, on lake Erie, both of which are stated to be maintained with a view to the communication with, and to give countenance to, the Indian nations.

It is believed that Drummond's island will belong to the United States upon the completion of the arrangement of the demarcation of the frontier under the Treaty of Ghent. But it is desirable that you should visit both ports; and report upon their state.

Annexed to these instructions you will find the copy of a skeleton map of the Canadas, with a list of the ordnance stations in both provinces, their distance from Quebec, &c.

The Master-General and Board desire you will visit each of these stations and report upon the buildings in each; and likewise your opinion upon the necessity of maintaining those buildings, and for what particular purposes.

The Master-General and Board likewise refer to you a correspondence upon the subject of certain ordnance and stores left by the officers of his Majesty's Navy in different parts of the country during the late war, which this department have now been called upon to collect in some of his Majesty's magazines supposed to be in a greater degree of security.

The Master-General and Board have great objections to the sale of these stores. By the last reports of them they appear to be entirely useless, at least for the service of his Majesty,

and if collected in magazines they would not be worth the expense of their transport to those magazines.

The Master-General and Board desire that you will ascertain whether the ordnance and stores referred to in the annexed correspondence can be effectually destroyed so as never to be used again. If they can be destroyed the Master-General and Board desire that you will give orders that they may be destroyed in presence of officers to be employed on that duty, who are to report its execution. If they cannot be destroyed you will be pleased to give directions that such of them as are below Kingston may be removed to Montreal. All above Kingston are to be removed to the magazine at Kingston.

In respect to the Halifax command, the Master-General and Board observe that his Majesty's dominions in that quarter can be approached by an enemy by land only from the American province of Maine, and through New Brunswick.

The frontier between these provinces has not yet been determined; and it is difficult for the Master-General and Board to define what should be the system of defence of a frontier in that state.

The river St. John's, however, should be examined with a view principally to the use of that river as the communication between these provinces and those on the St. Lawrence; or for the establishment of a railroad along its course, with a view to the communication at all seasons of the year.

The other points for examination are the state of the barracks, and other ordnance buildings, and of the works for the defence of the harbour of Halifax, and of the other points throughout the provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick; and on the island of Cape Breton and Prince Edward's island.

It would be very desirable to look at the ground on which Fort George, at Halifax, now stands, with a view either to its reform or to the construction of a work of larger capacity upon that ground by way of Keep to the works destined for the defence of the harbour, which might be garrisoned by two or three hundred men.

The Master-General and Board likewise wish you to look at the point at which the two provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick join, between the Bay Verte and Chignecto Bay, in order to afford some support, by a port, to the troops employed in New Brunswick, in case of an attack by land.

The Master-General and Board likewise desire that you will inquire and report upon the following points in all parts of the provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, &c:—

The price of the different descriptions of materials for building, whether the produce of these Colonies, or of the United States, or of Great Britain, and purchased on the spot.

The price of the different descriptions of artificers and labourers, European as well as natives of the country.

The manner in which they are hired.

The average quantity of work which each description of artificer or labourer can, or will, perform, in comparison with the same description of artificer or labourer in England.

The possibility of constructing buildings or works in these provinces by contract.

The sort of building best adapted to the climate of these provinces, whether as barrack, hospital, store-house or magazine.

It is desirable, also, to ascertain whether there are any, and what works, magazines, or barracks, belonging to and under charge of the local authorities, and in what state they are; and also in what depôts, and at what stations, the arms and ammunition are kept for the militia of Canada, Nova Scotia, &c.

The Master-General and Board desire that you will communicate these instructions to Lieut.-Colonel Beresford, the officer at the head of the Engineer Department in Canada, and to * the officer at the head of the Engineer Department in the Halifax command; and that you will call upon those officers respectively to afford you every assistance and information in their power to enable you to perform the duty in which you are about to be employed by the Master-General and Board.

The Master-General and Board are aware that it will not be in your power to acquire all the minute and detailed information which these instructions call for in the short space of time during which the state of the seasons will enable you to carry on your investigations. But the Master-General and Board desire that you will investigate and report upon them all; and that you will instruct the officers at the head of the Engineer Department in the Canadas and the Halifax command respectively to continue those investigations by means of the officers under their command in detail according to plans, respecting which you

* Blank in manuscript.

will give instructions; and to report from time to time to the Master-General and Board the result of these investigations.

The Master-General and Board intend that you should visit the Bermudas on your return to England; but they will send you further instructions on that point.

Wellington.

[467.] *To Mr. Griffin.*

BARRACK ACCOUNTS—BARBADOES.

Ordnance Office, 11th April, 1825.

Observations upon a letter of 22nd ult. not delivered till 28th.

After all the respective officers had no right to call for a receipt for any article till such article was regularly delivered over to the barrack-master.

It appears to me that the respective officers had no right to do what they have done, as appears by the correspondence enclosed in the barrack-master's letter of 26th December, 1824.

The barrack-master is ordered to sign the lodging-money certificates after having first ascertained in what mode the quarters are disposed of.

The barrack-master is called upon to sign these certificates without first having this knowledge communicated to him and refuses.

Do the respective officers then give him this information?

They require him to sign not after giving him the information which the regulations require he should have; but showing him what the storekeeper, acting as barrack-master, had signed in the preceding month!

The articles referred to in the letter of the 16th January ought to be kept by the storekeeper!

It appears to me that all the requisitions enclosed in the letter of the 20th January, 1825, are inconsistent with the Barrack Regulations!

Wellington.

To Mr. Griffin. [468.]

MEMORANDUM.—DISPUTES AT BARBADOES—RESPECTIVE OFFICERS AND BARRACK-MASTER.

Ordnance Office, 19th April, 1825.

The Master-General is concerned to observe the state of irritation and disagreement which prevails among the officers of the Ordnance at Barbadoes.

The origin of these disputes is a misunderstanding by the respective officers of the nature of the relations between them and the barrack-master.

It is the duty of the respective officers of the Ordnance to see that the barrack-master performs his duty according to his Majesty's Warrant and the instructions of the Master-General and Board; but the respective officers will observe that the barrack-master is an officer responsible to the Master-General and Board, and who gives security for the performance of his duty; and they must take care that their interference does not relieve him and his securities from their responsibility to the Master-General and Board.

The Master-General feels no hesitation in deciding that neither the storekeeper nor the respective officers ought to have entered the stores or magazines of the barrack-master, or employed others to enter them, with a view to any alteration, or to arrange stores, unless by the permission or in the presence of the barrack-master; nor ought the barrack-master to have been required to sign receipts for stores which had not previously been regularly delivered over to him. To force an officer to sign a receipt for such stores by ordering him to sign it, and putting him in arrest for disobedience of such orders, instead of proceeding regularly to deliver over the stores in question to his charge, or to convince him that they had been so delivered over, is, to say the least of it, a *hasty proceeding*, which the Master-General hopes that the respective officers will not adopt again.

In the course of this part of these proceedings the Master-General observes an irregularity which he wishes had not occurred; viz., the sending an order to the barrack-master, on the 28th of January, dated the 22nd of January, and making him re-

sponsible for not immediately carrying it into execution. If this order had been delivered in time in all probability all the consequences would have been avoided.

The Master-General thinks it proper likewise to animadvert upon the discussion of the respective officers with the barrack-master respecting his signature to the lodging-money return of the Ordnance Department.

There is no doubt that the barrack-master ought to have signed the return if none of the persons returned for lodging-money were accommodated, or could be accommodated, in the barracks under his charge.

But as an honest public servant it was his duty to inform the Commissary-General that, in his opinion, some of the persons returned for lodging-money were accommodated in public quarters although not under his charge, however erroneous that opinion might be.

The Commissary-General, or those under whose orders he was acting, would then have seen how inapplicable a system formed in England for regimental service was to that of the head-quarters of an army; in which many persons must be accommodated with quarters at the public expense not in the barracks, which are alone in charge of the barrack-master, each of whom might thus draw for lodging-money as well as enjoy the advantage of those quarters.

The Master-General would have wished that a little more courtesy had been used in the correspondence upon this subject, particularly by the barrack-master; who by his instructions is placed under the directions of the respective officers; and ought to have written to them in terms of politeness and respect; and ought to have waited upon them when sent for.

The Master-General will not close these remarks without observing upon the system which appears to prevail of giving orders to the barrack-master respecting the occupation of the barracks at Barbadoes.

The barrack-master must be positively forbidden to allow any person to inhabit the barracks excepting those entitled to inhabit them under his Majesty's regulations as stated in his Warrant; and these must be admitted into the barracks by route, or written order from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, through the Quartermaster-General, or from the respective

officers of the Ordnance, or the senior officer of the Artillery or Engineers, in respect to the troops serving under the Ordnance; and they must inhabit the quarters, or rooms, allotted and marked for their respective ranks, which will be allotted to them by the barrack-master according to the usual customs of the service.

In case his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief should think proper to order that any person should be allowed to inhabit the barracks, who is not allowed or specified by his Majesty's Warrant, or that any particular rooms or quarters should be allotted to any particular officers, he must be requested to signify his commands by warrant, inasmuch as such commands will be in every instance a departure from the strict letter of his Majesty's orders and regulations, which must be the rule of the barrack-master's conduct.

The Master-General has further to observe upon the measure of giving camp equipage stores in charge to the barrack-master. The barrack-master should have no stores excepting those necessary for the troops in barracks. All others should be in charge of the Storekeeper of the Ordnance.

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [469.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 5th May, 1825.

I know nothing of the case which you have referred for my consideration.

The British Government have already made over to Portugal all the ordnance stores and other property captured at Oporto, Almeida, and other places in Portugal, and a proportion of those captured at Vitoria, and further paid to Portugal 85,000*l.* in full of all demands, on account of claims of this description. With this payment our part in this transaction is closed. The Portuguese Government may distribute the whole value received, or any part of that value, to its own army; and I should conceive that we as the British Government have nothing to say to the matter. I don't know of anything that passed either when Lord Beresford was appointed to the command, or upon the negotiation of any of the treaties of

subsidy, or in the notes exchanged between Count Palmella and the late Lord Londonderry, which can give us any right, or impose upon us any duty of interference.

It appears, however, that Count Palmella has engaged to Lord Beresford that the sum of 85,000*l.* should be disposed of in a particular manner. That is a question between the Portuguese government and Lord Beresford; and until his Lordship shall call upon this government to interfere to enforce his claim I don't see that we can give any opinion upon the transaction.

If the case should come before the government in that view we must of course consider of it in all its parts.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[470.] *To Sir H. Taylor.*

MY DEAR GENERAL, London, 18th May, 1825.

I write you one line upon the list of aides-de-camp to his Majesty, upon which I spoke to his Royal Highness.

There are two officers omitted of really the highest distinction, Lieutenant-Colonel Napier, and Sir Charles Broke Vere.

The former has lost his arm, and has been frequently wounded, as well as two other brothers in the army. In short, there is no family more distinguished. He was aide-de-camp to Sir J. Moore. Sir Charles Broke Vere was Assistant Quartermaster-General during the war in the Peninsula, and highly distinguished; so much so, as that when De Lancey was killed in the battle of Waterloo, I ordered Broke to perform the duty of Quartermaster-General, although not the senior, which he did perform during half the battle; and he performed the duty of Quartermaster-General on the march to Paris, and while the army remained at Paris, and was Deputy Quartermaster-General under Sir G. Murray of the Army of Occupation in France.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The King to Lord Liverpool.

Carlton House, Wednesday Morning, 18th May, 1825.

DEAR LORD LIVERPOOL,

I congratulate you most sincerely on your successful efforts of last night. God be thanked. Your speech was, indeed, most powerful. I hope you will not suffer from the great exertion.

Your very sincere friend,

G. R.

Lord Liverpool to the King.

Fife House, 18th May, 1825.

Lord Liverpool is most truly grateful to your Majesty for your kind inquiries, and begs to inform your Majesty that he has not suffered from the fatigue of last night.

The division was most satisfactory; but Lord Liverpool ought to inform your Majesty that some part of the majority must be considered as hollow, and not to be depended upon hereafter. Lord Liverpool will have the honour of explaining what he means to your Majesty when he is permitted to wait upon you.

Rev. Dr. Curtis to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Drogheda, 21st May, 1825.

During my late stay at London, where nothing but a superior order could have obliged me to appear, I wished for an opportunity of paying my respects to your Grace, which, however, I found to be difficult, as well on account of your many and important occupations, as because I was accompanied by several other Irish Roman Catholic prelates, without whom (as we were all on the same business) I could not at that period hold any conversation with personages high in office, lest I should be at least remarked, if not suspected of harbouring sentiments different from those of my confrères, which was certainly not the case. Besides, your Grace was probably apprehensive that I meant to trouble you about some matters of ours then pending in Parliament, about which we had been called. But had your Grace vouchsafed to honour me with an audience, I should not have mentioned, or even alluded to, such subjects if not interrogated. Nor did I act otherwise towards any person whatever, high or low, in London, as I considered it useless, and the whole affair then on the *tapis* only intended to amuse.

However, from the great mass of useful information that has been collected, I doubt not your Grace will have inferred the truth of certain statements I had the honour of recommending to your superior attention, relative to the Roman Catholics of this country, and to my positive assertion given at the same time, that they would respect and obey, without compulsion, whatever the legislature or government might think proper, in their wisdom, to determine, with respect to the Catholic Association, or to any other claims that they had already made or might afterwards propose. I have every reason still to abound in the same opinion which the event

has proved to be just, and I firmly hope, and earnestly pray the Almighty, that no future period may become less, but on the contrary every day more, fortunate, and perfectly tranquil, however prosperous or adverse the course of politics may happen to incline.

For my own part, my well-known sentiments are, and I am sure my confrères fully acquiesce in the same (as I should not otherwise hold my present station for one day among them), that naturally and conscientiously attached as I am, and ought to be, to my Roman Catholic fellow subjects, whose real welfare is dear to my heart, I do not wish them to obtain emancipation, or any other boon, that government may think unsafe to grant, or which a great proportion of other denominations of Christians, particularly those of the Established Church, may still continue to oppose, as inimical to the true interests of Church or State, whether well or ill understood by them. But much less should I wish that such boon were obtained for us by fraud and intrigue, or extorted by party faction, or even a remote semblance of intimidation, because concession thus circumstanced would not be a really desirable benefit, but rather a noxious firebrand, tending to perpetuate opposition and hostility, instead of that mild and truly Christian spirit of conciliation, mutual forbearance, and unanimity, without which this country must ever be miserable and unhappy.

These have ever been my unalterable principles, and of those who cooperate with me, and we adhere to them, not in theory alone, but we constantly impress them on the minds of those entrusted to our care, and thus endeavour by word and example, to have them duly practised, by a vital feeling of brotherly love, and the beneficence it inspires, towards all mankind indiscriminately. We meet few or none that refuse to admit these salutary doctrines, which are strictly followed by great numbers, but that all and each should be equally constant and faithful in the practice of these great duties is more than we can expect, particularly when we see them daily encompassed by evil examples, and wantonly attacked by the printed and verbal insults of men that turn them and their religion into ridicule, and upbraid both with the most senseless absurdities, &c. All this, indeed, and much more, should be endured and overcome by Christian patience and fortitude; but these virtues are not easily found among men on all occasions, and it is difficult to keep their minds habitually bent on observing them.

When I had proceeded thus far I received the unexpected and fatal news that the Catholic Relief or Emancipation Bill had been thrown out by the Lords. This must produce a feeling of deep dismay and irritation all over Ireland, and makes me tremble for the consequences, which, however, it shall be my earnest and unceasing endeavour, as it is my bounden duty, to obviate and restrain; and I have little doubt, with the Divine assistance, of succeeding, with the great mass of the people, as above expressed, but I fear there will be many exceptions among the rash and turbulent multitude who will think they see (and, alas! not be alone of that opinion) that so much enquiry and investigation, anxiously made and published to the world, could only be meant in order to convince them still more of the justice and necessity of their claims, and the certainty of their immediate redress, for the sole purpose of exciting their already too ardent hopes, and thus not only render their disappointment the more cruel, but to reduce

them to utter despair of ever obtaining any relief, merely because they were known and allowed to deserve it.

I request your Grace will have the goodness to excuse this communication, which is the last I shall ever take the liberty of making to your Grace on this or any other subject.

I have the honour to be, with profound respect, my Lord Duke,
your most obedient servant,
P. CURTIS, R. C. Archbishop.

MEMORANDUM FROM LORD STRANGFORD, IN ANSWER TO THE RUSSIAN STATEMENTS.

25th May, 1825.

The Russian government justifies its refusal to send a minister to Constantinople on two grounds:—1st, it denies that it has contracted any engagement to that effect; and 2nd, it asserts that the Porte has failed in the execution of its promises made to me.

On the first point I must here repeat, that the Russian government did most distinctly and positively authorise me to promise to the Porte that M. de la Ribeaupierre should proceed to Constantinople as his Imperial Majesty's minister, so soon as the evacuation of the Principalities should have been effected. I was not merely empowered to say that a minister should go to Constantinople; I was directed to specify the very individual who was to go there.

On the 4th of June, 1824, Sir Charles Bagot addressed to me a despatch, of which the following is an extract.

"It must be unnecessary to remind the Porte that until the engagements taken by the Ottoman ministers at your Lordship's conference shall have been actually fulfilled, his Imperial Majesty cannot direct his minister to proceed to Constantinople, but I have the great satisfaction of being now able to acquaint you that I am authorised by the Imperial Government to state that, relying upon the assurances given to your Lordship, the Emperor has, in consequence of those assurances, designed M. de la Ribeaupierre as the person whom his Imperial Majesty intends to send to Constantinople as his Imperial Majesty's minister, and that this gentleman is already prepared to proceed to his destination the moment that the Russian government shall have received from your Lordship the intelligence that the evacuation of the Principalities has been effected."

On the 10th July I officially communicated to the Reis Effendi a translation of the above passage, for the purpose of hastening the execution of the condition on which Russia made the return of her minister to depend.

In all my intercourse with the Porte, subsequent to the adjustment of the commercial questions, I can solemnly declare that I never employed the term *chargé d'affaires*. I always thought myself entitled to engage that the return of an *accredited minister* should follow the adherence of the Turkish government to those demands which I was charged to make on the part of Russia, and that I was always so understood by the Porte in the whole of my official correspondence, the daily reports of my first interpreter, and the protocols of my various conferences abundantly show.

After M. de la Ribeaupierre had been actually appointed by the Russian government, Count Nesselrode intimated to Sir Charles Bagot, that he could not proceed to his destination before the Emperor should have returned from a journey which his Imperial Majesty was about to take.

This intimation naturally startled Sir Charles Bagot, who thought that he perceived in it an intention of deferring the departure of the Russian minister to some indefinite period, and he accordingly lost no time in making representations to Count Nesselrode on the subject.

For those representations, and for an account of the manner in which they were met by Count Nesselrode, I beg to refer to Sir C. Bagot's despatch to Mr. Canning, No. 40, of August 24th, 1824. From that despatch it appears that Sir C. Bagot and his Austrian colleague (who had shared his apprehensions) "received assurances on which they thought they could rely that there was no *arrière pensée* on the part of the Russian government, nor any intention of delaying the departure of M. de la Ribeaupierre beyond the period of the Emperor's return."

The despatch proceeds to state, that some time after these assurances had been given, Sir C. Bagot thought that he had still reason to suspect that there was some intention of delaying M. de la Ribeaupierre's departure, and that he would not be suffered to go to Constantinople till the Russian government should have been able to furnish him with full instructions on the subject of Greece.

Sir C. Bagot again stated those apprehensions to Count Nesselrode, and he describes that minister's renewed *denial* of the design imputed to the Russian government to have been expressed with "warmth," and with "unusual vehemence."

His Excellency again declaring, that he (Sir C. B.) "should not be justified in leading his government into the supposition that there was any design to delay M. de la Ribeaupierre's departure beyond the period of the Emperor's return;" and he followed up this declaration with a series of statements, all admitting the fact, and turning upon the engagement of a *minister* (and that minister M. de la Ribeaupierre) being sent to Constantinople.

Moreover Sir C. Bagot wrote to me on the 28th of the same month in the following terms: "Count Nesselrode charges me to assure you that there is no intention whatever of sending M. de la Ribeaupierre to Constantinople in a ship of war (against which the Turks had protested), or indeed by sea. He is to proceed there by land."

It was once ruled on very high authority, that if doubts were entertained whether a man had, or had not, the intention of taking a particular journey, those doubts would vanish before the fact of his having specifically named the individual who was to act as coachman. Now here we have not only the coachman named, but the very road which he was to take pointed out!

With these assurances communicated to me by Sir C. Bagot in the name of Count Nesselrode, with the full recollection that at no period of the negotiations, whether at Constantinople or at St. Petersburg, was there any question of M. de Minciacky being to reside as a *permanent chargé d'affaires*, I did not hesitate to allay the apprehensions of the Turkish government that Russia was deceiving them, and that she never had really the intention of sending a minister to the Porte, by putting them in full possession of all

Sir C. Bagot had declared to me in the name of the Russian Court, and by thus virtually pledging both myself and Sir Charles Bagot to the truth of those declarations. But the Turks were not disposed to give implicit credit to Russian assurances, even when supported by two British ambassadors, and it was to the suspicions which they entertained of the sincerity of those assurances, and to the conviction which they felt that in spite of them Russia would *not* send a minister until after the decision of the Greek question (a conviction originally inspired by the very terms of the imperial ukase appointing M. de la Ribeaupierre), that I always attributed the reluctance of the Porte to complete the evacuation of the Provinces, and the contradiction between its promises and its proceedings, which marked the interval from September to December, 1824.

Had the Russian government proclaimed its objections to sending a *minister* to Constantinople solely during the period of this dilatory and wavering conduct on the part of the Turkish government, it would have been impossible to blame it. From September to December, 1824, the Turks had no right whatever to expect that a minister should have been sent to them, because during that period they had only *partially* (*i. e.*, in the instance of Wallachia) executed the condition on which the return of a minister was to depend. But when they *did* completely execute the condition, I cannot comprehend why the Russian government should persist in refusing to perform the promise which was all along stated by me, and understood by the Turks to have been meant, as the reward of their compliance with its demands.

This leads me to the consideration of the *second* argument advanced by Russia; namely, that the Porte has not fulfilled its engagements with respect to the Principalities.

When the Greek revolt broke out in Wallachia, the Turkish government sent a large body of troops (consisting, I believe, of about 25,000 men) into the Principalities on the Danube. This step was taken at the express invitation of the Russian minister (M. de Stroganoff), then residing at Constantinople (vide my despatch to the Foreign Office, No. 8, 1821).

On the retreat of Prince Ipsilanti, and the dispersion of his army, M. de Stroganoff, assuming that the presence of the Turkish troops in the Principalities was no longer necessary, demanded their recall.

This demand (on its being resisted by the Porte) was taken up by the Allies, and it was not until after nearly two years of anxious negotiation that it was complied with.

The great body of Turkish soldiers was at length withdrawn, and only a few hundred men were left in each of the Principalities as a sort of *armed police*, of the same description, and with the same duty as that which had always been kept up there.

Russia appeared to be satisfied with this measure on the part of the Turkish government, and the minister of the Allied Courts at Constantinople judged their task to be completed as far as the evacuation of the Principalities was concerned.

A fresh set of demands (relating to commercial matters, the lettre de Cabinet to announce the nomination of the Hospodars, the arrest of Villara, &c.), were then brought forward by Russia.

Those demands led to protracted and most difficult negotiations. As

soon as they were satisfied Russia suddenly came forward with the revival of the old complaint respecting the Turkish troops in Wallachia and Moldavia; complaints which Mr. Canning himself considered so captious and so unreasonable, that he, in fact, left it almost to my option, whether I should press them upon the Turkish government or not.

I did make them the subject of a fresh discussion with the Porte, the result of which was an official engagement on its part, that the number of Turkish troops should be reduced to "that of the Beshlis stationed in the Provinces in ordinary times."

This reduction was instantly carried into effect in Wallachia. In Moldavia it was unfortunately delayed for two or three months, but was at last effected there also.

Now, here it is to be observed, that it is utterly impossible to determine *precisely* (I mean within 150 or 200 men) *what* was the number of Beshlis employed in the Principalities in ordinary times. Treaty is silent on the subject, and the various statements which I collected at Constantinople, as well from Russian and Austrian, as from Turkish sources, all disagree as to the exact amount. But the difference does not in any case exceed the number above mentioned. At some periods a greater, at others a less number of Beshlis have been employed. The Turkish government in construing the engagement in question, naturally refers to the *maximum*, and the Russians, in making the present complaint, to the minimum of troops so employed. And it is to be remarked that the main argument in justification of the delay in the evacuation of *Moldavia*, which was urged by the Turkish ministers, in my more secret and confidential intercourse with them at this particular period, was their conviction that their submission to Russia, in this instance, would after all be unattended with the advantage which they looked for (namely the return of a Russian *minister*) and their discontent on finding that Russia seemed to think that the nomination of a *chargé d'affaires* was a full acquittance of her promises to the Porte.

It is to be remarked that all the official reports from Wallachia and Moldavia, addressed to the British, French, Austrian, Prussian, and even Russian missions at Constantinople during my stay there, concurred in describing the conduct of the Ottoman police as most exemplary, and as not giving the slightest cause of offence to the local government or to the inhabitants. Matters must indeed have been greatly changed if their behaviour has since become such as to justify the complaints which are now brought against them.

It is remarkable that neither in the official correspondence of his Majesty's minister (since my departure), nor in the letters which I have received (and I have received many from my Austrian and Prussian colleagues, and from the interpreters and other members of the embassy), is there the slightest mention of any misunderstanding between M. Minciacky and the Porte.

On the contrary, all the letters which I have seen, up to the 12th of April, describe in the most consoling terms, the harmony and cordiality which appeared to prevail between the Russian chargé d'affaires and the Ottoman government.

But Count Nesselrode states that the Porte has refused to restore the

status quo in the Principalities, that it even denies that it ever contracted an engagement to that effect, and that this point is now at issue between the Reis Effendi and the Russian chargé d'affaires.

Now I really must say that the only *status quo* which I ever understood the Porte to accept, was, that which regarded the *military* occupation of the two Provinces.

It would have been absolutely impossible for me to have undertaken a negotiation for the complete restitution of matters in all respects, *civil* as well as *military*, to the ground on which they stood before the revolt, because I was well aware that abuses and infractions of privileges might have been introduced at that period, of the precise nature and extent of which I was necessarily altogether ignorant, and which, in fact, could be understood only by a Russian. For there are a multitude of private arrangements and conventions between Russia and the Porte which rest upon *Firmans* and *Hattischerifs* that have never been made public, and, indeed, have always been studiously kept secret by Russia, except when it has been requisite to manufacture a complaint against the Ottoman government. It would have been in vain for me to have entered into this labyrinth, and accordingly I never proposed to the Porte anything beyond the *removal of the troops*, which measure would have given Russia an opportunity of sending back her agent-general into the Provinces, and of thus rectifying all abuses that might have been introduced during the three years of his absence, and it must not be forgotten that Russia *repeatedly promised* to the Porte *as the price of the* DÉMARCHE DE COURTOISIE in 1823, that she would send back her agents to the Principalities.

This promise, like other Russian promises made in the course of these transactions, has hitherto been evaded, and, I repeat, that until it be fulfilled (and there can be no reason for not fulfilling it, since even Russia will not pretend that the Porte has failed in her engagements on *commercial points*) the two Principalities, will continue to be a fertile ground of complaint and dissatisfaction. I had said on another occasion that whenever Russia wants to get up a grievance against the Porte, it is *there* that she looks for it, and is sure to find it; and this must ever be the case so long as she refuses to establish her agent there, armed with the authority given by treaties to watch over and protect the privileges of the inhabitants, whether specified in those treaties or merely conventional arrangements, depending on grants from the Sultan, which the *Russian* public servant only can be expected to know, and which no other person can either understand or enforce.

STRANGFORD.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Gloucester Lodge, 29th May, 1825.

The enclosed papers relate to a matter which might appear, at first view, to be of very little importance; but which is of a different character, when one considers the pretension which it indicates, and the consequences to which, if we yield the first step, it may lead.

The Russian Embassy have thought fit to determine that they will give

no passports for Russia, and will not even *visa* mine, unless accompanied with a *letter of recommendation* from me, or from one of the Under Secretaries of State. Such letter I will never give, nor suffer to be given.

The passport of the Foreign Office has always hitherto been sufficient throughout Europe, and I will not be party to its degradation.

It is quite obvious that if such an auxiliary document as is required was given in one instance, it would be required in all; and a passport *without* such an accompaniment would thenceforth become of no authority.

If we yield this point to Russia, it will immediately be pressed upon us by Austria, Prussia, and France. Remember the Austrian Police Report (which transpired, I dare say, contrary to the intention of the Court of Vienna), excluding by name certain English individuals from the Austrian territories.

I made no remonstrance; because we cannot dispute the right of any Sovereign to exclude any foreigners from his dominions. But it is quite another thing to enforce upon foreign governments a new condition; which, if it is peculiar to England, is an affront; if it is to be general and reciprocal throughout Europe, would constitute such a revolution in the established rules of international courtesy and intercourse as ought not to be made, (if at all), without full and common deliberation.

I am quite confident that this attempt of Russia is but the beginning of the system; and that our stand must be made here.

Believe me ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—I shall take no step with Lieven, or with the individuals, till I know your opinion. But the letter I will not give.

G. C.

P.P.S.—Possibly it may be advisable to have a meeting of the Cabinet upon the subject.

G. C.

[471.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

King's Lodge, Windsor,
31st May, 1825.

MY DEAR MR. CANNING,

I return the papers in the box.

There is one point on which the Russian Minister relies, respecting which Lord Strangford is not so clear as upon others. It relates to the Beshli Agas.

It appears that the Beshlis are Mahometans in the service of the Princes, for the purpose of keeping order in the Principalities among Mahometans visiting those countries. These were heretofore selected by the Prince, and placed by him under the direction of Beshli Agas appointed by the Princes.

It appears now that the Beshlis are troops in the service of the Porte, and that the Porte have appointed the Beshli Agas;

and that they are officers of rank. If this be true, there is no doubt that the nature of the institution is altered. Exclusive of other objections to the independence of the Beshlis of the authority of the Princes, founded upon the nature of the duties which they have to perform in the Principalities, it is clear that the treaty is not performed, and that the troops of the Porte are not withdrawn, as long as this system continues. Lord Strangford says that the presence of the Russian agent in the Principalities was to set all right. This is true in respect to the ordinary transactions of the government; but I believe that the treaty ought first to be carried into execution.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 4th June, 1825.

Here are Lord Strangford's answers to the questions suggested by your last note. I think they appear to be satisfactory.

In truth, Russia is seeking excuses to put off indefinitely the sending of Ribeaupierre to Constantinople, with the intention of having her other grounds of quarrel with the Porte entire, in case she should at any time see occasion to employ force in favour of the Greeks.

It is to be observed that M. Minciacky shares none of the doubts of his government, as to the fulfilment of the Turkish engagements with Lord Strangford; and also that he had not when the last accounts came from Constantinople received *any* communication from his Court, subsequent to the opening of his commission as chargé d'affaires.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,

very sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

MEMORANDUM OF THE ANSWERS OF LORD STRANGFORD TO THE QUERIES PUT TO HIM.

4th June, 1825.

Not having access to all my Turkish papers I can answer most of the questions which have been put to me from memory only.

The Beshlis ("*squads of five*," for such is the exact translation of the term) are and always have been Mahomedans. They are in point of fact in the service of the Hospodars, because they act under their government, but they hardly can be considered as under the *orders* of the princes, because there is no example in Turkish polity of Mahomedans or true believers being placed under the control, or of their holding employments at the pleasure of infidels.

There may have been instances (perhaps frequently) of the *recommendation* of the princes having been attended to; but I am quite confident that their *right* to *nominate* has never been admitted in general practice; at all events treaty is silent on the subject.

With regard to the number of those troops I can speak with some degree of certainty as to Wallachia, because I have now before me a memorandum relating to the province, on the correctness of which I can depend. I am less confident with respect to Moldavia.

Wallachia is divided into 17 Cadeliks, including the city of Bucharest. For each of these *Cadeliks* there resided a *Beshli Aga*,* having 40 men under him. Bucharest was the head-quarters of the *Agalar Agassi*, or chief of these Agas, with 100 men. This was the number of Beshlis in Prince Constantine Ipsilanti's time.

It is to be observed that these Beshlis were exclusive of the Pandours, Arnaoots, and other *Christian* troops who composed the body-guard of the Hospodars, and who were in all points under their orders, and commanded by the officers named by them. This corps does not now exist, the Princes and Boyards having themselves earnestly and repeatedly solicited that an additional number of Turkish Beshlis should be employed in lieu of it, and this additional number forms the excess of which Russia now complains. (On this subject I beg to refer to the inclosed extract (A) of my despatch, No. 63 of 1824). The Princes no longer wish to have Christian troops in their personal service, because they cannot forget that when the revolt broke out in Wallachia those troops instantly, and to a man, joined the insurgents; a circumstance which, were it again to occur, would make their own fidelity suspected by the Porte, and place them perhaps in a very perilous situation.

The Beshlis Agas (who are, in fact, non-commissioned officers of a rank inferior to that of Corporal in European armies) are officers in the service of the Porte. But the nature of the institution is altered thereby. For, as I have said above, the Princes might *recommend*, but certainly, as far as I can learn, never had a recognised *right to appoint*.

The treaty is in my view of it *executed*, even while the present system continues. In support of this opinion I cite *Russian* evidence, the evidence of M. de Minciacky himself, recorded in an official letter from the Internuncio to me of the 24th May, 1824, of which I add (B) a copy.

In this letter, M. de Minciacky is represented as expressing his entire acquiescence in the arrangements made by the Porte respecting the number of Beshlis which were to remain in Wallachia (*which number was subsequently diminished*) by the voluntary and unsolicited act of the Porte (vide annexed extract (C) of a letter from M. de Fleischhackel to M. de Minciacky of July 12th), his astonishment that I should *still* consider the evacuation as imperfect, and his conviction that his government would not see any grounds for dissatisfaction in the trifling excess of the number of Turkish troops retained by the Porte beyond that which had been stationed there in former times.

Beshlis	680
Additional number at Bucharest	60
Beshli Agas	17
	757

In answer to the last question which has been put to me, I must declare that there is no infraction of treaties (at least of public treaties) of which I am aware, which should prevent the Russian government from re-establishing its agents in the Principalities. Even when there did exist a far greater number of troops in the Principalities than are now quartered there, and when consequently (if supposed infractions of treaties are to be measured by the *number* of troops) Russia had a greater right to complain than she has now—even then she was fully prepared to send back her agents, and actually made more than one promise to that effect.

I cannot conclude this Memorandum without requesting that reference may be made to my despatches, Nos. 102 and 105 of 1824, which express the sentiments not only of the Turkish government, but of M. de Minciacky himself with reference to the delay in the appointment of a Russian Minister at Constantinople.

STRANGFORD.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [472.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 5th June, 1825.

I return the papers in the box.

It appears that Lord Strangford differs from the servants of the Russian government regarding the nature of the establishment of the Beshlis in the Principalities. I don't doubt that he is right.

But I must observe that I have never known an instance of the existence in any country of such an establishment as Lord Strangford describes which did not occasion constant disputes; and, indeed, the despatches in the box contain recitals of two abuses of power by the Beshli Agas. Indeed, such abuse is unavoidable.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [473]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 19th June, 1825.

I enclose a Memorandum upon the Portuguese case of Monte Video, written entirely from memory. But I believe it is quite correct, as I settled this case myself when at Paris during the occupation. It is curious enough that the omission of Spain to carry into execution this arrangement, to which refusal the Spanish government was instigated I believe entirely by the

intrigues of Pozzo di Borgo and Tatischeff, should have occasioned all their subsequent misfortunes.

If they had had a place d'Armes to which to send 10,000 men, instead of having to send an army to take such a place on La Plata, there would have been no mutiny at Cadiz; and they would have had 10,000 men in the strongest place and most healthy situation in South America, and would have certainly put an end to the revolution there, and eventually in Colombia.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM.

19th June, 1825.

In the course of the revolutionary contest at Buenos Ayres, a person appeared by the name of Artigas, who, although expelled from the city itself and its neighbourhood, had a body of armed followers of some consideration, and he obtained some successes in the Entre Rios and on the left bank of La Plata, of which last country and of Monte Video he obtained possession. From thence he attacked the Portuguese territories, and the Portuguese having reinforced their troops on the frontiers, and brought some troops, and even ships, from Portugal, drove back Artigas, and took from him Monte Video and the country on the left of La Plata, leaving him in possession of the Entre Rios.

The Spanish government then claimed Monte Video and its dependent territory from Portugal, and it was upon this claim that the mediation of Paris was founded. After long discussions it was at last settled that Portugal should restore Monte Video and its dependencies to Spain, on condition principally that Spain should pay to Portugal the expenses of the expedition by means of which Portugal had obtained possession of those territories, and the expenses of the occupation from the period of the signature of the Convention, by which the arrangements should be concluded, to that of the occupation of Monte Video, &c., by a corps of Spanish troops sufficient to maintain the possession.

The sum for the expenses of the expedition was fixed I think at six or seven millions of francs.

Other articles were agreed upon, principally relative to the frontier between Portugal and Spain, in that part of the world, as arising out of former treaties; but they are none of them material to the question now under consideration.

It is clear from what is above stated that the mediation between Portugal and Spain was founded, was carried on, and was concluded on the principle that Spain had a right to the possession of Monte Video and its dependencies, on condition only of the payment to Portugal of the expenses of the expulsion of Artigas, and of the occupation by Portugal till Spain should be prepared to occupy. If there were to be a negotiation between Don Pedro and the State of Buenos Ayres to-morrow, respecting the cession of Monte Video, the former would be entitled to claim the same terms.

The King of Portugal is now ceding all his rights in America to Don Pedro.

Portugal may be fairly deemed to have a lien upon Monte Video to the amount of the expenses incurred in the expedition fitted out by Portugal to expel Artigas from that place and its territory.

Is it not fair that when the King of Portugal cedes everything in America to Don Pedro, he should receive a value for this lien? Could not such an arrangement be made between father and son on this question under the mediation of this country as should recognize the rights of a third Power to the territory and place of Monte Video, and our own character as mediators in that question? Such a settlement might give us a little trouble, but it would certainly be equitable, and the endeavour to obtain it would be friendly to Portugal.

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD LIVERPOOL, London, 22nd June, 1825.

The period is approaching at which you will have to decide upon the dissolution of Parliament, and as it appears to me that your decision upon that subject will materially affect your position and that of Peel in the Roman Catholic Question, I venture to write you a few lines upon it.

The dissolution of Parliament, and the period of the dissolu-

tion, are questions for your own decision, rather than for that of any of your colleagues; and recent transactions and discussions will have shown you that the great majority even of those who differ from you upon the Roman Catholic Question are very little disposed to carry those differences so far as to embarrass you, or to endanger the existence of the government. In my opinion, then, you have only to decide on your measure, and you may be quite certain that your colleagues will support you, and that in so decided a manner as that probably none will in Cabinet state any objection.

It is impossible that, constituted as the government is, you should dissolve the Parliament upon the declared principle of an appeal to the people upon the Roman Catholic Question; neither should I think that you could in fairness dissolve the Parliament, if it had still two or three sessions to live. But as it is obvious that it must be dissolved at some period in this year, or be allowed, for the first time I believe since the Septennial Act, to expire after its full time after another session, it is surely not unfair that you should choose the period for the dissolution which is most convenient for the country, and most advantageous for your own views of government. Indeed I should contend that, viewing the Roman Catholic Question as you and Peel do, as one of principle, and seeing the difficulties and dangers from which by tranquillity and very good management alone we recently extricated ourselves, it is a point of duty to decide upon the period of the dissolution in reference only to the effect which that decision might produce eventually upon the Roman Catholic Question in the House of Commons.

I believe that nobody entertains any doubt upon that point. The opinion at present prevailing throughout the country is decidedly adverse to the claims of the Roman Catholics, and it would probably influence the returns from some places; and this, notwithstanding the neutrality of the government. Time, even a few months, will have its effect upon this opinion. The public attention may be turned to other subjects in the course of the summer, the Corn Question for instance; and in the autumn we may have a Parliament very different from that which we shall probably have if you should determine to dissolve as soon as the session is concluded.

I entreat you to turn this subject over in your mind, and to determine this question for yourself, in a view to your own

position and that of Peel in the government; and be assured of this, that there is no person in the government whose feeling for the Roman Catholic Question is so strong as to induce him to take any step to separate from you in consequence of your strengthening yourself upon this question, provided that there is no public manifestation of such intention.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Fife House, 23rd June, 1825.

I am most truly obliged to you for your letter and for the kind interest you are so good as to take about my situation in the government. I feel the full importance of the question of dissolution, but there would, at all events, have been considerable difficulties in carrying it into immediate effect at the close of session, particularly, in consequence of the very imprudent allusion to it in the Chancellor's speech upon the Catholic Bill.

The season is, however, too advanced, I think, to admit of it *now*. It has been usual either to dissolve Parliament in the month of June, before the hay and corn harvest, or after they are over, about the middle or end of September.

In the year 1818 parliament was prorogued and dissolved on the 10th of June, I do not believe there is an instance of parliament being dissolved in July, and we shall not be able to close our business so as to put an end to the session, before the 5th or 6th of that month.

The season is besides a forward one. We are now in the midst of the hay harvest, and the wheat is in blossom in all the southern counties.

Under all the circumstances, I am therefore of opinion, that after we have dispatched any business that immediately presses, it will be right for the Cabinet to agree to re-assemble about the 12th of September to consider the question of dissolution; and I should then strongly incline to recommend it, unless special and unforeseen circumstances should then occur to make it unadvisable.

This is the present impression of my mind on the subject of your letter; but I beg you to be assured that I feel most truly thankful to you for the communication of your sentiments upon this occasion. The King has not recently said anything to me about it. I understand he will not be adverse to close the session in person.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke,

very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

[475.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MEMORANDUM ON QUESTIONS IN AGITATION BETWEEN LORD BERESFORD AND THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT.

July, 1825.

The perusal of Lord Beresford's letter does not give a clear notion of what he wishes, and the Memorandum referred to in Lord Londonderry's despatch to Mr. Ward is not among the papers.

It appears, however, that he has two objects: the first that the sums of thirty-eight thousand pounds, being the supposed value of stores, &c., captured at Oporto and Almeida, and of twelve thousand pounds, being the value of stores captured at Vitoria, should be given by his Most Faithful Majesty to his army, including the British officers attached to that army.

It appears that the King of Portugal has given his consent to this arrangement; and at all events it has already been pressed upon his Most Faithful Majesty's attention by the Secretary of State, and there can be no objection to pressing this point over again.

The other object is that the portions of the above-mentioned sums, which are to be paid to the British officers who served in Portugal, should be paid out of money now in England at the disposal of Lord Beresford, being the donation of the British government to the Portuguese army at large.

It appears that, although the Portuguese government have agreed to comply with Lord Beresford's request upon this subject, this particular object had never been urged by his Majesty's minister at Lisbon; and particularly not by order of the Secretary of State.

The object is founded upon mistrust of his Most Faithful Majesty's means, or of his inclination to carry into execution his engagement to make a donation of these sums to his army.

But in neither case do I think the British government could have urged his Most Faithful Majesty to provide for the execution of his engagement towards the British officers who served his Most Faithful Majesty during the war, by allotting to those officers more than their due proportion of the sum which had been presented to the Portuguese army by his Majesty, and by depriving the Portuguese army of that which would thus have been allotted to the British officers.

But it is obvious that the King of Portugal has made an engagement to Lord Beresford that he will adopt this arrangement; and the question is whether this engagement had so far the cognizance of the British minister at Lisbon as to induce this government to endeavour to enforce its execution; or supposing it has not, whether the engagement is itself of a nature to induce this government to press its execution, even though the British minister had no knowledge of it.

Upon the first point I have no knowledge. Upon the last I should say that we ought to do everything in our power to induce the King of Portugal to carry into execution strictly his engagement to grant the thirty-eight thousand pounds and the twelve thousand pounds to his army, including the British officers; but that unless our minister at Lisbon supported Lord Beresford's negotiations on this point, and was positively instructed to do so, we ought not only not to enforce the execution of the engagement, and allot the British donation to this purpose; but we ought to prevent this allotment if in our power.

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Londonderry. [476.]

MY DEAR CHARLES, London, 2nd July, 1825.

I am very much obliged for the trouble you have taken respecting the discussion about me in the House of Commons. It is perfectly true that I never cared one pin about the matter, or its result. All that I wished was that if there should be an inquiry, it should be into the whole subject; and I wished yesterday that the letter to the Treasury of the 30th June should be laid before Parliament, principally, or indeed solely, because it appeared to be felt by you and others to whom I had spoken that the case did not stand well before the public after the discussion on Colonel FitzSimmons' petition.

What I felt respecting myself was this: that it was unfortunate that the term *insolent* should have been applied to me, and that nobody in Parliament should have noticed it, and particularly after the recent discussion respecting Sir Robert Wilson. This I found to be the feeling of others, particularly of officers of the army; and it will be the feeling abroad wherever our proceedings are attended to. But, as far as I am

personally concerned, and most particularly considering that I never gave the slightest ground for the application of such a term to me, I am totally indifferent to it, and I do not care if it remains recorded against me for ever.

I am really very much obliged to Robinson for the trouble he has taken, and I beg that if you refer to the subject again you will tell him that he was quite right in thinking that I did not care one pin about the matter.

I most sincerely congratulate you upon the birth of your son. I beg you to present my best compliments and congratulations to Lady Londonderry.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[477.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 7th July, 1825.

I return the papers in the box. It is unfortunate that this alteration was not made in France when the Dukes of Kent and Cumberland visited Paris; as the Ambassadors refused to those Princes, and I believe to the Duke of Cambridge, the precedence; and their Royal Highnesses submitted to this refusal. However, the case is well settled as far as it goes, and in my opinion we ought to acquiesce in the decision if other Powers do. The existing arrangement is very inconvenient to all parties; and unless the sons and brothers of emperors and kings submit to the pretension of precedence of ambassadors, the latter cannot meet the former at any third place in any foreign country.

But you will observe that this arrangement does not go the length of the case of the Duke of Brunswick. He is a reigning sovereign, but neither the son nor the brother of an emperor or of a king. A proposal might be made to amend the proposition to give the same precedence to reigning sovereign princes of a certain description.

The only modes of estimating the relative importance of reigning sovereigns are the population under their government respectively, or the strength of their contingent to the army of the confederacy.

The latter mode would apply only to the German sovereign

princes. Those of Italy, such as the Dukes of Modena and Lucca, must be estimated by the former.

I conceive that you cannot give any instruction upon this subject without submitting to the King all that has passed upon it, as well as the instruction itself. This should be done in personal communication if possible; if not, a Memorandum of Reference should accompany the papers.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the King. [478.]

London, 20th July, 1825.

I beg leave to submit to your Majesty the expediency of carrying into full operation in the corps of Engineers and Artillery the arrangement of your Majesty's Warrant of the 12th of August, 1814, in regard to the removal of officers holding the rank of Major-General from their regimental commissions, with the exception of the colonels commanders of battalions.

The object of this recommendation is to give promotion immediately in these corps respectively; to remove from the performance of active duties those probably not now the most fit to perform those duties; and to give these corps in future this channel for promotion which exists in all the regiments of the Line.

I have preferred to recommend to your Majesty this mode of granting promotion to that of forming an invalid battalion, of which I had the option, because at the same time that it is not more expensive, it will extend promotion throughout all ranks, and will place the corps of Artillery and Engineers on the same footing with those of the army upon the occasion of the future periodical promotions by brevet. The operation of the plan at present will be first, to place upon the list of unattached General Officers receiving the pay of 1*l.* 6*s.* per diem the following General Officers who are Colonels of the Artillery and Engineers respectively.

Secondly. To promote to the rank of Colonels the following officers of the Line corps respectively.

Thirdly. To promote officers in the several ranks in succession, whose names I will hereafter submit to your Majesty.

If your Majesty should be most graciously pleased to approve of this arrangement, I will hereafter submit to your Majesty the necessary Warrants for its regulation, and for that of other matters connected with the retired pay and allowances to officers of the corps serving under the Ordnance, widows' pensions, &c.

The General Officers who will be removed from their regimental commissions under this arrangement will retain their eligibility to employment when their services may be required, and their claims to succeed to the command of battalions under the arrangement approved of by your Majesty of February, 1824.

WELLINGTON.

Lord Strangford to the Right Hon. George Canning.

SIR, London, 3rd Sept., 1825.

After a careful consideration of the despatch, with which you honoured me on the 26th July, it appears to me that the most satisfactory mode of arranging the information, which you require, would be by a detailed examination of the following points:—

1st. What were the precise demands of Russia on the Porte, as entrusted to me, at, and subsequently to, the Congress of Verona?

2nd. What measures were taken by me, in support of those demands. And did the measures so taken comprise the whole of the Russian claims as made known to me at Verona, or as afterwards set forth in instructions from my own court, or from that of St. Petersburg?

3rd. What was the extent of the engagements taken by the Porte in reference to the Russian demands?

4th. To what degree have those engagements been fulfilled by the Turkish government?

Previously to my journey to Verona in October, 1822, I had, in point of fact, been charged with the chief direction of the negotiations at Constantinople, not in virtue of any specific authority from the Russian Cabinet, but in consequence of a general understanding among the Allied Courts that *Austria* should take the lead in those negotiations. But Prince Metternich had, or thought he had, reason to distrust the *temper*, and to doubt the *personal influence* of Count Lützow, then the Austrian Internuncio at Constantinople, and perceiving that Great Britain had acquired considerable authority over the councils of the Divan, he endeavoured to turn that circumstance to account, by addressing his instructions to his own minister, while he confided the execution of those instructions to the British ambassador, and by directing the Internuncio to leave in every case the initiative to me. In this distribution of duties, my own Court, tacitly at least, concurred.

During the period of the transactions at Constantinople (that is from

February, 1822, to September in that year), the objects which we were endeavouring to gain, were:—

1st. The evacuation of the Principalities, and the nomination of the Hospodars.

2nd. The assurance to the Greek subjects of the Porte of the free exercise of their religion, as secured to them by treaty.

3rd. The reconstruction or reparation of the Greek churches, which had suffered in the late disturbances.

4th. The making a due discrimination in the exercise of the sovereign Power, between those peaceable and innocent Greeks who adhered to their allegiance, and submitted themselves to the law, and those who bore arms, or were in revolt against the State; and further, the securing, as far as possible, to the former, effectual protection against all arbitrary and oppressive acts whatever, and especially against persecutions on account of their religion.

(*Vide* Baron Stroganoff's Mémoire to the Porte of July 6th, 1821, and the Marquis of Londonderry's note to Count Lieven of April 27th, 1822).

After my conference with the Turkish ministers of February 16th, 1822, two additional demands were brought forward by Russia, and I was charged by the Austrian Cabinet (under the sanction of my own Court) with the duty of supporting them, viz.:—

1st. The sending of a Turkish Plenipotentiary or Commissioner, or more, to treat with one or more named by Russia.

2nd. The renewal of the act of amnesty (which had already been proclaimed) in such terms as would introduce a *permanent* amelioration in the political condition of the Greek subjects of the Porte.

As these two additional propositions were decidedly rejected by the Porte, it will not be necessary to trouble you with an account of the various attempts made by me and my colleagues to procure their adoption.

Returning, therefore, to the four points, which, during the period above mentioned (*i. e.* up to my departure for Verona) formed the *original* Russian ultimatum, I have to state, that they were all substantially admitted, and, as far as time and circumstances allowed, executed by the Porte.

In the first place, the evacuation of the Principalities was effected, to the extent, at least, which, up to that date the ministers of the Allied Courts at Constantinople always understood Russia to mean.

The amount of troops originally stationed there, at the demand of Baron Stroganoff *himself* (*vide* my despatch No. 8 of 1821), was 30,000 men, according to the *avowal* of the *Turkish* ministers themselves (*vide* my despatch No. 166 of 1821). By slow degrees the greater part of this vast body was removed, and at the time of my passage through Bucharest on my road to Vienna in September, 1822, there remained 1500 men in Greater Wallachia, 500 in the Lesser, and scarcely a thousand in Moldavia. These corps sustained shortly afterwards a still further reduction, an official account of which reached Vienna nearly at the time of my arrival there. (*Vide* my despatch No. 154). Besides the removal of the Turkish armies, thus effected, the Porte, in further compliance with the demands of Russia, proceeded to appoint the Hospodars, and had actually sent them to their respective posts, where they were in the full exercise of their powers and functions at the moment of my passage through the Principalities.

In the second place (still referring to the *four* points of the *original*

Russian ultimatum) the Porte had given the most substantial and satisfactory proofs of its anxious desire to secure to the Greeks the full and free exercise of their religion (*vide* my despatches Nos. 123, 129, 135, and 136, of 1822).

With respect to the *third* point in the ultimatum, the permission of the Porte for the reconstruction of the Greek churches and chapels, destroyed or damaged by the populace in 1821, was distinctly proclaimed in all the official communications from the Ottoman government to the ministers of the Allies at Constantinople. It was at no time contended by the latter that the churches should be rebuilt at the expense of the Porte, nor would such a demand have been either reasonable in itself, or conformable to the tenets of the Mahomedan law. At the same time, the Porte did give a very remarkable proof of its disposition to go as far as possible in meeting the wishes of Russia on this subject by granting a large sum of money, for the repairs of the patriarchal church and residence (*vide* my despatch No.*).

As to the *fourth* of the Russian demands (contained in what was termed per ultimatum) it was one of which the admission could only be proved by a progressive series of facts. It was clearly not to be expected that any government styling or considering itself independent, should descend to the humiliation of publicly engaging at the requisition of a foreign Power, to act according to the simple dictates of common reason and justice.

But the series of facts by which the practical admission of this demand was shown, had begun to exist long before my departure for Vienna.

The scenes of bloodshed and massacre, which had disgraced Constantinople in 1821, had altogether ceased, and had been succeeded by a most commendable system of moderation and clemency on the part of the government.

I have thus traced the progress made in the adoption of the original Russian ultimatum up to October, 1822, because it was necessary to define the state of the question at that period, previously to any consideration of the four subjects, which, at the beginning of this letter, I proposed to examine. I shall now proceed to that examination.

1st. It will hardly be requisite to remind you in this place, of the ungracious reception which I met at Vienna from the Emperor of Russia and his ministers. They were discontented with what they considered the feebleness of my efforts to repel the charges, which the Turkish government had brought against the Russian agents in the Levant, during the course of my negotiations at Constantinople on the two supplementary points above mentioned (viz., the permanent amendment of the political condition of the Greeks, and the sending Turkish Plenipotentiaries to meet and confer with those of Russia). The dissatisfaction manifested by the Emperor Alexander originated, according to his Imperial Majesty's own avowal, in this circumstance alone, and not in any failure, on my part, to obtain the four original objects of negotiation, which (I repeat) I considered to have been sufficiently secured when I arrived at Vienna.

That this last opinion was also that of Prince Metternich himself, is shown by my despatch from Vienna, No. 151, and by that of his Majesty's ambassador at that Court, No. 12 of 1822.

In fact, on my arrival at Vienna and for some time afterwards, I had so

* Blank in manuscript.

little notion that Russia was dissatisfied with the manner in which her original ultimatum had been admitted and executed by the Porte, that I considered the necessity, under which the Emperor found himself, of doing something to "*améliorer le sort des Grecs,*" and of coming to a full understanding thereon with his Allies, as the only points remaining to be adjusted previously to the renewal of diplomatic relations between Russia and the Porte.

The circular note of Count Nesselrode to the ministers of the Allies (dated Vienna, Sept. 14th (26th), 1822) contained an *entirely new set of demands*, only one of which bore upon, or related to, the *original* and (as I thought) already accomplished ultimatum.

Those demands embraced :—

1st. The pacification of Greece, for effecting which two modes were proposed, either the giving guarantees to the Greeks according to the terms of the Austrian Memorandum of April 19th, 1822, or a series of facts, demonstrating to Russia that the Porte respected the Greek religion, placed (as the Russian note assumes) by treaty under the protection of Russia, and that the Porte was seeking to re-establish the internal tranquillity of Greece, on a basis, which would furnish to Russia the certainty of a durable peace being maintained, which would satisfy her as to the fate of her *coréligionnaires*, and hold out to them real pledges of security and happiness.

2nd. The affairs of Wallachia and Moldavia, which demand consisted solely in the unexpected requisition that the Porte should address a *direct communication* to Russia, announcing that the Turkish armies had been withdrawn, and the Hospodars appointed. And it was promised in the same note, that if this communication was made, the Russian agents should return to the Principalities, to ascertain whether the measures taken by the Porte, and by the new Princes, corresponded with the stipulations of treaty, and in case of necessity, to remedy in Wallachia and Moldavia the evils and irregularities which might have arisen from the prolonged military occupation of those countries.

I beg to annex an extract of this part of the Russian note, together with an extract of the declaration entered on the Protocol of the Conference held at Vienna on the 9th November, 1822, which are important, in as much as they prove that on the performance of a certain condition (which condition *was* performed) Russia *did engage to re-establish her Consulate in the Principalities*. And I cannot but think that it is solely in consequence of that promise not having been fulfilled, and of the Conservative Powers of the Russian Consulate in the Principalities not having been revived, that Russia is now accommodated with a new pretext for complaining of the Porte.

The *third* of the *new* demands of Russia, contained in the note of September 14th (26th), related to commercial grievances. Russia exacted not only the abrogation of certain restrictions on trade and navigation, which had been introduced at Constantinople subsequently to the departure of M. de Stroganoff, but also that the Porte should either permit vessels belonging to Powers which had not acquired by treaty the right to pass into the Black Sea, to navigate in that sea, as formerly, under *borrowed* flags, or to grant to the ships of those Powers an acknowledged right to navigate them under their own flag.

These three demands of Russia were the subject of many conferences at Verona, of which, as I did not assist at them, I can here give no account. But the result of them was, that the Emperor of Russia (having graciously restored to me that confidence which had been withdrawn) was pleased to desire that I should continue to be charged with the chief direction of the negotiations at Constantinople, and that I should return to my post with such instructions as (founded upon the conferences) the Duke of Wellington might think proper to give me.*

Those instructions were contained in a Memorandum under date of November 28th, 1822. They turned upon the three following points:—

1st. The *series of facts* required by Russia.

2nd. The "*démarche de courtoisie*," in other words, the letter from the Porte to the Russian Cabinet, announcing the evacuation of the Principalities, and the nomination of the Hospodars.

And 3rd. The adjustment of the commercial question. The Duke of Wellington's Memorandum (in other words, the *instructions under which I was to act*) does not contain, as you will perceive, one syllable respecting the *imperfect evacuation* of the Principalities, nor was I directed by his Grace to make any complaint or remonstrance to the Porte respecting it. This fact is sufficient to show that his Grace, up to the moment of my departure from Verona, shared the general opinion of the Allies, that Russia had nothing more to require on that score.

On my return to Constantinople I proceeded to execute the instructions contained in the Duke's Memorandum. With the utmost difficulty I extorted from the Porte the "*démarche de courtoisie*," on which I had been told (and on which I had told the Porte) that the re-establishment of the Russian Consulate in the Principalities was to depend.

As to the *series of facts*, I could do no more than watch over and promote it by every means in my power. And with respect to commercial matters, a variety of circumstances connected with the changes in the Turkish ministry, and a multitude of vexatious conflicts with the Porte, in which our own immediate interests were essentially involved, prevented me from effectually attending to them, for some months after my return.

On the 28th of February, 1822, I communicated to Count Nesselrode the success of my endeavours to obtain from the Porte the "*démarche de courtoisie*."

It was not till the 4th July that I received the Russian minister's answer to my letter of the 28th February.

That answer contained (what I had not before received) a precise and detailed statement of the Russian grievances on the subject of commerce, and of the demands of that Cabinet thereon. But it contained, moreover, a demand that a still further reduction should be effected in the number of troops yet remaining in the Principalities, and retained there (*vide* my No. 130 of 1822) at the earnest request of the Princes themselves, who had made the success of that request the *condition* of their assumption of the Hospodarate.

To these demands was added one of an entirely new description—that for the release of a Wallachian Boyard, who had been arrested for malversation in his public accounts.

* See vol. i. of these *Despatches*, pp. 598—604.

Of the demands thus contained in Count Nesselrode's letter of the 7th May, there was but *one* which I could consider as strictly a *sine quâ non* condition of the restoration of friendly relations between Russia and Turkey, because it was the only one of those specified in my instructions from the Duke of Wellington which yet remained unsatisfied, namely, the commercial questions.

I accordingly engaged in this most complicated and difficult negotiation; and on the 22nd of September, 1823, I had the satisfaction of announcing to Count Nesselrode that I had succeeded in every part of it, and that I had been so fortunate (as I believed then and as I believe still) as to place the commercial relations of Russia with Turkey on a *better* footing in sundry respects than that on which they had stood at any former period.

My letter to Count Nesselrode contained, moreover, an explanation of the reasons which had induced me to refrain (in the negotiation just concluded) from any attempt to procure what was termed "*the Pacification of Greece*," together with a frank and full statement of the arguments urged by the Ottoman ministers against any further reduction in the numbers of the Turkish police stationed in the Principalities, and against the release of the Boyard Vellarà; on each of which points I had touched at my conference, but which most certainly I had not put forward as *indispensable conditions* of peace.

My letter to Count Nesselrode (of the 22nd September) found his Excellency at Czernowitz, where the intelligence of the successful termination of the *Commercial Negotiation* was received with the utmost satisfaction, and produced the resolution of sending M. de Minciacky to Constantinople charged with the duty of superintending the interests of Russian trade and navigation in Turkey.

In a letter to me of September 28 (October 10) announcing this resolution, Count Nesselrode again adverted to the imperfect evacuation of the Principalities and to the affair of the Boyard Vellarà, and strongly urged me not to leave my work incomplete by neglecting to obtain the satisfactory adjustment of those points.

But as, in my letter to Prince Metternich of September 22nd, I had very plainly expressed my opinion that Russia had no reasonable ground for insisting on these points, and as Prince Metternich had begun to doubt whether I should be disposed to engage in an entirely new negotiation to obtain the admission thereof by the Porte, his Highness instructed the Internuncio to charge himself with the chief direction of the affair (*vide* the conclusion of my despatch, No. 152, of 1823), and I accordingly contented myself with the office of seconding that minister's efforts on the subject of the evacuation, reserving to myself the exclusive management of Vellarà's affair, which I thought I could arrange through other channels than the Porte.

As to the evacuation of the Principalities, I saw plainly that there was but one chance of success, namely, the giving a distinct assurance to the Porte (already wearied and disgusted with a never-ending succession of new pretensions and demands) that this, *i. e.* the reduction of the troops in the Principalities to the number stationed there in peaceable times, was positively to be the *last* of the Russian pretensions—the *last*, at all events, with which Great Britain would charge herself, and that, upon its being complied with, Russia would forthwith send her minister to the Porte.

I wrote to this effect to Sir C. Bagot and to my own Court.

In the mean time the Internuncio's efforts completely failed. On the 8th November the Porte gave, in the form of an official note, a decided refusal to the demand which he had made of a further reduction in the number of troops.

The negotiation thus sustained a temporary check, and no further progress was made in it until the arrival of your permission that I might continue to occupy my former place in the transactions at Constantinople—"questionable" though the Russian demand for the removal of the remaining troops appeared to you to be.

I was preparing to take up the negotiation where the Internuncio had left it, when M. Minciacky arrived at Constantinople. But almost immediately afterwards I was forced into a multitude of anxious and troublesome contests with the Porte respecting the Russian tariff—the mode of levying duties on Russian produce—and especially the novel and even equivocal character with which M. Minciacky was invested. These disputes prevented me for some time from bringing the question of the evacuation before the Porte. But during this interval I received, through Sir C. Bagot, most important and valuable means of negotiating with effect. His Excellency informed me, under date of the 14th (26th) December, 1823, that "his Imperial Majesty had deigned to authorise me to declare to the Porte, in his name, that so soon as the Principalities should be fairly restored to that state, *in so much as regarded their occupation by Turkish troops*, in which they were previously to the breaking out of the late troubles, his Imperial Majesty would engage to send his *minister* to the Porte, and to renew his ancient diplomatic relations with the Ottoman government."

In another part of the same despatch Sir C. Bagot quotes the precise terms employed by the Russian minister on this occasion. They are particularly worthy of notice, as they prove to a demonstration that it was the restoration of the *status quo* of the Principalities, in a MILITARY SENSE ONLY, which Russia had then in view, and that no mention was at that time made by her of the CIVIL STATUS QUO.

I annex a copy of Sir C. Bagot's despatch; and as the whole question now at issue turns upon the exact words of the engagement which I was, in virtue of that despatch, authorised to offer to the Porte, in the Emperor's name, I beg most earnestly to recommend it to your attention.

With the powerful means of negotiation thus supplied me (the very means which I myself had solicited), I proceeded to require from the Turks the admission of the *last point*, on which the Emperor of Russia had solemnly declared the renewal of his diplomatic relations with the Porte to depend. At my conference with the Ottoman ministers on the 23rd June, this point was finally conceded. They agreed to reduce the number of Beshlis in the proportion of *one-half*, and as all the information which my colleagues or I could collect showed that such a reduction would render the number to remain in the provinces *even less* than that of the troops cantoned there in ordinary times, I did not hesitate to close at once with the Turkish proposals. I communicated this result to Count Nesselrode on the 29th of June, and I represented it to him (as I was fairly entitled to do) to be the final act of the negotiations with which I had been entrusted. That his Excellency recognised it to be such, his reply to me of the 16th August abundantly shows.

I proceed now to the consideration of the next in order of the four divisions under which I have proposed to class the subjects of this despatch, namely, "*what measures were taken by me in support of Russian demands, and did the measures so taken comprise the whole of the Russian claims?*" &c.

It would, I conceive, be an unpardonable abuse of your indulgence were I here to recapitulate in detail the substance of each and every note which I addressed to the Porte, between my return from Verona and the date of my final transactions at Constantinople on Russian affairs. A recent and careful examination of the whole of that correspondence enables me to assert, in the most positive manner, that those notes did actually and fully comprehend *all* the demands of Russia, as they had been made known to me at various times, with the exception only of, 1st., the pacification of Greece; and 2nd, the release of the Boyard Vellarà.

I could not make the former of these points the subject of an official demand, for the reasons alleged in my letter to Count Nesselrode of the 22nd September, 1823, and, above all, for that most important and cogent reason, the want of instructions from my Court.

I did not choose to introduce the affair of Vellarà into my *official* communications to the Porte, because I knew that I had other and better means of carrying that point. Those means were resorted to, and complete success attended them.

Adverting now to the third subject which I proposed to examine in this despatch, namely, "*the nature and extent of the obligations contracted by the Turkish government,*" I have to state that (subsequently to its recognition of the four points constituting the original Russian ultimatum) the Porte engaged—

1st. To make a direct communication to the Russian government announcing the removal of the Turkish armies (as effected previously to the Congress of Verona) and the nomination of the Hospodars.

2nd. To abrogate the restrictions which had been imposed upon Russian commerce, and principally upon the transit through the Bosphorus of the produce of Southern Russia.

3rd. To admit to the navigation of the Black Sea, under their own flag and on terms suitable to the interests of the contracting parties, such ships as had hitherto surreptitiously passed into that sea under borrowed flags, an abuse which the Porte had resolved no longer to tolerate.

4th. To continue to furnish the *série des faits* demanded by Russia, by abstaining from religious persecution, and by admitting such of the revolted Greeks as should submit, to the full and fair benefit of the amnesty, and, in general, by acting upon a system of clemency and moderation towards them.

5th. To release the Boyard Vellarà.

6th. To withdraw *one-half* of the troops still stationed in the Principalities, *i. e.* to reduce the number of Beshlis to that existing there in ordinary times, and generally to restore matters in those provinces, as far as depended on the Porte, to the *status ante bellum.*

This is the summary of the engagements contracted by the Porte. It now remains to consider the fourth point, namely, *how far these engagements have been fulfilled.*

1st. The direct communication to the government of Russia, announcing the retreat of the Turkish armies and the nomination of the Princes, was made in February, 1823. The condition, therefore, on the fulfilment of

which Russia promised that she would re-establish her Consulate in the Principalities, *was* duly executed by the Porte.

2nd. The vexatious restrictions under which Russian commerce had laboured were successively removed by the mixed Commission appointed for the purpose by the British Embassy and the Porte; and, to this hour, I have not heard of the Turkish government having failed in the execution of any one of the arrangements made by that Commission.

3rd. The free navigation of the Black Sea was granted to the Sardinians under the mediation of the British Embassy. I believe that the only power which has since made an attempt to procure the same privilege is Denmark. The Danish negotiation failed; and I cannot but think that its failure is to be attributed in a great degree to the negotiator. It must be remembered that the Porte was under no obligation to accord this privilege *gratuitously* to such Powers as might solicit it. She *did* accord it gratuitously, it is true, in the case of Sardinia; but then she expressly declared that she waved her right to an *equivalent* from that government solely out of deference and respect for Great Britain, the mediating power. The terms of the engagement by which the Porte consented to admit the excluded flags purported that they were to be admitted "*sur des conditions que seraient de la convenance réciproque.*" I have the honour to enclose an extract of that part of the Reis Effendi's official message of the 10th September, 1823, which refers to this point. Now, if the Danish negotiator was either not empowered to offer such conditions as would be "*de la convenance*" of the Porte, or if he could not succeed in making those which he had to offer acceptable to the Turkish government, it is fair to think that the *whole* blame of the failure of the negotiation is not to be charged to the account of the Porte. I certainly believe that if circumstances had allowed his Majesty's Embassy to undertake the management of that negotiation (as in the case of Sardinia) the result would have been widely different, because I would not have hesitated one moment to admit the point, on which I understand it to have been broken off by M. de Clausewitz (viz. the right of *pre-emption* claimed by the Porte), on the same terms and with the same securities against its *abuse* as had been agreed upon in the case of Sardinia. Those securities have been found to be adequate and effectual. There has not been, I am credibly informed, the slightest attempt on the part of the Turkish government to evade them; and had they been also resorted to in the case of Denmark, I am persuaded that they would have proved equally efficacious, and that the Danish negotiator might safely have ventured on an arrangement for the admission of that flag into the Black Sea, similar in all respects to that which I concluded for Sardinia.

4th. The *fourth* of the Turkish engagements has been fulfilled, as far as it was in the power of such a government to fulfil it. The *série des faits* has been uninterrupted, and I believe that even the Russian Cabinet will not deny that the Porte has done everything, within its means, to secure to the Greeks (not in arms against it) the full exercise of their religion, and the enjoyment of that undisturbed tranquillity to which, as loyal and peaceable individuals, they are as well entitled as any other class of the Sultan's subjects. Persecutions have ceased, and an order of things, far different from that which so unhappily prevailed during the earlier period of the Greek revolt, has been successfully and steadily maintained.

5th. The Poyard Vellará was not only set at liberty, but a free pardon

was granted to him as a compensation for what Russia considered the illegal and irregular manner in which he had in the first instance been put under arrest.

6th. The reduction of the troops in *Wallachia* to the extent promised by the Porte on the 23rd June, 1824, was immediately effected. In *Moldavia* that operation was delayed for nearly three months after the promise of the Porte had been given, in consequence of a variety of untoward circumstances—one, and not the least powerful of which was, the *conviction* all along entertained by the Porte that its sacrifices and concessions were made in vain, and that Russia was not sincere in her engagement to send a minister to Constantinople—a conviction originally inspired by the terms in which the ukase announcing M. de la Ribeaupierre's appointment was drawn up.

But this reduction was at last effected in Moldavia also; and it cannot surely be pretended that Russia *was not satisfied* with the extent to which it *was* effected, since M. de Minciacky, immediately on receiving the official intelligence thereof, proceeded to present his credential letter as chargé d'affaires, which step had been constantly declared by Russia *to depend upon the evacuation of the Principalities.* I presume, therefore, that this fact may fairly be taken as a *proof* that the Porte had then executed the condition announced to me in the Emperor's name by Sir C. Bagot on the 14th (26th) December, 1823, and that the Principalities *were* restored to that state, *in so much as regarded their occupation by Turkish troops*, in which they were previously to the breaking out of the troubles.

These expressions of the Emperor of Russia plainly demonstrate that it was the restoration of the *military status quo* which his Imperial Majesty had then in view, and which I was instructed to procure from the Porte.

It would now appear that the Russian government claims the restoration of the *civil status quo* (of which assuredly no mention whatever was made in the Emperor's communication to me through Sir C. Bagot on the 14th (26th) December), that is, the restoration of the administration of the Principalities to the same state, in all points, as that in which it was previously to 1821. The Russians represent this as a *promise made to me by the Porte.* The latter denies having made such a promise.

I must now distinctly declare that the *only status quo* which I proposed to the Turkish government as the *condition* of the return of a Russian minister, or which I understood them to accept as such, was that which respected *military occupation.*

It is perfectly true that at my conference of June 23rd, 1824, I did insist upon a promise from the Porte of the re-establishment in the Principalities of all matters, *generally*, upon the footing on which they stood before 1821. The Porte *did* give me an assurance to that effect, and I announced it in my letter to Count Nesselrode of June 29th. But I positively declare that I understood, and I am confident that the Porte understood also, that this promise meant no more than that, when circumstances permitted, *i. e.* when the Russian Agent-General should have returned to his post in the Principalities, and should have undertaken there the superintendence of Russian rights and interests, the Porte would attend to *his* suggestions and execute *his* demands for the complete restoration of matters to their former state.

It would clearly have been impossible for me to have entered into any negotiation for the re-establishment of an order of things, of the precise nature and details of which I could absolutely know nothing. The rights

and privileges of Russia in the Principalities depend, not upon public treaties alone, but upon a multitude of *hattischerifs*, firmans, notes from the Porte, and other local and particular arrangements, which have never been made public, which it is the practice and the interest of Russian policy to keep secret, and which nobody but the servants of the Russian government *can* ever know anything about. Many, perhaps most of those unpublished stipulations, are unknown to, or altogether forgotten by, even the ministers of the Porte, and are never thought of by them except when Russia, having some complaint to manufacture or some grievance to get up, proceeds to rouse their recollection. Knowing all this, and knowing, moreover, that *my object* was *to hasten as much as possible the return of a Russian minister*, it is not likely that I should have encumbered the negotiation with an entirely new *condition*, NOT specified by Russia herself (*vide* the terms of the Emperor's communication to me), which condition might, for ought I knew, embrace such a variety and extent of details, that its complete execution would perhaps be deferred to an indefinite time, and with it the return of a Russian minister, which I was so anxiously endeavouring to accelerate. But I did as much as I thought I could safely venture upon. I obtained from the Porte the full recognition of the right of Russia to insist upon the re-establishment of the GENERAL *status quo*, and a promise that it *should* be re-established; but I repeat that I believed, and that the Porte believed, that the restoration of THIS STATUS QUO was to depend on the return to the Principalities of the Russian Agent-General, armed with the authority conferred upon him by treaty, and provided with that knowledge of what Russia was entitled to exact (in virtue of the secret as well as the *public* engagements of the Porte), which a *Russian only* could fully possess.

For a more detailed statement of the grounds on which I have always considered the fulfilment of the Russian promise, respecting the return of its *agent* to the *Principalities*, of at least as much importance to the maintenance of peace as even the return of a Russian *minister* to *Constantinople*, I beg to refer you to the Memorandum which I had the honour of transmitting to you, through Mr. Planta, on the 25th of last May.

I have carefully examined the documents inclosed in Count Nesselrode's despatch to Count Lieven, of the 25th of last March, and I must own that I do not clearly comprehend the precise ground of the present complaint of Russia against the Porte. If it be that the CIVIL *status quo* has not yet been re-established, I think I have shown that I was not directed by Russia to put it forward in the shape of a *condition*, and that its completion depends upon the actual presence in the Principalities of a person fully understanding and competent to enforce all those rights and privileges therein which Russia may be entitled to claim. If it be that the Beshli-Agas be not subordinate to the Hospodars, it is perfectly true that Russia *has* a right to insist upon this point, because I demanded it in her name, and because, most certainly, the Turkish ministers *did* admit it at my conference. But it does not appear that the Porte now disputes it. On the contrary, I cannot imagine language more satisfactory on this point than the expressions employed by the Reis Effendi in his message to M. de Minciacky of the 31st December, 1824 (marked *Q ad B*), in Count Nesselrode's despatch to Count Lieven of the 25th March. In that message the Reis Effendi distinctly declares (according to the report made by the Russian Dragoman himself) that the Beshli-Agas "avaient des ordres positifs d'être soumis à ceux des Princes, comme

ils l'avaient été autrefois, et que si les Princes n'inspirèrent point de crainte à ces officiers, ils doivent craindre du moins de désobéir aux ordres de la Porte. D'autant plus," continued the Reis-Effendi, "que ces Beshlis-Agas ne sont destinés qu'à maintenir la police parmi les *Turcs* qui se trouvent dans les Principautés, ou qui y vont pour les affaires commerciales." Here is a distinct admission that the Beshlis *are* subordinate to the orders of the Princes, and, consequently, Russia has no right to suppose that the Porte seeks to establish a contrary system.

If the complaint of Russia be that the Hospodars have not had the *nomination* of the Beshli-Agas, I have already stated in my Memorandum of the 4th June my belief that Russia has *no right*, growing out of any public treaty, to advance such a pretension. It may have been an occasional, perhaps a frequent, practice of the Hospodars to *recommend* the individuals who were to act as Beshli-Agas; but I am quite persuaded that it would be contrary to all the usages of Ottoman polity to give to a Christian government a recognised right to appoint officers who are to exercise an unlimited control over the lives and properties of *Mussulmans*. But if I be in error, and if this right do exist, it is assuredly only to be found in some of those occult and unpublished transactions relating to the Principalities, which have at various times taken place between Russia and the Porte, which are fully known only to the former, and which are always willingly forgotten or eluded by the latter; and a new and striking proof would thus be furnished of the necessity of sending the natural guardian of Russian rights, namely, the Russian agent, to resume his functions in the Principalities.

This statement, of what I conceived to be my duties at Constantinople, and the engagements of the Porte on the various points committed to my management by the Emperor Alexander, has been extended to such length, that I can hardly venture to add to it an explanation of my humble opinion as to the best mode of proceeding with reference to Count Nesselrode's despatch.

But I may perhaps be permitted briefly to suggest the expediency of declaring to the Russian government—

1st. That with respect to the *civil status quo*, it formed no part of the *conditions* which the British Ambassador, acting according to the terms and tenor of his *Russian* instructions, presented to the Porte, as indispensable to the return of a Russian minister.

2nd. That, fully admitting Russia to be entitled to demand its restoration, it can be effectually restored *only* by the fulfilment of the promise made by the Imperial Cabinet, that the agents of Russia should be sent back to the Principalities; they alone being qualified by a knowledge of all the rights of Russia to *detect*, and, by the authority given to them under treaty, to *remedy* such infractions of those rights, as may have been committed or connived at by the Porte.

3rd. That his Majesty's ambassador at Constantinople will be instructed to co-operate in the endeavours of the Russian agents, whether in the Principalities or at the seat of government, to procure the fulfilment of all Russian claims founded on treaty, and relating to the *civil status quo*, in the same manner as the British Embassy has heretofore exerted itself with respect to the *military* one.

4th. That his Majesty's ambassador will proceed, on his arrival at Constantinople, to ascertain whether the Beshli-Agas be or be not *subordinate* to the Princes (according to the promise undoubtedly made to his predecessor by the Porte), and if they should not be so, that he will be instructed to enforce the fulfilment of that promise.

5th. That he will equally make inquiry whether the Porte has *bonâ fide* executed the engagement made on the 23rd June, 1824, and has actually withdrawn *one-half* of the Beshlis then stationed in the Principalities—a reduction with which Russia expressed herself at the time to be fully satisfied, and of which satisfaction she subsequently gave the most incontestable proof, by permitting M. de Minciacky to present his credentials as chargé d'affaires; and that if it should appear that the Porte has evaded or imperfectly executed this engagement, his Majesty's ambassador will have orders to insist upon its completion.

I humbly conceive that these assurances are as much as, under present circumstances, Russia is entitled to expect from us—so long, at least, as one of the most essential of the promises made in the Emperor's name, by his Majesty's late ambassador to the Porte, shall not have been fulfilled; and that unless it be her design to make her quarrel with Turkey absolutely interminable except by war, and that she be resolved *never* to be satisfied, she cannot but find in them sufficient means for the removal of every just ground of complaint against the Ottoman government.

I have, &c.,

STRANGFORD.

[479.] *To the Lord Chancellor.*

MY DEAR LORD CHANCELLOR, Stratfieldsaye, 7th Sept., 1825.

I am very much obliged to you for your note. I wish that I had known that you were going down to Coombe after the 1st of the month. I have been here since that day; and I should have requested you to make this house your Inn. In conversation with the King, and with our colleagues, I have considered the question of dissolution or no dissolution to be one to be decided by Lord Liverpool in a greater degree than any other that might be brought under the consideration of the Cabinet; because I thought it as well that it should be kept out of the hands of some. But I have always advised Lord Liverpool to dissolve. I recommended to him to dissolve in July; and I would now recommend to him to dissolve as soon as he can.

My reasons are these. There is a very strong feeling in this country upon the Roman Catholic question. If Lord Liverpool could have dissolved in July that feeling would have had

a very considerable influence on the returns of the new Parliament. It will probably have some influence of this kind if Parliament should be dissolved in the end of this month; and this notwithstanding that the dissolution should not be founded on the desire of the King to appeal from the decision of the last House of Commons on the Roman Catholic question. There are some who contend that the decision in the existing House of Commons would not be the same on this question next session, that many would be apprehensive of losing their elections, &c., &c.

I am not quite certain that these apprehensions would not have their influence on both sides; that is, in favour of the Roman Catholic question upon some of the Irish members. But I confess that I don't think that reasoning embraces the whole question. The truth is that the Roman Catholic question brought the government in the last session to the point of breaking up. This must be known to several on both sides of the House; and we may rely upon it that if we don't dissolve we shall have the question again in the House, most likely to occasion inconvenience to the government, particularly to our part of it; and to produce the same result which the same question was near producing last session.

I don't mean to say that many zealous supporters of the Roman Catholic cause would not be desirous of avoiding another discussion in this Parliament, and that many would not consider such a result as I have described a great misfortune. But still they would vote and act together as a party as they did in the last session.

It may be said that the Protestant opinions of the country will not influence the returns to the new Parliament, and that we shall find the decision upon the Roman Catholic question the same in the new House as in the last. I hope those who think so are mistaken. But if they are not, we shall not be worse off with the new Parliament than we are with the old.

I hope that you are quite well after your long campaign. But we can't hear of your seeking more than your usual relaxation.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[480.] *To Major-General Sir J. Malcolm.*

MY DEAR MALCOLM, Stratfieldsaye, 7th Sept., 1825.

Lieutenant-Colonel —— is an officer who has served, and of whose services I have endeavoured to show my sense by recommending him for promotion by brevet. He says that this promotion was conferred on his own solicitation. I should think it was not; as I entertain a very particular objection to those officers who *solicit* favours, or require others to *solicit* for them. However, whether *solicited* or not, I recommended that he should be promoted, first, to be a major by brevet, next to be a lieutenant-colonel by brevet, he being still only a captain in the Artillery. He is now looking out for fresh *solicitors* to be made captain of the Horse Artillery; that is to say, neither more nor less, than to have conferred upon him every favour which the Master-General can confer upon any officer. This office of Captain of Horse Artillery is *solicited* by every captain in the Artillery regiment, because the holder of it is not called upon to serve in the colonies. There is no other reason whatever. I, who have served everywhere, cannot hear of such a reason. At all events Lieutenant-Colonel —— must know that I am not to be *solicited* out of doing justice to all parties. I knew that he wished to be removed to the Horse Artillery, and he, of all others in the corps, might have known that there was no use in employing friends to make solicitations in his favour.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[481.] *To Mr. Griffin.*

MEMORANDUM ON SOLITARY CONFINEMENT FOR SOLDIERS.

Ordnance Office, 8th Sept., 1825.

I have perused the letter from the Quartermaster-General and Mr. Griffin on the subject of places of solitary confinement, to be constructed in the barracks in the King's Mews, the Tower, and at Knightsbridge, upon the recommendation of the Hon. Colonel Townshend, and of Colonel Woodford, which I have likewise perused; and what follows is what occurs to me upon this subject.

. Solitary confinement is a punishment which cannot be adopted in the army at large. It cannot be inflicted at all in the field, or in ships or transports; nor in quarters or cantonments, except by resorting to the use of gaols; nor can it be inflicted in barracks, excepting by means of the gaols, till measures of the description now proposed are adopted generally in the barracks throughout the empire at an enormous expense.

After all, with submission to the superior judgment of his Royal Highness, I doubt that the description of solitary confinement which could be inflicted in a barrack is that which Parliament has in contemplation.

It is quite obvious that the description of solitary confinement in the contemplation of Lieutenant-Colonel Woodford is not that which the Legislature had in contemplation, and which alone could produce any effect as a punishment.

Real solitary confinement, that is a total seclusion from all social intercourse with the whole of the human race for a given protracted space of time, the prisoner seeing nobody excepting the person charged to bring into the cell the provisions for the day, and to carry away the dirt of the cell, and during the performance of this service neither party to be allowed to utter a word, is a punishment calculated to deter men from the commission of crimes; and if such punishment is continued for any length of time, it does make an impression never to be effaced on the mind of the man on whom it is really inflicted. But it is obvious that this punishment can in reality be inflicted only in places constructed for the purpose; and under the charge of persons specially instructed as to the mode of conducting themselves with such prisoners, and who will carry into execution strictly such instructions.

The execution of such punishment is quite inconsistent with the ordinary regimental practices or discipline. There is no particular person in charge of any description of regimental prisoners. They are confined in the guard-house, and in charge of the officer or non-commissioned officer of the regimental guard. Who can answer that in the daily reliefs some non-commissioned officer will not come on duty who will not understand the mode of dealing with this particular description of prisoner?

These prisoners must have one or more sentries over them. Is it not certain that these sentries will talk to their prisoners

in solitary confinement? If any body can communicate with the prisoner there is an end to his solitary confinement.

But Colonel Woodford goes farther. He says these soldiers in solitary confinement must have air and exercise, and good food and medical attendance; and they must come out of the place of solitary confinement in fit condition for service and to perform their duty. The description of confinement in the contemplation of Colonel Woodford may be very good and very right, but it is not solitary confinement as intended by the Legislature; nor is it calculated to produce any benefit to the service, much less a benefit at all adequate to the expense and inconvenience of adopting such mode of confinement generally in the barracks throughout the empire, nor are such places of confinement necessary to enable him to carry into execution this mode of confinement.

But the Legislature having adopted solitary confinement as a military punishment, I see clearly the necessity of giving it a trial, and no one can be more sensible than I am of all the evils and inconveniences attending the confinement of soldiers in the common gaols.

What I would recommend is that, for the sake of trial of this punishment in its real form fairly, some means should be adopted of constructing places of solitary confinement for the army in some one of the barracks of this country not immediately wanted, for instance, in Portchester Castle. That a proper person duly instructed, and with the necessary assistance, should be appointed to the head of this establishment; and that to this establishment should be sent all the soldiers sentenced to solitary confinement in Great Britain.

If such an establishment should be found to answer here another might be formed in Ireland.

To this establishment might be added a treadmill, or rather one might be formed in each cell, by means of which the prisoner might be required to grind daily the flour for his own consumption, or to perform such other task as might be required from him.

I perfectly understand the nature of the confinement contemplated by Colonel Woodford. I have seen it practised in the service at Fort William in Bengal. For trifling offences not necessary to be brought under the consideration of a court-martial, such as drunkenness, &c., soldiers are there con-

fined in what is called the *Conjee House*, by the commanding officer, for a period not exceeding forty-eight hours. They are there fed upon *conjee* alone, that is, the water in which rice has been boiled; they are locked up in what are intended to be solitary cells, that is to say, one man in each place of confinement. But they are under the charge of sentries, and no man who ever knew what British soldiers are, ever believed that they did not talk to whom they pleased.

Their allowance of food, liquor, &c., was stopped while in this place of confinement.

This description of punishment was in hot climates not otherwise than beneficial to the health of the men on whom it was inflicted, but I never found or heard that it had any effect upon their conduct.

It must be observed that this punishment is not solitary confinement. If, however, the Commander-in-Chief should think proper to introduce any punishment of this kind into the army, it would not be difficult, or possibly very expensive, to reform the Black Holes into one or more places of confinement for separate soldiers, of the same description with the *Conjee* Houses above described as existing at Fort William in Bengal.

Send a copy of this Minute to the Quartermaster-General for his Royal Highness's consideration.

WELLINGTON.

To General Mann. [482.]

INSTRUCTIONS TO COLONEL WRIGHT ON GOING TO THE GOLD COAST.

Ordnance Office, 8th Sept., 1825.

General Mann's letter of the 31st August states the first step to be taken to carry into execution the instructions of government respecting the Gold Coast.

Lieut.-Colonel Wright must be directed to survey the fort now existing at Cape Coast, and its buildings, and ascertain their exact state; and whether capable in their present state, or by any repair, and at what expense, to oppose any defence against an attack by natives on the land-side, or any attempt by an European or other enemy to land from ships in the offing.

If these works should be in a sufficient state of defence, or capable of being put in a sufficient state of defence, Lieutenant-Colonel Wright will then report what the amount of the garrison will be which is deemed absolutely necessary for their defence.

If the works at Cape Coast cannot be put in a sufficient state of defence, Lieutenant-Colonel Wright will examine the ground in the neighbourhood of the town of Cape Coast Castle, and fix upon a spot on which a work may be constructed, which will answer the military purposes above required from the fort already existing.

This work should not require more than fifty men for its defence against a native attack.

It must be revetted in masonry; have a counterscarp in masonry; a keep in masonry; and be capable of making use of the largest quantity of heavy ordnance that such a work can be made to contain. The buildings to accommodate the troops and the storehouses for military stores and provisions must be within the work. The work should be so situated as to give the greatest possible degree of protection by its fire to the habitations of his Majesty's subjects settled at Cape Coast Castle.

Lieutenant-Colonel Wright will enquire what ground there is at Cape Coast Castle the property of his Majesty; and if possible he will fix upon a spot for the construction of this work which already belongs to his Majesty.

If, however, there should be any military reason for the preference of any other spot of ground, Lieutenant-Colonel Wright will ascertain who is the proprietor of the ground, and what the expense of its purchase.

He will likewise ascertain whether any ground the property of his Majesty can be sold or exchanged for such piece of ground as he will have fixed upon; and whether any other ground can be sold to defray the expense of this work.

Lieutenant-Colonel Wright will next ascertain what materials and workmen can be procured on the Gold Coast and at Sierra Leone to perform this work; and what must be brought from England of the former, and from England or the West Indies of the latter.

The same instructions respecting Accra.

Refer these instructions to General Mann; and desire him to consider them, and suggest any addition which may occur to him to be necessary.

If he should not suggest any addition, inform the Secretary of State of the intention, in consequence of his letter of the 22nd July, to send out Lieutenant-Colonel Wright, of the Royal Engineers, and an inferior officer; and of the instructions intended to be given to Lieutenant-Colonel Wright; and request his Lordship to give instructions to the authorities on the spot to give every assistance and information to Lieutenant-Colonel Wright to enable him to perform the service on which he will be employed.

To ascertain and report on the number and condition of the ordnance in the present batteries, and the supplies that would be necessary to correspond with the principles of defence to be adopted for the forts.

As considerable expense is now incurring by the Ordnance in the construction of buildings at Sierra Leone; it would be advisable that Lieutenant-Colonel Wright should visit that station, either in going out to or returning from Africa, and that he make a report of the state and progress of the works ordered, the manner in which they are executed, the regularity in keeping the public accounts and the payments made, with the probable time that will be required to complete the whole as already ordered, with any suggestions respecting the same or other matters that the Lieutenant-Colonel may think necessary.

WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM ON THE DECCAN PRIZE MONEY. [483.]

10th Sept., 1825.

When the Deccan Prize Case was under the consideration of the Lords of the Treasury in the year 1823, it was stated by one party and not disputed by the other, and understood by their Lordships, that there was a very large booty at the disposition of his Majesty, taken by the troops at Poonah, at Nagpour, and Mahidpour.

The one party before their Lordships, Sir Thomas Hislop and the Army of the Deccan, claimed the exclusive right to have this booty distributed among them; the other party, Lord Hastings and the Grand Army, claimed to participate in this advantage.

The first mentioned party contended that there was no *previous*

concert or legal association in the operations by which the booty in question was acquired and placed at the disposition of his Majesty; nor any *co-operation* in those operations on the part of Lord Hastings, or of the Grand Army, such as it is understood the law requires, in order to give a party a right to share which claims on the score of co-operation. That the Army of the Deccan was a separate army, exclusively under the military command in chief of Sir Thomas Hislop. That he alone and exclusively ordered the operations of that army. That Lord Hastings, in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief, had never given any command to Sir Thomas Hislop, and that all the orders conveyed to Sir Thomas Hislop by his Lordship were given in the exercise of his political powers as Governor-General.

It is not necessary to examine on which of these grounds the decision of the Treasury, 1823, was founded. It might have been founded upon none of them. It is quite clear, however, that the parties were mistaken; the one in their statements, and the other in their admissions of the existence of this booty, and of the sources from which, and the mode in which such booty had been captured.

It will be stated in this paper what booty really does exist at the disposition of the Crown in consequence of the operations of the war in India in 1817 and 1818; but in the mean time it is desirable to consider of the statements and arguments above referred to, in order to apply them to the booty which is really at the disposition of the Crown at the present moment.

The first point is, that there was no previous *concert* or *association* in the operations against the *Mahratta Powers*, as distinguished from the *Pindarries*.

It is asserted that Lord Hastings did not expect the hostilities which subsequently took place on the part of the Peshwah, the Rajah of Nagpour, or of Holkar, and this assertion is founded not upon Lord Hastings' acts, or upon his omissions, or upon the general tenour of what he wrote upon this subject, but upon a few selected phrases found in different parts of his correspondence expressing his surprise rather at the mode in which the treachery had been carried into execution than that it existed.

Lord Hastings was aware in what light the Pindarries had been considered, and to what degree they had been encouraged by all the Mahratta powers to undertake their operations in

preceding years in the Company's territories, and he could not believe that he could effectually put down the predatory system without exciting the jealousy, the animosity, and eventually the hostility of these powers, if they should consider it possible to manifest such hostility with advantage or without danger to themselves. Lord Hastings did not, nor could not, foresee in what manner, at what time, or under what circumstances this hostility would be manifested, and he adopted every measure in his power to frustrate and render such hostility harmless by the display and employment of the largest and most efficient force which the resources of his government would supply.

But there is one measure adopted by Lord Hastings which manifests in the clearest manner that he did expect these hostilities on the part of the Mahratta powers, and that was the nomination of Sir Thomas Hislop to command the troops in the Deccan. Those troops consisted of as follows:—the Nagpour subsidiary force under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams; the Hydrabad subsidiary force under Colonel Doveton; the Poonah subsidiary force, under Colonel Smith; the Mysore Horse; the Hydrabad and Poonah Infantry and other irregular troops; all of them doing duty, or they might have been appointed to do duty, with one or other of the subsidised corps of regular troops; and, lastly, a body of troops of the army of Fort St. George, detached from the territories under the government of Fort St. George.

These last might have been organised under the command of any officer whom his Lordship might have selected for such command, and the whole of the troops above mentioned might have moved to the Nerbuddah in separate bodies under the command of their several commanders acting under instructions from Lord Hastings, with equal, if not with greater facility than they did move by the intervention of the command of Sir Thomas Hislop in his capacity newly conferred upon him by the Governor-General in Council, of Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Deccan.

But Lord Hastings saw that possibly, nay probably, it would be necessary to carry on operations with those troops previously to their arrival upon the Nerbuddah, and to the period at which they should be in immediate and direct communication with himself, and with the divisions of the Grand Army. He could not foresee what would be the nature or the period of those

operations, and he therefore did that which, as a statesman and a general, he ought to have done; he appointed an officer to command the whole, and endowed him with full military and political powers, and instructions to act as circumstances might require. His Lordship manifested his foresight as well as his wisdom in this arrangement, and, in point of fact, it occurred that Sir Thomas Hislop was under the necessity of using his military as well as his political powers in the three only instances in which they could by possibility be used in the interval between his march from the Company's territories and his communication with Lord Hastings after his arrival at the rendezvous upon the Nerbuddah. It is to be hoped then that we shall hear no more of the want of foresight, and of previous concert and association. The fact is that everything was foreseen, and we enjoy the fruits of this foresight, as the only measures which could be an adequate remedy for the evils which might occur in the execution of this great and necessary enterprise were adopted. Secondly, in respect to co-operation. I am one of those too much accustomed to estimate the value of real military co-operation to allow any exaggeration upon this subject to enter my mind. I besides draw a distinction between political and military co-operation, and, as I understand the law, which, however, I apprehend has been laid down only in reference to naval operations, it is military co-operation alone which can give a party a claim to be considered as a joint captor. I object to military co-operation being admitted only in cases in which the claimant has been in sight, as in cases of naval co-operation, but I assert that there must be an actual co-operation in the action.

The existence of previous concert and association, provided nothing intervened to prevent the co-operation, would render the proof of such co-operation unnecessary, and it is quite obvious from what has been above stated that previous *concert* and *association* existed in the operations at Poonah, Nagpour, and Mahidpour.

But if that principle should be denied, or the fact denied, we must then consider the cases.

The position of the Grand Army undoubtedly prevented Scindiah and Meer Khan from moving; and it is certain that the movement of either of these chiefs would have had great influence over the result of affairs in the Deccan. But there

was no military co-operation in the action at Poonah, and this co-operation would be merely political.

In the case of Nagpour there was positive military co-operation by the troops of the Grand Army under Brigadier-General Hardyman.

The case of Mahidpour was the strongest of all. The march of the first and third divisions of the army had been delayed by the illness of Sir Thomas Hislop, and by the badness of the weather.

What was the meaning of the delay of the operations against the Pindarries till these troops should arrive at the rendezvous upon the Nerbuddah?

Was it for the purpose of inquiry after the General's health, or any other act of courtesy?

It was solely for the purpose of co-operating in the general plan laid down according to previous *concert* and *association.*

Accordingly from the moment of the passage of the Nerbuddah, Brigadier-General Sir John Malcolm and Lieutenant-Colonel Adams with the third and fifth divisions of the Army of the Deccan, were in daily and hourly communication with General Marshall's division of the Grand Army, and of course with the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Hastings.

In the course of these operations it was found that Holkar acted exactly as had been foreseen by Lord Hastings; and Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Hislop, according to the instructions which he had received from his Lordship, declared Holkar in a state of war with the British Government, and attacked his army as he would have done a Pindarry force. Not only was General Marshall's division co-operating upon this occasion, but likewise General Donkin's, and General Brown's and Sir W. Keir's.

It was no trifling act of co-operation to have enabled Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Hislop to force Holkar to an action.

An attentive perusal of the papers and a knowledge of the parties will show that this was effected by two modes. First, by the movement of General Malcolm to form a junction with Sir Thomas Hislop; and secondly, by the position of the divisions of Sir W. Keir, General Donkin, General Brown, General Marshall and Lieutenant-Colonel Adams in different parts of the country which rendered the retreat of Holkar impossible. Here was no chance, but clear previous concert and

military co-operation, not for the purpose of obtaining booty, but for a better purpose, that of attaining a great and glorious public advantage.

It is not disputed that there was distinct military co-operation among all the troops on the right of the Nerbuddah acting against the Pindarries; but it is disputed that in the war with Holkar, an event foreseen and clearly provided for in the instructions to Sir Thomas Hislop as likely to be the consequence of the operations against the Pindarries, there was the same co-operation, the different divisions of both armies being in fact in the same scene of action, and in the same relative position towards each other, and in the same habits of communication.

The next assertion is, that the Army of the Deccan was a separate army exclusively under the command-in-chief of Sir Thomas Hislop; that he exclusively ordered its operations; that Lord Hastings as Commander-in-Chief in India had never given any orders to Sir Thomas Hislop or the troops under his command, and that the military orders given by his Lordship to Sir Thomas Hislop, although military in themselves, were given in the exercise of his Lordship's political power as Governor-General.

The most extensive powers, political as well as military, were confided to Sir Thomas Hislop, of which the only limit was to be found in his instructions, and that he was to obey the orders of the Governor-General, or of the Governor-General in Council; and that he was to be "subject to the control eventually in the conduct of operations in the field to the authority of the Commander-in-Chief in India, Lord Hastings."

For the purpose of this cause then it is to be supposed that Lord Hastings, a military officer of high rank and great reputation, having Sir Thomas Hislop undoubtedly under the control of his authority as Commander-in-Chief, abandoned his duty as an officer, for it was his duty as an officer to command Sir Thomas Hislop, and that he preferred to send him military orders in virtue of the political superiority vested in his Lordship, instead of in the exercise of the military command and control which he undoubtedly had on this service.

The words above recited conveying the authority conferred upon Sir Thomas Hislop, and stating its limitations will show how little there is in all the arguments to prove that he was a commander-in-chief of a separate independent army, and that

in that capacity he could be under no control. He was under the control specifically of the commander-in-chief *eventually*, and the event in contemplation occurred as soon as he came within reach of his Lordship, and was in communication with his Lordship; that is, as soon as one of the divisions of the Army of the Deccan crossed the Nerbuddah.

This is the difference between Sir Thomas Hislop's case and mine. I never was in communication or co-operated with Lord Lake. Sir Thomas Hislop was in communication with Lord Hastings from the moment his troops crossed the Nerbuddah. From that moment a union of operation was necessary, and a unity of command alone could insure it.

Lord Hastings, in whom the chief command of the operations was vested, could not do otherwise than exercise that command. His Lordship might choose, as he did choose generally but not invariably, to issue his orders to the divisions of the army of the Deccan through their Commander-in-Chief Sir Thomas Hislop, and he might choose to write them himself in official or in private letters, either upon the military subject alone, or mixed up with other matter, or he might issue them if he should think proper through his adjutant-general, or his quartermaster-general, or his secretary, or his aide-de-camp. They were equally his orders, and Sir Thomas Hislop was responsible as a military officer to obey these orders.

I assert this principle: no officer in command of an army is bound to issue his orders in any particular mode or channel. Provided those who receive those orders are certain that they proceed from him, they are bound to obey them; and these very papers afford an instance of two different modes of issuing orders to armies upon the same subjects.

Lord Hastings issued his orders regarding the movements of the troops sometimes through his adjutant-general, Lieutenant-Colonel Nicoll, sometimes by his own letters official or private. Sir Thomas Hislop issued his orders upon the same subject through Lieutenant-Colonel Blacker, the quartermaster-general, and there are not two commanders-in-chief of British armies who have issued such orders in the same precise channel.

But it is stated that these orders, though undeniably issued by Lord Hastings the Commander-in-Chief, and having for their objects detailed movements and manœuvres, were issued in the exercise of his political power as Governor-General.

I will just inquire what Lord Hastings meant by the words *my army,* frequently used in the letters conveying these orders. Did he mean that he was the sovereign whose army it was, or was he the Governor-General commanding the army, or the Commander-in-Chief commanding the army? Upon that point there can be no doubt; and these very words are sufficient to fix the real character of the letters in question.

It is true that Sir Thomas Hislop refers himself to Lord Hastings as *Governor-General,* on some points which are considered elsewhere as military, but which in India are exclusively civil. One of these is the appointment of Colonel Walker, and afterwards that of Colonel Scott to be a brigadier-general. But it must be observed that each of these appointments was an augmentation of the staff of his army; and the officer of the pay-department of the army must have declined to pay the brigadier unless the appointment were sanctioned by the Governor-General, or by the Governor-General in Council.

Lord Hastings filled two offices, that of Governor-General and that of Commander-in-Chief, both of them having distinct duties to perform in the government of the affairs of the Presidency of Fort William.

All the acts of that government are done by law in the name and by the authority of the Governor-General in Council.

But there are several acts which must be recommended to the Governor-General in Council by the Commander-in-Chief under different orders and instructions from the Court of Directors.

The distinct duties of the two offices are clear enough when they are filled by different persons, but they require in their management the official machinery which may be observed in these papers when both are filled by one person, in order to keep the military business in its proper channel.

But it is quite clear that Lord Hastings was the Commander-in-Chief on this service, and that he acted as the Commander-in-Chief in reference to the military body called the Army of the Deccan, by giving to the officer immediately in command orders for its movements, which nobody on the spot was authorised to issue excepting his Lordship, after the *event* occurred which rendered an exact unity of operations necessary between the two armies.

I will now consider the nature of the booty realised and at

the disposition of his Majesty, and will apply the facts and reasoning in this paper to the consideration of the question, to what parts of the army ought that booty to be distributed?

In the letter from the Trustees to the Treasury of 22nd June, 1825, an opinion is stated that the order of their Lordships in their minute of the * February, 1823, could not be carried into execution; and it is recommended that the booty realised should be divided among the commander-in-chief, officers, and troops of the Army of the Deccan. When that letter was written the proceedings before their Lordships and the arguments of counsel had not been brought under the view of the Trustees. If they had been such an opinion could not have been formed.

It now appears that there was no prize or booty taken at Poonah, Nagpour, or Mahidpour, which is not included in the sum of about £150,000 sterling in the whole, realised by the officers appointed to appraise and sell booty captured, and that the remainder of the sum at his Majesty's disposition consists in the value of jewels abandoned by the Peshwah, but concealed at Nassuck in his flight through that town in February and March, 1818, and found in Nassuck in May, 1818, above a month after the Army of the Deccan had been broken up; of deposits made by the Peshwah in the hands of certain individuals for services, which services were never performed, and the individuals in question had been called upon in July, 1818, to refund the sums deposited, and had since refunded; of debts due to the Peshwah, whether on account of tribute, of arrears of revenue, &c., &c.; all discovered since the Army of the Deccan was broken up in March, 1818, and generally since the Peshwah delivered himself up to Sir John Malcolm in June, 1818.

These sums have been claimed on the part of the Crown as booty obtained by the East India Company's officers in consequence of the operations of the war, and have been delivered over as such by the East India Company. But it is obvious from the nature of the sources from which they came, and the period at which possession of them was obtained, that their realisation has been the consequence of all the operations, and not of any part, however important.

* Blank in manuscript.

Whatever may be deemed to be the state of the case regarding *previous concert and association* or of actual *co-operation* on the part of the troops of the Grand Army, or even of those of the first, second, third, and fifth, and reserve divisions of the Army of the Deccan, with the fourth division in the capture of Poonah, it is quite clear that if the Pindarries, and Holkar, and the Rajah of Nagpour had not been destroyed we should never have heard of the Nassuck jewels, nor of deposits made by, nor of debts due to the Peshwah.

Indeed we did not hear of the two latter till after the Peshwah had delivered himself up to Sir John Malcolm.

But let us trace the operations which ended in that event, and we shall see how the whole were linked together.

The Peshwah early in the year 1818 was driven from the neighbourhood of the River Kistna by the fourth and reserve divisions under Generals Smith, Munro, and Pritzler. He passed through Nassuck into Candeish, from whence he was driven in February by the troops which had been sent across the Nerbuddah and Taptee under Sir Thomas Hislop by Lord Hastings, and by those of the second division of the Army of the Deccan under General Doveton. He then turned to the south-west, towards the head of the Wurda River, into the territories of the Rajah of Nagpour, and those of the Nizam, where he was met again by the troops of the fifth division under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, and defeated by them in April. The second division under General Doveton was again co-operating.

The Peshwah then fled to the neighbourhood of Asseergur, between the Taptee and the Nerbuddah, where on the 3rd of June, 1818, he delivered himself up to Sir John Malcolm, who had put in movement all the troops, even to Delhi, to stop the Peshwah in case he should pass the Nerbuddah. All those in the Rajah of Nagpour's territories, Bopaul, Bundlecund, &c., had been put in movement in April, to stop the Peshwah when he was endeavouring to pass through the Nagpour territories.

For all these troops there is a clear case of *concert* and *association*, and for most, of direct military co-operation.

They would include nearly the whole of both armies, even if it could be doubted that, as the war with the Peshwah was

occasioned by the just and necessary design to put down the Pindarries, so the surrender of the Peshwah was the consequence of the previous operations against those freebooters, and could not have occurred if these, in which all without exception were engaged, had not been successful.

WELLINGTON.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Walmer Castle, 16th Sept., 1825.

I received yesterday the favour of your letter, with the enclosed paper on the Deccan Prize cause. I shall not fail to read it with the greatest attention, and, when I have read it, I will forward it to Mr. Robinson and Lord Bexley. You will recollect that, before we separated, certain questions were put to the Law Officers, which I hope they are by this time prepared to answer. Your paper and their answers may, I trust, enable us to decide as to the course which it may be fit now to adopt in this business.

We shall all meet in Cabinet on Thursday, and the first question to be decided will be that of dissolution of parliament this year or the next.

You may like to know my personal impressions upon this matter; subject, of course, to alteration from what I may hear from others.

If we can *all* agree to keep the Catholic question and the Corn question in abeyance during the next session, I am very indifferent as to immediate dissolution. I see some advantages in its taking place now, but I think, on the other hand, good may arise from gaining time.

But if we are to be exposed to the renewal of these questions, particularly of the former, next year, in that case I have no hesitation in saying that the dissolution ought not to be delayed. I do not mean that I would make an appeal to the country upon this question. Under the present circumstances of the government, such an appeal would be neither fair nor practicable. But there are sufficient other reasons for calling a new parliament at this time; and, until a new parliament is assembled, the renewal of the discussion upon the Catholic question cannot take place with any advantage to either party.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke,
very sincerely yours,
LIVERPOOL.

To Lord Liverpool. [484.]

MY DEAR LORD LIVERPOOL, Woodford, 19th Sept., 1825.

Although I shall have the pleasure of seeing you so soon, I write you one line in answer to your letter of 16th, which I received yesterday.

My opinion is, that you had better determine for yourself whether you will or not dissolve the Parliament, as I really believe the duration of *your* government depends upon the decision of that question. Your colleagues in the House of Commons can promise you nothing on the subject of corn. Mr. Huskisson must tell you, as he did the Cabinet upon the discussion of this question last year, that if it should be brought forward, he must take the same line in discussion as he had done heretofore.

However, upon the Corn question, you may be at your ease. I don't think it possible to force upon Parliament any alteration which shall not be founded upon the principle of securing to the landed interest, the same advantages as they enjoy at present.

In respect to the Roman Catholic question, three out of four of your colleagues may promise you that they will not vote for that question. But will Mr. Wynn make you that promise? If he does, will he be followed by the Duke of Buckingham and his party? Will your colleagues do more than stay away? What reason can they give even for that mitigated opposition to the Roman Catholic question? Will not such conduct be equally injurious to their reputation as the most strenuous opposition to the Roman Catholic question? But this view of the case does not convey all my objections to this mode of proceeding. If you do not dissolve on the condition stated, you will in fact take in the Cabinet, and induce the Cabinet to take a new step respecting the Roman Catholic question. It will be a step against the Roman Catholics. Recollecting what passed after the discussion of that question in the House of Lords last session, I cannot but think that we could not alter our position at all as a Cabinet without inconvenience and eventual injury to the government.

My opinion upon the dissolution of Parliament is that unless you should dissolve, you will find yourself in the same difficulties respecting Ireland as you did in the last session, which difficulties would lead to the destruction of *your* government. The dissolution of Parliament at present may make such an alteration, as that these difficulties would no longer exist; but I am certain that no engagement to stay away in the discussion of one of these Irish questions, even if your colleagues could make such an engagement, and fairly carry it into execution,

will do you any good. I recommend to you, then, to declare your resolution to dissolve Parliament, and be assured of the support of the great majority of your colleagues, and of the consent of the King.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

To Major-General Sir J. Malcolm. [485.]

MY DEAR MALCOLM, London, 21st Sept., 1825.

Nothing could give me more pain than that you should imagine that I have any feeling respecting your application to me in favour of anybody. What I object to is, that officers who have served, and who know that I have noticed them, should go and expose themselves for sale, and come to me upon electioneering and other jobs, and claim troops of Horse Artillery, &c. This practice really degrades them and me, and I take every opportunity of letting them know that I don't approve of it.

When I was in India, and with the army, nobody ever thought of applying for anything, knowing that I would do justice to all as fast as I could. But these confounded corps of Artillery and Engineers are so accustomed to look to private patronage and applications, that I am teazed out of my life by them; and there is not a woman, or a member of parliament, or even an acquaintance who does not come with an application in favour of some one or other of them.

But although those who apply must receive the answers, they are not intended for them, but for the officers who thus debase themselves; and, indeed, I hoped I had manifested to you the intention of my answer in the private note I sent with it.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Duke of York. [486.]

SIR, London, 22nd Sept., 1825.

I have had the honour of receiving your Royal Highness's letter of the 21st instant, and before I close this letter, I hope

to be able to inform your Royal Highness of the result of the deliberation of the Cabinet on the question to which it relates. It will most probably be in conformity with your Royal Highness's opinion. I confess that my opinion is different from that of your Royal Highness. My belief was in July, that if we could have dissolved the Parliament at that period, the elections would have been influenced in a great degree by the prevailing opinions upon the Roman Catholic question; and although I am informed and believe that the same result would not probably be produced by a dissolution at the present moment, I cannot believe that there would not be some advantage gained by having the elections in this year. I think we ought to expect some advantage, because it is obvious that our adversaries upon this question deprecate the dissolution this year. If the Protestant sentiment is not likely to have the same influence on the elections in October as the same sentiment would have had in July or August, it must be admitted that it will have still less influence in July or August next year. Although the Roman Catholic question is not the only topic to be considered in deciding upon this subject, it is certainly the principal one. It is quite obvious that the government could not go on if we were to have another session of such acrimonious debate as the last; nor can the Houses of Parliament continue to differ in opinion, each with such large majorities on its side of the question as there were upon this question last session, without the chance at least of the inconvenience of such difference being felt on other questions.

Your Royal Highness will say the remedy is easy. Form a new government composed of persons exclusively of the Protestant opinion! But I am afraid that is impossible at present, at least of men accustomed to the business of parliament. I should wish them to try to get the better of the danger with which the government is threatened, by a dissolution of Parliament at the moment at which such dissolution is likely to be followed by new elections, of which the result will be a Protestant majority in the House of Commons.

But this is not the only view in which I think it would be advisable now to dissolve the Parliament. It is true that we are quiet and prosperous; but who can tell what will be the storm between this and next July. The dissolution has been expected; some of the expense of an election has been

incurred, and the inconvenience felt, and both will continue till we shall have the general election, however remote the period of it. This will be the case, particularly if the state of the money market, or of trade, or of any other branch of our system, should by accident get into disorder. Upon the whole then, I am sorry to say that I don't agree with your Royal Highness's opinion upon this question.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Sir Henry Wellesley.

SIR, Foreign Office, 27th Sept., 1825.

Your Excellency's despatches to No. 72 inclusive have been received and laid before the King.

I take advantage of the return of Mr. Spencer to Vienna to put your Excellency in possession of the present state of the information and opinions of his Majesty's Government on the three important questions pending in Europe, in which Great Britain and Austria have a common concern. First—as to the Conferences of the Allies on the affairs of Turkey and Greece. The only certain and valuable information which we have on this subject comes from your Excellency.

The Count Lieven has not been directed to make any communication to me upon it, nor has it been thought either proper or expedient that I should address to his Excellency—situated as we are with respect to those Conferences—any enquiries as to their result.

The French Government has not either now, or at any former time, either offered or sought any confidential intercourse with us, with respect to the affairs of Greece.

France is, evidently, playing a double game. On the one hand, she has aided the formation and discipline of the Egyptian army; and on the other hand, she is encouraging the Greeks to perseverance, by the intrigues of secret emissaries, and by promises of future countenance, which will be realised, or not, as circumstances may prove favourable or otherwise to the Grecian arms.

The suggestion of a French Prince to fill the throne of Greece, erected into a separate State, may have come, perhaps, rather from the Greek Committee at Paris, than from the French Government itself; but that committee is notoriously in constant communication with the French Government. Some of its members even belong to the Court of his most Christian Majesty, and could hardly have become members, without at least a tacit permission.

That such suggestion has been offered to the Greek Provisional Government, there is little doubt; though it does not appear to have met with much encouragement.

In this state of things, and with the consciousness of what they are

themselves doing, or allowing to be done, the French Government may naturally be alive to the suspicion of similar intrigues on the part of Great Britain. It must be owned, indeed, that the resolutions of the "Greek clergy, representatives, and chiefs—civil and military," tendering to Great Britain the Protectorate of Greece, might have furnished a reasonable ground of such suspicion, had the candour and directness of all the proceedings of this country, during the war in Greece, been less notorious and unquestionable than they are.

Lest your Excellency should not have received a copy of these resolutions I enclose one.

The jealousy which is felt at this appeal to the British Government manifests itself in the protest of the agents of the *Philhellenick* Committees of France and America (a copy of which I also enclose). M. Damas, however, has disclaimed to Lord Granville any participation in the belief that this appeal to England has been suggested by her agents, and professes to "acquit" Captain Hamilton (who commanded off Napoli de Romania at the moment when this document was signed) of any "connivance at the measure."

The same confidence which is thus expressed by the French Minister, might surely find a place in the breast of the Prince Metternich.

It is but justice to the Ionian Government to say that the neutrality proclaimed by his Majesty has been scrupulously observed and maintained by that government. It is but justice to the British naval officers employed in the Grecian seas (particularly to Captain Hamilton, whose name is so much brought into question by Prince Metternich) to say, that they have conducted themselves in all instances with a strict impartiality (and in some with a severity justly merited towards the Greeks), such as can leave no doubt of their entire belief in the sincerity of the professions of neutrality, so often repeated by the British Cabinet, and of their earnest desire to carry those professions into full effect.

A maritime Power possessing extensive coasts within the reach of the operations of such a war, as that now unhappily raging between the Turks and the Greeks, and protecting an extended trade, amidst the conflict of two parties, not over strict in their estimate of belligerent rights, nor over nice in their respect for correspondent duties, must naturally be exposed to misrepresentations on both sides. Each occasional instance—in which practical advantages are refused, or in which a violation of neutrality is repressed, or reparation demanded for it—is felt and represented by the party whose interests are prejudiced in that particular instance, as an act of partiality to its antagonist.

The instances in which the demand for reparation has been made against the Greeks outnumber those in which the Turks have rendered themselves liable to such demands; but the fault is with the Greeks, not with his Majesty's officers, or with the Ionian Government.

The Turks, on the other hand, have had more frequent occasions than the Greeks for what they conceived to be just cause of complaint, on the ground of refusals on the part of the Government of the Ionian Islands, either to facilitate their military movements, or to give up their fugitive enemies to their vengeance? But such facilities could not be given to them, without exhibiting a decided partiality in their favour.

That both parties should think themselves aggrieved by our proceedings, is perhaps the best proof of the steadiness with which, under circumstances of exceeding difficulty and complication, the naval officers of his Majesty and the Chief of the Ionian Government have contrived to adjust the balance of neutrality.

That each should endeavour to persuade us that, without departing from our neutral character, we might incline the balance a little to his side, is very natural according to the principles on which each party respectively rests its cause.

One party contends that all Governments should consider the other party as rebels, and therefore as not qualified to claim the legitimate rights of belligerents. The other party puts forward the plea that in a struggle for emancipation from tyrannical rule, they are entitled to expect more than the strict laws of war authorise them to claim at the hands of all free nations.

We, who neither admit the plea of the one party, nor subscribe to the doctrine of the other, respect in both alike the lawful exercise of their strict belligerent rights, while we resist the extravagant extension of those rights by either.

Prince Metternich, it is not difficult to see, enters, heart and soul, into the Turkish view of this controversy. He considers the Greeks simply as rebels to their natural Sovereign. He would, no doubt, mitigate the rigour of that Sovereign's rule, and obtain, if he could, peaceably and by persuasion, an improvement in the lot of his subjects; but he would repress the armed resistance of the Greeks with a strong hand, and does not conceive that, by any duration, or by any successes, insurrection can ever grow into legitimate war.

Whatever opinion the Austrian minister may entertain on these subjects, we must protest against his employing it to measure our conduct, although it must naturally govern his own.

The Greeks complain loudly of the proceedings of the Austrian cruizers, which they represent as, in effect, the most active allies of the Turkish cause.

The forcible recapture of Austrian ships taken by the Greeks in the act of convoying stores to Turkish garrisons and armies, in breach of Greek blockades, which Prince Metternich (no doubt) feels to be only a just vindication of the natural right of Austria to trade with any power, notwithstanding a partial rebellion of its subjects, would be in us, who acknowledge the belligerent character of the Greeks, a gross violation of neutrality, and the direct taking of a part on the side of Turkey in the war.

Prince Metternich's inculpation of our conduct, as too favourable to the Greeks, arises therefore from an original and pervading difference in the opinions of the two governments upon this subject.

What we do, and what Prince Metternich blames, is (whether it be right or wrong) a necessary consequence of our own proclaimed opinion (an opinion from which indeed we know that of Austria to differ), and not a deviation (as Prince Metternich seems to assume) from some common principle in which Austria and England were agreed.

The disclosure of these opinions on the part of Prince Metternich, shews the extent of the embarrassment which we have avoided, by not being involved in the Conferences for the settlement of the affairs of Greece.

If, in addition to the practical divergency of views between Russia and Austria, there had also come into full light the now understood difference of opinion between Austria and England, the attempt at a joint interference between Turkey and Greece would probably have ended in a still more marked and irretrievable failure.

These observations arise out of those which your Excellency reports as having been made to you by Prince Metternich. But your Excellency may assure Prince Metternich that he may be quite at ease as to any imputed designs of Great Britain upon Greece. There is not the slightest disposition on the part of his Majesty's servants to advise his Majesty to accept the Protectorate which is said to be intended to be offered to his Majesty, nor in any way to change the system of neutrality which he has hitherto observed in this unhappy war.

It is more difficult to enable your Excellency to give a completely satisfactory answer to the apprehension of Prince Metternich respecting the expedition supposed to be projected by Lord Cochrane.

It is impossible not to feel that such an expedition, if it took place on anything like the scale which is supposed to be in contemplation, would bring into suspicion the neutrality of England, and give cause of just complaint to the Turkish Government.

But the prevention of individual enterprise is not so easy in this country as Prince Metternich may suppose.

The genius of our laws is not preventive but retrospective. They attach criminality not to intentions, but to acts; and the proof which they require is not moral, but positive.

A British subject is master of his own movements, and is not amenable to punishment or restraint for his declarations. He may quit England when he pleases—he may go with the avowed *intention* of joining Greek or Turk. The law cannot impede him, nor can the law animadvert upon him, unless it can be proved that he has entered into some *engagement* to that effect. When indeed he has *effected* what he threatened, he becomes amenable to the law, and may be punished, but the mischief is then done.

It is very possible, therefore, that a project might be in such forwardness as to be on the eve of execution, and of such notoriety, as to be the talk of all London; and yet that the government might find it difficult to lay its hand upon evidence which would justify its interference, and ensure conviction of the offender.

This is especially liable to occur when the popular feeling is strongly on the side of the offence, and when the act which the law erects into a crime is of a political character.

That such a popular feeling exists at present in favour of Greece, and that other governments, besides that of England, are unable to keep it within due bounds, there requires no stronger proof than the enclosed protest of the French and American Philhellenists, who assume to themselves the language and almost the functions of the governments of their respective countries, calling the Greeks to account for their preference of British protection.

You may safely assert, however, that the British Government is fully alive to all the inconveniences of Lord Cochrane's supposed intentions, if carried into effect. You may give the most positive assurances that we do

not connive at the carrying them into effect, and that such means as are legally within our power shall be immediately employed to counteract them.

I am, &c.,

GEORGE CANNING.

PROTOCOL OF CONFERENCE with the Greek Deputies, MM. ORLANDO, SPANIOLACKI, and LURIOTTIS.

Sept. 29th, 1825.

Mr. Canning commenced the Conference by enquiring of the Greek Deputies, whether or no they were charged with any commission relative to an act or proclamation which had appeared in the public papers of Europe, and which (or a copy of which) had reached him through another channel, tendering to Great Britain on the part of the Greeks a species of protectorate of that country?

M. Spaniolacki, the deputy lately arrived from Greece, answered that they were NOT so charged—that a copy of the papers to which Mr. Canning alluded, was indeed in their possession, transmitted by their government, but that a Captain Miaulis was understood to be on his way here, and to have already left Zante with the original.

Mr. Canning observed that it was in that case unnecessary to enter with the deputies into any discussion of the contents of that paper, but that he could not in fairness withhold from them the information that the intended offer could not be accepted by Great Britain.

The copy of the paper in question, which was in Mr. Canning's possession, being before him on the table, he asked whether the signature of the letter enclosing it was that of M. Colocotroni, and was answered in the affirmative.

He then asked in what capacity they considered M. Colocotroni to have signed it, and whether the paper itself was to be considered as an act of the Provisional Government of Greece, or as the collected sense of a number of individuals, and if the latter whether of inhabitants of the islands as well as of the Morea?

It was answered that Colocotroni probably signed the covering letter not as a minister but as a person well known, whose name would authenticate the character of the enclosure; that the signatures to that enclosure were all those of Moreotes, but that (the deputies had no doubt) the inhabitants of the islands would entirely concur in its contents.

Passing from this paper to the letter which Mr. Canning had received from the deputies, and which had given occasion to this interview, the deputies said that the proposition contained in that letter was the act of their government, and that they had express instructions brought over by M. Spaniolacki to ask the advice of the British government upon the subject of it.

They proceeded to state that in consequence of their past misfortunes, of the divisions which still prevailed among them, and of the unjust and partial conduct of several of the powers of Europe (instances of which they detailed in respect both to Austria and France), the Greek nation thought that it had now become absolutely necessary to change the form of their political establishment, and to make choice of and place at their head one

supreme chief who might put an end to dissensions and jealousies, and become a common centre of government, and an organ of the Greeks with foreign powers—that they wished therefore to know upon whom England would recommend that their choice should fall. They would much prefer that it should be on some person connected with the Royal family of England.

One of the deputies named Prince Leopold and another hinted at the Duke of Sussex. Upon the Duke of Sussex's name they did not dwell, but they dilated a good deal upon the advantage of selecting Prince Leopold as a choice less calculated to compromise Great Britain than that of any immediate member of the Royal family. In support of this proposition they stated that France, or at least General Roche the agent of the Greek committee—countenanced by the French government—had proposed a Prince of the Orleans family, and was at present actively intriguing to attain that object.

Other powers would probably, when the determination of the Greek government was known, pursue the same course—and the Greek nation therefore naturally turned to England as their best friend for advice—and if they could prevail upon us to afford it, for assistance in their difficulties.

Mr. Canning said that he thought the best way of answering their specific propositions was to explain to them generally what had been and what was still the policy of Great Britain towards Greece.

From the time at which the disturbances in that country assumed the character of a war between the Ottoman Porte and the inhabitants of Greece, England had declared and maintained a strict and impartial neutrality in the contest.

England was the first power that allowed the claim of the Greeks to exercise the rights of a belligerent, and set the example of respecting those rights by discharging towards the Greeks all the duties of a neutral, by respecting Greek blockades, by submitting their merchant vessels to the search of Greek cruizers, having regular commissions, and by not contesting the confiscation (after due trial and condemnation) of enemies' property found on board British neutral ships if any such cases occurred. That in doing this we had in fact assigned to the Greeks a character which not only the Porte, but which other powers denied to them, and which Austria specifically (if the Greek deputies had been rightly informed) continued to deny to them by refusing to submit her merchant ships to the visit of Greek cruizers, and by forcibly withdrawing any property seized by them, even though contraband of war.

That what we had thus done was according to the strict rules of neutrality; that by acting upon these rules we had without any more active effort contributed to reduce a barbarous system of warfare within the rules of civilisation, and prevented other Powers, if there were any so inclined, from making common cause against the Greeks as insurgents, not entitled to the privileges of legitimate warfare. Were we to go one step further, and transgress the limits of impartiality in favour of the Greeks, it would be in fact to take part with them in the war, and in consequence to set other powers free to take part with their enemies.

That the wish expressed by the Greeks that Great Britain should at once take part with them in the contest was natural enough; but Mr. Canning

thought he could shew that even such a course of policy, if it could be adopted, would not be so advantageous to the Greeks themselves as they seemed to imagine.

That their sanguine and enthusiastic friends who suggested to them the supposed facility with which England, by her interference, might bring the struggle in which the Greeks are engaged to a favourable termination, deceived either the Greeks or themselves. They reasoned upon the assumption that the contest between Turkey and Greece, though not the *only* contest now existing, would become the *only* contest in the world after England had joined in it—and that it would be to be fought out by the Ottoman Porte on the one side, and Greece with England as her protectress and ally on the other. They forgot that there existed between England and Turkey treaties of very ancient date and of uninterrupted obligation which the Turks faithfully observed, and to the protection of which British interests to a vast amount were and are confided within the dominions of Turkey, and that all these interests must at once be put in jeopardy, and the obligation of the treaties which protect them be at once advisedly broken by the first blow which Great Britain should strike, as the ally of Greece in hostility to Turkey. They forgot further that independent of the particular treaties between Great Britain and the Porte the peace of the world rests upon general treaties between the powers of Europe, of which the primary and pervading stipulation is that no one of the powers parties to them shall aggrandise himself at the expense of others. Is it to be supposed that the Protectorate of Greece, if assumed by Great Britain, or that the placing on the throne of Greece a prince allied to Great Britain would not be considered as a territorial aggrandisement, or that we could fairly contend that it was not so?

The result must necessarily be the breaking up of the present system of treaties—a breach of which England would have *doubly* set the example—both in her violation of her treaties with Turkey, and in her departure from the general arrangements by which the late war was concluded.

Every power from henceforth would pursue its separate interests without regard to previous connection or obligation. The war would spread to the west as well as to the east, it would soon become general throughout Europe, and long before its conclusion—whenever that might arrive—the separate interest of Greece, though the main cause of the contest, would be forgotten in the general confusion.

Mr. Canning was sure that the Greeks would not find their objects obtained by such a state of things even if they could produce it. There might be a point in the contest in which they were engaged with the Turks, when Great Britain might make herself useful to the Greeks by promoting a fair and safe compromise (if such a thing were feasible) between Greece and her late masters, not for the entire independence of Greece, for that was asking *everything*, and could not form the subject of a compromise (if they could conquer it, it was well, and that was their affair), but for anything short of independence which might form the basis of an arrangement with the Porte.

Any plan of this description the Greek deputies declared at once to be now impossible. The Greek nation could never consent to it—they never could live again in amity with Turks established amongst them, or have

confidence in any arrangements made with them. The Greeks must now either be entirely independent or perish.

Mr. Canning said that he had stated to the Greek deputies with perfect frankness all that they had to expect from the British government, and that he was convinced that if those persons in England who distinguished themselves most as friends and advisers of the Greeks were to be at the head of the king's councils to-morrow, they would not have the means, or, when they saw all the difficulties of the question, the disposition to go beyond the line at present prescribed to themselves by the British government.

Mr. Canning wished particularly to impress upon the minds of the Greek deputies that their endeavours to press his Majesty's government to take part in their cause had not only no favourable result, but were always attended by consequences prejudicial to the cause itself. Every step taken by the Greeks to identify Great Britain with their undertaking obliged her to put forth to the world a new declaration of her perseverance in the system of neutrality which she had established.

In a country like England the real intentions and acts of its government though pretty well known, and in the result accurately judged of, were nevertheless liable to temporary misapprehension, and the case was still more serious when the conduct of England was considered abroad.

Mr. Canning was therefore apprehensive that some explanatory step must be taken by this government in consequence of the late offer to Great Britain of the Protectorate of Greece. The Greek nation must not be surprised, nor consider it as an act of unfriendliness to them, if we felt ourselves under the necessity of again proclaiming to the world our fixed determination to maintain an unvarying neutrality in the contest carrying on in Greece. And one of the objects which Mr. Canning had in view in consenting to this Conference was to apprise the Greek deputies of the probability that such a step would be taken.

The Greek deputies replied that they felt sincerely grateful to Mr. Canning for the candid and friendly manner in which he had explained to them the views and policy of the British government, and that they would be equally frank with him in stating what would be the course which the Greeks would probably now pursue.

That their national assemblies would meet in the course of the winter, and that in these assemblies a chief or king would certainly be chosen—that they knew (as they had already said) the wish of the greater part of their countrymen to be that that chief should be part of or connected with the Royal family of England, but that if that were refused by Great Britain, the Greeks must then turn themselves to other Powers, and must seek a chief in the other families of Europe. The Greek deputies trusted that such a proceeding on the part of their countrymen would not expose them to the ill-will or to the hostility of England.

Mr. Canning answered that should the Greeks, after what had passed, adopt such a proceeding the British government would certainly not have any right to complain of *them*. That the question would probably not take that shape: the subject of complaint, if any were to be made, being rather one between the powers of Europe and that particular power from whose family the chief of Greece was selected, than between those powers and the Greeks themselves.

The Greek deputies added that as Mr. Canning had been so open and candid in his explanations to them, perhaps he would allow them to ask what would be the effect on the British government, if the Greek nation were, in their approaching assemblies to choose of their own accord Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg as their king, and to make an offer directly to him, and not through the intervention of the British government.

Mr. Canning answered that in that case also the question would in all probability come back to that which he had already answered.

Connected as Prince Leopold was with the Royal family of England, and possessing as his Royal Highness did, a large stake in this country, he would, even if disposed to accept the trust, doubtless not do so without previously obtaining the consent of the King of England. The asking of that consent would necessarily draw from the British government the same refusal which they were now obliged to give to the proposal about to be made to them.

The Greek deputies replied that the connection between the Prince Leopold and the Royal family of Great Britain being in fact slight, they had hoped that his Royal Highness might not feel himself strictly bound by it, and in offering to him the supreme power of Greece the Greeks might be considered as tendering it to a German Prince.

Mr. Canning replied that it was of course open to Prince Leopold to take whatever course his Royal Highness might choose, were the offer made to him, but that in as far as his Royal Highness would be swayed by his position in England, and Mr. Canning (speaking merely his own individual opinion upon a question which took him entirely unprepared) believed the Prince Leopold would be swayed by it, his Royal Highness's decision would be in the negative.

On the Greek deputies rising to take their leave, Mr. Canning again stated to them that they must be prepared for the promulgation of some formal act by the British government declaratory of the policy of England, which was still to maintain, under all circumstances, the neutral conduct that we had hitherto pursued, that the stir which had been made and was now making in this country to engage the king's subjects in the Greek contest—contrary to the law of the land—and to procure succour of every description for Greece (the Greek deputies knew very well to what he alluded) rendered the taking such a step absolutely necessary; that the Greek nation he repeated and earnestly begged them to believe were not to consider this measure as hostile to them, but that above all things they must remember that it was rendered necessary by their acts and by the acts of their agents.

The Greek deputies very fairly assented to the expediency of such a step as we meditated (in the forthcoming proclamation), in consequence of the suspicions of our neutrality growing out of the late measures in Greece, and out of Lord Cochrane's preparations here.

They implored Mr. Canning at the same time to say a word avowing and proclaiming *our* acknowledgment of *their belligerent rights*. They admitted with gratitude that we did respect them, though there were occasional deviations from the rule which our government laid down, in the conduct of *some* of our merchants and *some* of our cruisers.

But these deviations they had no doubt were disapproved by our govern-

ment. What they wanted, however, was some public document to which they could appeal as proving our system of neutrality, which other powers who did not follow it pretended to disbelieve.

We had publicly rebuked them, and almost made war upon them, for their transgression of the limits of their belligerent rights last year, of which they did not complain; but they should be grateful if we could properly give the like publicity to our acknowledgment of their exercise of the rights of war, which we allowed them to possess.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Sir Henry Wellesley.

Sir, Foreign Office, 3rd Oct., 1825.

I concluded my despatch No. 13, by Mr. Spencer, with the assurance that his Majesty's government would take every measure, lawfully within their power, to defeat the projects imputed to subjects of Great Britain, of active co-operation in the war, which the Greeks are waging against the Ottoman Porte.

The enclosed Proclamation, and the Order in Council which is annexed to it, are the measures to which his Majesty has resorted for this purpose.

These papers are transmitted to Prince Metternich by Prince Esterhazy, of whose courier I take advantage, to forward this despatch to your Excellency.

Your Excellency will not fail to point out to Prince Metternich that the language of his Majesty's Proclamation sufficiently implies the resolution of his Majesty, not to contract with the Greeks any other relations than those of the neutrality which his Majesty has hitherto scrupulously observed.

After my despatch was prepared, Prince Esterhazy communicated to me one from Prince Metternich, of which the topics were so exactly the same with those reported by your Excellency as having been brought forward by Prince Metternich in conversation, that it does not appear to me to be necessary that I should add anything to my former despatch, in consequence of this communication; especially as the documents which I now transmit to you are, in fact, in themselves, the most conclusive answers to all Prince Metternich's inquiries. I will not, however, omit to express to your Excellency the satisfaction which I feel at the tone of Prince Metternich's despatch, and to direct you to take this opportunity to assure Prince Metternich of the sincere disposition of this government to interchange on all occasions, in which the interests of the two Countries are concerned, the most friendly and unreserved exposition of their respective feelings and opinions.

I have, within these few days, again examined into the truth of the alleged facts upon which much of Prince Metternich's reasoning and representations are founded; and I have derived from that inquiry the most decided conviction that his imputations upon Captain Hamilton have originated in misinformation. That Captain Hamilton, so far from intriguing to procure, did not encourage or countenance the offer to England of a protectoral power over Greece; and that he positively refused to transmit that offer to his government; that, so far from habitually favouring the

Greeks in their maritime war, and conniving at piratical captures, Captain Hamilton has recently swept the seas of Greek pirate boats, destroying some, and taking security from the owners of others, for a discontinuance of their irregular practices.

Nay, it has appeared that, in one instance (perhaps in more) Captain Hamilton has forcibly wrested from the possession of Greek cruisers regularly commissioned, a British ship captured by them lawfully, according to the rules of war, as having on board property and provisions undoubtedly belonging to their enemy.

Such violence is contrary to the orders under which his Majesty's naval officers act, and the last paragraph of his Majesty's Proclamation is intended to enforce these orders for the future.

I am, &c.,

GEORGE CANNING.

The Right Hon. Charles Wynn to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Whitehall Place, Saturday night. 1st Oct., 1825.

Will you excuse my representing to you the great advantage which would result from your being present at the meeting between Lord Liverpool and the Chairs on the subject of the government of India?

I am aware that after you have mentioned to me your intention of passing this week out of town, this representation may seem unreasonable on my part, but this is a question upon which your personal assistance may be of the utmost importance.

I do not myself expect that the Court of Directors will ultimately incur the responsibility of acting on this occasion against the opinion of government; but it is to be recollected that this opinion will be conveyed to them through most reluctant channels. The Chairman this morning declared his disposition himself to move Lord Amherst's recall, if he should find such a measure consonant to the feelings of the Court, and the Deputy Chairman, though content to submit to the decision of the Cabinet, expressed, still more strongly than the Chairman, his disapprobation of the conduct of the Bengal government upon the mutiny.

Considering therefore how powerful the official influence of the Chairs is, in the Court, I do not think that we can afford to part with any advantage, and I am sure I need not urge upon you, how much greater the weight and authority of your opinion will be, when delivered personally, than if it should only be reported to the Chairs by Lord Liverpool.

Lord Liverpool comes to town on Tuesday, and has given me leave to fix the meeting for any subsequent day. If Thursday would suit you, I think that probably might be the best; but I should think it might be deferred till Friday if you come up on that day for the Recorder's Report.

Believe me, my dear Duke, with the greatest truth and respect,

ever most faithfully yours,

C. W. WILLIAMS WYNN.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Lord Liverpool.

My dear Liverpool, Foreign Office, 3rd Oct., 1825.

I am just returned from a conference with the Chairs, but not to the effect for which I prepared you by my letter of Saturday.

The Duke of Wellington came to me yesterday; and in consequence of what passed between us, the enclosed correspondence took place between Wynn and me. I take this short method of putting you in possession of it because I have really no time to write to you more at length.

My conversation with the Chairs, therefore, was confined to the inquiring of them what it was that they wished to say to the government respecting Lord Amherst, telling them that I was requested by you to receive their answer in your absence, and that you were disposed to give to it the fairest and fullest consideration.

The Chairman then proceeded to state very nearly what Wynn repeated to us from his last conference with the Chairs, but in a tone of perfect temperance, and (as it appeared to me) good-will to the government.

I said that the question was much too grave a one to admit of being decided in a hurry; that the Duke of Wellington was to see all the papers and reports upon the mutiny; and had promised to report his opinion for the information of his colleagues; that his Grace's present views of the state of the war were favourable; that it was to be considered what would be the effect of recalling Lord Amherst hastily and disgracefully, if the main measure of his government, and the much questioned one, were after all to end well; but that I stated these considerations rather as to the mode and time than as to the substance of the matter; for that if his recall were deemed essential to the public service you were not disposed to obstruct it, nor, I told them, would my feelings of private friendship stand in the way of a great public duty.

I presumed that it would be enough for their present purpose to be enabled to state, if called upon, that they had called the attention of the King's government to the matter; and that they had found no indisposition to afford it the most dispassionate consideration.

They said that it would be quite enough; and seemed quite reconciled to the postponing of anything more till your return to town at the beginning of November.

Ever sincerely yours,

George Canning.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My dear Duke, Walmer Castle, 6th Oct., 1825.

I am under the necessity of troubling you in consequence of a letter which I have just received from Wynn, and by which I find that the whole Indian question is in a very perplexed state, from a course having been followed decidedly at variance with what I understood had been settled previous to my leaving London.

I have never authorised the Duke of Buckingham's name being brought forward. I told both Wynn and Canning that I would not only not

give, but that I would not even *form* an opinion till I had heard your sentiments upon the *whole case*. I felt this to be due to you on every account, but more especially from your being the only member of the government who had any personal Indian experience, and who could form a just opinion on the actual state of the war in that quarter.

The first question to be considered is, Ought Lord Amherst to be recalled? Secondly, Is it in our power to maintain him?

You know the East India Company can *legally* recall a governor without the consent of the government; and they would do it of course in a more obnoxious manner, if they took the step in opposition to the wishes of government, instead of proceeding in concurrence with government. This consideration ought in justice, however, to be subordinate to the opinion, whether Lord Amherst, considering the progress of the operations of the war in India, the state of public opinion, and his conduct in respect to the report on the mutiny, can *fairly* and *properly* be maintained by the government.

The papers I understand have been sent to you, and you will be able, therefore, to give me your opinion on this part of the subject.

If Lord Amherst cannot be maintained, the next question is, Would it be most expedient for the *public service* (I put all personal and party considerations out of the question) to recommend the Duke of Buckingham for the government of India, or Sir Thomas Munro; regard being had to the local experience of the latter, his being upon the spot, and his knowledge of the nature of the contest in which we are engaged?

You will see, by the manner of putting the question, that I am strongly impressed with *some* of the advantages connected with the appointment of the latter, but I feel myself to be no judge of the objections to it. They may be stronger than I had imagined them to be.

I have no doubt the Duke of Buckingham will be greatly offended by the preference being given to Sir Thomas Munro; but he has not the least right to be offended. The question is a *public* question, and whatever may be the Duke of Buckingham's rank, station and abilities, it is no offence to him that a person of great local experience should be preferred, at a very critical conjuncture, to one, who (whatever may be his other advantages) can have no such experience.

Another consideration remains about which you may be unable to give or to form any opinion.

Would the Duke of Buckingham's appointment receive the sanction of the Court of Directors? Would it not be right that this should be ascertained before his name is formally brought forward? His rejection would be an unpleasant circumstance for the government and a severe mortification to himself. The influence of Government amongst the electors is very low, and I think it highly probable that the party in opposition to government would bring forward Lord William Bentinck again, who is a popular candidate. I need not add that a majority of the Court being in his favour would be a mortifying result to the Duke of Buckingham and a very embarrassing one to the government.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

[487.] *To Lord Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD LIVERPOOL, Sudbourne, 8th Oct., 1825.

I have received your letter of the 6th by the messenger, and I am happy to find that I view the Indian question nearly in the same light that you do. I am now reading all the proceedings upon the mutiny, upon which it is desirable that I should be able to give an opinion, and with that opinion I will send you an answer to your letter. I hope to be able to send it to you on Monday.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[488.] *To Lord Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD LIVERPOOL, London, 10th Oct., 1825.

Since I wrote to you from Sudbourne I have put together my opinions, formed after perusal of the papers on the mutiny in India, of which paper I send you a copy.

I don't see how it is possible to find fault with Lord Amherst upon any part of this transaction. The acts or the omissions of his government did not occasion the mutiny; it was put down in the field by the Commander-in-Chief in person, into which field the Commander-in-Chief was forced to go by the mutineers; and the consequences which followed are those of trial, condemnation, and punishment. But it is pretended that Lord Amherst ought to have pardoned the criminals, and to have remitted the sentence of working upon the roads, because it is stated (but I don't know where) that the arms of the mutineers were not loaded.

I would beg leave to recommend to the government here to allow those upon the spot in India to judge of the expediency of punishing after fair and legal trial or of pardoning; and most particularly in cases of mutiny. These men have had a fair trial by a court-martial composed of *native* officers, and it is best to allow the local government to decide what shall be done with those condemned by legal sentence.

I say, then, in answer to your first and second queries, that not only we ought not to remove Lord Amherst on account of the mutiny, or for any of the acts preceding that misfortune or

following it, but we ought to do everything in our power to support him in the performance of his duty.

Neither is there, in my opinion, anything in the state of the war which ought to induce the government to recall Lord Amherst. He ought not to have commenced the war without knowing a little more of the enemy he had to contend with; he ought not possibly to have sent Sir Archibald Campbell to Rangoon till he could co-operate with him from other quarters. But even this last opinion may be doubted, as it is certain that there has been no alarm in Bengal since the enemy has found himself under the necessity of detaching troops to oppose the operations of Sir Archibald Campbell. But whether the war was originally right or wrong, or the detaching Sir Archibald Campbell right or wrong, it is quite clear to me that the Bengal government are now on the right road, and that nothing but the season will prevent them from putting an end to the war in a very short time. It must be observed, however, that the rains begin in May or June, and that their effects are felt in that country till towards the end of December.

I am aware of the power of the Court of Directors to remove the Governor-General. But in my opinion it would be better both for the public interest and for the honour of the individual concerned, that they should remove him against the will of the government, than that we should be guilty of injustice, or take upon ourselves the appearance of protectors of mutiny.

If Lord Amherst should be removed, I am clearly of opinion that you ought to appoint Sir Thomas Munro to be the Governor-General. You ought to do so because he is peculiarly conversant in Indian warfare; and, in fact, the only intelligent papers which I have seen on the subject of this Burmese war have come from Sir Thomas Munro; and he has adopted the best and most judicious measures to enable the officers employed to bring the war to a conclusion.

In this view of the case I put the appointment of the Duke of Buckingham entirely out of the question for the present; and, indeed, I would do so altogether if it were possible. The Duke has not health to bear the climate, and his talents, however brilliant, are not of the description which would be successfully applied to the government of that country. But from what I have understood from Mr. Wynn, the case has gone beyond

that point. The king was spoken to upon the Duke's appointment at Windsor on the 30th of September, and gave a favourable answer, which was communicated to the Duke; and the Duke might have reason to complain if his wishes were laid aside altogether. But in a case of war, there is no room for trifling about men's feelings. We must adopt the measures most likely to bring the war to an early conclusion; and there is no doubt that Sir Thomas Munro is much better calculated to effect that object for us than the Duke.

Then if the Duke is to be proposed to the Court of Directors, it is much better that enquiry should be made quietly as to the manner in which the proposition will be received by the Directors before it is formally brought before that body. It is probable that the Duke himself would not like to be rejected; and I am sure that it is not creditable for the government to propose formally such a man as the Duke of Buckingham for the office of Governor-General, and to have him rejected by the Court of Directors; and most particularly not creditable if this rejection should have been preceded by the removal of Lord Amherst against our will.

If Lord William Bentinck should be chosen by the Court of Directors, he must be rejected by the government at all events.

Believe me, my dear Lord Liverpool,

ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Stratfieldsaye, 11th Oct.

P.S.—I was in hopes that I should have received this morning the Memorandum referred to in the commencement of this letter; but it is not arrived, and I will send it to-morrow.

[489.] *To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn.*

MY DEAR WYNN, Stratfieldsaye, 11th Oct., 1825.

I enclose a Memorandum written after perusal of the proceedings of the Court of Enquiry on the subject of the mutiny at Barrackpoor.

You will collect from it my positive opinion, that the government in Bengal did not cause the mutiny, whether by its acts or its omissions. The Governor-General was not re-

sponsible for the manner in which the mutiny was put down, even if that manner can be blamed, after the fact (unnoticed by the Committee of Enquiry in their report, but which appears on their evidence) has come out, that General Dalzell had ordered a Court of Enquiry to investigate the causes of the mutiny, and that the sepoys declined to attend, notwithstanding that the commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel Cartwright, had offered to remain on the parade, as a hostage for the security of the return to them of the sepoys who should be sent to the Court to state their grievances. The Commander-in-Chief then was forced into the field, when he could not do otherwise than insist upon the mutineers laying down their arms in the first instance. The events which followed were the consequence of the sepoys having refused to lay down their arms.

I do not think there is in the proceedings any positive evidence to the fact that the arms of the mutineers were not loaded on the morning of the 2nd, when in communication with the Commander-in-Chief. But I consider that point very immaterial in judging of his conduct. They were then under arms in a state of mutiny, having refused to march, having forcibly seized their colours, and driven from the parade their general, their officers, and the men disposed to perform their duty; and it was the duty of the Commander-in-Chief to force them to submit before he should listen to their complaints; more particularly as they had refused to state them to a Court of Enquiry on the preceding day. Neither do I think that this fact ought to have induced the government to interfere to obtain their pardon. There was not a symptom of submission till the moment at which the attack upon them was made; and even then their attempt was not to submit, but to escape.

Besides the evidence given before the Court of Enquiry, I have perused the Appendix containing the examinations of the sepoys taken up in the country who had escaped from the field. These men do not say they were deluded, and do not submit themselves to mercy; but they assert that they mutinied because they were ordered on board ship, which they knew to be false, and on account of the oppressive conduct of the Subadar and Havildar Major, and of their want of pay.

I say, then, that the Governor-General had no grounds for interfering to pardon these mutineers. But, at all events, whether he had or not, I must say that having had sufficient

confidence in Lord Amherst to appoint him to the office of Governor-General, I cannot but think that he must be a better judge than anybody here, whether men fairly tried by a general court-martial, composed of native officers, and legally condemned to punishment, ought to suffer that punishment; and I am particularly anxious to avoid to interfere in this case, because I do not wish to give to the government at home the appearance of protectors of mutiny.

Neither do I think that Lord Amherst could have adopted or recommended any measures on the various points adverted to by the Committee of Enquiry, excepting, indeed, to order the European officers of the native corps, however employed, to join their corps. But his Lordship's own sagacity and knowledge of the military service must have led him to the discovery that this was the real evil, as the Court of Enquiry in their report do not notice it.

I think, then, that you cannot consent to the recall of Lord Amherst upon any point connected with the mutiny.

As for the war, it appears to me that it is going on as well as it can go on. The Bengal government are now on the right road, and they must succeed. There will be another campaign probably, as General Morrison had not above six weeks of weather upon which he could rely after the capture of Arracan. But that is not the fault of Lord Amherst. He could not collect his army on the Eastern frontier one moment sooner than he did; and, as far as I can see, there is no ground of complaint against the government.

But then you may say that the Court of Directors will dismiss Lord Amherst whether the government consent or not. Let them do so. I prefer that they and not we should do an injustice; that the Court of Directors and not we should have the appearance of encouraging the mutiny of the Native troops in India, and that they and not we should be guilty of occasioning the inconvenience of changing the government at the moment in which it is engaged in an arduous war.

Ever, &c.,

Wellington.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM ON MUTINY AT BARRACKPOOR.

10th Oct., 1825.

I have perused with great attention the proceedings of the committee of officers in Bengal on the mutiny at Barrackpoor in October and November last; their general observations, and the letter from the Governor-General in Council to the Court of Directors of the 30th of March last.

These proceedings refer only to the transactions up to the 1st of November.

It appears from them, however, that the 47th Native Regiment, after various acts of insubordination on preceding days, refused to march on the 1st of November; that a considerable body of that corps drove from the parade on that morning 180 men there assembled with the European and Native officers for the purpose of commencing the march, and seized the colours of the regiment; and remained throughout that day in a state of mutiny in their lines in the cantonment at Barrackpoor; the European and Native officers, and non-commissioned officers having been obliged to withdraw themselves from the men of the regiment.

It appears that meetings had been held near a tank in front of the cantonments on different nights previous to the 1st of November, between the men of the 47th Regiment and those of the 26th and 62nd, two other Native regiments ordered likewise to march, and to follow the 47th Regiment; and it is a fact that considerable bodies of both these regiments joined the 47th in the night of the 1st November with their colours, which they had seized.

It likewise appears by the proceedings of the committee, that Major-General Dalzell, commanding in the cantonment at Barrackpoor, had on the 1st of November, after the mutiny of the 47th Regiment, ordered a Court of Enquiry to assemble to investigate the alleged grievances and claims of the sepoys, and the causes for which they had refused to march. The mutineers were informed of the assembly of this Court by Lieut.-Colone Cartwright, their commanding officer, and were desired to send two sepoys at a time of each company to attend the Court to state their complaints. The mutineers refused, as they said that these sepoys would not be allowed to return to them in

safety. Upon this statement, Lieut.-Colonel Cartwright made the offer to remain upon the parade with the mutineers as hostage, till all the separate detachments of sepoys sent to attend the Court should return.

The mutineers refused to accept this offer; and, in fact, the Court of Enquiry was under the necessity of adjourning without proceeding on the intended enquiry.

From these facts it is obvious that the mutineers of the 47th Regiment felt considerable confidence in their security from their numbers, the connivance of their Native officers, and the promised support of other corps; and it was not without reason that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief required on the following morning that the mutineers of the three corps assembled should lay down their arms, before his Excellency should proceed to take into consideration the demands contained in a petition in the Persian language, which they had conveyed to his Excellency.

If his Excellency had adopted any other course, he would have been guilty of a gross violation of his duty to the government and to his employers.

The supposed causes of this mutiny are stated in the observations of the committee to have been, first, "The general dislike to proceeding to the unhealthy country into which our military operations were to be carried."

Secondly, "The state of public feeling as to the nature and character of the war; and the difficulties they expected to meet in its progress."

These were indeed the real causes of the mutiny. The sepoys serving under the presidency of Fort William are in general levied in Benares and Oude; and they dislike at all times to serve in the lower provinces, particularly in that of Bengal, on account of the nature of the climate, the food, and the supposed difference of pay, which will be discussed presently. They dislike still more to serve on the eastern frontier; and above all to pass that frontier into Assam.

But it is obvious that such objections could not induce the government to countermand the march of these corps. The State was at war, and required all its troops; and it would not do to excuse any on account of their dislike of the particular service; provided that to employ them in such service was not inconsistent with the engagement under which the troops

had enlisted, or the customs which had usually prevailed in employing them.

The third cause of the mutiny stated is, "The aversion to being employed on board ship." If such an intention on the part of the government existed, it would have been a breach of engagement, and of the practice of the service.

But all these troops were repeatedly assured by General Dalzell, by Colonel Cartwright, by those of their European officers in whom they felt confidence, and by their Native officers, that there was no such intention; and they must have known from experience that no native troops had ever been embarked, excepting as volunteers, and by their own consent. The suspicion of such an intention on the part of the government must have been excited by those who fomented this mutiny.

The fourth cause stated for this mutiny is, "The want of a proper provision of cattle for the conveyance of the baggage of the sepoys."

The sepoys in the service of the government of Bengal are nearly all men of the highest caste of Hindoos; and the ceremonies of their religion and the duties of their caste require that each of them should possess for his own use certain cooking utensils and other conveniences in camp and on service, which are of a bulk and weight to render it impossible for him to carry them on his back in the same manner as other soldiers do those applied to a similar purpose.

For this reason, the sepoys are allowed to hire at their own expense cattle to carry these articles; which cattle are usually hired for them by the interference of the magistrates in the different parts of the country.

It appears that notwithstanding that the commanding officer of the 47th, Lieut.-Colonel Cartwright, applied to the magistrate as early as July to have the bullocks for the service of his corps hired, and repeated his application again on the 13th of October, the magistrate could find no bullocks for hire in the country, on account of the want of these animals for the general service of the army, and of the unwillingness of those who usually hired bullocks to proceed on service to that part of the country.

Lieut.-Colonel Cartwright urged the sepoys to buy bullocks to carry their baggage, and actually advanced money to the non-commissioned officers to make the necessary purchases; but

the sepoys refused to purchase, and insisted upon having them for hire as usual. The commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel Cartwright, then advanced three thousand rupees (about four hundred pounds) out of his own pocket to purchase bullocks for the sepoys; and the government, upon the representation of the Commander-in-Chief, directed that 4000 rupees, or about five hundred pounds, should be advanced to the commanding officer of each of the corps going upon the service, to purchase bullocks to carry the baggage of the sepoys.

I certainly think that the sepoys in the service of Bengal, having been in the habit of hiring bullocks to carry their baggage, and this accommodation being necessary for the particular description of men of whom those regiments were composed, and the assistance of the civil magistrates to obtain what they required having been usually given, and being necessary, it was the duty of the government to adopt measures to give them the accommodation of the necessary number of bullocks in some other manner, when it was found that they could not be obtained in the country for hire. Accordingly, it appears that the government and the commanding officer of the regiment, Lieut.-Colonel Cartwright, performed this duty by the 47th, and ten bullocks for each company were in camp on the night of the 31st October, the night before the mutiny.

There is a difference of opinion respecting the quality of these bullocks, whether they were sufficient in number, &c. But it must be observed that the sepoys had been desired to leave behind them, or to dispose of everything which it was not necessary for them to take with them, which order was not only reasonable, but under the circumstances a proper order to give out.

It likewise appears that a building in the cantonment had been allotted to receive the baggage which the sepoys should leave behind.

But no imputation can be cast upon the government whether the bullocks were or not sufficient in number, or their quality good. They manifested their desire to provide for this service by the advance of the money; and it was the duty of others to superintend and take care of all the details of the execution of the intentions of the government, whether in regard to the carriage of the baggage of the sepoys, the care of their baggage if left behind, and all other details.

The fifth cause stated by the committee for the mutiny is, "The effect produced by the enormous wages extorted from the public, and from individuals, by all classes of persons whose services were wanted on this occasion."

This cause of discontent was made known to Lieut.-Colonel Cartwright, who very properly explained to the sepoys the difference between their situation and that of the persons referred to.

They, the sepoys, were permanently in the service, and enjoyed many advantages, besides their monthly pay, such as their batta on a march, their pensions when unable to serve any longer, &c.; whereas the persons in question were hired only for the occasion, and when the occasion should no longer exist, their pay would cease. This want of an increase of pay, however, it appears was stated by the sepoys as one of the causes of the mutiny to the last moment, and they peremptorily demanded an addition of half the pay they already received as a condition of their return to their duty.

This whole question of pay deserves consideration, as it is a point upon which the committee have gone much at length in their observations.

The first complaint is that the pay of the sepoys is calculated in Sonat rupees, in which coin they are paid in Benares and Oude, but that they are paid in Sicca rupees in Bahar and Bengal, upon which coin a premium is taken from them of about 1½ per cent. Sonat rupees are the coin in general currency throughout Hindostan. Having been coined in all parts of the country, they are very old, much worn, and defaced; and one hundred, upon an average, are calculated not to be worth more than 95 or 95½ of the standard Sicca rupees. The standard Sicca rupees are coined by the company in their mint; and when the troops are paid in this coin it is the common practice to deduct the overplus of the value compared with Sonat rupees, in which the pay of all ranks is calculated.

In stating the complaints of this arrangement, the committee do not mention that the sepoys do not change a single Sonat rupee in the bazaars of Hindostan, without paying something to the Shroff, or money changer. The Sicca rupee will invariably change for its standard value in other coins. What is the remedy for the evil stated by the committee? Is it to pay

the troops in Bahar and Bengal without deducting the difference of value in Sicca rupees, continuing to pay those in Benares and Oude their old pay in Sonat rupees? This arrangement would be neither more nor less than to increase the pay of the troops in Bahar and Bengal; and I beg to observe that the troops in those provinces have always been supposed to be in peace cantonments, whereas those in Benares and Oude are in camp or in war cantonments.

The next claim would be to add to the pay of the troops employed in Benares and Oude 4½ or 5 per cent. to make their pay equal in reality to that of the troops employed in Bahar and Bengal.

It would be impossible to pay all the troops in Sicca rupees, on account of the difficulty, expense, and delay of transporting those rupees from the mint to the stations in Benares and Oude; and equally impossible to pay all the troops in Bahar and Bengal in Sonat rupees without giving circulation within the Company's territories to a base and depreciated currency. It is clear, then, that there is no remedy for this inconvenience, which in some shape or other must exist, and which, after all, is exaggerated by the committee, as well as by the sepoys.

But there is still behind a question connected with this subject, and that is, the sufficiency or the insufficiency of the pay of the sepoys in Bengal.

The pay of a sepoy is seven rupees a month, or seventeen shillings and sixpence, deducting therefrom 5 per cent., or say ninepence. Let that sum be compared with the price of labour and of food in the country, and with the pay of soldiers, the price of labour and of food in any part of the world, and it will be found ample, even after making allowance for all the deductions stated in the observations.

Suppose a sepoy eats one seer, or two pounds, of rice in a day; and I have known thousands of them live and serve upon half a seer, or a pound a day, and the Bengal sepoys never have more than two pounds when on service; the average price of rice being about twenty seers for a rupee, the sepoy would have 5½ rupees of his seven in every month for his other expenses.

But besides this pay, the sepoy has at all times when in Oude, and when he marches or is on service elsewhere, an

allowance called batta of about twopence a day, which, in fact, is intended to defray, and does defray, the expense of his food. Seven rupees a month, then, is a fair allowance of pay; and in Bengal it is known that they are satisfied with that amount, and so well satisfied as that the ranks are always complete with men of the highest caste. When not in Bengal, the sepoys eat wheaten flour, which is cheaper food than rice is. But the price of rice is lower in Bengal than that above stated.

The seventh cause stated by the committee for the mutiny is, "The want of knapsacks, for which the sepoys had been put under stoppages."

This cannot fairly be deemed a cause for mutiny. Indeed, it was scarcely stated by the troops; and those who did state the grievance, were satisfied with the answer that the knapsacks had been embarked in boats on the river at Futty Ghur, and were expected from thence. However, there is no doubt that it would have been better if the charge had not been made for the knapsacks till the troops should have received them.

The eighth cause stated by the committee for the mutiny is, "The undue influence of the Subadar Major and Havildar Major of the 47th Regiment." These men appear to have conducted themselves meritoriously, particularly during these discontents, and therefore they are complained of. They rendered themselves very useful to the commanding officer, Colonel Cartwright, who attended to them accordingly. But it does not appear in any part of the proceedings that injustice was done to anybody in consequence of their influence. As connected with this part of the subject, I will now advert to the observations of the committee upon the native troops in Bengal. I have known these troops long enough to have heard many similar complaints of their having fallen off in discipline, efficiency, and attachment to the service; but I have seen these troops perform the best service at the moment when these complaints have been loudest.

About thirty years ago, that is in the year 1796, a great change was made in the Company's service in India, particularly in the Native service, which I don't think was fully considered at the time; and it certainly has not tended to improve the qualities of the Native troops. But whether that alteration was right or wrong, no change can now be made; and we must endeavour to rectify the defects which are apparent upon the proceedings of this committee.

Of all the armies in the world, the Native army in India is that one of which the Staff officers should not be effective in its ranks. But on the contrary, the European officers with the Native troops should always be kept effective. Yet in this army, it appears that by far the majority of the officers of the regiments, and of course the best officers, those who best understand the language, manners, and customs of the natives, those most capable of preventing such a catastrophe as happened at Barrackpoor, are employed in civil and diplomatic situations on the Staff of the army, in the Commissariat, in command, or to officer provisional and local, or irregular corps of cavalry and infantry; some even in the service of the allies of the British government. This being the case, it cannot be matter of surprise to find it recorded on these proceedings, not only that the European officers of the 47th Regiment had no influence in preventing this mutiny, but that they had no knowledge, some till the 31st October, others not till the 1st November, of the discontents which existed, and irregularities committed by the sepoys in their companies many days previous to the mutiny, or till long after those discontents and irregularities were known to the General Officer commanding in the cantonments, and even to the Commander-in-Chief.

It appears that these European officers never attended the roll-calls of their companies, and but seldom the regimental parades. That they were not acquainted with the sepoys of their companies, did not know their names, and never spoke to them or communicated with them, excepting through the Native officers, or non-commissioned officers, nearly all of whom, it appears, encouraged the sepoys to mutiny.

The European officers knew nothing of the orders issued by the commanding officer, did not take measures to see them executed, or take any part in the command or discipline of the corps.

It appears that the European Staff officers did not know of the irregularities of which the sepoys were guilty till the morning of the 31st October, although they were days before known to the commanding officer, and to the General, and Commander-in-Chief, and did not know or perform more of their duty than the officers in command of and attached to the companies.

It appears that the adjutant, when he gave out the orders of

the commanding officer, did not consider it his duty to see them carried into execution; and as for the quartermaster, he knew nothing, and did not consider it his duty to know anything about the clothing or equipment of the troops; and when the government had taken the trouble, and had incurred the expense of 4000 rupees to purchase bullocks to carry the baggage of the sepoys of this corps, and the quartermaster might have known how important it was that this supply should not be lost or rendered useless for want of care, he did not consider it his duty to take any steps whatever to have care taken of these animals.

It is not necessary to seek for curious reasons for the falling off in the discipline, efficiency, and attachment to the service of the Native army in Bengal, when such a state of things exists among the European officers in one of the favourite corps of the service, the 47th Regiment.

I have come from the perusal of these proceedings with a firm conviction upon my mind that neither the acts nor the omissions of the government caused the discontent, much less the mutiny. The discontent was caused by the necessity of employing the sepoys on the Eastern frontier instead of in their own country, *Oude;* and the mutiny because the Native officers connived at the conduct of the mutineers, and the European officers knew nothing about that, or anything else which it was their duty to know, excepting the commanding officer, Colonel Cartwright, who appears to me to have done everything in his power, as well to allay the discontents, as to prevent the mutiny, and afterwards to get the better of it; excepting that he did not force the European officers to perform their duty, or bring them to trial for a neglect of it. The sepoys, then, finding that their conduct was thus connived at, or not checked by those who ought to have controlled it, and feeling themselves strong in numbers, and supported by other regiments in the same cantonments, broke out into open mutiny.

It is a curious fact that the committee have taken no notice of and made no observation upon their declining to attend the committee ordered on the 1st November to hear and investigate their complaints. But having so declined, the Commander-in-Chief had but one line to follow, and that was to force them to lay down their arms before he should consider of their complaints.

I entreat my colleagues, before they decide upon these questions, to consider well what would have been the consequences of any weakness or want of decision in the settlement of this question upon the spot, or in the punishment of those since tried by a court-martial composed of *Native* officers, and condemned to work upon the roads for this crime.

Let them recollect the impressions upon their own minds when they first heard of this mutiny; and I beg them when the danger is over not to judge too severely the conduct of those who got the better of it, probably by the promptitude and vigour of the very measures upon which it is now attempted to cast blame.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Mr. Stratford Canning.

SIR, Foreign Office, 12th Oct., 1825.

The King having been pleased to select you to be his Majesty's Ambassador to the Ottoman Porte, I am now to furnish your Excellency with the necessary instructions for your guidance in the discharge of the duties of that important and delicate trust.

The present situation of affairs in the East of Europe is peculiarly difficult and complicated.

The honour of his Majesty, the general policy of his government, and the immediate welfare of a large class of his subjects, are deeply concerned in the result of those difficulties and complications.

I flatter myself, that by an open language, and a direct and straightforward conduct, your Excellency will be enabled to preserve all these several interests of his Majesty, his government, and his subjects, unharmed, amidst the shock of untoward events and conflicting passions, even if circumstances shall not allow of your bringing those passions to reason and conducting those events to a peaceful issue.

It is not to be disguised that the new British embassy will have considerable obstacles to surmount at Constantinople and considerable prejudices to encounter.

Other and rival missions have been for some time in possession of the field. The absence of a British ambassador has not only afforded advantage to such missions, but may have, and undoubtedly has, been represented to the Porte as a proof of a diminished interest in its concerns, if not as an indication of positive hostility.

Meantime the public and uncontrollable interference of British subjects in the military operations of the Greeks, and the recent measures of the Greeks themselves, will have rendered the professed neutrality of England (and it must be admitted not unreasonably) an object of suspicion to the Porte, with whom that neutrality itself, even if strictly and successfully enforced, is already an object of dissatisfaction and remonstrance.

That such unfavourable impressions as I have described must exist on the mind of the Ottoman government is so certain, that I hold it to be quite unnecessary to instruct your Excellency to ascertain the existence of them, and I proceed rather to direct you at once, in your first conference with the Reis Effendi, to declare your persuasion that they do exist, and your readiness and ability to remove them.

1st. The absence of a British ambassador from Constantinople has not been accidental or undesigned.

Lord Strangford had conducted to a successful termination the negotiations with the Porte with which he had been charged by his Sovereign, on the part of the Russian government. (The slight exception with which this proposition may perhaps be qualified does not affect its general truth, and will be stated more particularly in another despatch.)

Unluckily, however, the termination of those negotiations was not accompanied by the restoration of good humour on the part of Russia, or by the expected, or promised, re-establishment of the Russian mission at Constantinople. The British government was not, and is not, satisfied with the excuses which Russia alleges for her non-performance of the promise made by Lord Strangford in her name. Lord Strangford could not continue at the Porte after the failure of the engagements of which he was the organ: nor would it be fitting that he should return there either to resume discussions which had ended so much less satisfactorily than he had a right to expect, or to create additional distrust by declining to resume them.

It is hoped that during the interval which has elapsed between his departure and your Excellency's arrival at Constantinople the remaining points of dispute between the Porte and the Emperor of Russia may have been settled by direct negotiation through M. Minciacky. To afford room for such a settlement has been one motive for postponing the moment of your Excellency's repairing to your post.

But, in any case, it is not intended that your Excellency should take up the burthen which Lord Strangford has laid down.

Another motive for letting Lord Strangford's place remain so long unsupplied was the step resolved upon by the four great Continental Powers in the conferences of this year at St. Petersburg—a step in which England did not concur, in which, therefore, her ambassador was not to participate, and which it was on that account desirable to leave to be executed in his absence.

England declined participating in that measure, not from any unwillingness to do anything in her power towards producing a settlement of the distractions which agitate Greece, and towards establishing such an arrangement between the Greeks and their late masters as would combine the fair interests of both parties, and secure from interruption the general peace of Europe.

But the British government entertained no hope of such a result from propositions which had been discredited even before they were brought forward, by a premature publication of the basis upon which they were to rest, and by the consequent expression by both parties to whom they were to be tendered of their entire determination to reject them.

The British government entertained no hope of good from a co-operation of which (as appeared to the British government) those who undertook it

had neither defined the limits, nor adjusted the principles, nor taken into consideration the consequences which were likely to result from its failure.

Had a British ambassador been present at Constantinople when the joint propositions of Austria, Russia, Prussia, and France for an intervention between the Ottoman government and the Greeks were brought forward, it cannot be doubted that the unfavourable reception of those propositions by the Porte would have been ascribed by some at least, if not by all those parties, to the advice or intrigues of the British mission.

On the other hand, the Porte itself would hardly have believed that the British ambassador was there at his post, in a state of absolute inactivity and mere impartial observation. It would either have suspected him of instigating others to measures of which, for some unavowed reason, he was not permitted openly to share the responsibility; or if he had been tempted to explain the reason of his abstinence from participation in the proceedings of his colleagues, the Porte would, in all probability, have conceived a false or exaggerated notion of the extent of the disunion between the Allies, and would have construed a difference of opinion as to the means of attaining a common object into a diversity of views as to the desirableness of the object itself. Such an error would have been fatal to the Porte if it had led her to rely upon the support of England against the measure in which England declined to share, and in that reliance to resent, as well as to reject, the proposition of the Allies.

His Majesty would have rejoiced if the efforts employed by the representatives of his Allies at Constantinople (unassisted by those of his Majesty's own mission) had achieved the purpose to which they were directed; but having no hope of such success, the British government was naturally desirous to mark to the Porte, and to the world, both, that it was not a party to the attempt, and that it was in no degree responsible for the failure.

It may be right here to add that if on any occasion the gentleman charged with the affairs of his Majesty at the Porte during the absence of the ambassador so far mistook the duties of his office as to join in any written or verbal remonstrance or representation connected with the propositions of the Allies, he did so from mistake only; he was instantly reprehended for having done so; and from that time forth it is hoped he has confined himself strictly within the limits of his charge, which was merely to carry on the current business of the mission.

2ndly. It is true that the withholding the British mission for so long a period from Constantinople did (as I have said) afford free scope to Powers, rivals of Great Britain, for acquiring influence with the Porte. This is particularly true with respect to the French embassy, which began its career at Constantinople soon after that of his Majesty's embassy was suspended.

This disadvantage (if it be one) could not but be foreseen, but it appeared to us to be compensated by more than countervailing advantages.

Count Guilleminot will have had some sixteen months start of your Excellency; and you will be able to judge upon your arrival to what account he may have turned the propitious opportunity which he has thus enjoyed; whether, for instance, he has succeeded in satisfying the Turkish

ministers that the French officers who were sent some time ago to Egypt to drill and discipline the troops of the Pasha, were sent there with the purpose of preparing those troops to fight against the Greeks in the Morea, and not with a design of aiding the Pasha to set up for himself an independent Principality in Egypt.

Whether he has satisfied the Turkish ministers that General Roche and Colonel Fabrier have been sent to join the Greek armies for the purpose of persuading them to return to their allegiance to the Porte; and whether he has explained to the entire contentment of the Sultan the cases and contingencies in which alone a branch of the house of Orleans is proposed to be seated on the throne of Greece.

I confess I am not very apprehensive that Count Guilleminot's success on these topics will be found to have raised the French embassy to such a pitch of confidence and credit with the Porte as to form any material obstacle to the cordial reception of his Majesty's renewed embassy in the person of your Excellency. Should any coolness have grown up between the Turkish government and the French embassy, I am far from regretting that your Excellency has not been in the way to be accused of having contributed to that estrangement. Your Excellency will cultivate the most friendly relations with M. Guilleminot. You have on your part nothing to conceal from the French ambassador. You will speedily judge whether he is equally open with you; that is to say, whether he is utterly unconscious of the double game which his government is playing in the affairs of Greece: but, in any case, while you place yourself on the most cordial footing with M. Guilleminot, you will be careful not to take any joint measure with him towards the Porte which may identify in the eyes of the Turkish Government the plans, the objects, and the good faith of the governments of France and of England.

3rdly. I do not conceal from myself that we (as well as France) have something to explain and to extenuate with the Porte in respect to the assistance rendered to the Greeks by individual subjects of his Majesty, in contravention, it must be allowed, to the neutrality proclaimed and sincerely intended to be enforced by his Majesty's government.

I cannot better enable your Excellency to offer the necessary explanations than by enclosing to you—

1st. Copies of two despatches which I have recently written on this subject to his Majesty's ambassador at Vienna. (No. 13, No. 18.)

2ndly. A report of a conference which I have lately held (being my first and only one) with the Greek deputies in London. (Sept. 29th.)

3rdly. The Proclamation issued by his Majesty a few days after that conference took place, with the Order in Council which accompanied it.

It is needless to enlarge upon the topics suggested by these several documents: your Excellency will know how to select those which are most applicable and most likely to be effectual to your object, and your Excellency is sufficiently apprised of the real views and policy of your government to urge the arguments, which are therein supplied to you, with that confidence and that thorough consciousness of the truth of what you are saying, which no man can sincerely feel without inspiring those to whom he addresses himself with a perfect conviction of his sincerity.

4thly. I am aware, however, that it is not only of violations of neutrality,

but of neutrality itself, that the Turks are disposed to complain. They complain that we allow to the Greeks a belligerent character; and that we appear to forget that to subjects in rebellion no national character can properly belong. The answer is so obvious as scarcely to require to be stated; but it may be useful perhaps to state it, once for all, in the shortest and plainest terms.

The character of *belligerency* is not so much a principle as a fact; a certain degree of force and consistency acquired by any mass of population engaged in war entitles that population to be treated as a belligerent, and (even if their title were questionable) renders it the interest well understood of all civilised nations so to treat them. For what is the alternative? A power or a community (call it which you will) which is at war with another, and which covers the sea with its cruizers, must either be acknowledged as a belligerent or dealt with as a pirate.

The third description, that of rebel, under which alone the Porte consents to consider the Greeks, cannot constitute a rule for the conduct of foreign nations, except either on a presumption (which the Porte must be foremost to repel) that foreign nations have a right to take cognizance of the internal disturbances of the Turkish dominions (a right which, if admitted, some nations might exercise in favour of the Turkish, but others in favour of the Greek side of the quarrel), or on the pretension (which the Turks surely cannot mean to put forward) that, in a quarrel between a sovereign and a portion of his subjects, all foreign governments are bound by an overruling obligation to make common cause with the sovereign.

Respecting these two equally untenable propositions we revert to the single option between belligerent and pirate. Is it necessary to point out the monstrous consequences which would follow from treating as pirates a population of millions of souls, to whom, by that very treatment, be it remembered, you would convey the right, and even impose upon them (according to the natural law of self-defence), the obligation of terrible reprisals? Can it be necessary to suggest the advantage to humanity of bringing within the regulated limits of civilised war, a contest which was marked on its outset, on both sides, with disgusting barbarities? and of restraining, by those conventional observances and modifications which disarm war of half its miseries, passions inflamed on both sides to so furious a pitch as to aim at nothing short of mutual extermination?

Is it not, in fact, owing to the example set by Great Britain in allowing to the Greeks the privileges of a belligerent character that the war has been brought into a state in which the Powers of Europe could venture to offer their intervention for the restoration of peace, and which (however abortive the first attempt at pacification may have proved) it is earnestly and anxiously hoped may yet be susceptible of being brought to a conclusion on equitable terms by amicable mediation.

5th. It is upon this point only that it now remains for me to explain to your Excellency the opinions of your government.

We do not offer our mediation at present, because at present we know that it would be refused; but if asked by either party, it will be offered to the other, and, if accepted, we should not despair, difficult as the task may appear, of rendering essential service to both.

There are not wanting reasons which should induce the Porte to reflect

seriously upon its situation and prospects in this struggle. A war with Russia cannot be matter of indifference to the Porte, and yet surely the Porte must know with what difficulty, with what compulsion and laborious perseverance, the Russian government and nation (the government through the influence and persuasion of its Allies, the nation through the really pacific disposition of its Sovereign) are kept quiet, and prevented from crying out for war, a war against their ancient and natural enemy, and in behalf of a nation professing the same religion with themselves.

War, once begun would spread through Europe; but there is not that nation in Europe that would side with the Porte against the Greeks, however little desirous any of them may be to assist the aggrandisement of Russia at the expense of Turkey, and however anxious all of them to restore peace and to preserve the system of Europe undisturbed.

It is to be considered further that the recent events in the western hemisphere have approximated, as it were, the different divisions of the world to each other, and have brought new powers to bear on every question of political struggle or change in whatever part of the globe it may arise. The Porte cannot doubt that all the inhabitants of both Americas, to a man, are in their hearts favourers of the Greek cause, and might at no distant period become active co-operators in it.

This is not the language of intimidation; it is that of truth. The influence of England, whatever it may be, will continue to be exerted with Russia to encourage the forbearance of the Emperor and to discountenance the warlike propensities of his subjects.

But our refusal to join in the propositions of last spring have, it cannot be doubted, much impaired the operation of that influence; and the continuance of the Greek struggle increases every day the motives for war which actuate the Russian army and nation, and diminishes the power of resistance to them on the part of the Emperor and of his Allies.

Every success of the Turkish arms renders the Greeks more and more objects of sympathy and compassion, and every failure contributes to place Turkey in the light of a more tempting and easy prey.

In this state of things we cannot hesitate to recommend to the Divan to think of the pacification of Greece.

To suppose that Greece can ever be brought back to what she was in relation to the Porte is vain. With how much less than complete separation and independence Greece herself would be satisfied we have not the means of pronouncing; but, if it is wished, we would endeavour to ascertain. We do not obtrude our services. We do not insist that they should be exclusive; but we are at present free from all engagements with other Powers, direct or constructive, with respect to the affairs of Turkey and Greece. The opportunity is therefore one of which the Reis Effendi may, if he thinks fit, take advantage to open himself to your Excellency without apprehension that his confidence will be communicated to other governments than your own. How long that opportunity may last events only can determine. It is for the Turkish Ministers to consider whether they will profit by it in time or risk the loss of it for ever.

George Canning.

PROTOCOLE de la CONFÉRENCE OFFICIELLE tenue Jeudi, le 1 (13) Octobre, 1825, dans la maison de campagne de S. Ex. le Reis-Effendi, située sur le Bosphore, du côté de l'Asie, entre Monsieur de MINCIACKY, Chargé d'Affaires de Russie, accompagné du Conseiller de Collège de Rukmann, du Premier Drogman de la Mission Française FRANCHINI, et de son adjoint le Conseiller de Collège, ANTOINE FRANCHINI, d'une part, et de S. Ex. le Reis-Effendi Seidàa Effendi, assisté de l'Ulema des Conférences, ARIF BEY, de l'Amedgi Effendi, Secrétaire d'Etat, et du Drogman de la Porte, de l'autre.

A l'ouverture de la séance, qui a commencé à une heure et demie, le chargé d'affaires a déclaré: qu'il avait reçu des ordres de sa Cour à l'effet d'entretenir, dans une conférence officielle et à protocole, les ministres de la Porte de la situation des Principautés de Moldavie et de Vallachie, et de leur témoigner que la surprise de sa Majesté l'Empereur, son auguste maître, en voyant le Divan donner une réponse verbale à la note officielle présentée le 22 Juin (3 Juillet) de cette année, est allée au point de lui faire revoquer en doute l'authenticité de cette réponse; d'autant plus qu'elle est contraire à la foi des plus formelles promesses, et que S. Ex. le Reis-Effendi devait d'ailleurs se rappeler les conditions auxquelles la Russie a rétabli ses rapports avec le Divan, conditions qui sont énoncées dans le texte même de la lettre de créance du chargé d'affaires de Russie.

M. de Minciacky ayant attendu quelques instans dans l'espoir que les ministres Ottomans voudraient répondre à ces observations, mais ceux-ci ayant gardé le silence, il a ajouté:

Que puisque la Sublime Porte avait déjà une entière connaissance des réclamations que la Russie faisait valoir au sujet du mode de nomination et de l'autorité des Beshlis-Agas et du nombre et des attributions des troupes sous leurs ordres, ainsi que des argumens sur lesquels se fondaient les griefs de la Cour Impériale, il se bornerait cette fois-ci à demander simplement si la Porte était intentionnée de prendre en considération ses réclamations.

Le Reis-Effendi a repliqué alors: que les réponses de la Porte sur ces objets avaient été données directement et verbalement au chargé d'affaires de Russie dans la conférence confidentielle du 20 Mai (1 Juin).

M. de Minciacky a demandé si, d'après ce qu'il venait d'entendre, il devait considérer les réponses dont parlait le ministre comme définitives et invariables, et si la Porte n'avait aucune communication à lui faire.

Le Reis-Effendi a demandé de quel objet nommément M. de Minciacky voulait parler.

Le chargé d'affaires a repris que c'était sur les commandans et les troupes que la Porte laissait dans les Principautés, que c'était enfin sur la nécessité d'y rétablir un ordre de choses conforme aux anciens usages et privilèges des Valaques et des Moldaves, et des traités qui les avaient garantis.

Le Reis-Effendi a demandé en quoi l'état des choses actuel était contraire aux stipulations.

Après cette question le chargé d'affaires, en se rapportant aux explications détaillées qu'il avait données dans ses communications écrites, a dit:

"Qu'avant les troubles de 1821, les Bash-Beshlis-Agas étaient nommés uniquement par les Hospodars, qu'ils n'exerçaient aucune influence sur l'administration, qu'ils étaient uniquement destinés à maintenir la police

parmi les Musulmans, et que par conséquent ils n'avaient jamais été considérés comme des fonctionnaires de la Porte, tandis qu'aujourd'hui ils sont nommés par elle, étaient installés par des firmans, avaient un rang supérieur, enfin qu'ils étaient les véritables délégués du gouvernement pour surveiller les princes, et qu'ils commandaient à cet effet non pas quelques Musulmans enrolés par eux, sur l'autorisation de l'administration locale, mais bien de véritables troupes Ottomanes, dont le nombre est hors de toute proportion avec celui des anciens Beshlis."

Le Reis-Effendi a repliqué :

" Que quant aux troupes, la Porte s'était vue dans la nécessité de les envoyer en Vallachie et Moldavie, pour étouffer la révolution qui y avait éclatée : que ces troupes avaient été sous les ordres de Pachas à deux et à trois queues : qu'elle les avait retirées à la demande des représentans des Cours Alliées, et principalement à celle de Lord Strangford : que ces ministres s'étaient déclarés parfaitement satisfaits de la manière dont la Porte avait opéré l'évacuation de ces provinces; que M. de Minciacky lui-même, qui avait eu ordre de ne point présenter ses lettres de créance tant que cette mesure n'aurait point été effectuée, avait, en la remettant, sanctionné l'état actuel des choses; que par conséquent tout devait être considéré comme terminé, et que l'on ne devait point revenir sur cette affaire."

Le chargé d'affaires de Russie a fait observer, quant à la manière dont l'évacuation s'était faite, que malgré que la Porte eût promis à Lord Strangford qu'il ne resterait dans les provinces que tout au plus le nombre des Beshlis qui s'y était trouvé dans les tems antérieurs, il y avait encore jusqu'à ce jour 1000 hommes de troupes en Vallachie, et 500 en Moldavie.

Le Reis-Effendi a repliqué " que ce n'était point des troupes, mais des Beshlis."

Le chargé d'affaires a de nouveau exposé la différence qui existe entre les anciens Beshlis et les troupes auxquelles on donne aujourd'hui ce nom ; ainsi que l'influence et la surveillance que leurs chefs exercent dans les Principautés.

En conséquence de ces observations, le Ministre des Relations Extérieures à répondu :

" Que l'intention de la Porte n'était point que ces Beshlis s'immiscassent dans les affaires administratives des Principautés, et qu'aussi ils ne le faisaient point.

" Qu'elle avait donné un rang élevé aux Bach-Beshlis-Agas, afin de leur assurer une plus grande autorité sur les troupes, et de les mettre par là à même de mieux maintenir l'ordre et la discipline.

" Qu'au commencement de la révolution il y avait eu près de 15,000 hommes de troupes dans les Principautés, qu'on les avait retirés peu à peu, que quand le Chargé d'Affaires de Russie était arrivé à Constantinople, il y avait encore dans ces provinces plus de 3000 hommes. Que la Porte s'était aussi décidée à diminuer ce nombre, et qu'on n'y avait enfin laissé que ce qu'il fallait absolument pour maintenir la tranquillité et la sûreté du pays.

" Que M. de Minciacky avait là-dessus remis ses lettres de créance, et que dès ce moment tout ce qui a rapport à cet objet devait être considéré comme définitivement réglé et terminé."

Le chargé d'affaires a dit qu'il croyait devoir faire observer, une fois pour toutes, que la Porte pouvait d'autant moins s'autoriser d'une démarche qui

avait seulement prouvé la confiance qu'on avait eue dans les assurances de la Porte, que ce n'était que plus tard qu'on s'était convaincu que ces promesses n'avaient point été exécutées dans toute leur teneur, et qu'au surplus la Porte devait se rappeler que la lettre de créance avait formellement énoncé les conditions auxquelles la Russie s'était décidée à rétablir ses relations avec l'Empire Ottoman.

"Mais," a de nouveau repris le Reis-Effendi, "lorsque le chargé d'affaires de Russie est arrivé à Constantinople, les ambassadeurs et envoyés des cours étrangères traitaient l'affaire des Principautés, et avaient fini par annoncer que M. de Minciacky ne remettrait ses lettres de créance qu'autant que la Porte aurait rempli ses promesses. Elle l'a fait telles qu'elle les avait données, et la preuve en est que les ministres étrangers en ont à plusieurs reprises témoigné leur entière satisfaction, et que M. de Minciacky a remit ses lettres de créance.

Le chargé d'affaires a repliqué, qu'il devenait dorénavant inutile de refuter un fait au sujet duquel il avait donné déjà, à tant de reprises, les explications les plus amples, et qu'en conséquence il ne lui restait qu'à demander encore une fois si la Porte persistait invariablement dans sa résolution de laisser dans les Principautés les choses dans le même état où elles se trouvent actuellement.

En réponse, le Reis-Effendi a déclaré :

"Que quant au nombre des troupes, tout devait être considéré comme terminé, la Porte ayant donné à cet égard les raisons les plus valables, appuyées des droits les mieux fondés.

"Que pour ce qui concernait le rang des Beshlis-Agas, elle avait pris cet objet en considération par déférence pour l'intervention de l'Internonce d'Autriche et celle de l'Ambassadeur de France, et par égard pour la Russie ; qu'elle avait en conséquence pris la résolution de rappeler ces officiers, et de les remplacer par des Beshlis-Agas qui n'auraient aucun rang, qui ne seraient ni Capidji Baschis ni Selahors, qui ne seraient que de simples individus.

"Que cette résolution avait déjà été annoncée à la mission de Russie par l'organe de son drogman, que nonobstant cela le chargé d'affaires avait voulu avoir une conférence, et que la Porte n'avait point fait de difficulté à la lui accorder."

A la suite de cette communication M. de Minciacky a demandé par qui les nouveaux Bash-Beshlis-Agas seraient nommés ?

Le Reis-Effendi a dit qu'ils étaient des Musulmans, et a demandé à son tour, qui d'après cela avait le droit de les nommer ?

Le chargé d'affaires a répondu que ce droit appartenait aux princes, qu'ils l'avaient exercé toujours avant 1821, et que par conséquent c'est ce qui devrait encore avoir lieu maintenant.

Le Reis-Effendi a repris : "Ce sont des Musulmans ; un Musulman ne peut tenir sa place d'un Chrétien ; donc qui pourrait le nommer si ce n'est le gouvernement Turc ? Il est vrai," a continué ce ministre, "il y a eu autrefois des exemples que les Boyards Grecs, quand ils étaient appelés aux fonctions d'Hospodars, choisissaient pour Beshlis-Agas des individus auxquels ils voulaient du bien ou qui leur étaient recommandés par des personnes de leur connaissance, mais ils n'en sollicitaient pas moins toujours le consentement de la Porte, qui l'accordait ordinairement. Cependant si par

quelque motif quelconque elle n'aurait pas voulu que tel ou tel individu fût Bash-Beshli-Aga, elle aurait refusé son consentement, parceque le choix et la nomination lui appartenaient de droit. Aussi, lorsque les princes avaient choisi un individu, étaient-ils obligés d'obtenir du gouvernement son investiture."

Le chargé d'affaires a demandé alors si les nouveaux Bash-Beshlis-Agas seraient nommés par des firmans, et si les firmans étaient déjà expédiés.

Le Reis-Effendi a répondu qu'il était sans notions positives sur cet objet, puisque l'exécution de cette mesure n'était point de son ressort, et dépendait uniquement du Grand-Vizir et du Ministre de l'Intérieur.

Le chargé d'affaires a exprimé ses regrets de ce que le changement des Bash-Beshlis-Agas, tel qu'il avait été fait, ne répondait point à la juste attente de la Russie, et a demandé si la Porte se refusait décidément à rétablir dans les deux Principautés les choses telles qu'elles avaient été en 1821, et telles que les usages et les traités les avaient consacrées à cette époque.

Le Reis-Effendi s'est référé à ce qu'il avait dit, et a annoncé que la Porte n'avait plus rien à répondre puisqu'elle considérait tout comme terminé entre elle et la Russie sur cet objet.

Le chargé d'affaires a alors annoncé : que comme la déclaration faite par le Reis-Effendi tant relativement au maintien des troupes qu'au mode de nomination des Beshlis-Agas, ne répondait point à la légitime demande de la Russie, qui voulait que l'état des choses dans les Principautés fut rétabli absolument, et sous tous les rapports, tel qu'il avait existé au commencement de 1821 ; que comme d'un autre côté le changement qui avait été fait dans la personne du Bash-Beshli-Aga était une mesure tout-à-fait illusoire, et que, comme enfin les discussions fréquentes qui avaient eu lieu sur cet objet ne laissaient plus aucun espoir de se mettre d'accord, il ne lui restait d'autre parti à prendre que de protester formellement, au nom de la Cour Impériale, contre les déterminations de la Porte, et de l'inviter pour la dernière fois de faire de sérieuses réflexions sur les suites de la politique qu'elle a adoptée envers la Russie.

En conséquence de cette déclaration le chargé d'affaires de Russie a lu, signé et remis entre les mains des ministres Ottomans, la protestation qui se trouve jointe en copie au présent protocole, et qui est considérée comme en faisant partie.

Après quoi le chargé d'affaires a annoncé qu'il était chargé en outre d'attirer encore sur un autre objet l'attention des ministres de la Porte, et de demander si le Grand Seigneur était resolu à poursuivre le même système envers les Serviens, et à n'avoir aucun égard aux représentations amicales et confidentielles de sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies, concernant la nécessité et la justice de reconnaître par l'exécution complète et franche de l'Article VIII. du Traité de Bucharest, le dévouement exemplaire de la Servie.

Le Reis-Effendi a répondu que les Serviens sont les sujets du Grand Seigneur, qu'il appartient à sa sollicitude de veiller à leur re os, qu'ils jouissent, sous la protection de la Porte, de toute la tranquillité et de tout le bien-être qu'ils peuvent désirer, et qu'elle prend soin qu'ils ne soient point molestés.

Le chargé d'affaires a repliqué que jusqu'ici les Serviens sollicitaient en

vain les privilèges que la Porte leur avait garantis par le Traité de Bucharest.

Le Reis-Effendi a dit qu'il ne se rappelait point les termes de ce traité, et a ordonné de l'apporter; la lecture ayant été faite de l'Article VIII., le ministre a répondu que ce n'était qu'avec le peuple Servien que la Porte avait à se concerter et à s'arranger.

Le chargé d'affaires a fait observer que le traité avait été conclu avec la Russie, et que ce traité avait assuré et garanti des privilèges aux Serviens, et qu'au lieu de les obtenir ils avaient le déplaisir de voir leurs députés en prison.

Le Reis-Effendi a alors parlé de la manière suivante :

"Lorsque la députation Servienne est arrivée à Constantinople, des troubles avaient éclaté dans plusieurs parties de l'empire. Dans ces circonstances malheureuses, le gouvernement, n'ayant point voulu exposer à quelque danger ces députés, avait pris le parti de les mettre dans un lieu de sûreté, et en conséquence on les avait placés dans le palais même du Grand Seigneur. Là ils reçoivent le taïm (nourriture journalière); ils y vivent dans l'abondance; le Grand Seigneur a soin de pourvoir à tous leurs besoins. Sa Hautesse leur fait même délivrer de tems en tems des sommes plus ou moins fortes pour leurs petites dépenses; enfin ils ont la faculté d'entretenir des relations avec leurs pays, car bien que leur correspondance passe par les mains des ministres, elle leur est rendue intacte. Par conséquent les députés n'ont pas le droit de se plaindre."

Le chargé d'affaires a fait remarquer que les Serviens n'envisageaient point la détention de leurs députés sous le même point de vue, et qu'il fallait déplorer que, pour prix du dévouement que cette nation avait témoigné dans les dernières années, on faisait tout pour exciter son mécontentement; qu'il était par conséquent du devoir du chargé d'affaires d'engager le gouvernement Ottoman à prendre en considération les vœux que les Serviens avaient manifestés en tant et tant d'occasions.

Le Reis-Effendi est convenu que les Serviens avaient donné jusqu'ici des preuves de fidélité, "néanmoins," a ajouté ce ministre, "la Porte regarde les députés qui se trouvent ici comme des ôtages. Tout l'univers connaît la révolution qui a éclaté en Grèce, la Porte a fait ce qu'on aurait fait partout ailleurs; elle a pris des ôtages de toutes les provinces de l'empire, dont les habitans n'offraient point de garanties suffisantes de leur fidelité; c'est un usage généralement établi. C'est ainsi que des évêques et même le Métropolitain de Constantinople, se trouvent dans le même lieu où sont les députés Serviens, et répondent de la soumission des Grecs de la capitale: mais du reste, il ne manque rien à ces députés, ils sont dans l'abondance."

Le chargé d'affaires a encore rappelé le dévouement de la nation Servienne, et par conséquent l'inutilité et même le danger de lui témoigner cette méfiance peu méritée; la nécessité d'entamer avec ces députés des négociations dont le résultat affermirait la tranquillité de la Servie en calmant les inquiétudes de ses habitans.

Le Reis-Effendi est encore convenu que les Serviens avaient été jusqu'ici fidèles; néanmoins, comme c'est une nation armée, aguerrie, et montagnarde, la Porte a jugé convenable d'avoir des ôtages comme garans de sa soumission.

Le chargé d'affaires a répondu; que voyant, d'après ces réponses, que la

Porte était déterminée à ne rien changer relativement au système qu'elle avait adopté envers les Serviens, qu'elle niait même en quelque sorte que cette nation eût des droits à réclamer, et des privilèges, par suite de la teneur du Traité de Bucharest, il devait déclarer que, par là même, la Russie, après avoir rempli jusqu'au scrupule tous les devoirs d'une bienveillante sollicitude envers la Porte, ne saurait nullement garantir les conséquences d'aussi déplorables résolutions.

Les termes de cette dernière phrase ayant amené de la part du drogman de la Porte quelque incertitude sur son véritable sens, le chargé d'affaires a ajouté que la Russie veut la tranquillité et la prospérité de l'empire Ottoman, qu'elle désire le préserver du fléau des révolutions, que dans ce but elle n'avait cessé de donner au gouvernement Ottoman les conseils les plus bienviellans, qu'il devait se rappeler les troubles qui avaient eu lieu, il y a peu de mois, en Servie, et que c'était pour éloigner une catastrophe dont la Porte pouvait facilement peser toutes les conséquences, que la Cour Impériale l'avait engagée à différentes reprises de traiter les Serviens avec bonté, d'accueillir leurs demandes, de récompenser leur fidélité, et d'assurer ainsi le repos et la tranquillité de cette nation. Qu'elle renouvelait encore aujourd'hui cette démarche qui devait prouver à la Porte que la Russie a mis tout en œuvre pour l'éclairer sur ses véritables intérêts, mais que si la Porte voulait rester sourde à ces conseils, elle ne devait que s'en prendre à elle-même des fâcheuses conséquences d'une politique aussi déplorable.

Le Reis-Effendi a répondu que les Serviens étaient sujets de la Sublime Porte, et que c'était à elle à veiller à leur tranquillité et à leur bien-être; qu'elle le faisait; que si, après cela, ils osaient entreprendre quelque chose, ce seraient des traîtres qu'on châtierait comme tels; que dans cette même supposition c'était au gouvernement Ottoman seul à aviser aux moyens propres à employer; qu'il saurait trouver ces moyens; mais que dans le cas contraire, c'est-à-dire, si les Serviens restaient fidèles, la Porte se conduirait envers eux comme elle l'a fait jusqu'ici, en les traitant avec la même douceur.

Immédiatement après cette réponse le chargé d'affaires a terminé la conférence, qui a duré jusqu'à trois heures et un quart.

Lord Liverpool to the Right Hon. Charles Wynn.

My dear Sir, Walmer Castle, 13th Oct., 1825.

I have received the Duke of Wellington's answer to my letter. I enclose a copy of it. I will be obliged to you not to communicate it *in extenso*, but I can have no objection to your informing the Duke of Buckingham of the substance of the Duke of Wellington's opinion. Indeed it is my intention to write to his Grace for this purpose in consequence of the letter I received from him through Lord Chandos.

It is scarcely necessary for me to say that I entirely concur in the opinion of the Duke of Wellington as to the expediency of recommending Sir Thomas Munro in the event of Lord Amherst's recall.

If you believe that it would be easy to carry the Duke of Buckingham through the Court of Directors, as Governor-General, I am satisfied you are under a mistake. I am as convinced as I can be of any point of this

nature, that if Lord William Bentinck were (as he would be) opposed to him, a very considerable majority would be in favour of the latter. Our nomination would be popular in no quarter. The resistance to Lord William would be considered as personal, and we should only bring discredit upon the Duke of Buckingham and upon the government.

Independent however of these considerations we have now the authority of the person who will be generally admitted to be the most competent judge of what is best to be done at the *present conjuncture* in support of the pretensions of Sir Thomas Munro. I think all the objections I have heard to him quite idle. I think the Court of Directors will hardly set their opinion against the Duke of Wellington when he is supporting the nomination of one of their own servants on the ground of merit: but if they do, the public will be decidedly on our side.

As to the recall of Lord Amherst, it is a different question. We may not have the power to prevent it; but I should certainly wish that we should abstain from any further step in regard to him, till we meet in town in November.

I understood from Canning that the Chairs entirely concurred in this course, and after the explanation which took place with them before you left town, it cannot at least be necessary for us to move without some previous intimation from the Chairs that the recall of Lord Amherst can no longer be delayed.

I am &c.,

Liverpool.

The Right Hon. Charles Wynn to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My dear Duke, Llangedwin, 15th Oct., 1825.

I received last night your letter of the 11th, which was, to-night, followed by the copy of the Memorandum there referred to as enclosed.

It will be impossible for me to peruse the latter before the post leaves this place. Lord Liverpool also has, by to-night's post, communicated to me a copy of your letter to him, and of that which he has since addressed to the Duke of Buckingham.

I feel most strongly the force of your observations. You will, however, I am sure excuse my stating that the question is not, whether the government shall recall Lord Amherst, but whether when the directors have notified their intention to supersede him they shall, or shall not, proceed to the choice of a successor, without an intimation of the wishes of government.

The principal ground urged by them for the pardon of the mutineers, is not an extenuation of the offence, but that most of the offenders are of high caste, and that the sight of them labouring in irons on the highway will be productive of more discontent and irritation than if the capital sentence originally awarded by the court martial had been carried into effect.

I trust you will not think that I am too pertinacious in even now doubting whether it could have been desirable to prolong the recollection of

the transactions at Barrackpoor by a continued exhibition of this punishment, which is represented to me as particularly revolting to the feelings of the Native soldiery.

The Chairs having expressed to Mr. Canning and myself their determination to recall Lord Amherst even in the event of the conclusion of peace, I cannot form any very sanguine calculation of the effect, which the news just received may have; but on perusing the enclosed intelligence I cannot help indulging strong hopes that the war may by this time be actually terminated, especially if the Arracan Flotilla has proceeded up the Irrawaddy.

I will request you to forward these papers to Lord Liverpool when read.

I also enclose the abstract of a military augmentation which appears from the Calcutta Gazette to have been carried into effect, but on which we can form little opinion till the arrival of the Larkins with despatches.

Believe me, my dear Duke, ever very faithfully yours,

CHARLES WILLIAMS WYNN.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Lord Amherst to the Right Hon. Charles Wynn.

MY DEAR WYNN, Calcutta. 24th May, 1825.

Having written to you on the 29th and 30th ultimo, and on the 9th instant, giving you an account of our successes up to those periods; I have now to acquaint you that Sir Archibald entered Prome without opposition on the 25th ultimo.

Thus, with the exception of Munnypore, which physical difficulties prevented our reaching, have the objects of this campaign been answered; and when you come to consider the progress which has been made since Sir Archibald and General Morrison were enabled to put their troops in motion, I will venture to say that our proceedings may be termed "short and decisive."

The best and latest news is that Sir Archibald has been met by overtures from the Court of Ava, which seem to indicate a real desire for peace. Contrary to our expectations, the enemy has made the first step towards negotiation. I believe the destruction of Bundoola and his army has left the war party at Court without the means of carrying on hostilities any further. A few days will evince whether their proposals are really sincere; in the mean time they have been met by Sir Archibald by corresponding sentiments, and the negotiation will not fail for want of a sincere desire, on our part, to bring this war to a conclusion.

You will have received accounts of the havoc which disease made amongst our Europeans at Rangoon. It was everywhere an unusually sickly season, and of course local circumstances added to the mortality at that place. Major Canning told me that he considered Rangoon, generally speaking, far healthier than most of our stations in Bengal. Had we postponed our attack of that place until the cold weather, I doubt much if Sir Archibald would have been now at Prome and master of the kingdom of Pegu. It was not unreasonable to suppose that the possession of the place whence issued all the commerce of the country and whence the members of the royal family drew their revenues would at once lead the Burmese to come to terms with us. If they held back

there was the prospect, strongly entertained by Major Canning but defeated by the unexpected drying of the country, of getting up the river at the season when the S. W. Monsoon overcomes the current, and when most of the articles demanded by the capital are carried thither. If this failed the time might be employed, as it was, in the capture of their maritime possessions; and most of all, the only way of getting the enemy out of our own territory, where the climate prevented our meeting them, was to attack the only vulnerable part, at that season of the year, of the kingdom of Ava; and this completely succeeded, for Chittagong was cleared as soon as it was well known that Cheduba and Rangoon were taken. We have had never, therefore, reason to repent that we attacked Rangoon in May.

I shall be anxious to keep you informed of occurrences at Prome. God send they may end in peace; but if not, we are in a most formidable position for the commencement of the next campaign.

Believe me faithfully and sincerely yours,

AMHERST.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Walmer Castle, 17th Oct., 1825.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter, and for the paper which you have sent to me upon the Indian mutiny, and the proceedings growing out of it.

I entirely agree with you, in the preference which ought to be given upon public grounds to the nomination of Sir Thomas Munro for the Government General of India under all the present circumstances of the war, if it should be necessary to recall Lord Amherst.

I have written to the Duke of Buckingham to this effect; indeed if it had not been for a strange and unaccountable blunder of Wynn's we might have avoided any serious embarrassment upon the subject. As it is, the Duke of Buckingham is, I believe, perfectly satisfied that I never held out to him any encouragement, upon which he had a right to consider his succession to Lord Amherst as determined by the government.

With respect to Lord Amherst's recall, I shall be glad on every account to maintain him if possible, and I wish to keep the question where it is till we assemble in town early in the next month.

I quite agree with you that any *cabal* or *clamour* amongst the directors or proprietors, unless founded on sufficient grounds, ought to be resisted, and that if they think proper to recall Lord Amherst without an adequate cause of complaint against him, let them do it upon their own responsibility. The circumstance which has made the strongest impression upon my mind is the reported want of confidence in the government *in India*. Now from whatever cause this proceeds it is a serious evil; an evil indeed it would be any where, but more especially in a country where government must mainly rest upon *opinion;* and a protracted war, unless accompanied by brilliant results, soon becomes, as I know by experience, unpopular.

Before we meet early in the next month we may learn more than we know at present, and be able to shape our course accordingly.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn. [490.]

My dear Wynn, Stratfieldsaye, 18th Oct., 1825.

I have received your letter of the 15th in the box. I have sent the latter to Lord Liverpool, and return the papers which it contained relative to the augmentation of the army referred to in your letter. If the Court of Directors should recall Lord Amherst, notwithstanding the successful result of the campaign and the prospects of peace, much will depend upon the manner of the recall, and the circumstances under which it is made, in deciding upon the course which the government ought to follow in respect to the nomination of his successor. I confess, however, that I think they will not venture to recall him if they should see that the government, after a fair review of his conduct, do not think that any blame can be attached to him, and object to his recall on the ground of its injustice.

If there is any ground for the belief that the sight of the mutineers labouring in irons upon the high road is likely to create irritation and discontent, and that it is not desirable to prolong the recollection of the transactions at Barrackpoor by the continuance of that punishment, you may rely that the Governor-General in Council will not be the last authority which will be made sensible of the necessity of pardoning these criminals. I think therefore that if Lord Amherst is at all worthy of confidence he ought to be left to himself.

Believe me, &c.,

Wellington.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My dear Duke of Wellington, Seaford, 23rd Oct., 1825.

Lord Liverpool has sent me a note of yours inquiring about Cabinets in November. I do not see any occasion for any Cabinet in the course of that month.

Lord Liverpool, I believe, settled to come to town then for business of his own, and I shall be there whenever the King holds a council on the Recorder's Report, as his Majesty has been pleased to fix that time for receiving the ministers from the New States of America. The Colombian is here: and I have now fixed the 7th for the exchange of the ratifications, for which purpose, indeed, I went up to town last week, but M. Hurtado was ill in bed.

The Buenos Ayres minister is expected by the next packet.

But I mean to return to the seaside after the council; and I do not at

present foresee the necessity of calling a Cabinet, on any business of my department, before the beginning of December. If *then* you shall have due notice.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—The only question of any importanee and difficulty, which is pending, relates to our dispute with France upon the oyster fisheries, and the differences upon Maritime Law which have grown out of it.

I am preparing a reference to the law officers upon it: to which it is not to be supposed that their answer can be had before December.

I will, with your permission, send you all the papers, when they are complete. It is very dry reading; but the decision cannot be formed without it.

G. C.

[491.] *To Mr. Planta.*

MY DEAR PLANTA, London, 24th Oct., 1825.

I sent you one box by the post last night, and I now send the other.

I have never seen Lord Bloomfield's correspondence on the sale of the Swedish ships, nor Count Nesselrode's despatch to Count Lieven, nor Lord Strangford's observations. I therefore do not understand the *status quo* as to civil governor in the Principalities. If it means the selection of the princes from among the Greeks of the *Fanar*, I am afraid that it is impossible for the Porte to comply with the terms required, as there are none remaining. I should doubt the existence of any instruments which render it obligatory upon the Porte to select the princes from the Greeks residing in the *Fanar*, at Constantinople.

If you should write to Mr. Canning on this subject, I beg you will likewise tell him that I sent Mr. Wynn a letter and Memorandum about a fortnight ago, which I think have put Lord Amherst's case upon very satisfactory grounds.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Liverpool to the Right Hon. Charles Wynn.

MY DEAR SIR, Walmer Castle, 24th Oct., 1825.

I have returned under another cover the last communications from India which you sent me, and I enclose under this the Memorandum of the Duke of Wellington on the proceeding of the Committee at Barrackpoor.

You may have a copy made of the latter, but I will then thank you to return it to me.

I confess I think that after the intelligence we have recently received, and with this Memorandum from the Duke of Wellington in our possession, it will be a very strong measure for us to be parties to any proceeding for the recall of Lord Amherst at the present moment. All I ask, however, is that nothing may be done to commit the government before my return to town, where I expect to arrive early in the morning of the 8th of November.

Ever faithfully yours,

LIVERPOOL.

EXTRACT FROM THE MEMORANDUM OF A CONFERENCE BETWEEN MR. CANNING AND COUNT LIEVEN, dated October 25th, 1825.

The Court of Russia has positive information that, before Ibrahim Pacha's army was put in motion, an agreement was entered into by the Porte with the Pacha of Egypt, that whatever part of Greece Ibrahim Pacha might conquer should be at his disposal, and that *his* plan for disposing of his conquest is (and was stated to the Porte to be, and has been approved by the Porte) to remove the whole Greek population, carrying them off into slavery in Egypt or elsewhere, and to repeople the country with Egyptians and others of the Mahometan religion.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Walmer Castle, 26th Oct., 1825.

I believe Canning has written to you to say that he has no occasion for any Cabinet at present.

I have no wish, therefore, to bring you up when I come myself, about the 7th of November. I must be in town to attend a Masters' Report, the nomination of the Sheriffs in the Exchequer Chamber, and to see the Chairman and Deputy-Chairman of the East India Company on the subject of Lord Amherst, whom I trust it will not be necessary to remove.

If you have anything further to say upon this latter subject, I shall be glad to hear from you.

Ever sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

The Hon. Arthur H. Cole to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Residency, Mysore, 26th Oct., 1825.

The enclosed papers will explain to your Grace the cause of my present address. They relate to your old protégé Salabut Khan,* who unfortunately has died here of cholera.

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* Son of Dhoondiah Waugh.—See *Wellington Despatches*, 8vo. ed., vol. i., p. 76, and *Supplementary Wellington Despatches*, vol. iv., p. 500.

I have now the honour to enclose to you a bill for 463*l.* 15*s.*, which sum is the residue (after payment of expenses, &c.) of the money you left in charge of the Seringapatam Court for Salabut's use.

The Memorandum will fully explain the matter to you, and I hope you will be satisfied with what has been done.

There are very few of your old friends alive at this Court; but there are many of your old followers amongst the Silladars, who still keep up their good name.

We have never got on very well since the death of Poorneea, the Rajah not being a man of business himself, and unfortunately not possessing confidence enough in any ministers to enable a man of ability and character to conduct the government.

I remain with respect,

your very obliged and very faithful servant,

A. H. COLE.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM.

In a letter dated the 28th Feb., 1805, from Sir Arthur Wellesley to the address of the magistrate of Seringapatam, he enclosed a Company's bond, No. 2713, of 1804-5, for the amount of 1000 star pagodas, which sum he wished to be placed in the charge of the court of Seringapatam for the benefit of Salabut Khan (the adopted son of the late Dhoondiah Waugh), and desired that the court should be the boy's guardian, and should superintend his education, the expense of which he expected should be defrayed out of the interest of that sum, viz., 1000 pagodas.

Salabut Khan has since died of cholera at Mysore, considerably in debt, contracted secretly, although the boy was under the particular care of the Resident's head Moonshee, and well looked after. As his creditors became clamorous, Mr. Cole considered it proper to address the judge at Seringapatam, requesting him to transfer the bond for 1000 pagodas to the Resident's office, that he might, after discharging Salabut Khan's just debts, hold the remainder of the money at the disposal of his Grace the Duke of Wellington.

Mr. Casamajor, magistrate and collector of Seringapatam, accordingly sent the original bond to Mr. Cole, who forwarded it to the government of Fort St. George, and solicited an exemption on the interest of this bond of those deductions that were usually imposed where claims for interest had not been demanded within prescribed periods,* stating, that he would wish to pay the just debts incurred by Salabut Khan, and remit the remainder of interest and principal to his Grace the Duke of Wellington.

Accordingly the government authorised Mr. Cole to draw the principal and interest, and approved of Mr. Cole's intention of applying both to the payment of the debts of the deceased, and remitting the residue to his Grace. The Accountant-General then enclosed a bill of exchange in Mr. Cole's favour for Madras rupees 7,119 13 6, being the amount of the principal and interest of the bond,

A list of Salabut Khan's creditors, a translation of the Moonshee's receipt, and an account current accompanying this Memorandum, also a bill for 468*l.* 15*s.* on Messrs. Richards and Co., London, at the exchange of 1*s.* 10½*d.* per rupee, being rupees 5000.

* The bond had, through mistake, not been renewed at the office of the Accountant-General.

The Right Hon. Charles Wynn to Lord Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD, Whitehall Place, 27th Oct., 1825.

I lose no time in returning to you the Duke of Wellington's Memorandum, as he has already been so good as to send me a copy of it.

Without at present entering into a discussion of all the subjects on which it touches, I shall most readily admit, that if those observations had been transmitted from Lord Amherst they would have supplied some defence for his neither adopting himself, nor recommending the adoption of, any of the measures suggested by the Court of Enquiry. But this is not the case of Lord Amherst. As far as I can collect from his correspondence, either public or private, he does not disagree with the Report. In a letter written on the 31st January, he says with reference to the slowness of promotion of the Native officers:—

"A good deal of light will be thrown upon this question, when you come to peruse the proceedings of the Court of Enquiry; and I now recall my assertion in a former letter that the grievances of the soldiers were imaginary, because, although nothing could justify their proceedings, I think the enquiry has shown that they were not without grounds of complaint."

So strongly is the Court of Directors impressed with this as the construction of the silence of the Supreme government, that the draft of a despatch has to-day been sent up by them, assuming the entire concurrence of the Governor-General in the recommendations of the Report, and therefore proceeding to direct measures to be adopted for the remedy of the different grievances there particularised.

Is it fair upon the authorities in this country that they should be left in this state of doubt and uncertainty as to the opinions of the Indian government upon points of such vital importance? Or can we censure the Court of Directors for withdrawing their confidence from Lord Amherst?

I have written more at length to the Duke, and will to-morrow transmit to you a copy of my letter.

Believe me, my dear Lord,

ever very faithfully yours,

C. WILLIAMS WYNN.

The Right Hon. Charles Wynn to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Whitehall Place, 27th Oct., 1825.

I have considered the observations contained in your Memorandum on the mutiny at Barrackpoor, with that respect and attention to which everything proceeding from such an authority is entitled; and, though I cannot entirely concur in the conclusion to which you come, I readily allow that, if those observations had formed the basis of Lord Amherst's despatch, in which the Report of the Court of Enquiry was transmitted, the inaction of the Supreme government would have been materially extenuated, inasmuch as it would have appeared that they were dissatisfied with the information and opinions which they had transmitted; and it would have been probable that they were engaged in procuring better.

You have stated very strongly your reasons for disapproving of that Report.

This, however, is not Lord Amherst's case; so far as I can collect from his correspondence, either public or private, in neither the one nor the other does he intimate disapprobation of the Report, and in a letter written some time ago he refers me to it for information on the state of the Indian army, and at the same time retracts his former opinion that the sepoys had no real grounds of complaint.

If the members of government dissented either from the facts or conclusions stated in the Report, they were bound both by their instructions and by the invariable practice of their predecessors to have recorded their opinions on every point seriatim; and the omission of this, after so long a delay, forms a heavy charge against them.

This particularly applies to the different questions which arise upon the pay of the sepoys.

I fear that you take too favourable a view of this subject, and have formed your opinion of the satisfaction of the men with the amount of pay, and of the readiness of those of the highest caste to fill the ranks in Bengal, rather from what you remember formerly, than from the present state of India. At least, I find that the increased frequency of desertion and difficulty of obtaining recruits form two of the most frequent grounds of complaint, and are referred to by the government as among the most unpleasant symptoms in the Bengal army. I observe, also, that you take the value of the rupees at 2*s.* 6*d.* in your calculation, whereas at present it is not more than 2*s.* or 2*s.* 1*d.* at the utmost.

The object of establishing an uniform currency through the British dominions in India has for some time occupied the attention of the Home authorities. The Madras and Bombay rupee have already been assimilated, and a plan is now under consideration for extending the same plan to Bengal, with a view to which it would have been most essential to have known how far the Supreme government concurred in the observations of the Court of Enquiry.

It is unnecessary here to enter upon the detailed consideration of all the causes of the mutiny assigned in the Report, for everyone must agree that whether those causes be or be not correctly stated, they are not attributable to the present government of India.

For the manner, also, in which the mutiny was suppressed, the government is not in any degree responsible. That rests wholly with the Commander-in-Chief.

I feel that this is a subject of extreme delicacy. The crime of mutiny cannot be excused, and it is clear that the employment of force for the purpose of suppressing it, in this instance, was absolutely necessary. No one can doubt that soldiers who, with arms in their hands, refuse obedience to their officers, must be coerced into immediate submission.

Whether the manner in which that force was applied was judicious, is a different question; and I may be permitted at least to lament that, after the mutineers were dispersed without even a show of resistance, the pursuit should have been carried on with such severity, that the number of persons actually killed is stated in most accounts to exceed 400.

I state this as a circumstance for regret, not necessarily for censure, as

the irritation of the troops employed against them might be such as to render it impossible to restrain them, or to induce them to secure the fugitives whom they took, instead of putting them to death.

After this the courts-martial were convened, by which many more were capitally convicted; twelve were executed, and the sentences of the remainder (one hundred and thirty), many of them men of the highest caste, commuted to labour in irons on the highway.

That this punishment so inflicted, not by the Native court-martial, who of course were obliged to award a capital sentence upon every man proved before them to be concerned in the mutiny, but by the commutation of the Commander-in-Chief, was more revolting to the feelings of the sepoys than that of death, is distinctly asserted by all those with whom I have communicated on the subject. The question therefore is whether, when so very large a portion of those concerned in the offence have atoned for it with their lives, it is politic or desirable to keep up the memory of the transaction, in the Native soldiery, by the continued sight of men whose rank they respect in this degrading situation.

In all cases of rebellion and mutiny the first desire of a wise government will be to avoid making the sufferers objects of sympathy and compassion, and as soon as possible to bury the whole in oblivion. A severe and immediate punishment of the ringleaders, followed by an amnesty to all minor offenders, has therefore usually been esteemed the most prudent course. For the publication of such an act of grace, it would appear that the good conduct in Arracan of the remainder of the men belonging to the offending regiments might have afforded an opportunity. But as there is no intimation of any such intention on the part of the government, I did not think myself entitled to negative the paragraphs of a despatch, by which the Court of Directors, before I left town, recommended that an immediate pardon should be granted to the men who continued in irons on the highways.

No one who knows the character of Lord Amherst, or Sir Edward Paget, will impute to either of them a want of humanity; but I believe it will be found that the former is averse to any interference on what he conceives the department of the other, and that the Commander-in-Chief is less disposed to attend to the feelings and prejudices of the natives than might be wished.

One subject remains to be touched upon, and that the most important, since it is to that you, as well as Sir Edward Paget, principally attribute the deteriorated state of the Bengal army. I mean the subtraction of European officers from their regimental duty for diplomatic and staff situations, for the commissariat, and the command of provincial battalions and of the troops of our allies.

An attempt was made at the last organisation of the army, two years ago, to alleviate this evil by a regulation that in no case should more than five officers be taken away for these purposes from the same battalion. But the mischief itself is inherent in the constitution of the Indian army, and the nature of its service; nor can it, I fear, be remedied till the expiration of the Charter shall afford an opportunity of transferring the Company's army to the Crown, and opening to it the general promotion of the British army.

The objects of young men who enter the King's and Company's services are widely different.

A King's officer never looks to obtaining the means of retiring from his profession, as an object of ambition. His hopes, indeed, point to increased rank and income, but still they are to be enjoyed in his own profession, and to be the reward of his distinguishing himself. By activity and intelligence in the discharge of his regimental duties, he may obtain the reward of brevet rank or of other promotion, without being removed from the line of regimental service.

The case of an Indian officer is almost the reverse. He goes into the service with the object of quitting it at the earliest possible moment, and passing the remainder of his days in his native country. This object he can attain only by the means of *extra* employment. Indeed, there is hardly any other way in which merit of any kind can be rewarded, in a service where all promotion goes by seniority. It might, therefore, be a reasonable ground of complaint if an officer, on account of his peculiar attention to his regimental duties, was to be confined to regimental allowances and pay, while his comrade with less merit should receive the additional emolument of a Staff or other extra appointment.

The general distaste and inattention to regimental duty is, therefore, rather to be regretted than wondered at, but still it does appear most extraordinary that negligence, such as you have pointed out, should, when established by evidence before a Court of Enquiry, be passed over without censure either from that Court or the government to which their Report was submitted.

The Report must necessarily be communicated to the Court of Proprietors, and will infallibly be printed for their use, unaccompanied by any defence of the Indian government, or intimation of measures to be adopted by them. The Court of Proprietors and the public will therefore necessarily conclude that the government admit it to be correct in all its parts, and will reason upon it accordingly.

It must, however, be remembered that the Directors have notified their intention of insisting on Lord Amherst's removal, not only on account of his conduct respecting the Report on the mutiny or the Burmese war, but on that of general incapacity and inefficiency, and on the want of confidence in his government both at home and abroad; and that the Chairman, when he made this communication, referred to their predecessor's reply to Lord Castlereagh, when desired to specify their complaints against Lord Wellesley:—"There is no use in giving reasons; we are tired of him, and have the power of appointing another Governor-General in his room."

It is now near a year since the late Chairman represented to Lord Liverpool the dissatisfaction of the Directors with Lord Amherst's conduct. Lord Liverpool then pressed upon him the propriety of delay, but distinctly admitted that, "if the Directors should continue to feel that, on any ground, they could no longer confide in the Governor-General, it would be unwise, even if it were not impossible, for the King's ministers to endeavour to support him against such an opinion."

The Chairman and Deputy now state that they have with difficulty prevented the discussion of the mutiny, and motions for Lord Amherst's recall, at the two last quarterly Courts of Proprietors; but that it will now no longer be possible to stop them, if they are not enabled to state that measures are taken towards the appointment of a new Governor-General.

Should these be much longer delayed, it is to be apprehended that the

Directors will either proceed at once to the appointment of Lord William Bentinck or Sir Thomas Munro, or that they will preface this step by obtaining a recommendation to that effect from the Proprietors; in which case the newspapers will be filled with uncontradicted abuse of every measure of Lord Amherst's government, and a vote of censure will pass (if at all resisted) by an overwhelming majority.

The question will then arise, whether the King shall be advised to reject or confirm a Governor-General so chosen, and a more embarrassing one I cannot well imagine.

Surely it would not be for the advantage of Lord Amherst, of the King's government, or of the public, that such a course of proceeding should be adopted.

From what I can learn it does not appear probable that the late accounts from India, even should the event realise the most sanguine expectations, will alter the intentions of the Court of Directors; and the utmost concession that any of them speak of as possible, is the further delay of a few months before the recall shall be carried into effect. In the event of the restoration of peace, it will be for government to consider whether the appointment of Sir Thomas Munro (though probably the properest, if hostilities were to continue) would then be equally desirable. Would his authority be equal to that of a person of rank and situation from home? Will he be equally capable of carrying into effect any further measure to limit the number of Staff and other appointments to be held by the army?

There are many who believe that the mutiny among the officers of the Madras army would not have broken out, if the measures adopted by Sir George Barlow had proceeded from Lord William Bentinck, or any person whom they did not view with jealousy as belonging to the Company's service, and therefore, in some respects, an equal; and with dislike, as coming from another Presidency.

The measures, also, which Sir Thomas has adopted at Madras for the establishment of a Ryotwarree settlement, and a varying assessment, and for the reduction of the number of Zilla courts of justice, and transfer of judicial authority to the Collectors, are directly opposite to the system of Bengal, and have already provoked loud outcry against him. His appointment, from his age and other circumstances, must necessarily be of a short duration; and I fear that, during its continuance, there would be an unceasing course of intrigue and canvass for the nomination of his successor.

On the whole, therefore, supposing the war to be at an end, I should very much prefer the appointment of a new Governor-General from hence; but I have already trespassed upon your patience at too much length, to enter at present on the discussion of this further question.

I had written thus far before my arrival in town, on which I have found the draft for a despatch from the Court of Directors, assuming the complete concurrence of the Supreme government in the Report of the Court of Enquiry; and grounding upon that Report, in consequence, several observations and some measures which I shall be very glad to have an opportunity of communicating to you.

Believe me, my dear Duke,

with the greatest truth and respect, ever most faithfully yours,

C. Williams Wynn

[492.] *To Lord Liverpool.*

My dear Lord Liverpool, Hatfield, 30th Oct., 1825.

I have but little to add to what I wrote to you before respecting Lord Amherst's removal. You will have seen his Lordship's letter to Wynn, and the Reports of the last military transactions in India. I think that the war is in as forward a state as any man could reasonably expect; and there is a good deal in Lord Amherst's letter to justify its commencement, as well as the detachment to Rangoon, under Sir Archibald Campbell.

I don't think you will hear any more of the Duke of Buckingham. When he was last in London he sent a gentleman to Dr. Fleming, who is in Parliament, but who passed a great part of his life in the Medical Department in Bengal, of which he was at the head when he quitted India. This gentleman described to Fleming the Duke of Buckingham, his habits, constitution, complaints, &c., and inquired his opinion whether it would be safe for him to go to India. Fleming answered certainly not; and that he had never known a man of such habits, and having such complaints, live six months in that climate. The gentleman desired Fleming not to repeat that he had been consulted; and he was of course silent upon the subject. But he afterwards heard of it from others, and then stated what had passed.

I conclude, then, that the Duke has withdrawn his pretensions, and has stated as his reason for so doing that Fleming's opinion of the effect of the climate upon his constitution was not favourable.

Give us timely notice when you wish the Cabinet to assemble. I was at Arbuthnot's when I received your letter, who is quite well, and is going to Apethorpe; but he desired me to tell you that he is ready to go to you whenever you will write to him.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

Wellington.

Lord Liverpool to the Right Hon. Charles Wynn.

My dear Sir, Walmer Castle, 31st Oct., 1825.

I have read with great attention your letter to the Duke of Wellington on his Memorandum.

Although there may be some points in which we may none of us entirely

concur with the decision of the Governor-General in Bengal, I cannot, as at present informed and upon the best consideration I have been able to give to the subject, conceive that any case is made out, which would justify the recall of Lord Amherst under all the present circumstances of the war, and after the intelligence we have recently received of the operations of the Indian army.

I should give this as my opinion upon a candid and unbiassed perusal of the papers which have been brought before me, independent of any authority; but it is impossible for me not to feel that I am strongly fortified in the opinion to which I should otherwise have come, by the sentiments of that member of the government whose military reputation and experience, as well as his personal knowledge of India, particularly qualify him for forming a judgment upon questions principally, if not exclusively, military.

But it may be asked, Can we prevent the recall of Lord Amherst? and if we cannot, Is it not for Lord Amherst's advantage that we should lend ourselves to the arrangement, and qualify it in the best way we can?

With respect to the first question, I am quite aware that we cannot prevent the recall, if the Court of Directors are determined upon that measure. But as to the second question, I must adopt the only course which justice prescribes in all matters of this nature—place myself in Lord Amherst's situation, and ask what it is, as Lord Amherst, I would wish to have done?

I should then have no hesitation in answering, as Lord Amherst:—If the Court of Directors are determined to recall me, let the recall be their act, but do not let the government partake in it. My recall at such a moment can be considered as nothing short of a condemnation of my conduct; and, if it must take place, let it be the act of one party and not of two, and, above all, not of the party to whom I have a right more particularly to look for protection against injustice.

Such, I think, would be the answer of Lord Amherst, or of any personal friend of his Lordship.

If, indeed, any great public advantage was likely to arise from Lord Amherst's recall at this moment, it might be necessary that personal feelings should give way to such considerations. But I am at a loss to know what we should gain by agreeing to Lord Amherst's recall. I think we should puzzle the public and all our friends, by concurring in the recall of a Governor-General in the moment of victory, and before time had been given him to reap for his employers the fruits of such victory. I think we should create for ourselves all the difficulties which might attend upon a new choice at the present moment; and as to the Court of Directors combining with Lord Amherst's recall the nomination of Lord William Bentinck, however disagreeable such a step might be, I should not feel the least embarrassed by it, with the ultimatum of Sir Thomas Munro, to which, in such case, we could without difficulty resort.

I shall be quite ready to see the Chairs with you any day next week, after Monday, upon which you may think it right to appoint them; and I only request of you to keep yourself wholly uncommitted till we learn the view which they take of the subject, since the last intelligence from India.

LIVERPOOL.

[493.] MEMORANDUM TO MR. ROBINSON ON THE CASE OF MESSRS. PATERSON.

Nov., 1825.

In the year 1812 Messrs. Paterson, of Baltimore, shipped, in the ship *Edward Perry*, Dawkin master, 2806 whole barrels and 147 half barrels of flour, which they consigned to Mr. Sampayo, of Lisbon.

The ship left Baltimore on the 9th of January, 1813; was detained for some days by the ice and contrary winds; and having proceeded on her voyage was, on the 15th of February, met by a British squadron employed in the blockade of the Chesapeake, under the command of Captain Burdett, of H. B. M. ship *Maidstone*, and detained, and ordered, in writing, to return to Baltimore.

The ship was provided with a British licence, dated the 15th August, 1812, permitting her to proceed with her cargo of grain to the port of Lisbon; and, notwithstanding this licence, this order was given by Captain Burdett, and even written on the back of the licence.

The ship returned to Baltimore. Both cargo and ship had been insured, the former to the amount of 20,000 dollars with the Baltimore Insurance Company; the latter, to the amount of 15,000 dollars, with the Marine Insurance Company.

The invoice bill of lading makes the value of the cargo 31,055 dollars; the value of ship is stated at 20,000 dollars. It appears, however, that she was insured for only 15,000 dollars.

On the return of the *Edward* to Baltimore the usual protests were made, and notices given to the insurance companies; and at length ship and cargo were sold by auction. The ship sold for 10,067 dollars, and the cargo for 11,125 dollars. The owners thus sustained a loss upon the ship of 4933 dollars, and upon the cargo of 19,930 dollars, making a total loss of 24,863 dollars.

The insurance companies in Maryland were sued for this loss, but the suit was decided against the claimants after repeated appeals. It does not appear upon what grounds it was so decided by the courts in Maryland. It is stated in one of the papers that the suit was thus decided because the *Edward* was bound to the port of Lisbon, an enemy's port.

There appears no such plea in the proceedings; and, in point

of fact, it would not have been true. The United States were never at war with the kingdom of Portugal. In point of fact, the British fleets and armies were never in possession of the port of Lisbon; and the fact, if stated, would have been untrue. Throughout the war the Portuguese authorities governed the kingdom of Portugal, and most particularly the town and port of Lisbon. But whether the foundation of this decision of the courts in Maryland was or was not that the port of Lisbon was an enemy's port does not signify much in consideration of the question of claim upon the British Government for compensation for these losses.

There was on board the *Edward* a British licence; and yet, in defiance of this licence, which Captain Burdett ought to have respected as he ought any other order of his Majesty, he detained and sent back this vessel to port. Captain Burdett's conduct may be justifiable in consequence of some orders received by him posterior in date to the 15th August, that of the licence; but till that point is ascertained, it appears that it is upon Captain Burdett that the claim of compensation should be made, and not upon the government.

The government would naturally answer the claim by stating: "We gave you a licence; our officer did not respect that licence, and you have consequently sustained an injury. Our courts are open to you to obtain redress against the officer in question; but until you have proceeded against him, we can do nothing for your relief."

The first step, then, would be to proceed against Captain Burdett. If he should justify himself, which he can do only by the production of the orders of his superiors, then will be the time to apply to the British government for compensation for a loss sustained in consequence of the issue of orders by them, or by those acting under their authority, which cancelled the effect of the licence on the faith of which the *Edward* had been chartered and freighted.

I have purposely left out of the consideration the claim of Messrs. Paterson, not for their actual loss in this transaction, but for the profit which they would have made if the ship had arrived in safety at Lisbon, and if the flour had been sold at the price at which they ordered it should be sold; and, in short, if the speculation had wholly and entirely succeeded. The amount of the demand cannot affect the principle on which

redress is demanded, and the mode in which, and the person on whom, the demand ought in the first instance to be made.

Whether this amount of demand would be conceded or not would depend upon the practice of our courts; whether they are in the habit of giving to a claimant for compensation, not his actual loss, but in addition to his actual loss, all he would have made if his speculation had wholly and entirely succeeded.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Charles Wynn to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, East India Office, 1st Nov., 1825.

I have not been a little surprised this morning to learn from a Calcutta newspaper that a general pardon to the mutineers employed on the roads was granted by the Commander-in-Chief in a General Order, dated on the 22nd of April, only two days after the sailing of the *Euphrates*, by which the proceedings of the Court of Enquiry were transmitted.

That the government should not have intimated this intention in their despatch of the 30th of March, or communicated the order by any of the vessels despatched since its issue is very extraordinary, and were it not for their previous neglect and silence on similar occasions, I should conclude some vessel with despatches must have miscarried, but as far as I can learn there is none missing.

I trust, however, that this will contribute to allay the anger of the Directors, and dispose them at least to allow Lord Amherst time to resign, instead of being superseded, should they still insist on his removal.

Believe me ever most faithfully yours,

C. WILLIAMS WYNN.

[494.] *To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn.*

MY DEAR WYNN, Stratfieldsaye, 3rd Nov., 1825.

Since I received your letter of the 27th October I have received your note of the 1st instant, from which I learn that the Commander-in-Chief had, on the 22nd April, pardoned the mutineers, who had been till then working upon the roads in Bengal.

There is no man who rejoices more sincerely than I do that the Commander-in-Chief has found it to be in his power to take this step; and it is unnecessary that I should trouble you further upon that part of the subject. However objectionable

I should have thought it for the authorities at home to interfere in this question, and however unwilling to be a party to such irregular interference, which, as I said before, would give us the air of protectors of mutiny, I should not have written one line, or said one word upon the subject, if I had known that the Board of Control had, on the part of the government, authorized such interference before you spoke to me.

I will pay every attention to any subject on which you may desire to have my opinion, which is founded not only on my own long experience, but upon a very general acquaintance and frequent intercourse with the officers who have served in the East Indies. Things may have changed since I was there, but it is desirable to know where and how, and whether such changes have affected the facts upon which my opinions are founded. I contend that the pay of the Bengal troops is sufficient, not only in comparison with the price of provisions and labour in that country, and with the pay of soldiers and the price of provisions and labour in other countries; but likewise because I see that all these corps, even in the province of Bengal, are complete in numbers; and, moreover, I see that in the proceedings of the Committee the fact is stated that very recently young men had followed the marches of this very 47th Regiment to enlist when there should be vacancies. This was generally the case, particularly in the corps stationed in the Upper Provinces, when I was better acquainted with the Bengal army. If it is the case now, no man can pretend that the sepoys are underpaid. Then it is said that the rupee, which I have calculated at 2*s.* 6*d.*, is only 2*s.* 1*d.* At this reduced rate the Bengal sepoys have more pay than any soldiers in Europe, excepting the British. But for the purpose of the comparison with the pay of other troops, the rupee ought to be rated at its intrinsic value. This is 2*s.* 6*d.* But when a bill upon England is wanted, only 2*s.* or 2*s.* 1*d.* can be obtained. This is a question of exchange, which depends upon a variety of circumstances besides the relative intrinsic value of the coins in the country in which the bill is obtained and in that in which it is to be paid.

Then it appears that there is a plan for assimilating the currency and the pay of the troops in all the Presidencies, which may be very proper measures; but as they involve great expenses in consequence of your being unable to lower the pay

of any of your armies, or the salaries of the civil servants on any of your establishments, and as there were in my time (and they exist still, I believe) several local peculiarities attending as well the currency of India in general as that of each of the Presidencies, I earnestly recommend to you to allow the local government to settle these matters.

I see that Lord Amherst's position is so far improved as that it will be possible to give him the option of resigning or of being dismissed by the Court of Directors. I have seen but two reasons stated for either the one or the other. One of these reasons, viz., that he was afraid of interfering in the military affairs of the government, is positively disproved by many Minutes which I have perused, written by Lord Amherst, on the Burmese war; of the other, viz., the general want of confidence in his government, there is no proof at all.

However, I know enough of the service in India to think it very possible that this reason exists. I never knew any Governor-General, not excepting Lord Wellesley himself, who inspired general confidence at first. If the want of confidence in Lord Amherst should continue, it might afford a reason for recalling him. But even in that case, I should wish to know the measures or the omissions, or even the misfortunes, upon which that want of confidence is founded before I could give my consent to the removal of a public officer before the usual period of his government should have expired.

As for his omitting to write about the mutiny, or the proceedings of the Committee, or the pardon of the mutineers, the fact is that all these points are important in this country because it is the fashion of the day to protect criminals, and to applaud the disloyal, the disaffected, and the mutinous. But they are not arrived at this pitch of refinement in Bengal yet; and Lord Amherst could not believe that all these details would be so important. I firmly believe that he never read more of the proceedings of the Committee of officers upon the mutiny than the Report. If he had, he could not have failed to observe the remarkable circumstance that the Committee did not notice in their Report that a Court of Enquiry had been ordered to investigate the causes of complaint, and that the mutineers had refused to attend; and that they had equally omitted to notice the conduct of the European officers of the 47th Regiment. These omissions on the part of Lord Amherst may be very

provoking and inconvenient, but they cannot afford a ground for the government being parties either to his recall, or to give him the option of resigning, which, I conceive, would be an act of injustice forced upon us by the most contemptible clamour.

If the Court of Directors should think proper to remove Lord Amherst, and to appoint a Governor-General without reference to the wishes of the government, the authority vested in the King must be exercised to prevent the appointment.

We all agree that Lord Amherst had nothing to do with the mode of or the circumstances attending the putting down the mutiny. But I earnestly entreat you to observe, that when you admit the necessity, and approve of putting down the mutiny by force, you cannot turn short round and say that you don't approve of the nature and degree of force used upon the occasion. When swords were drawn, and the body-guard were ordered to charge, there was no human power that could determine whether one, ten, or four hundred lives should be sacrificed. We may lament that so many deluded men fell; but the act itself being thought necessary, and approved of, we must take care, as a government, not to cast blame upon our officers for its consequences, which were positively beyond human control.

I have long reflected upon the state of the Indian army, which requires a good deal of arrangement. What you say respecting the difference between the officers of the Indian army and those in the King's service is very true, and unfortunately there is no complete remedy for the evil. To make the army the King's army would not be a remedy. The government in India require, and always will require, the services of the officers of the army in civil and political offices. They are as well qualified as the civil servants to fill some of those offices, and better qualified to fill others. Indeed, in my opinion, great good would be effected both for the country and for the army if the civil police magistrates were all officers of the army, and the private policemen retired sepoys. But there ought to be in India a half-pay list. Those officers who serve on the military Staff, properly so called, and who are employed on real military duty, such as in the command of extra or irregular corps, ought, although on half-pay, to retain their pretensions to promotion; and each of them ought to be pro-

moted by brevet or otherwise when the officer who had been next in rank to each of them in the regiment or in the army should be promoted; but those employed in political or civil situations, or in the police, or in the civil departments of the army, ought to give up their pretensions to promotion, and enjoy only their half-pay and the pension, upon retirement, of the rank which they should have acquired previous to their acceptance of such employment.

I believe the expense of this arrangement would be but trifling. It would fall upon the civil establishments, which ought to pay for such services; and it is certain that it would cure one great evil, that of a deficiency of European officers with the Native corps.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[495.] *To Lord Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD LIVERPOOL, Stratfieldsaye, 4th Nov., 1825.

I think it desirable that you should see the enclosed correspondence between Mr. Wynn and myself regarding the Indian discussion, as it will show you exactly where he stands. Lord Amherst, instead of being dismissed, is to have the option whether he will retire or be dismissed by the Court of Directors.

I think, from Wynn's anxiety to have Lord Amherst removed, I have been misinformed or mistaken respecting the Duke of Buckingham having given up the notion of going to India.

Be so kind as to return these papers to my house in London, when you will have perused them.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[496.] *To the Earl of Clancarty.*

MY DEAR CLANCARTY, London, 14th Nov., 1825.

I have seen your picture of myself which I wish to send you, if I knew by what conveyance it would be most likely to reach

you in safety. I spoke to Lord Dunlo about it when he was here last spring; but I beg to have a line from you. I believe I ought to send it to some person in Dublin, who would forward it to Garbally in safety.

Much time has elapsed since I ought to have written to you; and I have frequently been tempted to do so upon various topics on which I know that we think very much alike, and upon which I should have wished to throw fresh light by consultation with you. But you are too far removed from the stage of our varying politics; and the truth is, that while I am more than ever mixed up in all our concerns, you have withdrawn yourself from them entirely. I wish that you would look at us here occasionally. Your withdrawing entirely from public life is really a disadvantage to your family, as well as injurious to the public interests; and I am convinced that you would find that you could render some very satisfactory services to the public by coming here occasionally from the period of the Easter holidays till the end of the session.

I don't know whether much advantage would be derived from your appearance here in the next session. Lord Liverpool determined not to dissolve the Parliament; and he was led to expect (and in fact expected) that the condition of this determination of his would be that certain others would agree that there should be no Catholic question in the next session of Parliament. When the question, however, came to be decided, it was found that certain great parliamentary powers, in the Protestant interest, were desirous, for private electioneering reasons, that the dissolution should be postponed till 1826; and then those who were to have agreed that there should be no Catholic question were unwilling to go further than to say, that they were of opinion that there ought to be none; and that their intention was to move the previous question if the Catholic question were moved. With this Lord Liverpool was satisfied; and I understand that Mr. Plunkett has been informed that this intention is entertained by the Catholic leaders in Parliament on this side of the water.

If this intention be carried into execution, you will see that there will be little to be done in the next session of Parliament, at least upon that point. Although I am very desirous of seeing you here occasionally, and I should be very glad to have an opportunity of talking over that question with you, as I

think you and I are not far from entertaining the same opinions upon it, I must tell you that I think we are farther from the accomplishment of anything like an arrangement such as you and I would look to than we have ever been yet. First, the Catholic party in the government are more violent than they have ever been. In the last session of Parliament they voted with the Opposition as a party, against the majority of their colleagues, the majority of the House of Lords, and the King; and the Chancellor of the Exchequer moved a resolution in the House of Commons, the very next step upon which would have brought the King and House of Commons in collision, and the government must have been broken up. I had the utmost difficulty in keeping things together towards the close of the session, and after the session was over. Secondly, the declaration of the Duke of York has had a very extraordinary effect throughout the country. It has certainly made some men who have hitherto voted on the Protestant side alive to the necessity of a settlement. But it has also turned the attention of the public to this question; and the Duke of York has received a good deal of applause; and I think that the elections will feel the influence of the protestant opinions which this speech has called forth. Then the speech has pledged the Duke of York against all settlement; and others likewise; and has given all the low, shabby people in Parliament a sort of standard to which they may rally, which would prevent them from supporting anything of which the object might be a settlement.

You are so far removed that I am afraid you will not understand the position of things which I have been endeavouring to describe to you; but this very difficulty, in conveying to you a description of our position, will tend to show you how desirable it is that you should come and look at us, and judge for yourself what we are about.

I saw the King of the Netherlands in the summer, who, with the Queen, inquired very kindly after you and Lady Clancarty. He had got quite well; but was grown enormously fat. He had married his son Fritz to a very delightful young princess, with whom they were all charmed.

I say nothing to you about foreign politics. You will have seen and admired the note to Mr. Zea, and its publication!!! What do you think of the familiar appellation of the august house of Bourbon, *the Bourbons;* and of the information to the

world, that it had been thought by the Allies that there were others more worthy of reigning over France?!!!

Pray, remember me most kindly to Lady Clancarty; and

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Cirencester, 14th Nov., 1825.

I am very much obliged to you for sending me the papers relating to the Report on the Indian mutiny; and I am very happy that you have been able to make out so good a case both for Lord Amherst and Sir Edward Paget. They would feel infinitely obliged to you, if they knew the trouble you have taken in the investigation of the evidence on which the Report was founded, and the exertions which you have felt it your duty to make for their protection. The only real difficulty of the case is, the having sent such a Report without a comment, as it enables their adversaries to say that this is an admission of all its contents; and I confess I do not think that in one instance at least, and that not an immaterial one, the excuse you have offered for them, viz., that it related to a subject which no longer occupied the attention of the public in India, and therefore they concluded it had become equally indifferent here, is the real motive of their silence. Both Lord Amherst and Sir Edward must have been equally aware that the real evil had been studiously kept back by the reporters (all of them officers in the service of the East India Company). But they knew that if this were adverted to by them, it would give mortal offence to the Directors, the value of whose patronage would be affected if any measures were taken to remedy it; unless there were some alteration made in the military service of the Company, on a liberal scale, such as you have suggested; but which the Directors might be afraid to adopt. The omission of any mention of the previous Court of Enquiry stands upon a different ground, and to this omission they might have adverted without offence to the Directors. As it appears to me to be a very material part of the case, I cannot understand this apparent indifference to it.

I do not think that Mr. Wynn very much overrates the effect which will be produced by the publication of this Report, without a comment; but unless government are prepared to consult their ease at the expense of their duty by giving way to the clamour, although they know it is undeserved, ought not an opportunity to be sought to prevent this mischief, by contriving to supply those comments, to which the Report is liable, and which the Indian government have not sent?

It appears to me that such an opportunity will occur when the despatch of the Court of Directors on this Report shall be under consideration. Mr. Wynn says it assumes that the Report has the concurrence of the Indian government. If the Board of Control passes it by equally without a comment, the Court of Directors will have a right to assume the same with respect to the government at home. Here, therefore, is presented an

opportunity, I may say a duty, to interpose some observations; and whatever else may be said with respect to the Report, I am sure the two omissions I have mentioned ought not to be passed over.

Mr. Wynn thinks that nothing can be done to remedy the evil respecting the Indian army, until the expiration of the Charter, but it may be qualified; for without adopting your suggestion or any other measure of a great scale, nothing can be simpler than to regulate that in future no more than a given number of officers shall be taken away at a time from any one regiment to be employed at a distance. This might affect the value of the patronage, but not so materially as to make the Directors venture on an opposition to a regulation to which they could not state any real objection, unless they proposed a more fundamental remedy or denied the evil, which they could not do.

If Lord William Bentinck is to be the Governor, which by Lord Liverpool's and Mr. Wynn's letter, I presume is in contemplation, I hope that there will be some explanation with him on the rights of a free press and other Whiggish questions.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

The Right Hon. Charles Wynn to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Audley End, 17th Nov., 1825.

In considering the practical operation of your plan, for filling up the places of the officers of the Indian army, who may be employed on the Staff and on other duties not regimental, by bearing them in the mean time on a list resembling the half-pay of the regular army, but allowing them a promotion parallel to that of the officers immediately junior to them in their respective regiments, I am anxious to know in what manner you contemplated that they should return to their regiments in the event of the cessation of their Staff duty, or of its being found expedient that they should no longer be so employed. Some of these employments are in their nature temporary, and I am sure that you must be aware of many cases, where, though there might be no sufficient cause to oblige an officer to quit the army altogether, he may have proved himself ill qualified for a Staff situation, or may have rendered it highly desirable that he should be recalled from the service of one of the Native sovereigns in our alliance. If an officer so circumstanced were to return as a supernumerary major or captain to the regiment, which he quitted perhaps when a subaltern, the hardship would probably be severely felt by all those below him, but especially by those, who had entered since he quitted the regiment.

Perhaps the same object might be answered by the following plan. Every officer so taken away from a regiment to receive the whole of his pay and allowances from the department to which he is attached; but to retain his rank and place in the regiment. The officer of the grade next below him, without obtaining promotion, to receive the difference of his own pay and that of the absent officer.

A certain number of supernumerary cadets to be sent out, who shall be attached as ensigns to any regiment, which either by officers being taken

away for extra duties or by sickness, shall be reduced below the complement of fifteen officers present, which Sir Thomas Munro considers as amply sufficient—allowing a commandant, adjutant, quartermaster, one officer per company, and two supernumeraries.

He states with great appearance of reason in one of his minutes on this subject that a battalion may be too fully as well as too thinly officered by Europeans, and that in the former case, it leads to the inefficiency of the Native officers, who must form the links between the sepoys and their officers. I imagine that it could not be desirable that the number present should on this account ever exceed seventeen.

From what I have heard this morning, I am afraid that the Court will be more pertinacious in insisting on the recall of Lord Amherst, than I expected last week; but I shall hear more on Monday when I am to see the Chairs.

Believe me, my dear Duke, with high respect,
ever most faithfully yours,
C. WILLIAMS WYNN.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Seaford, 17th Nov., 1825.

I send you a sketch of the force and positions of the Russian army under Count Wittgenstein, which has been communicated by Mr. Yeames, our Consul at Odessa.

I do not know whether you will be enabled by this information to infer anything respecting the Emperor's projects. Count Lieven continues to assure me that they are still pacific, and renews his desire of our intervention to keep the peace.

The subject is a most perplexing one. I am turning it in my mind very anxiously; and meditate a paper on the case as it now stands, which, as soon as it is finished, I will send for your consideration.

Very sincerely yours,
GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURE.]

SKETCH of the FORCE AND POSITIONS OF THE RUSSIAN SOUTHERN ARMY, called the Second Grand Army, consisting of two corps.

Odessa, 15th Aug., 1825.

Head-quarters at Tulzyn.

Commander-in-Chief, General Count Wittgenstein.

1st Corps, consisting of 3 divisions of infantry, 1 division of cavalry, 3 brigades of foot artillery, and 5 companies of horse artillery.

Head-quarters at Cherson.

Commanded by General Ruzewitz.

1st Division, consisting of 4 regiments, infantry of the line, 2 regiments of chasseurs, and 1 brigade of foot artillery.

Head-quarters at Human.

Commanded by Lieutenant-General Karnilef.

2nd Division, consisting of 4 regiments, infantry of the line, 2 regiments of chasseurs, and 1 brigade of foot artillery.

Head-quarters at Nemirof.

Commanded by Major-General Prince Simbirsk.

3rd Division, consisting of 4 regiments, infantry of the line, 2 regiments of chasseurs, and 1 brigade of foot artillery.

Head-quarters at Symphiropol.

Commanded by Major-General Oudam.

4th Division, consisting of 4 regiments of dragoons, and 5 companies of horse artillery.

Head-quarters at Novomiryorod.

Commanded by Lieutenant-General Kreitz.

2nd Corps, consisting of 2 divisions of infantry, 2 brigades of foot artillery, and 6000 Cossacks.

Head-quarters at Teraspol.

Commanded by General Saboneyef.

1st Division, consisting of 4 regiments, infantry of the line, 2 regiments of chasseurs, and 1 brigade of foot artillery.

Head-quarters at Kaminietz.

Commanded by Major-General Ivanhof.

2nd Division, consisting of 4 regiments, infantry of the line, 2 regiments of chasseurs, and 1 brigade of foot artillery.

Head-quarters at Tymuel.

Commanded by Major-General Teltouchin.

The 6000 Cossacks are chiefly on the Turkish frontier along the Pruth and Lower Danube.

Observations.—The reduction that was made in this army, is the *colonisation* of the third battalions, not effected, however, in the divisions of Oudam, and of Teltouchin, the regiments of which are still composed of three battalions each.

No late recruitment having been made, the present force of the battalion can be estimated at no more than 850 to 900 men.

Approximative total numerical Force of the Second Army.

	Men.
72 battalions of infantry	61,200
5 brigades of foot artillery	2,500
5 companies of horse artillery	700
4 regiments of dragoons	4,800
Cossacks	6,000
Total	75,200

Lord Hastings to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

18th Nov., 1825.

In returning to your Grace the statement, with the perusal of which you have honoured me,* I must indulge myself so far as to express my admiration of the comprehensive view taken by you of the case. I have been too often tasked with the disentanglement of similarly complicated questions, not to know thoroughly the exertion of mind requisite for unravelling such a subject, and then condensing the exposition. It is impossible that anything could be more perspicuous or more accurate than the selection of the points established by your Grace, or than the reasoning founded on them. You may possibly allow me a future opportunity of conversing on the details. But in the mean time I entreat you to accept this hasty acknowledgment of sincere obligation.

I have the honour to be, with the truest respect,

your Grace's most obedient and humble servant,

HASTINGS.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

[497.]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Stratfieldsaye, 22nd Nov., 1825.

I have looked over the returns of Wittgenstein's army which you have enclosed, and I do not think its numbers or the positions which they occupy are calculated to create any uneasiness. The former are only 75,000 men; and these are disseminated over a very great extent of country, having their left at Trudel on the Danube, and one division at Cherson. They are extended along the Pruth, and their right at above 300 miles distance from their left.

In this position, and with these numbers, the troops might certainly be employed to take possession of the Principalities; but it is scarcely possible that the Emperor of Russia, having employed his Allies, and this country in particular, to prevail upon the Turks to evacuate the Principalities, should, as soon as the last man is withdrawn, occupy those countries with his own troops.

It must be observed also upon this return, that it is only of one army, and is dated the 15th of August, which is previous to the period at which the Emperor ordered the officers of the army to join their corps. I am afraid therefore that no conclusion can be drawn from the information conveyed by this paper.

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* See Memorandum on the Deccan Prize Money, p. 489.

The subject is a very difficult one. The establishment of a new Power in Europe, which must be founded on the principles of modern democracy, and therefore inimical to this country which must be continental at the same time and maritime, and, from its topographical situation, liable to be influenced by the great Military Powers of the Continent, would under any circumstances be no small subject for the consideration of the government of this country; and an excuse for having allowed the contest to take the course which it has taken is to be found in the great detestation of all mankind of the Turkish government, and in the probability, nay almost certainty, that the Turks can neither conquer the submission of the Greeks nor any longer retain that people in subjection, if others should assist them in making the conquest. But the establishment of a Greek power in Europe by means of the operations of a Russian army is quite a different case from that of a Greek power established by its own unassisted exertions against the Turks.

The Emperor of Russia interferes in this case, the contest still existing, solely because it suits the policy of his government that a Greek power should be established in Europe. It must be observed that this interference between a government and its revolted subjects is not, as has been the case in other instances, with a view to restore the power of a legitimate government, but to alter the state of possession in Europe for objects purely Russian, to deprive the Turks of a vast dominion and power, and to substitute Russian influence, and possibly in the effort to destroy the Ottoman government altogether, and to establish a Russian government on the Bosphorus and Dardanelles.

I entertain no doubt that as these measures cannot be carried into execution by Russia without maritime means, the naval power of this country could prevent their execution. But we must exert that power in concert with the Turks, frankly and fairly to maintain the Ottoman government at Constantinople. Otherwise they will never consent to our entering the only seat of our operation.

This is the real difficulty of the case. The country would not bear the Emperor of Russia overpowering any other Power for Russian objects. But the Turkish government is so oppressive and odious to all mankind, that we could scarcely expect

to carry the country with us in a course of policy, however interesting, the result of which is to be to maintain by the exercise of our power that government at Constantinople. But I should think that the other Powers of Europe ought not to be less alive than ourselves to the danger of this interference of the Emperor of Russia in this contest, as well in its principle as its consequences; and that they would not be indisposed to join with us in remonstrance, or possibly in something more forcible.

The Austrians dread the very name of a great power, and this dread would not be diminished by its being established by the interference of the Emperor of Russia, and existing under his influence.

As I told you, M. de Villèle is very indifferent as to the result of the contest in that part, provided that result does not tend to the aggrandisement of the power or influence of any of the great Powers.

I would recommend you, then, to connect yourself with Austria and France, as the best mode of preventing the Emperor of Russia from carrying into execution his supposed measure.

I should think that a joint declaration of the three Powers, not to submit to any further aggrandisement of the Russian empire, would induce his Imperial Majesty to pause; and if that declaration should not produce the desired effect, and it should be necessary to resort to the only effectual measure for saving the Turks, its unpopularity will be divided; and it will at least have the appearance and the grace of being one of common interest.

Believe me, &c.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Charles Wynn to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Whitehall Place, 24th Nov., 1825.

Enclosed I transmit for your perusal the minutes of a secret Court of Directors held on the 16th instant, which I shall be obliged to you to return when you have read them. The resolution with which they conclude passed with the single dissent of Mr. George Smith, out of twenty-one Directors present.

I yesterday wrote to Lord Liverpool to express to him my apprehension that the knowledge of a resolution so carried (communicated as it will be immediately to India by the channel of private letters), will so materially weaken the authority of the government that it will be hazardous for the

public interest, to endeavour further to delay the appointment of a successor to Lord Amherst.

When such a resolution is formally recorded by those who have the legal right of recall, I think the continuance of the Governor-General can neither be productive of advantage to the public or satisfaction to himself.

At all events I am convinced that the question is of so much importance that the consideration of it ought to be submitted to the Cabinet, and I have therefore requested that one may be summoned for any day next week when it can most conveniently assemble.

Believe me, my dear Duke, ever most faithfully yours,

C. WILLIAMS WYNN.

[498.] *To Lord Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, Goodwood, 28th Nov., 1825.

I have recently had before me the proceedings on the pulling down and building up a general officer's quarters at Demerara, by General ———, an officer of experience and discretion, who in this act has set at defiance all regulation and responsibility. This is another flagrant instance of the manner in which the general officers commanding in the colonies abroad take upon themselves *unnecessarily* authority which does not belong to them. It is by some exerted for the purpose of jobs and acts of impropriety; by others for the mere purpose of incurring expense, and gaining popularity among the officers and troops; and by all in the most arbitrary manner, and in defiance of order and regulation.

I cannot be a party to such a system; and if these matters are not regulated, I must decline, on the part of the Ordnance, to have anything to do in common with the general officers commanding in the colonies.

I hope therefore that you will yourself take the subject into consideration, and let us have it fairly regulated.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[499.] *To Lord Bathurst.*

MY LORD, London, 6th Dec., 1825.

I send herewith the Report of the Committee of Engineers appointed in the month of April last to proceed to his Majesty's

dominions in North America, with instructions of which a copy was forwarded to your Lordship on the 25th of that month.*

In considering this subject I entreat your Lordship to observe that it is impossible for his Majesty's government to withdraw from these dominions. Whether valuable or otherwise, which can scarcely be a question, they must be defended in war; and an attentive perusal of this Report will show what it is necessary should be done beforehand, and in time of peace, to enable his Majesty to defend these dominions at the least possible burden to the resources of the empire in time of war.

The first object for the observation of your Lordship is the communication with Upper Canada. Your Lordship will see in the report what progress has been made in the completion of the system suggested to your Lordship in my letter of the 1st of March, 1819;† and how far the detailed plan therein recommended has been found upon examination to be practicable. It is quite clear unless some system of communicating with Upper Canada besides the use of the river St. Lawrence should be carried into execution, such communication will be impracticable beyond Montreal in time of war. Indeed if his Majesty should ratify the arrangement made by his commissioners, under the ‡ article of the treaty with the United States, and the Island of Barnhart should pass to the United States (see p. 34 of the Report), the communication with Upper Canada by the River St. Lawrence will be impracticable even in time of peace, excepting by the permission of the government of the United States.

The next object to which I would wish to draw your Lordship's attention in the Report of the Committee is the communications between Lower Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia.

The establishment of these communications is but a little less important in a civil and commercial than in a military point of view. But it is in the last principally that it is my duty to urge the importance of these communications upon the attention of his Majesty's government. There can be no doubt that these communications are necessary in any view that may be taken of the defence of these provinces, and that by facilitating the concentration of all the military means of his

* See page 436. † See vol. I., page 36. ‡ Blank in manuscript.

Majesty's government upon any point that may be threatened or attacked they will tend to the general security of all his Majesty's dominions in that part of the world.

The third object to which I would wish to draw your Lordship's attention is the importance attached by the Committee to the possession of *Rouse's Point*, on the river Richelieu, and to the direction of the frontier of New Brunswick on the line on which it has hitherto been considered to have been originally fixed.

The fourth object to which I would wish to draw your Lordship's attention is the military works proposed by the Committee, to be executed in his Majesty's dominions in North America.

Your Lordship will observe that the system of defence of these dominions is founded principally on the means of communication to be established, to which I have already adverted. There are besides some capital points on which it is necessary to complete, or to establish works, such as Quebec, Halifax, Montreal, Kingston, on lake Ontario, and a fort on the Niagara frontier, and others, to render still more difficult the approach to those above mentioned, such as the works proposed on the river Richelieu or Chambly to protract an enemy's advance upon Quebec; and as the works upon the island at the mouth of the river Chateau Gaye, with the same view in relation to Montreal; and others for the protection of naval stations such as those at Pentenguashene, Amherstburgh, a work on the Ouse, and one at Chatham.

As, on the one hand, I do not entertain the smallest doubt that, if the communications and works proposed by the Committee are carried into execution, his Majesty's dominions in North America ought to be, and will be, effectually defended and secured against any attempt to be made upon them hereafter by the United States, however formidable their power, and this without any material demand upon the military resources of the country; so, on the other, I am convinced, that if these, or some measures of this description, are not adopted, and if measures are not taken at an early period to manifest the determination of the King's government to hold this dominion, at all events we cannot expect the inhabitants, upon whose loyal and gallant exertions we must in the end depend for their defence, will do otherwise than look for the security of their

lives and properties to a seasonable submission to the United States.

Even by the greatest exertion of the military resources of his Majesty's government in war, these dominions could not be successfully and effectually defended without the addition of the greatest part of the measures proposed; but if they are all adopted, and attention is paid to the militia laws in these countries, and care taken to keep alive a military spirit among the population, the defence of these dominions ought not to be a more severe burthen upon the military resources of the empire in war than such defence as was made proved to be during the late war.

I earnestly entreat, then, your Lordship's attention and that of his Majesty's government to the enclosed document; and that I may be authorised to have these measures proposed to Parliament in the next session.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Downing Street, 6th Dec., 1825.

Mr. Canning has desired I would forward to you the enclosed papers from Corfu. The letters to which he wishes to call your attention are those from Mavrocordato, in reference to some conversation he had with you about ten days ago on Greek politics.

He has sent me a copy of a proclamation, which the French party are in hopes of getting adopted by the Greek assembly, and which I send you, if you have not seen it.

It is now near three years, if I am not mistaken, since an Orleans party have attempted to establish a party in Greece. By the interceptions which have been sent to me, from time to time, it was quite clear that at first the party acted without the concurrence of the French government, the House of Orleans not being then well with the French Court. Since the present reign, there has been a better understanding between them, and there is much reason to believe that the Orleans party in Greece are now in constant communication with the French government; but all the interceptions, I think, show that the French government are unwilling to commit themselves to the Greek cause without us, as they are apparently at times giving assistance to the Egyptian army, and have French officers belonging to it.

The proclamation of a son of the Duke of Orleans appears, by former interceptions, to have been projected by the party more than half a year ago, and they were very sanguine in their expectations about it. Whether

our refusal to accept their offer of the Duke of Sussex, or Prince Leopold, will now render them more successful is to be seen; but all my communications hitherto show that the French government is distrusted; and certainly they have been very double.

Yours ever, my dear Duke, very sincerely,

BATHURST.

[500.] MEMORANDUM.—MARQUIS OF HASTINGS, *versus* SIR T. HISLOP.

It is understood to be the intention of Lord Hastings' Counsel, at the meeting of the Treasury on Tuesday next, to claim on the part of the Grand Army to share in the 150,000*l.* of actual capture by the Army of the Deccan.

A concession to this claim would certainly be inconsistent with the first part of the alternative in the Minute of the Treasury of February, 1823, which Lord Hastings' Counsel will contend ought to be set aside altogether.

The captures which this money represents were made in the daily operations of the several divisions of the Army of the Deccan, such as elephants, camels, horses, bullocks, grain, &c. The articles were sold, and this money is the produce of the sales, which was lodged in the hands of the paymasters of the army.

There was no division of the Grand Army which did not make similar captures, which captures were disposed of in a similar manner. But the money, the produce of the sales of these captures, has been divided among the officers and troops composing the division which made the capture.

Either, then, such money must be carried to the general account, and credit taken for such sums against the troops composing each division, among whom such money has been divided, or the money, the produce of the sales of the actual captures made by the several divisions of the Army of the Deccan, must be divided exclusively among the troops composing the division which made the capture.

The latter alternative will be the most simple, the easiest to carry into execution, and, above all, the most consistent with the Treasury Minute of February, 1823.

MEMORANDUM.

Dec. 7th, 1825.

The conversation at the Treasury on the 6th instant turned very much upon the question whether the Army of the Deccan was or was not a separate army.

The Army of the Deccan was not a separate army, and I refer to the reasoning in my paper of September, 1825, to show that it was not a separate army.*

But I contend for it that it is immaterial to the question before the Treasury whether it was so or not.

The Treasury, in their Minute of February, 1823, decided that actual capture should be the principle that should govern the distribution of the booty supposed to be at the disposition of the Crown, and that each portion of booty captured should be divided among the body of troops by which the capture was actually made, but that if constructive capture were to be admitted, the distribution must be made among the whole army.

The whole of this rule is applicable to all the troops employed, whether belonging to the body called the Army of the Deccan, or to that body called the Grand Army. In either case, or if there had been no such local distinction of armies, the produce of an actual capture would, under that decision, have been distributed among the body or division of troops which made the capture.

This decision of the Treasury of 1823 is founded upon that of the Marquis of Hastings. The Marquis of Hastings went one step further, and ordered that Sir Thomas Hislop and the Staff of the Army of the Deccan should have the usual share of the Commander-in-Chief and Staff in the booty captured by each of the divisions of the Army of the Deccan, although not personally present with such division at the moment of an actual capture. But this last order is not inconsistent with, nor sets aside the other; nor is it inconsistent with the practice of the service in such cases, nor does it establish the exclusive command of Sir Thomas Hislop over the Army of the Deccan, nor the total separation of that body of troops from the Grand Army.

Lord Hastings would have had the right himself to the share of the booty usually allotted to the Commander-in-Chief, which by this order he makes over to another.

The whole question to be considered turns upon the Treasury Minute of 1823. Is the booty the produce of actual capture, or of constructive capture?

If it is the produce of actual capture it must be divided among the body of troops which made the capture, be they a part of those which came from the north-east, called the Grand

* See page 489.

Army, or a part of those which came from the south, called the Army of the Deccan.

If the booty be the produce of constructive capture it must then, according to the same Minute, be divided among the whole army. In this view of the case, then, the separation of the armies is immaterial, however convinced I may be that such separation did not exist.

Upon the question whether the great portion of the booty actually at the disposition of the Crown is the produce of actual or of constructive capture, I refer to my Memorandum of September last.

WELLINGTON.

Sir Herbert Taylor to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Horse Guards, 8th Dec., 1825.

I have now the honour to return to your Grace the interesting documents which you were so kind as to allow me to peruse; and which have, as you know, been communicated to the Commander-in-Chief. His Royal Highness has, I believe, himself expressed to your Grace the satisfaction which he has derived from the clear and able manner in which you have treated the question of the Barrackpoor mutiny, and the liberal and manly feeling with which you have advocated the cause of individuals placed in very arduous and responsible situations, in remote stations, who have discharged their duties to the best of their abilities and judgments; and who might, if you had not so strenuously supported them, have been sacrificed to clamour and prejudice. It is, indeed, most fortunate for them, and for others who may be similarly circumstanced, that they may rely upon such powerful support, and everyone must feel that the country will be essentially benefited by the confidence which must result from a course so just and so considerate.

His Royal Highness was also much pleased to find that your Grace had urged the necessity of providing for the better efficiency of the Company's establishment of European officers with the Native regiments. It is a point to which he has often endeavoured to draw Mr. Wynn's attention, and his Royal Highness has ordered me to communicate to you some documents enclosed which will show that some of his observations and suggestions conveyed in March 1824 agree in great measure with the view which your Grace has taken of the subject.

You will observe that Mr. Wynn had communicated to his Royal Highness the outline of the last military arrangement of the army in India, and that his Royal Highness entered at large into the question in his letter of 6th March, 1824; and, in the latter part of it more especially, into that of the relative efficiency of the officers of the King's and the Company's regiments.

No answer was given to his letter, nor has the subject been further

noticed. I have not sent Mr. Wynn's letter of 19th February, 1824, as it relates exclusively to the rank of cadets, or rather to their taking date *as subalterns of fifteen years' standing* from the period of their nomination to cadetships in this country, to which his Royal Highness objected. My letter to Mr. Freemantle was in reply to verbal communications.

I have the honour to be, with great regard, my dear Lord Duke,

your Grace's most obedient, and faithful servant,

H. TAYLOR.

I request the favour of you to return the enclosures, as I have no other copies.

Lord Combermere to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Camp before Bhurtpoor, 16th Dec., 1825.

I arrived at Agra on the 4th instant, and after inspecting the troops assembled there, I proceeded to Muttra on the 7th. The army (consisting of 1 European regiment of dragoons, and 3 Native regiments of cavalry, 1 regiment of European infantry, 9 battalions of Native infantry, 2 24-pounders, and 14 18-pounders from Muttra, a regiment of European dragoons, 1 of infantry, and 9 battalions of sepoys, with 22 18-pounders &c.) moved upon Bhurtpoor on the 9th. I took up my ground on the 10th, and got possession that morning of the jeel (or lake) from which the ditch of the outer wall was to have been filled. The bund (or dam) was cut the night before I arrived, but the ditch is so extensive (8 miles in circumference) that what little water got into it has already been absorbed.

The enemy has not been able to retake this important post (which is only a mile and a quarter from the fort), and I have made it so strong that he will not be able to do so. We shall break ground in about six days, near the north-east angle.

The Burmese war is still going on, but might have been ended in October, had not the government offered terms which his golden-footed majesty was not likely to accept; namely, to give up Pegu and Arracan, and to pay two crore of rupees. Sir A. Campbell had received his instructions, as to the operations for this campaign, before I arrived in India.

The force under Brigadier-General Morrison could not cross the mountains (seventeen in number) between Arracan and the Irrawaddy. The sickness and mortality in that corps has been dreadful. The two European regiments (44th and 54th) could not parade 300 men, out of which number not 100 were in a state to march. The Native regiments were also quite done up, and there were above 5000 men in hospital in October. I have therefore sent a regiment of company's light infantry, and 4 battalions of sepoys to Arracan, and have brought away all that remained of Brigadier-General Morrison's force. Arracan (though so unhealthy) must be kept as long as Sir A. Campbell remains in Ava. The commissariat has totally failed; so that if a road could be found, or made over the Arracan mountains, that corps could not move. The Native army here is in very bad order, composed chiefly of recruits, and very old and very young officers of

European infantry; we have only three regiments in this presidency, one of which is in Fort William.

I will let you know from time to time how we are going on.

Believe me, my dear Lord Duke,

ever your very faithful and attached,

COMBERMERE.

Mr. Stratford Canning to the Right Hon. George Canning.

SIR, Corfu, 16th Dec., 1825.

From the time of my arrival in this island, where I have unfortunately been detained by the illness of several persons of my family, I have made it one of my principal objects to obtain correct information as to the state of affairs in Greece. The communications which I have received from his Excellency the Lord High Commissioner, and from the officers of his Majesty's squadron in the Archipelago, added to what I had previously learnt on the same subject from Vice-Admiral Sir Harry Neale, have been particularly useful to me in this respect.

The departments of his Majesty's government with which those officers correspond will doubtless put you in possession of whatever is most interesting in their reports; and the despatches of our consul-general at Prevesa may be referred to as containing an account of many of the principal occurrences which have taken place in the neighbouring theatre of war during the last few weeks.

I shall therefore make no excuse for endeavouring to occupy as little of your time as possible in stating, so as to bring into one point of view, the prominent circumstances which may be considered to have constituted the actual state of the Greek contest when the latest accounts came away

The most remarkable of these circumstances are the evident determination of the Porte to continue its military operations through the winter, and the arrival of a powerful reinforcement from Egypt in aid of that determination.

The partial successes obtained by the Greeks in the interval which elapsed between the retirement of Ibrahim Pacha to Navarin and the disembarkation of the third large division of troops sent out from Alexandria, have been attended with no lasting advantage. Tripolitza is still in possession of the Egyptians; and Ibrahim, in marching round to Patras by the western coast of the Morea, has been able to occupy the districts situated in his passage without meeting any greater resistance than what has sufficed to display the resolute spirit of the inhabitants, and to give him on several occasions a colour of right in putting them to the sword, and destroying their towns and villages.

In the Morea, Napoli di Romania, Napoli di Malvani, and the citadel of Corinth, continue to be held by Greeks. It does not appear that Colocotroni is actually at the head of any considerable force. It is not, however, the practice in Greece to keep on foot large bodies of men beyond the time for which they are wanted in the execution of some particular service. A greater command of money and better discipline than they can at present

boast of would be requisite for that purpose. But the whole extent of the Morea, except in such parts as are positively occupied by the Egyptians, is open for enrolment in case of emergency; and the cruel policy now adopted by Ibrahim is not likely to diminish the number of Greek recruits, otherwise than as it thins the population in general.

You may remember, Sir, that the earliest operations of this Pacha in the Morea were carried on with some appearances of forbearance and conciliation. Whatever may be the cause of the change, his conduct is no longer the same. If the statements which have reached me be true, he now acts on a system little short of extermination. I have not, indeed, heard of any acts of slaughter committed by him in cold blood; but he seems to spare no one where the slightest show of resistance is made. There is room to apprehend that many of his prisoners have been sent into Egypt as slaves, the children, it is asserted, being even compelled to embrace the Mahometan faith.

The great advantage obtained by Ibrahim Pacha over the Greeks may be attributed to the introduction of discipline amongst his troops, to their employment of the bayonet, and to the assistance which they derive from French and other foreign officers skilled in European tactics, of whom a large additional number has arrived at the head-quarters of Ibrahim Pacha with the last expedition from Egypt. The Greeks also have French engineers in their service, and they have been endeavouring to match their adversaries by increasing the corps of regular troops, which they have been some time engaged in forming, though it does not as yet exceed the number of twelve or fifteen hundred men.

The regular force commanded by the Pacha may be computed at upwards of twelve thousand men, including cavalry; the whole amount of his army, comprising the first and latest expeditions from Egypt, and making due allowance for his losses, which must have been considerable, may perhaps be set down at sixteen or eighteen thousand. By far the greater part of this army he has with him at Patras, the infantry having been conveyed to that fortress by transports under convoy of the Captain Pacha, who is also there with his fleet.

To the north of Corinth the Greeks possess no fortified places except Missolonghi and the citadel of Athens. Four thousand Suliotes under several captains still hold out amidst the ruined houses and half-demolished entrenchments of Missolonghi. The bombardment of that place is directed from a distance of eight hundred yards by the Seraskier of Rumelia, whose whole army does not far exceed as many thousand men, though the country is now open to him, notwithstanding the defection of his corps of 5000 Albanians stationed at Salona, and numerous recruits are reported to be on their march to his camp. The position of this general is sufficiently embarrassing. The Albanians, whom he has been obliged to employ, counteract his measures, and seek occasion to betray him. The Suliotes listen to his offers, and at their leisure decline accepting them. The Pacha of Egypt affects to wonder at the length of the siege, and threatens him with the immediate assistance of his Arabs. In spite of these difficulties he has lately taken courage from the proximity of the Captain Pacha to settle matters with the Albanians by dismissing the most unruly of them, and beheading some of their chiefs. It remains to be seen how far this act

of rigour will serve to accelerate the surrender of Missolonghi, where the garrison would doubtless by this time have been reduced to the greatest straits if they had not received some few supplies from the Greek squadron.

The small army before Missolonghi is the only force immediately dependent on his command, which the Sultan at present employs against the Greeks, who, on their side, unless Colocotroni be actually in the field, have no body of troops assembled on service, except a few hundred men under Karaiskaki, and two or three other Guerilla captains in Acarnania. Garrisons are, of course, not included in this statement.

The fleet of the Captain Pacha, now lying in the Gulf of Patras, and forming the blockade of Missolonghi and the adjacent coasts, is composed of about eighty vessels, of which fourteen are frigates, mounting from fifty to fifty-two guns, and twenty are large corvettes, armed in proportion. The rest are brigs and schooners of various kinds, including three or four fire-ships. One division of this force is, I believe, Egyptian.

The Greek squadron immediately opposed to the Captain Pacha consisted a few days ago of thirty-five vessels, all brigs, mounting, with the exception of three or four fire-ships, from fourteen to twenty guns of various sizes, each manned with about seventy sailors, and the whole commanded by the celebrated Miaulis.

In several partial actions which took place at the beginning of this month between this squadron and a detachment of the Pacha's fleet, no greater loss than the ineffectual explosion of a fire-ship or two was experienced on either side. The Greeks are described by British officers who witnessed their manœuvres as having displayed a degree of skill in the management of their vessels, which presented a striking contrast with the awkward movements and slovenly appearance of the Turkish squadron, and can alone account for the impunity with which they succeeded in engaging an enemy of such superior strength. Another Greek squadron, composed of about forty armed brigs and a few fire-ships, is in the port of Spezia, under the command of Tombasi and Startouri. It appears to have been the intention of the commanders to unite the two squadrons at the entrance of the Gulf of Patras; and if this junction were effected it is not unlikely that a serious attack would be attempted on the Captain Pacha's fleet. But there is reason to suppose that Miaulis, instead of being joined by his colleagues, has sailed round to Spezia, with a view to assist in repressing the spirit of insubordination which has recently broken out in acts of violence and plunder amongst the sailors under their command. The object of the mutineers was to possess themselves of certain funds which they claimed as prize money; and such was their contempt of subordination and sanguinary disposition that, during the tumult, a leading member of the magistracy escaped assassination only by taking refuge on board one of his Majesty's cruizers.

You are, no doubt, aware, Sir, that since the destruction of Psarà, the whole naval force of the Greeks is supplied by the islands of Spezia and Hydra. These two are, in fact, the only islands in the Archipelago the possession of which by the Greeks is attended with any essential effect on the duration of the war. Hydra alone, if unprotected by the navy, is esteemed capable of resisting for any length of time the invasion of an

adequate Turkish force. The late insurrection in Candia is said to have induced Ibrahim Pacha to send thither a detachment of two thousand men from the last Egyptian expedition. But a proportional diminution of his main army is the only advantage likely to accrue to the cause of Greece from that quarter, inasmuch as the Candiote insurgents are not in sufficient force to subdue the Turkish garrisons of themselves, and the Greek Provisional Government has not been in a condition to send them any essential aid.

The fortresses of the Negropont are all in the power of the Turks; Samos, though at present independent, expends its very limited means of annoyance on the neighbouring coasts of Asia; and in the other islands, where the Greek population prevails, the want of shipping and exposure to attack combine with the general narrowness of their resources to render them of little or no importance as to the final issue of the war.

To this brief view of the present state of the campaign in Greece, I have only to add that letters of the 13th instant from Prevesa describe the Turks as having lately occupied a point on the Bay of Salona calculated to interrupt the communications of the Greeks between that part of the country and the opposite coast of the Morea, while Ibrahim Pacha was engaged in directing two strong detachments to the east, the one by sea towards Corinth, the other inland by Calavritä. The specific object of this movement is uncertain; but one of its probable consequences will be to extend the ravages of the Egyptian army, and to place the whole range of coast, from Modon westward to the Isthmus of Corinth, under the immediate control of the Pacha.

I will not presume to hazard a conjecture as to the results which may be expected from this state of things. If the parties directly concerned in the struggle were other than what they are, it would be natural to infer that, as matters now stand, the Greeks have scarcely a chance of ultimate success. Many of the leaders themselves are known to be of this opinion, though perhaps resolved to continue the war, partly through a vague hope of assistance from abroad, and partly in the belief that destruction itself would be preferable to a return under the yoke of their former masters, with whom the Pacha of Egypt is necessarily identified in their minds. But such unexpected turns of fortune have already taken place in the course of this contest; the disasters which the Porte has repeatedly experienced are so disproportioned to the strength and apparent resources of her adversary; the relations of the various parts of the Turkish population one to another are so delicate and complicated, the genius of the one nation and its motives of action being so conducive to perseverance and enterprise, the character of the other so marked with habitual indolence and want of foresight, that it is clearly no case for the application of ordinary rules.

Europe has witnessed with admiration the achievements of a navy composed of merchant vessels very imperfectly armed, maintained in great part by the trading inhabitants of two small islands, attached only by courtesy to the national government, and in many cases not only commanded, but even in a great degree manned, by the proprietors themselves, the common sailors being not unfrequently joint-owners of the vessel. That such an armament should be subject to the evils of insubordination is not surprising; that it should exist at all is the wonder; and if, as would seem not impro-

bable, it were to break up before the object of its formation be accomplished, the exhaustion of private funds and the failure of Greek credit in foreign countries, not any successes of the colossal monarchy to which it is opposed, would in all likelihood be the causes of its dispersion.

The same causes ought, in the common course of events, to affect the duration of the war in the Morea. The Greeks themselves appear to feel that, in order to contend with Ibrahim Pacha, they must have a regular force at their disposal. But how is a regular force to be maintained without money? and where are they to look for money in the present discredited state of their funds in England?

These questions would seem unanswerable: yet who would not have asked with equal confidence at the beginning of the insurrection by what means an unarmed and despised peasantry was to master the Turkish population, to defeat in succession the numerous armies of the Sultan, and to get possession of some of the strongest fortresses in his empire? This miracle has, however, been performed.

In like manner the difficulty of carrying on the functions of government, destitute, or nearly so, of pecuniary resources, by means of individuals who agree in nothing but their hatred of the Turk, would seem insuperable, if the greater difficulty of creating a government out of those discordant elements in the very infancy of the enterprise had not been already surmounted. It appears that a new form of administration, to be in force during the present emergency, is about to be adopted by the Greek legislature. According to the 'Napoli Gazette,' the powers of gov rnment are to be entrusted to a committee of the executive and legislative bodies; and it is natural to suppose that the meeting of the General Assembly of Deputies, convened for Christmas Day, will be reserved for times of less danger and alarm.

Whatever I had heard when at a distance from Greece of the disorderly spirit of its inhabitants, and of the factious and interested disposition of their leaders, has been confirmed to me by those who are best situated for observing the progress of the war.

But it is equally true that the same testimony is given to those more noble and redeeming features of the Greek character which ages of ruthless oppression have not been able to efface. Remarkable examples of this strange mixture of conflicting qualities in the same people have occurred during the short period of my detention here. I have already mentioned the disgraceful mutiny which took place a few days ago in the squadron off Spezia, at a crisis when its services might have been of incalculable advantage to the cause in which it is employed. On the other side the most heroic self-devotion has been displayed by the inhabitants of the Morea in several of the districts which were traversed by Ibrahim Pacha in his recent march from Navarin to Patras. I have seen a letter in which Prince Mavrocordato states that, in one instance, a number of peasants destroyed their wives and children to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Egyptians. The Suliotes engaged in the defence of Missolonghi have manifested the same uncompromising spirit.

With respect to the intrigues of foreign agents in Greece, nothing of any importance has come to my knowledge that is not already known to his Majesty's government. The impressions which you entertained at the

time of my departure from England as to the partial conduct of Austria and the two-handed policy of France, the former leaning most unfairly towards the Porte, and the latter ingratiating itself with both the belligerent parties, are to all appearance correct. There is no doubt that Admiral de Rigny has taken part in the intrigue, which has for its object the eventual elevation of the Duke of Nemours to the throne of Greece. But it is the opinion of those most conversant with the state of parties in that country, that no proposal to place themselves under the protection of a foreign Power has been hitherto addressed by the Greeks to any government but that of Great Britain.

The effect of his Majesty's Proclamation of Neutrality will be best made known to you from Constantinople. I am not in possession of any late political intelligence from that quarter. You will learn from Mr. Meyer's despatches that the Captain Pacha received the King's declaration with expressions of satisfaction. The manner in which the Greeks consider it may be collected from the accompanying extract of their newspaper, published at the seat of the Provisional Government. They seem not to have entirely abandoned the hope of being joined by Lord Cochrane, and of obtaining some steam-boats from England, and a couple of frigates from America. It may be stated meanwhile, as matter of fact, to which if there be any exceptions they must be few and insignificant, that no Englishman is at present enlisted in the military service of either belligerent, and actually employed on the theatre of war.

When the Captain Pacha's fleet last sailed into the Gulf of Patras it was attended by several transports under various foreign flags, among which I grieve to say that the English, as well as the American, colours were seen. There is also at Patras, in the service of Ibrahim Pacha, a steam-boat, understood to have been procured from England, and having, no doubt, an English engineer on board. But it is probable that the British vessels in question were agreed for before the Proclamation was made known. It is this consideration which principally restrains me for the present from adopting, through the means of his Majesty's consuls in the Levant, some general measure—if any can be adopted with effect—for enforcing a more rigid observance, in spirit as well as in terms, of his Majesty's declaration.

I have the honour, &c.,

STRATFORD CANNING.

[ENCLOSURE.]

OBSERVATION of the Editor of the 'General Greek Gazette' regarding his Majesty's Order in Council, dated 30th of September, about neutrality.

Various rumours have been lately spread about regarding the Proclamation published in the 'London Gazette' by H.B.M.'s government. Having now under our view the said document, and ascertaining the true state of the case, we think it necessary publishing our opinion on the subject.

We do not observe as others do, and suppose in the said document any innovation regarding the policy of the English government to the injury of the Greek nation. Said document is founded on the principles of neutrality, which the said government not only did declare, but also strictly observed, throughout

the Grecian struggle against the Ottoman Porte. The situation of Greece, as well as that of the Porte, in reference to the British power after the publication of the above document, is exactly the same as what it was before its publication.

Whatever the English government did previously publish regarding our struggle, such publication has always had, as we know, for foundation and object the state of neutrality, and it did officially pledge to Greece the same rights of warfare which were accorded to the Ottoman Porte. The English government, faithful to its peaceful political principles, repeats the same in the above Proclamation, by which whatever is interdicted to Greece is also interdicted to the Porte, as also whatever is ceded to the one, is not denied to the other, as we ascertained by the following paragraph of the above Proclamation. "H.B.M. having heard the opinion of his Council, &c., &c."

The said Proclamation, therefore, dictated by the circumstances well known to all of us, is no other but a simple recapitulation of what the British government did previously declare, and it may be particularly looked upon as a confirmation of our nation's *war rights* placed upon a par with those of the Ottoman Porte. Consequently the bad impression given to several persons by this Proclamation proceeds in no manner from the nature of the thing itself, but from the simple erroneous idea that Great Britain, as soon as received the Grecian petitions regarding protection, was to arm herself in favour of Greece. We confess that, however sacred appear to us the rights of our struggling country, we are not of such opinion, because the sacredness of the struggle alone is not sufficient in our days to become the guide of policy. It was decidedly the English power which, since the commencement of the Greek Revolution, did endeavour, with more perseverance and with more success than any other, to prevent the commencement of a war between Russia and the Porte. How could it be expected, therefore, that the same Power would, upon our national petitions only, kindle the flame of that war, which to the present day it has succeeded in preventing being kindled by any other power? But if we are not of opinion that England would have undertaken a war in favour of Greece, we always thought, however, and we still think, that Great Britain, for various reasons unnecessary to be mentioned here, is the fittest to benefit Greece, without the necessity of taking up arms. We always had, and still have, anxious hopes that Great Britain will protect, and perhaps already is protecting, our rights, not, as we said above, by means of her arms, but by means of her strong influence, and her upright, wise, and liberal policy. Nor do we despair of the other Powers of Europe. The intricate circumstances of policy had until now prevented them from hearing, during the time of our long struggle, the distressing lamentations of the Greeks; but we cannot deny that they did often take (though ineffectually, and perhaps not in the most advantageous manner for us) into consideration the state of the Greek affairs, and that they do consider the same in the present day more deeply and more effectually than at any other time, through the interference, perhaps, of the English power. We are of opinion that this year's campaign in Greece has brought circumstances to light which will necessarily dictate to the European Cabinets a far different way of policy towards the Grecian struggle. Greece in future is fighting with the Porte only nominally, but, in fact, it is fighting with the Satrap of Egypt, whom events have proved to be stronger than the Sultan. Nay, by far much stronger! Greece has always beat the Sultan by sea and land. All Europe has seen how all the Sultan's attacks against Greece have been successfully frustrated for the space of five years. It has witnessed with surprise a few days ago how this year's most significant expedition of the Grand Sultan against the weak redoubts of Missolonghi has been crushed to pieces, notwithstanding it was led by the

most experienced and most valiant of any other Pacha that has moved against Greece for the space of five years. All Europe has seen that sixteen only Greek vessels scarcely appeared before Missolonghi towards the end of last July, and all the haughty fleet of the Sultan at once disappeared. The Island of Zante declares that the whole fleet of the Sultan was seen about her shores, chased by three Greek vessels only. This is the Ottoman power! In the course of this year, and particularly in the present circumstances, Europe found out what the Ottoman power in reality is. It discovered that it was a mere pompous title, and, as such, cannot preserve what is called political balance, regarding which all Europe was deceived, and to the present day was in error with respect to its calculations regarding the Ottoman power. After such discovery, after such glaring exposition of the nullity of the Ottoman power, can we believe that enlightened Europe will found in future its cherished political balance upon such a power as that of the Porte, proved unworthy of the very name of Power. We cannot believe it. This year's discovery of the nominal existence of a power called Ottoman Power, we are sure, as we said above, will indicate to the European Courts a different course of policy towards Greece. Europe cannot be any longer deceived. The events declare Mahomet Ali to be the Sultan, and Alexandria to be the capital of the empire. The views of this ambitious enterprising person are well known; such views have been more strongly roused in his mind by the consciousness of his superior strength. This is a new and material object of consideration for the European powers. Greece, in spite of any advantage that may be gained over her by her enemy (and no other enemy she has to fear except the Satrap of Egypt), will never return again *de facto* to the submission of the Ottoman Porte. No! Greece, or will remain Greece, or if conquered will become Egypt. This just idea to our opinion, if it could find as it ought its way into the councils of the European Courts, we have no doubt that, in a short time will bring to struggling Greece all the benefit we can so justly hope from abroad.

MEMORANDUM enclosed in MR. STRATFORD CANNING'S despatch marked private and confidential, Corfu, 17th Dec., 1825.

I have at present no adequate motive for proposing or seeking an interview with any of the leading individuals in Greece, though I should not hesitate to receive, in his private capacity, any one of them, who, in the course of our voyage through the Archipelago, might happen to come within reach of us and request to see me. The language which I should hold on the occasion of such a visit might, I think, be employed without inconvenience, and not altogether without a prospect of advantage, by Captain Hamilton in conversing with Prince Mavrocordato, or any other Greek of influence with whom he is acquainted, and of whose political views he has no reason to form an unfavourable opinion.

The marked discretion with which Captain Hamilton appears to have regulated during several years, and not unfrequently in very delicate and complicated circumstances, his intercourse with the provisional authorities of Greece, is a sufficient security that his conversation, as touching the politics of that country, would not only be of a strictly private and unofficial character, but would not the less on that account be couched in the most guarded terms.

The substance of what he would be at liberty to state on any seasonable occasion which may offer during his cruise to Hydra and Napoli di Romania, may be expressed in very few words.

The Greeks are already aware that Great Britain is willing to employ her good offices in endeavouring to contribute to the termination of their struggle

with the Porte, by an arrangement in which the honour and interests of both parties would be saved. But the opportunity of mediating in that friendly manner with any tolerable chance of success must be furnished by one or both of the belligerents themselves. So long as the conflicting parties are both exclusively bent on prosecuting their adverse claims to the utmost, it is evident that the good offices of a mediating Power would be unwelcome to both, and could not in consequence be employed with benefit to either.

It is for the Greeks to judge whether the present state of the contest is such as to make it their interest to look rather to such an arrangement as would result from the successful mediation of a Power friendly to peace, than to that complete and triumphant result of the war, which can only be wrested from the Porte by force of arms, and for the accomplishment of which the Provisional Government of Greece must look entirely to its own resources. If the present posture of their affairs be so critical in their own estimation as to incline them to the former alternative, it may be worth the consideration of their leading men how far it is prudent to defer the communication of their sentiments until the progress of the Turkish arms be such as to leave them no prospect but that of absolute submission, or of utter destruction. No conferences in which Great Britain takes part are at present on foot with a view to the Pacification of Greece. The effect of the proposals directed to that object, which were made at Constantinople some months ago by the other great Powers of Europe, is already well known. The arrival of a new British Embassy at Constantinople may afford a favourable opening for confidential communications with the Porte; but if the advantage which the Turks have lately derived from the assistance of Ibrahim Pacha be little calculated to dispose them to conciliation with Greece, it would be grossly absurd to expect that the Turkish ministers would be induced to avow any such disposition, even supposing them to entertain it in secret, unless they were previously satisfied that, if avowed, it would at once be met with a corresponding disposition by the Greeks.

I need not repeat my conviction that, in employing this language on suitable occasions, Captain Hamilton will keep in mind that it is the principle deliberately adopted by his Majesty's government to abstain most carefully from mixing itself in any degree whatever with the quarrel in which the Turks and Greeks are at present engaged, however desirous it may be of contributing by friendly means to the termination of that quarrel.

COPIE d'un RAPPORT de M. le Baron d'OTTENFELS, Internonce d'Autriche près la Porte Ottomane, à S. A. le Prince de METTERNICH, au sujet des Bash-Beshlis-Agas.

Constantinople, le 17me Décembre, 1825.

Depuis la réception de la dépêche du 20me Novembre, par laquelle V.A. m'a ordonné de lui soumettre un rapport détaillé sur la question de fait, si l'engagement pris envers nous par le Reis Effendi sur le rétablissement du *status quo* ancien des rapports des Bash-Beshlis-Agas dans les deux Principautés sur le Danube est déjà exécuté en réalité et en entier, je me suis appliqué avec toute la sollicitude qu'exige l'importance de l'objet, à la recherche des notions et des données nécessaires pour éclaircir la question et établir le fait.

Je prends la liberté de soumettre aujourd'hui à V.A. le résultat de ces recherches.

Ce qui dès le principe a contribué à embrouiller la question, et à rendre difficiles la recherche et la découverte de données positives sur la mode

pratiquée anciennement dans la désignation et la nomination des chefs des Beshlis, c'est qu'il ne se trouve aucun traité, convention, ou autre acte officiel et écrit, passé entre la Russie et la Porte, ou entre cette dernière et les Hospodars, qui en fasse mention. Si un tel acte existait, il aurait été, sans aucun doute, produit par la Cour de Russie dans le cours des discussions auxquelles cet objet a donné lieu. Il n'est pas difficile d'expliquer ce silence. Les chefs des Beshlis étaient autrefois des officiers d'un rang si subalterne, leur autorité et leur sphère d'activité et d'influence étaient jadis si bornés et de si peu d'importance, qu'on n'a pas jugé apropos de s'en occuper. Ce ne fut qu'à la suite des troubles de l'an 1821, de l'occupation militaire de ces provinces, et de l'état précaire de la tranquillité publique dans des pays bouleversés par une révolution récente, que la Porte, reconnaissant la nécessité d'y entretenir un nombre de Beshlis plus considérable que par le passé, leur a donné des commandans revêtus d'un caractère plus élevé, et investis de pouvoirs plus étendus. Ces commandans auraient dû être changés et remplacés par des officiers plus subalternes de la même catégorie que ceux qui y avaient été avant les troubles, quand en automne 1824 la Porte, sur notre demande, consentit à la réduction du nombre des Beshlis exigée par le Cabinet Russe.

Elle ne l'a pas fait alors; elle a laissé les mêmes Bash-Beshlis-Agas, et ce n'est que depuis cette époque que la question sur le caractère et les attributions de ces commandans et sur la mode de leur nomination a été mise sur le tapis, parce qu'elle était inséparable du *status quo* ancien.

Or, pour décider en quoi consistait ce *status quo*, et qui désignait et nommait anciennement les chefs des Beshlis, il nous fallut, au défaut de documens et actes par écrit, consulter l'usage ancien et la pratique suivie dans les temps passés. Les actes de l'Internonciature que j'ai compulsés à ce sujet ne contenant absolument aucune donnée sur ce sujet, j'ai invité nos agens dans les Principautés de me communiquer celles qu'ils avaient recueillies à Bucharest et à Jassy. Il eut été facile d'avoir des renseignemens positifs sur la mode de nomination des Bash-Beshlis-Agas pratiquée du temps des Hospodars, tirés des familles Grecques du fanal, si ces familles existaient encore; mais malheureusement, par la suite de l'insurrection Grecque, la presque-totalité des grandes familles fanariottes a été ou exterminée, ou elles se sont refugiées dans l'étranger, ou elles vivent dans l'exil en Asie Mineure. A peine trouve-t-on encore ici quelques individus autrefois attachés à ces familles, et ceux-ci, intimidés par les circonstances, évitent avec soin tout contact avec les missions étrangères. Ce ne fut donc qu'en confrontant et combinant les données fournies par nos agens avec celles que j'ai recueillies des employés du gouvernement Ottoman, et avec les notices contenus dans le mémoire du Sieur Vlangaly, que V.A. m'a fait l'honneur de me transmettre par sa dépêche de Milan du 26 Mai, 1825, que je suis parvenu à établir les faits suivans :—

Les Hospodars avaient de tout temps un certain nombre de Beshlis attachés à leur service, pour exercer la police sur les Musulmans arrivans ou de passage dans les deux Principautés. Le nombre exact de ces Beshlis n'a jamais été fixé invariablement; il a été augmenté ou diminué selon les circonstances, et sans que leur quantité ait formé le sujet d'une transaction soit avec les Princes, soit avec les puissances étrangères; mais il paraît qu'elle n'a jamais été au-delà de 7 à 800 hommes pour la Valachie, et de la moitié de ce nombre pour la Moldavie.

Leur chef, ou Bash-Beshli-Aga, qui résidait auprès de la personne de l'Hospodar, a été toujours *désigné* par celui-ci ; mais la *nomination effective* n'a pu être faite que par les autorités Ottomanes, parce que, d'après une loi qu'on peut considérer comme fondamentale, puisqu'elle repose sur le code religieux, un non-Musulman, quelqu'élevé qu'il fût en rang, ne peut conférer à un Mahométan un grade militaire supérieur, que le soldat Ottoman ne peut recevoir que de son Souverain, de ses Vizirs, ou de son Corps. Ces Bash-Beshlis-Agas désignés par les Hospodars, et nommés par la Porte, recevaient ensuite leur investiture par le Prince, qui les faisait revêtir en sa présence d'un caftan. Il est encore à remarquer que les Princes fanariottes désignaient rarement un individu pour la place de Bash-Beshli-Aga par leur propre mouvement; comme au moment de leur élévation à la Principauté ils se trouvaient toujours à Constantinople, les ministres Turcs ou les grands de l'empire leur recommandaient ordinairement quelque homme attaché à leur service, ou qu'ils voulaient favoriser, et il est naturel de croire que ces recommandations étaient rarement infructueuses.

Les Hospodars avaient le droit de changer les Basch-Beshlis-Agas, mais comme ils ne pouvaient conférer à un simple Beshli le grade d'officier supérieur, que celui-ci ne pouvait recevoir que d'une autorité musulmane, un pareil changement ne pouvait se faire à l'insu de la Porte.

Après avoir posé ces faits, que je ne balance point de déclarer pour authentiques, il nous reste à examiner si la forme qui vient d'être observée récemment corresponde à l'ancienne pratique. Le Reis Effendi, que j'ai questionné plus d'une fois, et notamment depuis la réception de la dépêche de V.A. du 20me Novembre, sur la mode suivie dans la nomination des nouveaux Bash-Beshlis-Agas, m'a répondu ce qui suit.

La Sublime Porte désirant mettre un terme aux discussions qui ont eu lieu au sujet des rapports des Bash-Beshlis-Agas, et pour satisfaire à la demande de la Cour de Russie, que ces rapports fussent rétablis sur l'ancien pied, a, immédiatement après avoir pris envers M. l'Internonce l'engagement sur le rétablissement entier du *status quo* de ces rapports, adressé des ordres aux deux Hospodars, ainsi qu'au Pacha de Silistrie, relativement au changement à faire dans la personne et dans les rapports futurs des Bash-Beshlis-Agas; elle a invité les Hospodars à s'entendre avec le dit Pacha sur la désignation et la nomination de ces officiers, en ajoutant qu'ils devaient être d'un grade subalterne, et être placés dans la même dépendance des Hospodars où s'étaient trouvés anciennement ces chefs des Beshlis. C'est à la suite de cette entente mutuelle que le Pacha de Silistrie leur a envoyé deux officiers de leur choix. La lettre de recommandation ou d'accompagnement dont Ibrahim Aga a été le porteur pour le Prince de Valachie, et dont notre agent, M. de Hackenau, a pris lecture, porte que conformément aux ordres de la Porte, et aux désirs de l'Hospodar, il lui envoyait un officier apte à remplir les fonctions de Bash-Beshli-Aga, en le priant de lui donner l'investiture, s'il le trouvait qualifié à cette mission, et de le traiter en tout sur le même pied que les anciens Hospodars traitaient leurs chefs des Beshlis. Cette investiture a eu lieu dans les formes usitées, et le nouveau Bash-Beshli-Aga se tient scrupuleusement dans les bornes qui lui sont prescrites.

Le Reis Effendi m'a assuré que la même mode a été suivie à Jassy. Comme je n'ai pas reçu de M. Lippa des détails aussi circonstanciés que ceux que m'a donné M. de Hackenau, et qu'il me restait quelque doute, si

en Moldavie l'ancienne forme a été suivie avec la même exactitude qu'en Valachie, j'en ai pris occasion pour observer au Reis Effendi que nous ne saurions nous déclarer comme étant entièrement satisfaits des procédés de la Porte, à moins d'avoir la certitude que tout y fût remis sur l'ancien pied. Le Reis Effendi m'a protesté que les ordres de la Porte avaient été absolument les mêmes pour les deux Principautés; que si le Prince de Moldavie, qui déjà plus d'une fois avait été trouvé en défaut, a fait un mauvais choix, ou s'est écarté de l'ancienne pratique, on ne devait pas en accuser la Porte; qu'on n'avait qu'à choisir un autre individu; que la Porte ne s'opposerait point à ce changement, s'il était reconnu nécessaire, attendu qu'elle était fermement résolue de remplir en entier l'engagement pris envers sa Majesté Impériale. On ne saurait nous supposer l'intention, a-t-il fini par dire, de chicaner sur la mode d'exécution, après avoir formellement reconnu le principe, que les rapports des Bash-Beshlis-Agas doivent être rétablis sur le même pied. Nous avons pris toutes les informations sur le *status quo*; nous avons donné l'ordre de le rétablir, et nous sommes prêts à redresser ce qu'on nous prouvera n'a pas été conforme à ce *status quo*.

Après une déclaration aussi positive, je crois pouvoir assurer que la Porte a en réalité épuisé son engagement contracté envers nous, et je me flatte d'avoir fourni toutes les preuves à ma portée, que tel est le cas. Si elles ne seraient pas jugées suffisantes, c'est à la partie adverse à désigner les points qui devraient recevoir un amendement. On ne doit cependant pas perdre de vue la différence essentielle qui existe entre les Hospodars actuels tirés des familles indigènes du pays, d'avec les anciens Hospodars choisis dans les familles Grecques du fanal. Ces derniers par leur demeure à Constantinople au milieu des Turcs, étaient à même de désigner quelqu'individu de leur connaissance pour la place de Bash-Beshli-Aga, tandis que les Hospodars actuels ne voient autour d'eux aucun Musulman, à l'exception du Divan-Effendi, ou Sécrétaire Turc, et le commun des Beshlis. Cette différence de position a nécessairement dû occasionner quelques nuances dans la mode de désignation, qui n'étaient pas d'usage anciennement. Il ne resterait d'après cela d'autre moyen de vérification que celui de demander aux Hospodars eux-mêmes une déclaration, si les nouveaux Bash-Beshlis-Agas ont été nominativement désignés par eux au Pacha de Silistrie, ou si celui-ci d'après leur demande a fait ces choix.

Enfin, pour ne rien négliger, j'aurais demandé à M. Minciacky, que j'ai informé successivement de tous ces faits relatifs aux changemens des Beshlis, en quoi le *status quo* de leurs anciens rapports n'est point encore rétabli, si ce chargé d'affaires ne m'avait pas répondu, toutes les fois que je touchais cet objet, qu'il avait ordre de sa Cour de ne point parler sur les affaires des Principautés.

Tel est, Monseigneur, l'état de la question sur laquelle vous m'avez ordonné de vous soumettre un rapport détaillé. S'il devait ne pas épuiser la matière, il renferme du moins tous les éclaircissemens qu'il m'a été possible de procurer sur un objet qui par sa nature n'admet pas des données plus positives.

Agréez, &c.

[501.] *To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn.*

MY DEAR WYNN, Sudbourne, 25th Dec., 1825.

I return Munro's letter. Without knowing more than I do of the details at present of the Bengal service, I cannot tell whether the Bengal army ought or ought not to be increased beyond what it was when Lord Amherst went to India. Of this I am quite certain, that all augmentations of the Native army in India ought to be made in the first instance by extra battalions, probably of volunteers from the old battalions in the service. I am afraid, however, that Lord Amherst's augmentation is of permanent regiments in which the promotion has been made. If this is the case, it will not be very easy to countermand it; and the countermand ought to be the result of a very detailed examination of the duties required from the army.

I quite agree in what you say of the employment of the East India Company's servants as governors, &c., abroad; but Malcolm is certainly an exception. He has lived much in this country, and to great advantage. He has a thorough knowledge of men and affairs here; and I should say, that if it is difficult to find a proper person out of the Company's service, he is the fittest man in that service who could be found.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[502.] MEMORANDUM ON THE CASE OF THE ROMAN CATHOLICS IN IRELAND.

1825.

It might have been expected that the conduct of the Roman Catholic Association would have awakened men's minds to the nature, the extent, the inconvenience, and danger of the Roman Catholic system in Ireland; and would have tended to bring over some, and render others more steady in their opposition to farther concessions. But these considerations have had an influence with but few of the former description and those not of any importance.

The opinions of the great majority of those who support the claims of the Roman Catholics not only have not been shaken by the conduct and proceedings of the Roman Catholic Association, but they draw inferences from those proceedings in

support of their former view of the question; and the opinions of those opposed to the Roman Catholics have been shaken by other circumstances which it is desirable to consider with a view to form a right decision on the exact state of the Catholic question.

One of these is the recent arrangement in Hanover.

The only fault which I find with this arrangement is its indiscreet publication. Such publication was not necessary; and should not have been made without previous communication with this government.

In my opinion the Roman Catholic question in Hanover and in Ireland are as different as any two questions of the same denomination can be. But we must not conceal from ourselves, that the adoption of this arrangement by his Majesty, as King of Hanover, has affected many well judging persons upon the Irish Roman Catholic question; and has tended, both in and out of Parliament, to occasion in some, and to augment in others, the apathy upon the question of which the opposers of the Roman Catholics have had so much reason to complain.

At all events this Hanoverian arrangement deprives the opposers of the Roman Catholic cause of all arguments founded upon the repugnance of his Majesty and of the Royal Family to farther concession.

The second of these circumstances is the public apathy above referred to.

This may be attributed originally to many causes. The composition of the Administration is certainly one; as it renders it desirable for the members of the Administration and their friends to discourage discussion upon the Roman Catholic question.

Another cause is the unpopularity of the clergy of the Church of England, on account of their supposed riches, their want of discipline, and of attention to their duties; and their extreme eagerness respecting their worldly concerns. This dislike has influenced the opinions of the dissenters from the tenets of the Church, and those who in the distresses of recent times looked to the tithes of their estates as a personal resource. Some are apprehensive of the eventual interference of the Roman Catholic party in France in this question; and others of the interference of the people of the United States; and all these have become lukewarm, and desirous that government should consider of the means of a settlement.

Some who might be averse to the grant of the claims of the Roman Catholics, do not like to stand alone; and are apprehensive of the consequences of assembling their county to discuss the subject in a public meeting, from which they and the loyal might be driven by any demagogue at the head of a mob.

To these causes of the public apathy upon this question add the speculating money-making spirit of the day, which pervades all ranks and classes of society. Men think of nothing but their speculations, and are desirous to avoid any public measure or even public discussion which might in its consequences occasion disturbance.

We see then none but the clergy presenting petitions upon this question; and every petition is received with derision and treated with contempt by the opposition in the Houses of Lords and Commons.

It does not appear to me that it would be very easy to revive a public feeling in this country upon the Roman Catholic question, which would enable those inclined to oppose themselves to the Roman Catholic claims to resist them effectually.

If all this be true no hopes can reasonably be entertained of a different result by the alteration of opinions, and of the relative numbers in a new Parliament. On the contrary, the new and young members are more exposed to the impressions above described, and are found to be more strongly in favour of the Roman Catholics than those who have sat for any length of time in the House of Commons; and we have reason to expect from the sentiments which have dropped from some lately that the majority in that House in favour of the Roman Catholic claims will increase even in this session.

The result in the House of Lords will probably be different. The majority will probably continue to be against the Roman Catholic claims as long as Lord Liverpool shall be the Minister, and Lord Eldon on the woolsack. But we must analyze that majority, and see of what it consists; and we must look to the growing influence upon it of the repeated divisions in the Commons in favour of the Roman Catholic claims; and to the influence upon the members of the House of Lords of those same circumstances which have occasioned the want of all feeling upon the question in the public at large. We shall probably find then that the majority in the House of Lords, although not materially affected at present, will be so eventually.

But I should likewise add, that even if I could hope to preserve and keep together a majority in the House of Lords upon this question, notwithstanding the declared opinion of the House of Commons, and the apathy of the public mind, I should not think it proper to endeavour to do so under the discouraging circumstances referred to; and the consequent increasing risks and dangers of disturbance in Ireland in the various discussions with foreign powers which may and probably will occur in these eventful times.

I have already stated that the existence of this majority in the House of Lords depends upon the continuance in power of Lords Liverpool and Eldon; and it is quite obvious that a change of the ministry would produce a majority on the other side of the question.

It appears then to be desirable that the question should be considered while that majority, our only resource, remains undiminished and unimpaired.

It must be admitted that if any arrangement can be made upon this question, the fittest time for it is one of external peace and of internal tranquillity; and when the government is strong, and universally respected. The concessions hitherto made to the Roman Catholics have been made in times of war and of difficulty; and it is not unreasonable to suppose that they must have produced an impression upon their minds that they were concessions to the apprehensions of the government of their enmity and strength. As the arrangement to be made, if made at all, must include every point which can be a subject of difference between the two religions, it is most desirable that the impression should not exist that the arrangement, whatever it may be, was extorted from our fears.

The Act to put down the Roman Catholic Association, and the submission to that Act, render, in this view, this moment peculiarly favourable for the consideration of the question.

But I go farther, and say that the King's present servants are the men who ought to consider of it, and to decide it as far as circumstances will enable them. They alone can satisfy the public mind that all that can be done under such circumstances will be done; and it must be observed that the existing majority in the House of Lords against the Roman Catholic claims, and the composition of the administration will give those members of the administration of the Protestant opinion more

facilities in making the settlement than any other set of men could have.

This is no common question. The ministry have long considered it as one which should not be taken up as a government question; but each member of the government was at liberty to bring it forward, and take such part in the discussion of it as he should think proper. Surely then if all or any of those hitherto opposed to concession should think the time is come, or is approaching so near that farther resistance is not only useless, but might be injurious to the King's service and the interests of the country, no reason can exist why they should not be parties to a settlement.

The success of the question will be no party triumph, nor will it occasion weakness on any other point. It will have been occasioned by particular circumstances and events already discussed in this paper which have manifested an alteration of opinion in the minds of men in general, or a disinclination to come forward and declare their opinions; and it will be an error to suppose that either the one or the other betrays a want of confidence in those members of the government who have hitherto been opposed to the Roman Catholic claims.

If this be true it is surely more manly and consistent with our duty to our Sovereign and the public so to conduct ourselves as to be able to render most service in the particular crisis of the time, than to be looking about to see what imputations can be brought against us of supposed attachment to office, founded upon our continuing to hold our offices after a question has been carried, or is about to be carried, contrary to our opinions, by our own friends in Parliament, and by the influence of those acting in the Cabinet with us. I really cannot think that we ought to quit the King in such a crisis, or that it can be any satisfaction to our friends the Protestants that the loss of the Roman Catholic question should be attended by the additional misfortune of our retirement from office.

The evil in Ireland is of long standing; and consists entirely in the state of society. There are two parties in that country, the *Protestants* and *the Roman Catholics.* In the Protestant party are the proprietors, the clergy of the Church of England, and the mass of the Protestant population; in the Roman Catholic are the Roman Catholic bishops, clergy, and gentry, and the populace now called six millions of people.

There may be occasional exceptions in the composition of these parties. Some of the Protestant gentry may really think well of the Roman Catholics; and others may wish that concession may be made as the best or only mode of tranquillising the country. But those whom we see in Parliament on that side of the question, and those who sign petitions, are in general either political partizans, or men who have adopted that line of conduct because they would otherwise lose their elections, or from some other political motive.

It may be stated as a general truth that there are no Protestant residents in Ireland, who do not in reality apprehend, not the result of another contest with the Roman Catholics for the government of the country, as long as the connection with England subsists, and England is in her existing state of triumphant strength; but a sudden and general rising of the populace of that religion in which many would fall a sacrifice.

There are none who reside who have not constantly in their minds the recollection of the histories of former rebellions; and of those more recent of 1798 and 1803; and before their eyes fresh instances of the facility and secrecy with which the Roman Catholic population, even the servants in their own houses, combine for the purposes of mischief and outrage.

On the other hand, there are some Roman Catholic proprietors, and of the higher orders of the clergy, and even some of the priests, who do occasionally exert themselves to promote peace and good order. But these are exceptions to their general line of conduct. The Roman Catholic clergy, nobility, lawyers, and gentlemen having property, form a sort of *theocracy* in Ireland, which in all essential points governs the populace, I believe even to the extent of being able to *prevent* disturbance and outrage; and by the measures of the Roman Catholic Association, and particularly the rent, this *theocracy* has acquired a knowledge of the means of organising this mass which it had never possessed before.

This theocracy is in strict communion with the Church of Rome; and that Church continues established in Ireland in all its parts, as it was three hundred years ago, with the same hierarchy, the same discipline, but ten times the authority and influence possessed by any National Church whatever; although without the property belonging to the Church.

This in my opinion is the great distinction between this and

other religious parties in this or any other State. The Dissenters of different descriptions in England, however troublesome and factious, and the Greeks in Hungary, are domestic parties, and have no connexion with foreign powers, nor have the Greeks even in the Turkish dominions, excepting by virtue of treaties between the Porte and the Emperor of Russia. But this Roman Catholic party in Ireland is, and acts in every respect as, and its existence has all the effects upon the prosperity and greatness of the Empire, of a party connected with and protected by a foreign power.

Then, this formidable party not only has no connexion whatever with the State; but considering all the circumstances of preceding wars and confiscations, all upon Roman Catholic principles, and the nature of the settlement of the government, and of the property of the Church and of individuals in the hands of the Protestants at the revolution, it is obvious that it must be hostile to the Church of England, and to the connection between the two countries; and therefore to the government. It is hostile to the Protestants as the proprietors of the soil and the ancient instruments of the conquest and of the suppression of the different rebellions which have taken place; and the supporters of the English connexion and government.

It cannot be doubted that nothing keeps this party down, particularly in war, excepting our strength. It was in this light that this party was considered by King William. His laws went to banish the higher orders of the hierarchy, and the regular clergy of the Roman Catholic Church; and to oblige the lower ranks of the clergy to register the places of their abode, and to remain in them without changing them; to prevent the increase of the Roman Catholic and the decrease of the Protestant population by the prohibition of conversions to the Roman Catholic faith, and of intermarriages between Protestants and Roman Catholics; and to prevent the possibility of Roman Catholics possessing horses of any use for military purposes, or arms, or the knowledge of the mode of manufacturing arms.

He appears to have considered the Roman Catholics in Ireland as a beaten army, the heads of which were to be sent out of the country; and the lower ranks to be disarmed; and it does not appear that he thought of applying civil disabilities to keep in order a party whose means consist principally in their numerical strength. Indeed the only civil disabilities found in his

Irish laws are those against Solicitors, which can be easily understood from the previous forfeitures, and renewed grants of the forfeited estates.

It was not till the following reign that the war of civil disabilities in Ireland commenced; which having been extended in the three reigns following that of King William, the system was at last relaxed in that of George III., first by the Act of 1772, to enable all descriptions of his Majesty's subjects to testify their allegiance to him, in which a new oath was enacted, and afterwards by the repeal of many of the disqualifying statutes in 1782, 1792, and 1793.

It is obvious then that everything has been tried; that neither legislative harshness on the one hand, nor concession on the other, has even to this day produced an alteration for the better, and that this Roman Catholic party remains, and has been throughout the period from the reign of King William, as formidable as in his time; and on the same principles and for the same reasons. Indeed it is in itself more formidable, inasmuch as the numbers of the Roman Catholic populace have increased much faster in comparison than the Protestant population; and the higher classes of the laity have become richer. And the absence of all restraint upon the theocracy co-operating with the liberal spirit of the times has made this class bolder, particularly lately; and they feel less scruple in approaching a breach of the laws made for their government.

From this statement I conclude that the laws imposing disabilities upon the Roman Catholics in Ireland have not answered their purpose. It is useless to enter into an enquiry to ascertain for what reason; as it is quite obvious that even if they can be maintained in the state in which they now are, (the doubts upon which question are the foundation of this paper, and the subject of discussion in its commencement), it is quite clear that in these times they cannot be made more efficient, and cannot be brought back even to the state in which they were left by King William.

Upon this state of things the friends of emancipation propose the repeal of every law which imposes a disability upon a Roman Catholic; and they tell us that the influence of the theocracy will thus be destroyed. To this system some would add an arrangement by law for the appointment of Roman

Catholic bishops, and for paying them and the whole of the Roman Catholic clergy by the State; and some invention respecting forty-shilling freeholders in Ireland.

It will be seen that I do not entertain a higher opinion of the effect produced by the existing disabilities upon the Roman Catholics than those have who entertain an opinion which I do not entertain, that the consequences of the repeal of the laws imposing those disabilities will be beneficial.

But I would maintain those laws if I had the power of doing so, because after these concessions will be made on the one hand, and the supposed securities given on the other (which securities it must be observed will go the length of giving to the Roman Catholic religion a legal establishment in Ireland), there will still remain behind many questions of difficulty and difference, even arising out of this arrangement, to be settled between the Protestant and Roman Catholic establishments.

The Roman Catholics in Ireland will continue to act upon all these questions under the guidance and direction of the theocracy; and I cannot think it expedient to concede everything, leaving behind important State questions to be settled as they can; or, considering the extent and nature of the power and influence exercised by the Roman Catholic clergy over the laity in Ireland, to admit Roman Catholics to situations of trust and power, and most particularly of such extent of power as is enjoyed by subjects in such situations under the British constitution, without knowing exactly in what relation the British government is to stand towards the Roman Catholic Church. In this I ask no more than is required by the Sovereign of every State in Christendom, whether professing the Roman Catholic or the Protestant faith; and I conceive that it is not consistent with the dignity of the Crown or with the security of these kingdoms, nor is it fair towards the Protestants, particularly in Ireland, to make any farther concession till an arrangement should be made, which should include every point of difference, and should provide security against foreign interference or Papal encroachment, at least as strong as those provided in any other kingdom in Europe dissenting from the Roman Catholic Church.

But there are some who consider the exclusion of the Roman Catholics from situations of trust and power, as principles of

the Protestant government established at the revolution. We must trace that exclusion farther back. It grew out of the Reformation, and the disputes and jealousies which were its consequence; and the consequence of the suspicions entertained of the Kings and Princes of the house of Stuart.

We shall find the laws imposing civil disabilities on Roman Catholics to be, either of the date of the Reformation, or of a date anterior to the Revolution; and to have been adopted as measures of security against the Crown and Royal Family of that day, or of a date, some subsequent to the Revolution, others even to the reign of King William, and to have been adopted in aid of those of his reign, to keep down the Roman Catholic party in Ireland; or to oppose the pretensions of the Princes of the House of Stuart, and the intrigues of their adherents.

The Roman Catholic religion was mixed up with the Revolution because King James was a Roman Catholic, because Roman Catholics were his instruments, and because it was suspected, and as it now appears justly suspected, that his design was to overturn the religion as well as the constitution of the country.

These facts and suspicions, the Irish Rebellion, the recollection of anterior circumstances, and charges against the House of Stuart, whether founded or otherwise, certainly connected in men's minds the establishment of the Revolution with the disabilities of the Roman Catholic subjects of the State. But a reference to the history of the times, and to the Irish statutes will show that in fact the laws imposing these disabilities were not enacted in that kingdom in the time of King William, or till some time after his death. Indeed it is very remarkable that while King William was hunting out the Roman Catholics in Ireland, disarming them, taking from them their horses, banishing the Roman Catholic hierarchy and regular clergy, and preventing the Roman Catholic Solicitors from practising, he tolerated the exercise of the Roman Catholic religion in Ireland by the inferior order of priests, and he allowed the Roman Catholics to retain possession of their estates with the right of voting, &c.

The measures of following reigns may have been the necessary consequence of the measures which King William adopted to put

down and keep down the rebellious party in Ireland; of the assumption of the title of King of England by the son of King James II., of the intrigues of the Roman Catholics of those days and afterwards, and of the rebellions in this island of the year 1715 and 1745. But it is quite obvious that they were neither the principle of the Revolution nor the measures of King William in Ireland; nor were they the principle nor the measures of the Revolution itself in this country.

However, whatever may have been the origin of these measures, we must all admit that they have failed in giving security to the public; that the moment of their repeal is probably approaching, and the question is what we shall have instead of them.

All the measures, whether proposed in Parliament or by the Roman Catholics themselves before the Lords' Committee, are deficient in this respect, viz., that they have no foundation on which they can stand.

The object of these propositions is to give the Roman Catholic religion not toleration only, but a legal establishment and provision within the King's dominions; and this by Act of Parliament. The laws against *provisoes* and communication with the See of Rome will at the same time remain as they are; and Parliament will be called upon to establish and regulate that by statute which those old established laws of the kingdom declare to be illegal.

But this is not the only absurdity attending these propositions. That which it is intended to regulate is that which is undoubtedly the power of the Pope, over whose actions Parliament can have no control. I say undoubtedly, because those thus explain the matter over whom the power is exercised. Let us see in what manner the nomination of bishops has been managed hitherto, which, in my view of the case, forms the whole question.

We were told in the Lords' Committee that upon a vacancy of a bishop, three candidates to fill the vacancy were named by election, either by the Chapter (and by whom the Chapter is composed does not appear), or by the parish priests of the diocese; and these names were presented to the Pope, who generally appointed to be the bishop the person whose name stood first upon the list. This mode of appointment, however,

has not been invariable. At times an aged or infirm bishop requiring a coadjutor has named the person to be appointed to that office, who having been appointed first coadjutor to that see by the Pope, has been afterwards invariably appointed its bishop upon the see becoming vacant.

During the time that any of the Princes of the House of Stuart lived, they named the persons to be appointed bishops in Ireland, who were appointed by the Pope upon their nomination. It appears then that there have been different modes of suggesting to the Pope the names of the persons to be appointed to these offices of bishop; and that one mode has been by the Pretenders to the crown of these kingdoms!

Is it possible, with these facts before their eyes, that Parliament can pretend to legislate upon the mode of election or of presentation to the Pope of the persons to be appointed Roman Catholic bishops?

Who can say that, after all the forms of election and presentation will have been carried into execution as prescribed by the law, either Charles X. or Ferdinand VII. may not nominate the person whom the Pope may appoint to be the bishop?

If it were certain that one of the persons elected by the Irish clergy would in every instance be appointed by the Pope to be the Roman Catholic bishop, that certainty would be but a very inadequate security to the Crown of the loyalty and fitness of the person appointed to such an office; and here it must be observed and recollected that the Irish Roman Catholics will not allow of any superintendence by the Crown over these elections.

But there is to be a *Regium Donum;* and the Crown may refuse to grant this bounty in any particular instance in which the government should not approve of the person appointed. That power of withholding the bounty does not give the Crown any security that the person appointed bishop by the Pope has been elected a candidate by the clergy of the diocese, however inadequate that security, and inconsistent the whole system with the dignity of the Crown of England. But I would ask the question: Does any man believe that if for any reason the Crown were to withhold the *Regium Donum* from any individual appointed by the Pope to be a Roman Catholic bishop, such person would not still be *the* bishop, and at least as well provided for as any other Roman Catholic bishop in the land?

It behoves the government then to take care that the person nominated is a proper person; because whether the *Regium Donum* is granted or not he will be a bishop and provided for; and if once the *Regium Donum* is granted, the Roman Catholics will not allow of its resumption by the Crown, excepting for canonical causes, of which the Roman Catholic hierarchy and the Pope are the sole and exclusive judges.

It is quite obvious then that none of these measures can answer the purpose of giving security to the Crown in respect to the persons to be appointed to the office, or indeed that Parliament can entertain them.

The difficulty in this most difficult question is much aggravated by the state of enmity towards the government in which the Roman Catholics in Ireland stand, and by their determination to prevent the Crown and Church Establishment from acquiring an additional security under the settlement. Any other sovereign excepting his Majesty, and his Majesty as King of Hanover, would upon approaching the Pope upon such a question as this have the full support of his Roman Catholic subjects in the discussion; each class of whom would be as anxious as the King's Protestant Ministers that the question should be settled in a manner honourable to the Crown, and beneficial to the public at large. But as referable to Ireland there are three parties to these questions: the King, the Pope, and the Roman Catholics in Ireland. Of these the last named are incomparably the most difficult to treat with. They will not hear of the interference of the Crown to put an end to Papal encroachment or its consequences: and it is obvious that their object is to prevent the exercise of any inspection or control by the Crown, in order that the country may continue under the government of the Roman Catholic theocracy. As long as the Roman Catholic religion exists in this or any other country out of the control of the crown, it remains a system of secresy and concealment, and therefore of danger. It has not been suffered thus to exist in any country in Europe, whether governed by a Roman Catholic or by a Protestant Sovereign; and we see from antecedent transactions in Ireland, from the existing state of society in that country, and from what has come out in evidence before the Committee of the Lords, that of all the countries in Europe Ireland is the one in which such a system should not be suffered to exist.

Whatever may be the opposition on the part of the Irish Roman Catholics, our view must be then to bring the Roman Catholic religion in that country under the control of the Crown; and in proportion as we shall be successful in attaining this object, will the arrangement be good, and the security of the Church of England in Ireland be confirmed. Our success in this object is not less necessary for the dignity of the Crown than it is for the security of the Church, and of the Constitution and government of the country.

It is obvious, however, that these questions cannot be so settled without an alteration of and a departure from the ancient policy of the country, from the period of the Reformation down to the present time. It must be observed that this policy was adopted in this country at the period at which the political divisions of Europe and the religious divisions were the same; and these distinctions existed till the French Revolution and its consequences annihilated Church property in nearly every part of Europe. The political distinctions attending difference of religion have since become but feeble. We see the Protestant Sovereigns of Europe possessing dominions in which the Roman Catholic religion is predominant; and each of them making arrangements with the Pope of the same description as the Concordats made by the Roman Catholic Sovereigns to define and regulate the spiritual authority of the Pope within their several dominions; and settling what the Roman Catholic Church shall be.

The consequence of these arrangements in every case is, that the sovereign authority becomes secure by the knowledge of and control over the transactions of the Roman Catholic Church; and the municipal law of the country can be put in operation in relation to the Roman Catholic Church and its establishments equally as upon any other establishment in the country.

There may be more difficulty in the arrangement of the details of such a question for this country or for Ireland than has been found in any other country in Europe, because the property of the Church is still entire, and the Church of England is Episcopal; and the dignities and offices which the Roman Catholic hierarchy now hold contrary to law, and by usurpation, and which they would be desirous of filling under the new arrangement, are already filled by clergymen of the

Church of England. It appears to me that the law could not recognise two bishops, one of the Church of England and one Roman Catholic of the same diocese. Such a system must end in the destruction of the Church of England in Ireland or wherever it may be established. But even if such a system could be established and recognised by the law, and that the law could define the authority of the dignitary of each of the Churches, there would still remain behind points of conflict, of which it is impossible to expect that advantage would not be taken to continue the dispute.

It appears to me then that what has been done in other States will not answer for this country. But still the object is so important, and the policy so clear, considering that we are suffering under the evil in its most aggravated shape, that I would recommend that we should turn our minds to a mode of settlement with the Pope somewhat different from that adopted by other Protestant States. My notion is, that the Roman Catholic establishment in Ireland should be *Missionary* rather than *National*. That the bishops, whose offices and duties are inseparable from any Roman Catholic establishment, should be Bishops *in Partibus* and *Vicars Apostolical* on mission in Ireland, instead of being bishops of diocese in Ireland.

That the Pope should name the persons to fill these offices from lists formed by election, and submitted to the inspection of the government; the government, if it should think proper, reducing the list to two names, of which the Pope to choose one.

That the number of the vicars and the extent of the mission of each shall be specified in the arrangement, as well as the nature and extent of his canonical jurisdiction, the nature of the appeal which should be national, and his salary, and the salaries of the priests of the several parishes included in the mission, and the dues to be received as well by the Vicar Apostolical as by the priests; and the nature and mode of communication between the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland and the Pope.

Having settled these measures at Rome, they should be recognised by Parliament, and the same Act should repeal every law imposing any disability upon a Roman Catholic.

There will certainly be great difficulty in arranging such a system at Rome, as it will tend in effect to destroy what is stated to be a National Church. In our view of the case, and

according to the law, that National Church is destroyed; and we cannot allow it to be re-established in any manner. We are willing to tolerate, to establish, and to regulate, and salary the Roman Catholic religion in Ireland, on a principle which will render it not inconsistent with the existence of the Church of England, and if either the authorities at Rome, or the Roman Catholics in Ireland, will not submit to the only arrangement to which we can agree, before much time will elapse it will be found that the good sense of the people of England will be roused, and they will not hear of any arrangement at all.

There is still one view of the case to be taken, and that is in the hypothesis that the authorities at Rome should agree to the missionary system, and the Roman Catholic Church of Ireland should not.

In this case I would recommend a perseverance in the plan proposed. Some ill temper might be shown, and temporary inconvenience might be felt. But if the authorities at Rome should persevere in appointing no bishops in Ireland excepting on the missionary system, and none were paid by the State excepting on that principle, the disputants would soon become very few in number; and in the end we should find the system act well.

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END OF VOL. II.

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